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Instrumentalism is a philosophy of science which holds that scientific theories are 
merely useful fictions for making computative predictions. Its pragmatic purpose 
of 'saving the appearances' downgrades the role of theory in science. Realists, on 
the other hand, take the implications of theories seriously. 
This study investigates the attributes of both instrumentalism and realism, taking 
theory as its point of departure. It is pointed out that constructivism is closely 
related to instrumentalism, both being forms of pragmatism. Since both tend to 
concoct and relinquish theories too easily, they tend to be relativist and subjectivist. 
It is therefore concluded that neither instrumentalism, nor constructivism, nor 
empiricism is sufficient for a rounded science education. What is needed is a type 
of realism which acknowledges both the empirical physical world 'out there' and the 
constructivist nature of scientific knowledge. The naive (empiricist) realism so 
prevalent in school science textbooks cannot do this. It is contended that critical 
realism, and especially that of Bernard Lonergan, can meet this requirement. 
Reality is more than what is given in sensory experience. Therefore, in order to help 
solve the problem of relativism and subjectivity inherent in constructivism, we need 
to revise our notion of reality and objectivity. 
Twenty-three selected British, American, South African, and African Third World 
high school physical science textbooks were examined in detail to determine the 
extent of an instrumentalist philosophy in them. They were subjected to several 
textual analyses, including one especially devised for this study. The results reveal 
that our high school physical science textbooks do indeed contain a high degree of 
instrumental ism. 
This study postulates that this instrumentalism may be used to help pupils move 
towards realism. However, this needs to be augmented by a full-blooded critical 
realist approach which takes theoretical entities seriously. One way of doing this is 
through the use of suitable material in the preface of every textbook. Not only should 
the dangers of instrumentalism (and naive constructivism) be pointed out, but the 
role of theory in science should be emphasised. This may be achieved by simulations 
to encourage growth of models and theories, historical case studies involving 
theory-development, and additional reading of scientists in action. Some examples 




''The roads by which men arrive at their insights into celestial matters I 
seem to me almost as worthy of wonder as those matters in themselves." ! 





INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM POSED 
1.1 Instrumentalism as a form of anti-realism 
No form of anti-realism can do justice to the scientific enterprise, for modern 
science is pre-eminently realist. Its chosen object of study is the real physical world, 
and it assumes that such a physical world exists independently of our knowledge of 
it. 
It is disconcerting to find, therefore, that instrumentalism is a particular kind of 
anti-realism (Hacking 1983, p.63), that instrumentalism is the prevailing view in 
science today (Popper 1956; Powers 1982), that school science has an instrumental-
ist leaning (Hodson 1989), and that our school science textbooks are becoming 
increasingly so (Selley 1989). Even more disquieting is the revelation that construc-
tivism, so popular and prevalent in current science education research literature, is 
closely related to instrumentalism (Pope and Keen 1981; Von Glasersfeld 1989). 
For both are rooted in pragmatism, a practical philosophy which is avowedly 
anti-realist (Dewey 1929), and of which Bertrand Russell (1946) wrote dramatically 
that pragmatism is a step "on the road towards a certain kind of madness". Pragmat-
ism can be traced back to Hegelian idealism, and is, to boot, relativist regarding the 
notion of truth. Therefore both instrumentalism and constructivism are relativist. 
Finally, constructivism involves both the creation of imaginative intellectual struc-
tures called theories, and the notion of choosing between competing theories, which 
seems to make it not only relativist, but also subjectivist! 
The bewildering feeling of being sucked into a vortex, and the consequent desire to 
find solid ground, resulted in this study, which focuses on a quest for reality. For it 
seems that the circular debate involving instrumentalism, constructivism, and anti-
realism, can be broken only by concentrating on the realism problem. Further, as 
this study began to move into the instrumentalism and constructivism areas, it 
became more and more clear that the debate centred on the role of theory in 
science.Thus it is important to clarify the meaning of theory, and its role in science. 
Once the role and status of theory are established, the true nature of science may 
begin to emerge. Also, the notion that scientific knowledge and scientific theories 
are intellectual constructs calls for some sort of validation. 
Bearing the above in mind, it is clearly important to probe the characteristics of 
instrumentalism and clarify its philosophical implications. If, indeed, it is anti-rea-
list and relativist, and if our school textbooks are instrumentalist, then a way has to 
be found as to how an instrumentalist approach can be used in science education 
without falling into either relativism or naive realism. 
A similar problem arises with constructivism. How do we avoid the apparently 
inexorable spiral into relativism and subjectivity? If constructivist psychology is 
accepted uncritically by teachers, where does it ultimately lead? The spectre of 
relativism is not, in my view, an attractive one. Nor is that of subjectivism. It is 
postulated in this dissertation that a constructivist approach in school science 
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textbooks may be a way of overcoming the shortcomings of the inductivist-empiri-
cism and instrumentalism contained in them.Yet, if constructivism is itself relativist 
and subjectivist, then what good would that achieve for school science educators? 
The whole question revolves around reality and our knowledge of reality. In-
strumentalists, heavily influenced by British empiricism, hold that "reality" and the 
"existing physical world" are identical. Reality is precisely what is directly observed. 
Instrumentalists would not, therefore, believe that theories are real. What, then, 
is the reality status of electrons and atoms? Instrumentalists refuse to acknowledge 
the reality of such theoretical entities. Electrons and atoms do not exist. They are 
simply fictions, only useful intellectual tools for solving problems. So instrumental-
ists are strongly anti-realist. 
Constructivists acknowledge the reality of invented intellectual structures (the-
ories). Electrons and photons, as well as dragons and phlogiston, are real, for 
children create imaginative theories in an attempt to make sense of their experi-
ence: they construct their own reality. Thus reality is not just what is "out there". It 
is much more, for it includes all one's explanations amd imaginings, all one's 
theoretical presuppositions and experiences. Theory is part ofreality. In this sense, 
constructivists are realists. 
Yet in another sense, they are anti-realists, at least to some degree. For construc-
tivism is a form of pragmatism. Children construct theories to enable them to cope 
with their environment. Electrons and dragons may be real, but do they exist? 
Theories, say constructivists, are not representations of reality; they are simply 
functional adaptations to help them 'get by' in life. Children simply choose the best 
theory they construct. They live in a world of theories, with little or no contact with 
an ontologically existing world. 
So, on the one hand, the instrumentalist seems to be anti-realist because, for him, 
there is no underlying reality behind the directly-observable world. Reality is 
appearance. Electrons do not exist. On the other hand, the constructivist, whose 
roots, like those of instrumentalists, lie in pragmatism, cannot escape from his world 
of theories. His form of anti-realism is more a type of unreality. 
No school science educator should, in my view, tolerate anti-realism in any form, 
for it is a self-destructive philosophy. Yet the fact is, it is prevalent in our contem-
porary science education and our school science textbooks. Therefore, it is very 
important to find a solution to the problems of relativism, subjectivism, and anti-re-
alism inherent in the instrumentalism/constructivism scenario. Hence the following 
discussion should be of great interest to those science educators who are inclined 
towards the constructivist psychology embedded in what Gilbert and Swift (1985) 
call the 'alternative conceptions movement'. 
An essentially realist stance seems to be the answer, but which realism fits all the 
requirements? We must acknowledge the practical success of empiricism and 
instrumentalism in science, and we cannot ignore the constructivist nature of 
scientific theories. It will be shown that the only type of realism which, in my view, 
ably reconciles the best in empiricism, instrumental ism, and constructivis11,is critical 
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realism. There is a growing conviction that critical realism is a way out of the 
philosophical impasse caused by naive realism (Bhaskar 1975; Selley 1981a; Hodson 
1985). My particular contribution to this discussion is, I believe, the fact that, not 
only have I endeavoured to promote the cause of critical realism, but also that I 
may also have introduced the reader to the critical realism of Bernard Lonergan. I 
hope to show that his brand of critical realism offers a viable solution to the problems 
raised above, especially those of subjectivity and objectivity. 
These philosophical problems form one of the three main questions which this 
dissertation sets out to address, and may be summarized as follows: what are the 
philosophical attributes of the instrumentalism/constructivism relationship which 
can guide us towards an answer to the problems of anti-realism, relativism, and 
subjectivism? 
1.2 Definition of terms 
Before proceeding further, the definition of several key terms is required in order 
to assist the reader who is not familiar with the technical language of philosophy. 
(a) Inductivism: This is a view of science which is based on inductive reasoning, 
that is, generalising from a number of particular observations. By observing the 
regularities in a number of phenomena, a universal rule or law is arrived at. For 
inductivists, science begins with observation, and by using a rigid experimental 
method, observations are made as objective as possible. The scientific knowledge 
obtained is therefore as free from personal prejudice as possible. Scientific knowl-
edge obtained in this way is seen as completely reliable and objective. It is regarded 
as proven knowledge and absolutely true. 
(b) Empiricism: This is a theory of knowledge which is based on the common-sense 
view that all our knowledge about the physical world comes through our five senses. 
Sensory experience is the only source of our knowledge. Therefore, we can never 
have any knowledge of any entity which is incapable of being observed. It is closely 
related to inductivism in that both hold that science begins with objective sensory 
observations. 
(c) Positivism: This is a tough-minded extension of the empiricist view that we 
cannot know that which we cannot observe. Therefore, any statement which cannot 
he strictly empirically verified would be regarded as being meaningless, and must 
be ruthlessly excised from science. This approach would not only eliminate meta-
physics from science, but would provide the simplest and most economical way of 
coordinating the facts of experience. 
(d) Instrumentalism: This is an approach to science which follows from positivism. 
Because certain theoretical entities in science are not directly observable by the 
senses ( for example, electrical resistance), they can be defined in terms of the 
operations used to measure them. This results in an instrumentalist approach, 
which is essentially interested only in computative predictions, and not whether the 
theoretical entity exists or not, that is, in questions of realism. Note that instrumen-
tal ism is a broad concept involving inductivism, empiricism and positivism. 
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( e) Phenomenalism: The phenomenon is that which appears directly to the senses. 
Only the outer appearance of an object presents itself to the senses. Any deeper 
reality which may or may not exist "behind the appearances" remains hidden to 
sensory observation. Since an empiricist would maintain that what cannot be 
observed does not exist, he would contend that only phenomena can be observed 
by the senses. Phenomenalism is therefore a direct consequence of empiricism. An 
empiricist would hold that only the phenomenon exists, and that there is no reality 
"behind" what appears to the senses. However, both the positivist and the in-
strumentalist would say that they are interested only in phenomena, and not in 
questions of realism. Phenomenalism is thus opposed to realism. Note that empi-
ricists, positivists and instrumentalists are all phenomenalists. 
(f) Realism: This has many meanings, only two of which will be referred to now. 
The naive realist believes that an external reality exists apart from himself, and that 
knowledge of this reality comes through his senses. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, there is no difference between a naive realist and an empiricist. We 
must be careful to distinguish between the existing world (ontology) and our 
knowledge of it ( epistemology). The naive realist ( empiricist) holds that reality is 
what he directly observes. He identifies reality with the independently existing 
object. The critical realist, like the naive realist, holds that a real world exists 
independently of his knowing it, but that he somehow actively has a part in con-
structing reality. For the critical realist, reality is not only that which is given from 
without by the senses, but the Gestalt of sensory experience, understanding and 
judgement. He does not identify reality with the existing object. 
(g) Constructivism: In order to make sense of his experience, the knowing subject 
interprets his experience in terms of his previous knowledge. He actively constructs 
his reality. He builds up conceptual schemes or theoretical structures to explain 
reality. 
(h) Idealism: This is the view that the world exists only in the mind. Mind is the 
primary and only reality. Matter cannot exist apart from the mind. 
(i) Relativism: This is the doctrine that knowledge is of relations only. There is no 
absolute criterion of truth. Truth is what is agreed upon. Truth is pragmatic. The 
relativist says that it is possible only to assess one theory relative to another. It 
cannot be firmly grounded on an empirical base, because all observation is 
prejudiced in some way. As Petrie (1981, p.34) points out, this is a typically Hegelian 
idealist position, namely, that the theory is best which most accords with the freedom 
and spontaneity of the human mind. 
(j) Subjectivism: This is the philosophical theory that all knowledge proceeds from, 
and takes place within, the thinking subject. It is associated with relativism. Sub-
jectivists hold that knowledge is only a personal construct, and that there is no 
independent standard of theory evaluation, because observation is influenced by 
prior theory. They are opposed to the ohjectivist view of testing theories by 
observation (Martin 1972, p.116), because objectivists emphasise the passivity of 
the mind as the test of objectivity (Lindsay 1959, p.xv). 
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1.3 Instrumentalism is the prevailing view in science today 
The instrumentalist approach is still the prevailing view in virtually all contemporary 
science. Indeed, as Powers (1982, p.1) notes, 
"the revolution in modern physics has been hailed as a triumph for the 
'no-nonsense' philosophical approach of 'positivism' and 'operational-
ism'", 
that is, instrumentalism. Instrumentalist philosophy follows from a strict adherence 
to positivism, which in turn is a rigid form of empiricism. 
Hacking ( 1983, p.24 ), referring to positivists and their rejection of theoretical 
entities, says: ''This kind of anti-realism is in full spate today." 
According to Popper (1956, p.360), 
"the instrumentalist view ... has become an accepted dogma" in contem-
porary physical science, and in fact "has become part of the current 
teaching of physics". 
1.4 Instrumentalism in school science textbooks 
Many researchers in science education have recently pointed out that contemporary 
school science is still permeated by an empiricist philosophy ( eg Cawthron and 
Rowell 1978; Factor and Kooser 1981; Driver 1983). This empiricism is usually 
associated with an inductivist approach. The question is: Is an instrumentalist view 
also present in school science? 
Cawthron and Rowell ( 1978, p.31) suggest that one way of investigating whether a 
philosophy such as instrumentalism is present in school science is to analyse the 
contents of the most widely-used textbooks in school science courses. No matter 
how objective a science textbook purports to be, it contains explicit or tacit asser-
tions which reflect a particular philosophy of science. Although it is recognised that 
the contents of textbooks represent the beliefs of their authors, nevertheless they 
must also heavily reflect the views of the practising school science community who 
give the texts their popularity in the first place, and who presumably then become 
influenced by them. 
The literature on the subject suggests that current school science textbooks portray 
a philosophical stance which is empiricist. Such a standpoint is revealed by its 
emphasis on the objectivity of scientific inquiry, and its view that scientific knowl-
edge provides absolute truth. Cawthron and Rowell ( 1978, p.32) state that 
"a scrutiny of school science texts almost invariably reveals an implicit 
epistemological preoccupation with the existence of 'objective' reality." 
They state further that such textbooks 
"project an image of science which can be called empiricist-inductivist." 
( Cawthron and Rowell 1978, p.33) 
In another paper, Rowell and Cawthron (1982, p.93) state that 
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"our texts portray science as some inexorable linear pursuit of truth." 
In a careful reading of nearly all the introductory first-year non-major chemistry and 
physics textbooks in use in the United States during the 1979-1980 academic year, 
Factor and Kooser (1981, p.28) point out that, 
"as with the science and society texts, the narrow inductivism and 
empiricism of the 19th century, particularly that of John Stuart Mill, 
plays a formative role in the image of science in skills and drills texts." 
According to this empiricist or positivist view, scientific knowledge purports to be 
authoritative, objective, and superior to other forms of knowledge, because scien-
tific method is deemed to be unbiassed and completely reliable. As Bentley, 
Ellington and Stewart (1985, p.664) point out, 
"such an image of science seems to be promoted in textbooks and by the 
use of heuristic methods in science classes". 
The inductivist-empiricist view is strongly present in textbooks advocating the 
heuristic method of science education. Discovery by activity, as proposed generally 
by Dewey, and more specifically in science education by Armstrong, and more 
recently in Science -A Process Approach and Nuffield 0-Level Physics, emphasises 
the role of observation and induction. Driver (1983, p.48) criticises inductivism, in 
that it 
"suggests that there is one unique interpretation of the data." 
However, as Piaget and other constructivists, including Driver, have shown, obser-
vation is in fact theory-laden, and children can and do form multiple explanations 
for events, each of which accounts for the data in a particular way. Driver (1981, 
p.99), in a discussion of pupils' alternative frameworks in science, notes that, in spite 
of many voices being raised to show the limitations of empiricism, 
"rational empiricism is still the view of science which predominates in 
our classrooms". 
The philosophy of science which a teacher consciously or unconsciously holds, or 
which a textbook tacitly or explicitly portrays, must inevitably affect the type of 
teaching provided and the type of learning which results. Pope and Gilbert (1983b, 
p.249) postulate that some teachers may take an empiricist-inductivist view of 
knowledge, and others a constructivist view. They say: 
"Within the various theories on the nature of knowledge put forward by 
philosophers, there are two polar positions: the '(naive) realist' and the 
'constructivist' viewpoints. In the (naive) realist's view, reality is a stable 
arrangement of subdivisions of objective facts .... It is expected that, as 
all disciplined enquirers are presumed to see phenomena in an identical 
manner, the confirmation of these facts will be a cumulative process. In 
the 'constructivist' view, reality is personally negotiated so that each 
enquirer will perceive a different world. The differences in perception 
will depend on the range of preconceptions brought to bear in the 
enquiry." 
6 
The teacher or textbook taking a naive realist stance will tend to emphasise the 
transmission of information, rules or values which have been collected in the past. 
The learner can acquire absolute truth by a process of iterative accumulation. This 
is the inductivist-empiricist model. In contrast, a teacher or textbook which en-
courages imaginative theory construction within the framework of the scientific 
community, helps the pupil to make sense of the natural world by engaging in 
interpreting experiences and so actively constructing his reality. This is the con-
structivist model. 
Selley (1989, p.29) believes that, since 1980, there has been a return to a non-par-
ticipatory transmission style in high school science textbooks. Authors are again 
implying that the information and explanations in the texts are simply the truth. He 
says that it is tempting to interpret this confident, assertive style as being due to the 
author's naive realist metaphysics. However, it is possible to read into school 
science a very different interpretation, namely instrumentalism. Selley believes 
that this instrumentalism could be developed into a philosophical view (that is, 
critical realism) which would solve many of the old inductivist problems. 
Hodson (1989, p.57) maintains that misconceptions about the nature of science and 
scientific method are entrenched and perpetuated in textbooks. He says elsewhere 
(Hodson 1986c, p.219) that it is quite common in school science to have a realist 
theory (for explanation) and an instrumentalist model (for prediction) for the same 
phenomenon. Also, he contends that, because of the low esteem for theory ( a 
characteristic of instrumentalism) in such science courses (and by implication, in 
textbooks), different, conflicting models for the same phenomenon (for example, 
wave-particle duality) cause confusion in pupils. We should, he says, try to avoid an 
excessively instrumentalist view without falling "into the trap of naive realism". 
Thomas Kuhn (1970, p.136) observes that textbooks 
"address themselves to an already articulated body of problems, data, 
and theory ... " 
That is, they tend to be seen as bodies of accumulated knowledge. This may often 
reinforce an empiricist view in the reader. However, the emphasis in most textbooks 
on problem-solving tasks may also strengthen an instrumentalist view in the stu-
dent. The increasing reliance on textbooks, says Kuhn, accompanies the emergence 
of a first paradigm in any field of science. Furthermore, reliance on textbooks is 
becoming increasingly evident especially in Third World countries, where the 
teacher often has little, if any, formal training in science. Thus in many areas the 
textbook is fast becoming the only ,,ehicle for transmitting an image of science. As 
Kuhn (1970, p.143) says: 
"More than any other single aspect of science, that pedagogic form 
(namely, the textbook) has determined our image of the nature of 
. " science ... 
It is therefore important not only to determine whether high school science tex-
tbooks are empiricist, but also whether they are instrumentalist. 
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Hence the second main aim of this study is to establish whether science textbooks, 
especially those in current use in South Africa, actually are instrumentalist, as 
suggested by the literature. Because instrumentalism is a form of empiricism, 
evidence of the latter will also be sought in textbooks. The presence of empiricism 
and instrumentalism may be found by determining the nature of science portrayed 
in a number of selected British, American and South African high school physical 
science textbooks widely used in schools today. On the basis of the above literature, 
as well as my acquaintance with some school texts, the hypothesis is put forward 
that high school physical science textbooks in current use portray an empiricist-
inductivist and an instrumentalist image of science. This will be tested by various 
empirical textual analyses, as well as by direct reading, of a sample of high school 
science textbooks. 
1.5 Out-dated view of the nature of science 
The third aim of this study is as follows: to achieve a more correct view of the nature 
of science and scientific method. It is postulated that this may be done by revealing 
the philosophical weaknesses and strengths of both instrumentalism and construc-
tivism, and by promoting the adoption of critical realism in science education. 
According to Hodson (1986c, p.222), the failure of modern science courses to 
achieve fully some of their declared goals in relation to children's understanding of 
the nature of science is due, in part, to a degree of confusion in the philosophical 
position underpinning many contemporary curricula and, in part, to the continuing 
failure to provide teachers with an adequate understanding of basic issues in the 
philosophy of science and their importance in the design of learning experiences. 
In many current science curricula, there is too much emphasis on inductive methods, 
a too ready acceptance of an instrumentalist view of scientific theory, a serious 
underestimation of the complex relationship between observation and theory, and 
a neglect of the activities of the scientific community in validating and disseminat-
ing scientific knowledge. 
Textbooks tend to encapsulate and perpetuate out-dated views of the nature of 
science and scientific method. Most science teachers (and the majority of science 
textbook authors are teachers) would appear to be at least thirty years behind 
current thinking in the philosophy of science. They pass on this out-dated and 
incorrect view to their pupils, who then become the scientists and teachers of the 
next generation. 
For example, one prevalent myth in science textbooks is that all science results from 
experimentation. This is an out-moded empiricist notion, which, according to 
contemporary philosophy of science, is blatantly false. Another even more damag-
ing myth preserved in textbooks is the notion that observation and experiment 
provide objective, reliable data. This is especially so in books promoting the 
discovery learning approach. Textbooks, says Hodson (1989, p.57), help to sustain 
the myth that the path of science is certain, clear-cut, and linear. The way practical 
work is presented in textbooks is a prime source of misconceptions about the nature 
of science. No clear distinction is drawn between the role of experiments in 
teaching, and their role in scientific practice. In schools, the majority of experiments 
usually have the pedagogic role of illustrating a particular theory, whereas in 
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science the purpose is to assist the development of theory. The textbook approach 
( especially in discovery or process approaches) of pretending that experiments are 
open inquiries all too often gives a distorted view of experiments and scientific 
methodology. The continuation of this kind of stage-managed science present in 
textbooks should be re-examined with utmost care. 
Selley (1981) agrees that pupils see the inquiry method, or discovery method, or 
process science, as a kind of 'stage-managed heurism'. One of the major misconcep-
tions behind this method is that pupils may come to believe that the path from 
experiment to theory is fixed, and that there is no room for creative thinking. 
Referring to the original Nuffield Chemistry (1966), Selley finds the philosophical 
stance of the investigations "falsificationist, or even positivist". The impression is 
given that the results of the experiments provide good reasons for belief in the 
theory. However, in no sense are the experiments 'tests' of the theories. Hence the 
original Nuffield scheme could give pupils misleading impressions. They could end 
up by thinking that theories can be refuted by a single experiment, or that theories 
are directly derived from experiments. 
As for the role of theories and models, Selley ( 1981 b) says that the Nuffield 
Handbook for Teachers (1967) makes no provision for questions which prompt 
pupils to explore the explanatory power of models in new situations, or to speculate 
on the limits of models. In spite of the many beneficial advances of a Nuffield-type 
course, a serious weakness is that models are presented as 'given'. Pupils are not 
invited to comment on their validity, nor to suggest changes to them. While it is 
accepted (says Selley) that a published course is a resource, rather than a directive, 
the pupil's handbook would be more effective in stimulating discussion or thought 
about the nature of scientific theories and models if it contained some definite 
questions at appropriate points, or perhaps a short chapter setting out the basic 
issues. Teachers may welcome some advice on ways of turning alternative models 
to advantage. For the use of models in science education raises an important 
question about the relationship between scientific theories and the real world. 
The point is that out-moded views about scientific method and the nature of science 
are still being perpetuated in school science textbooks, even in those which promote 
inquiry and process methods. Millar and Driver (1987) hold that process science 
reflects an inadequate appreciation of the nature of science. 'Process' is often seen 
as active and constructivist, and 'content' as passive and empiricist. However, 
process should not be opposed to content, for content-learning also involves per-
sonal knowledge construction. All the processes ( observing, classifying, hypothe-
sising), as well as the cognitive processes of content-learning, are theory-laden. 
Hodson ( 1989, p.65) sums it up: 
"As far as learning about science is concerned, it is imperative that the 
traditional inductivist notion that experiments are the open-eyed and 
open-minded confrontations of nature as a means of acquiring objec-
tive, value-free and certain knowledge of the world, be discarded. The 
simplistic interpretation of the Popperian notion that experiments pro-
vide crucial tests of a theory's empirical adequacy must also be replaced 
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by a more multifunctional view of experiments and a more sophisticated 
view of the relationships between observation, theory and experiment. 
As far as learning science is concerned it seems that there is a strong 
case for constructing a curriculum along Kuhnian lines. Conceptual 
development in individuals can be described in terms similar to those 
employed by Kuhn to describe conceptual change in scientific com-
munities (scientific revolutions)." 
This is a plea for a better appreciation of the role of theory in science. A study of 
the way instrumentalists regard theory, as well as contemporary views on the role 
of theory, can lead to a better perspective of the nature of science. 
Unfortunately, most science teachers are still of the cultural transmission type. 
According to Pope and Keen (1981), proponents of this type of education see the 
primary task of the educator as the transmission of information, rules or values 
collected in the past. Knowledge is internalised by children through explicit instruc-
tion. The criterion of successful education is accepted as being the ability of the 
student to incorporate what he has been taught and to respond to the demands of 
the system. The major objectives are literacy and mathematical skills necessary for 
integration into a technological society. Textbooks are used by the cultural trans-
mission teacher as the main vehicle for imparting knowlege. 
The philosophical approach underlying this approach is that of naive realism or 
empiricism. Empiricism, such as that of Locke, assumes that the mind is a tabula 
rasa, and that the intellect is essentially passive. Knowledge is acquired through the 
impact of the senses. The world we perceive is not the world that we have recreated 
but the world as it is. The Lockean ( empiricist) tradition is central to educational 
theories which stress the passivity of man's mind. It holds that absolute truth can 
be attained by the bit-by-bit accumulation of individual subjects. Knowledge is 
repetitive and objective, and can be measured by suitable test procedures. The view 
of linear accretion of absolute truth corresponds to the basic principles of naive 
philosophic realism. In the naive realist's view, the world exists independently of 
man and is controlled by its own laws. 
Although it is still widespread in science education, the empiricist philosophy on 
which it is based was rejected decades ago. Indeed, seventy years ago, John Dewey 
opposed this cultural transmission theory of education, and founded the Progessive 
School movement. Progressivism holds that education should encourage the per-
son's natural interaction with society and environment. The pedagogical environ-
ment should actively stimulate development through the presentation of a milieu 
in which the organising and developing force in the person's experience is the 
person's active thinking. Thinking is stimulated by cognitive conflict. Like the 
cultural transmission theorists, progressivists emphasise knowledge as opposed to 
feelings and experience, but they see the acquisition of knowledge as an act of 
change in the pattern of thinking brought about by experiential problem-solving 
situations. 
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Dewey maintained that learning should be directly related to the interests of the 
person; motivation should come from within rather than that knowledge be im-
posed upon him. The teacher is seen more as a guide or adviser in a process in which 
the person reconstructs the subject matter in accordance with its perceived relev-
ance to his own life. Learning should take place through problem solving and 
grappling with the subject matter. The child learns by doing. This involves the 
critical thinking process of reconstruction of previous ideas. The teaching method 
which best assists this is student-student and student-teacher interaction. 
The particular philosophy aligned with Progressivism is that of Pragmatism. Dewey 
called his philosophy 'pragmatic experimentalism' or 'instrumentalism'. Pragmat-
ism is mainly a twentieth century philosphy which has grown out of the British 
empiricist tradition, which maintains that we know only what our senses experience. 
Pragmatism holds that reality is the interaction of the human being with his 
environment; it is the sum total of what we experience. For Dewey, this reality is 
phenomenal only. There is nothing behind appearance. Man reaches out to make 
sense of his universe by engaging in the reconstruction and interpretation of his own 
experiences. Ideas are tentative, instrumental plans of action designed to achieve 
human ends. 
In this sense, Dewey has much in common with constructivists. Piaget claims that 
thought emerges by means of an active re-organisation of psychological structures 
resulting from organism-environment interactions. Cognitions are organised 
wholes attained by the active processes of accommodation and assimilation. For 
Piaget, the teacher's role is to facilitate development by exposure to higher levels 
of thought and conflict requiring active application of current thoughts to proble-
matic situations. 
According to Pope and Keen ( 1981 ), the 'activity' methods of the Progressivists have 
had a big impact on modern education, especially in the United States. Tasks are 
set in a series of assignments and projects. Team-teaching is often used. The 'inquiry 
method' has probably had a more lasting influence on the educational procedure in 
England than the efforts of the Romanticists. Whereas the latter allowed each pupil 
to learn what he wanted to learn when he wanted to learn it, the Progressivism of 
Dewey is much more pragmatic: while allowing for active participation in the 
acquisition of knowledge and some choice of subject, the choice is not necessarily 
completely free. Further, the Progressivists' notion of active learning received 
much support from the psychological research of Piaget, Bruner and Ausubel. 
Today in our schools (say Pope and Keen) there is a growing trend towards the 
acceptance of many of the principles of Dewey-type Progressivism. 
In my opinion, neither the cultural transmission nor the progressivist theories of 
education have the full solution, for both are ultimately based on empiricism. 
Although Dewey's method is a great improvement on the transmission approach, 
both, in their own way, tend to perpetuate an out-moded view of the nature of 
science and scientific method. What is needed is a balancing factor. Contemporary 
philosophy of science has supplied this in the form of Critical Realism (Bhaskar 
1989; Selley 1981a; Hodson 1982). 
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1.6 Point of departure and summing up 
One can attack the problem of an out-dated view of scientific method and the nature 
of science from several angles. It could be approached by a direct discussion (along 
Popperian lines) of the errors of traditional Baconian scientific method. Another 
approach might take a Kuhnian sociological slant and examine actual scientific 
practice. The point of departure chosen in this study is a discussion of the realist/in-
strumentalist debate as seen by contemporary philosophers of science. This debate 
centres on the role of scientific theories and models. 
Scientific theories are our intellectual constructions about the nature of the physical 
world. There are at least two ways of relating scientific theories and the world: the 
first is called realism, and the second instrumentalism. 
A realist believes that theories attempt to describe what the natural world is actually 
like. For the realist, the world exists independently of our minds. In order to make 
sense of what we observe, we build theories about our observations. Theories 
provide coherence and structure. By placing individual observations in a context, 
they make the natural world intelligible. They explain. The realist takes his 
explanations (theories) seriously, and holds scientific theories in high regard. 
Scientific theories, says the realist, do tell us something informative about the world, 
for the realist believes that the theoretical entities, such as electrons and photons 
and fields, which he postulates in order to explain his observations, really do exist. 
For example, the realist holds that the kinetic theory of gases claims that "gases really 
are made up of molecules in random motion". ( Chalmers 1986, p.146) 
On the other hand, an instrumentalist holds that scientific theories do not actually 
describe the physical world, but simply relate sets of observations. For the in-
strumentalist, the kinetic theory of gases is a mere convenient fiction enabling 
scientists to relate and make predictions about the observable properties of gases 
in order to make use of them in a variety of ways. Theories are only useful devices 
for prediction. They need not be taken seriously. It does not matter whether 
molecules exist or not, just as long as they yield correct predictions. 
Because instrumentalism is difficult to define, perhaps a concrete example will help 
clarify its meaning. Consider a pupil performing an experiment to verify Newton's 
Second Law of motion. He is using a stretched elastic to exert a constant force on 
a trolley in order to see how it affects the trolley's acceleration. As a realist, the 
pupil would observe that the force of the elastic accelerates the trolley. He would 
be quite happy to say that 'the force given by the elastic causes the trolley to 
accelerate'. 
If, however, he were to adopt an instrumentalist interpretation of his experiment, 
he would be far more restricted. He would adopt a strict empiricist approach, which 
holds that only what can be empirically observed can be taken as true scientific 
knowledge. He would say that his observation of a constantly extended elastic was 
always associated with an acceleration. He would make no mention of 'force', 
because he did not strictly empirically observe a force. Nor does he say that 'the 
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stretched elastic causes the acceleration', but rather that 'whenever the elastic is 
stretched, an acceleration occurs'. As an instrumentalist, he is committed to record 
only what he observes. To introduce concepts like 'force' or 'cause' is to go beyond 
the facts. He refuses to introduce speculative ideas, fearing that such concepts are 
metaphysical and therefore not the business of science. Science must confine itself 
to the the empirical facts only. Therefore, he is interested only in saying that, 
whenever one phenomenon occurs (ie stretched elastic), the other also occurs (ie 
acceleration). He simply relates variables, and is not interested in seeking expla-
natory causes. Indeed, his generalisation that the 'stretched elastics always make 
trolleys accelerate' is accepted only because it can be used to predict the motion of 
other bodies, not because it has expanded our knowledge for its own sake. Our pupil 
would regard the result of his experiment as true, not because Newton's theory 
agrees with his observations, but because his calculative predictions actually work. 
He treats force as if it has a real existence, but actually regards it only as a useful 
fiction. He is essentially a pragmatist, not a realist. 
Instrumentalism, then, is an approach to scientific inquiry which avoids questions 
about the real nature of the universe, and is solely interested in whether its practical 
purpose of computative predictions works or not. The instrumentalist scientist 
regards questions of realism as metaphysical, and therefore invalid from an empiri-
cal point of view. The instrumentalist is anti-realist. For this reason, theories do not 
have an explanatory role. Indeed, the instrumentalist shies away from explanation, 
holding that explanation also goes too far beyond empirical facts. The status of 
theory is down-graded. 
Thus, the significance of theoretical ideas is held in low esteem by instrumentalists. 
The naive instrumentalist scientist will refuse to admit, for example, that electrons 
and photons are real: they are simply very useful theoretical ideas. The very unity 
of scientific knowledge is thereby weakened, because our unifying concepts are 
splintered by trying to anchor their meaning in 'actions' rather than 'reality'. This 
is indeed a paradox: that the same method which made scientific knowledge so great, 
should also lead to an anti-realist position which is only interested in utilitarian 
considerations. 
Therefore an important spin-off of an analysis of the relationship between in-
strumentalism and scientific theory will be a more correct notion of the nature of 
science and scientific method. Such an investigation should serve very usefully to 
bring out all the various facets of the problems surrounding constructivism, the 
contemporary views about the role of theory and the nature and methods of science. 
For all these are inter-linked. Thus, in the end, it is hoped that a detailed discussion 
of instrumental ism will throw light upon some far wider questions. 
1.7 Outline of this Study 
This dissertation therefore sets out to examine the following questions: 
( 1) What is instrumental ism? Is it pragmatic and hence relativist? How can these 
pitfalls be circumvented? Is a constructivist approach a way of doing this? 
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(2) Is constructivism well-founded philosophically and psychologically? Is it also 
pragmatic and relativist? How does it guarantee objectivity? Does objectivity lie 
in conceptual structures as suggested by Piaget? How does Piaget's constructivism 
compare with Dewey's instrumentalism? What does it mean to say that 'reality is 
constructed' as opposed to the 'givenness' of reality? 
(3) Of the various types of realism, which is the best option? What is wrong with 
the naive realism of empiricism? Does Thomistic ( classical) realism apply? Why 
does instrumentalism, as a form of pragmatism, reject reality altogether? What is 
critical realism? Which form of critical realism offers the best choice? 
( 4) Are our textbooks indeed instrumentalist? If so, in what way? Is the instrumen-
talism in school textbooks strong or weak? What empirical methods may be used 
to detect instrumentalism in school science textbooks? 
(5) Armed with the answers to these questions, how does this affect science 
education? In particular, how can textbooks incorporate this critical realism? What 
practical strategies can be employed to try to use the instrumentalism present in 
textbooks to create a constructivist attitude? 
It should be noted that critical realism actually emerged during this study as a 
possible way of solving the problems of (a) anti-realism in instrumentalism; (b) 
relativity and subjectivity in constructivism; ( c) misconceptions about the nature of 
science and scientific method among both teachers and pupils. 
The investigation will take place in two distinct but related phases: (i) exploration 
of the philosophies behind instrumentalism and constructivism, in an attempt to 
find a type of realism which would unify the different ways these regard the role of 
scientific theory; (ii) a detailed survey of school science textbooks to see if they are 
indeed inductivist-empiricist and instrumentalist, followed by some practical sug-
gestions for textbook authors to overcome the philosophical weaknesses inherent 
in this. 
In Chapter 2 it will be shown that instrumentalism is a form of empiricism and 
positivism, and that it is an anti-realist approach to science. The philosophical 
characteristics of the phenomenalism of instrumentalism will be discussed. It will 
be contended that a constructivist approach can off-set this tendency towards 
anti-realism. The pragmatism of both instrumentalism and constructivism threa-
tens to destroy the unity of scientific knowledge and lead to anti-realism, but the 
emphasis constructivism places on theory gives the latter a stronger role. The 
contemporary constructivist notion of competition between rival theories will be 
examined. 
Chapter 3 will explore the philosophical basis of constructivism. It will try to show 
that the conceptual structures of Piagetian constructivism have a more secure 
foundation than the interactional functionalism of Dewey's. It will be postulated 
that a full-blooded realism which incorporates a constructivist element as well as a 
sound empirical base is a better option than the weak realism of instrumentalism. 
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The critical realism of Bernard Lonergan will be put forward as the type of realism 
required to meet the requirements of the objectivity of scientific theories. 
In Chapter 4 the question of instrumentalism in high school physical science 
textbooks will be discussed. The methodology of the empirical study will be 
described. This entails methods of text analyses, based on those of previous re-
searchers, as well as a direct, critical reading of the textbooks, to find the degree of 
instrumentalism present in them. 
The results of the various text analyses and preface and metaphor analyses are given 
in Chapter 5. In order to support the quantitative results, many additional quota-
tions and examples of instrumentalism in school science textbooks are provided. 
This chapter concludes that the school textbooks studied do indeed portray an 
instrumentalist approach to science. Further, there seems to be a trend towards 
instrumentalism, both in British and South African school science textbooks, espe-
cially those orientated towards educationally disadvantaged pupils. 
Chapter 6 concludes that textbooks, of their very nature, cannot do otherwise than 
present a strong instrumentalist image. Therefore it is very important for teachers 
to be aware of the shortcomings, not only of instrumentalism, but also of construc-
tivism. Ignorance about these stems largely from an out-dated notion of the nature 
of science and scientific method. For this reason, it is recommended that every 
school science textbook should contain a preface, or short chapter, or appendix, in 
which both the out-moded and the accepted contemporary nature of science is 
given. In addition, several exercises and historical cases studies are provided as 
guidelines to textbook authors, in order to encourage a more critical realist ap-




INSTRUMENTALISM: ITS ORIGINS AND CHARACTERISTICS 
2.1 Introduction 
Scientific knowledge differs from other human knowledge in the great emphasis it 
places on theory. Science has built up a great body of conceptual networks and 
structural schemes to help explain the relationships between facts. Because theories 
are social possessions, and because they are deliberately subjected to very severe 
empirical tests in an effort to refute them, scientific theories are so well corrobor-
ated that they themselves take on the form of tentative facts. To a very large extent, 
theoretical entities, such as forces and fields, electrons and energy levels, have 
become the objects of much of scientific inquiry. So the objects of scientific inquiry 
are of a very special sort: intellectually constructed objects. 
Scientists can regard theory in one of two ways. They can see it as an organising 
structure with explanatory and predictive power, or they can use it as a convenient 
device for prediction only, rejecting any explanation of reality. The former approach 
is taken by the realist, the latter by the instrumentalist. 
The chief aim of this chapter will be to show that instrumentalism is a form of 
anti-realism, and has several important philosophical weaknesses. A secondary aim 
is to investigate whether constructivist educational psychology may be used to off-set 
these instrumentalist weaknesses. 
The differences between realism and intrumentalism and their attitudes to the role 
of theory in science, will be explored. The origin of instrumentalism in the history 
of science and its attempt to "save the appearances" without getting involved in 
metaphysical speculations about a possible underlying reality will be examined. 
From this historical treatment, the characteristics of instrumentalism will be ela-
borated, as well as its philosophical implications. A critique of instrumentalism, 
based mainly on that of Popper, will be given. 
Finally, it will he contended that the philosophical drawbacks of instrumentalism 
may he remedied by a constructivist approach, and the relationship between in-
strumental ism and constructivism will be discussed. Both instrumentalism and 
constructivism are rooted in pragmatism, and so share its weaknesses of arbitrari-
ness, relativism and subjectivism. It will be shown that only a critical constructivist 
approach can lead to full-blooded realism. 
2.2 What is instrumentalism? 
Instrumentalism is a way of going about scientific inquiry which is more concerned 
with relating observations, usually in a mathematical and operational way, and 
heing able to make accurate predictions from them, than with the real existence of 
the entity under study. 
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Because it ignores questions about reality, instrumentalism tends to be superficial 
and pragmatic. It is a useful way of saving the appearances without getting involved 
in explanatory speculations which, it holds, go beyond the facts. For instrumental-
ism is rooted in the empiricist tradition which accepts only sensory experience as 
the source of valid knowledge. It rejects realism for two reasons: firstly, realists go 
beyond the facts when they try to explain phenomena; secondly, whether or not 
there is indeed an underlying reality behind phenomena, science works very suc-
cessfully when treated instrumentally. The postulating of a supposed reality under-
lying appearance is a superfluous hypothesis. 
Realist scientists are interested in whether their theories are true or false, that is, 
whether there is some sort of correspondence between their theories and the natural 
world. Instrumentalist scientists are not particularly interested in whether their 
theories are true or not. They are mainly interested in whether they work or not. 
Their aims are pragmatic. 
Instrumentalist scientists pursue their activity by emphasising (a) operational de-
finitions; (b) rules and calculative predictions; ( c) theories as useful fictions. They 
prefer to describe rather than explain. 
For example, resistance R is operationally defined as the quotient of potential 
difference and current, or as a volts per ampere (R = V /1). Hence, given potential 
difference and current strength, the resistance can be predicted by calculation. 
Whether resistance as the opposition to a flow of charges really exists or not, is 
beside the point. What matters is that the formula works. It is useful. Therefore it 
is pointless calling upon the possible existence of something if it does not add to its 
usefulness: keep the whole inquiry process as simple and as non-metaphysical as 
possible. 
Although instrumentalist science works, it is a very limited way to knowledge. In 
trying to save the appearances, it is reluctant to commit itself to deeper, more 
satisfying explanations. This leads to a tendency not to take the implications of its 
theories seriously. Theories are not explanations of reality, but only fictions devised 
to account for the facts. Hence they can be arbitrarily changed to suit the facts. This 
arbitrariness leads to relativism, scepticism and pragmatism. 
2.3 The importance of scientific theory 
The controversy about realism and instrumental ism is centred on the different ways 
they interpret the role of theory in science. 
2.3.1 The role of scientific theory 
A scientific theory is an intellectual construct which uses a set of logical rules which 
serve to link the theory with the world, and to relate observations with each other. 
It is an invented conceptual structure which stands or falls on its ability to describe, 
explain, and predict observable phenomena, without being dependent on any single 
falsifying observation. A theory must lead to fruitful consequences, which can be 
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tested empirically. Its function is to provide a context for a variety of facts, to give 
intelligible structure to our experience, and to offer a tentative explanation for 
phenomena. Truth is approached, but never reached. Such is the contemporary 
notion of scientific theory. 
This contrasts sharply with the traditional concept of theory which is still prevalent 
in school science education. This traditonal, now out-dated, view stated that the 
theories of science are derived directly from observations, and are tentative propo-
sals which stand or fall by their ability to stand up to a single, crucial experimental 
test. Today there is concensus in the scientific community that a theory cannot be 
refuted by a single, crucial experiment. Theories may be retained in spite of 
falsifying observations. They need time before they are rejected. The traditional 
view of science said: If a new opposing theory falsifies an older theory, then the older 
one must (logically) be ruthlessly rejected. The contemporary view holds: If a new 
opposing theory falsifies an older theory, both may be held simultaneously (and 
even illogically) for some time. 
The out-dated notion of theory held that a theory is a guess about some aspect of 
nature which cannot be observed directly, but which can be inferred by indirect 
evidence. This implies that there is an eternally existing real world out there waiting 
for scientists to discover. Today there is widespread agreement that the real world 
is not discovered, but is constructed. Our observations and experiments merely 
refute or confirm our guesses. According to Popper, almost all the knowledge we 
acquire is done through guessing, and what we learn from experience is only how 
wrong many of our guesses unfortunately are. We come to know reality by criticising 
our theories. Indeed, all we ever know are our theories. 
What distinguishes scientific knowledge from other forms of human knowledge is, 
amongst other things, its built-in mechanisms of self-regulation. All science is 
directed towards the growth of objective knowledge. This is achieved through 
critical preference of theories: some conjectures are better than others. 
"Objectivity rests on criticism, on critical discussion, and on the critical 
examination of experiments." (Popper in Miller 1983, p.84) 
"So long as a theory withstands detailed and severe tests and is not 
superceded by another theory in the course of scientific progress, we 
may say that it has 'proved its mettle' or that it is corroborated by past 
experience." (Popper in Miller 1983, p.136) 
The chief role of scientific theory is to explain. The aim of science, maintains 
Popper, is to find satisfactory explanations. What kind of explanation may be 
satisfactory? The answer is (says Popper): an explanation in terms of testable and 
falsfiable universal laws and initial conditions. Instrumentalists interpret scientific 
theories as having little or no explanatory power. But this, maintains Popper, is not 
so. Every time we proceed to explain some conjectural theory by a new conjectural 
theory of a higher degree of universality, we are discovering more about the world, 
trying to penetrate more deeply into its secrets. And, says Popper, every time we 
succeed in falsifying a theory, we make a new important discovery. For these 
falsifications teach us the unexpected. And theories reassure us that, although they 
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are our own inventions, they are none the less genuine assertions about the world, 
for they can clash with something we never made. Our theories enable us "to meddle 
effectively in the working of the world". (Miller 1983, p.11) Our theories do affect 
nature in some way. 
Our theories make assertions about structural or relational properties of the world. 
The properties described by an explanatory theory must be, in some sense or other, 
deeper than those to be explained. Although (says Popper in Miller 1983, p.167) 
this word 'deeper' eludes logical analysis, the 'depth' of a scientific theory seems to 
be most closely related to its simplicity and so to the wealth of its content. 
As Hodson (1986c, p.220) points out, an individual practitioner may have con-
fidence in his theory, but it must stand up to the severe criticism of his fellow 
scientists, and be accepted by the scientific community. As communal confidence 
in a theory grows, it acquires its own observation language with its own built-in 
assumptions. This allows scientists to say, for example, that, in terms of solubility 
theory, they "see sugar dissolving" rather than that they "see sugar disappearing", 
or that, in terms of the theory of particle physics, they "see the track of an electron 
in a cloud chamber", and not just "a thin, white line". In other words, theoretical 
ideas acquire a reality status. 
2.3.2 The status of scientific theory 
The status of scientific theory has two extreme positions: that of naive realism and 
of instrumentalism. Naive realists hold that scientific theories provide a true 
description of the world. Naive realists hold that all entities postulated by scientific 
theories ( eg electrons, atoms, photons, etc) have a real existence. However, because 
our senses and observational equipment are imperfect, our theories are incomplete 
and subject to revision. So if a naive realist states that a theory is tentative, he means 
that, one day in the future, when laboratory techniques and measuring procedures 
are perfected, absolute truth will be attained. 
Instrumentalists, on the other hand, maintain that theories do not refer to existing 
entities. Theoretical entities such as electrons are simply convenient fictions which 
are useful in making predictions. For instrumentalists, theory is not an intellectual 
structure, but only an intellectual device or functional instrument for relating 
observations. The real world is described by imaginary models which have no 
ontological counterpart. Observations are hard and factual, and completely distinct 
from theoretical entities, which are figments of the imagination. 
2.3.3 Instrumentalist theories are immature theories 
Science is more than an accumulation of facts. It is a synthetic, constructive activity. 
Thus when the early astronomers tried to 'save the appearances', or account for the 
facts concerning planetary motion, they were not simply collecting facts or telling a 
new tale for each fact. Rather, this was an intellectual advance, the beginning of a 
20 
scientific theory. By coordinating information, they began to see that there were 
patterns in the phenomena which enabled them to predict future events. And they 
obviously took delight in this. (Rogers 1977, p.223) But although their theories were 
able very successfully to predict planetary events, they lacked physical, bodily 
explanations. They tried to improve, not by simplifying, but by adding further ad 
hoc riders. They were intellectually satisfying, but lacked simplicity and fruitfulness. 
In his wonderful book Physics for the Inquiring Mind, Eric Rogers (1977, p.341) 
discusses the role of scientific theories in some detail. He begins by presenting ''The 
fable of the Plogglies" in order to illustrate the way scientific theories operate. This 
fable tells of a land in which men constantly found, to their perplexity, that whenever 
anyone wanted a pencil, one could never be found; and that whenever someone did 
find one and wanted to sharpen it, the pencil sharpener was always found to be full 
of pencil shavings. After investigations, a magnificent theory was put forward to 
account for these two phenomena. It suggested that, beneath the ground, lived a 
great number of little people called Plogglies, who at night would find any pencils, 
grind them up, and stuff the shavings into the pencil sharpener. This was a brilliant 
theory, for in one stroke, it accounted for both mysteries. 
This is an example of a prescientific theory. The work of nature is explained by 
invoking unpredictable gods or demons. The overall objection to the plogglies 
theory is simply that there are not any plogglies. There (says Rogers) is where many 
modern physicists would disagree. They would not mind the plogglies being a fiction 
(like any model in science) but they would call it bad theory because it was too 
expensive. The plogglies were invented and endowed with two special behaviours 
to explain two sets of events, and they do not explain anything else. They are an ad 
hoc theory, a theory concocted just 'for this purpose'. There is nothing wrong with 
ad hoc theories - they may even turn out to be true - but they are weak, usually little 
more than narrow hypotheses born in faith. They may be useful, but we do not place 
much trust in them. The prescientific theory has much in common with instrumen-
talist interpretation of theory. 
The case against demons is: they are arbitrary, unreasonable, multitudinous, and 
overdressed. We need a special demon with special attributes to account for each 
fact. We prefer something simpler, more economical: a consistent body of knowl-
edge, with strong ties to experiment, and with cross-checks and interlinkages to 
assure us of its validity. 
So, for Rogers, the test of a good theory is not success versus failure but remains 
simplicity and economy versus increasing complexity or clumsiness. The best theory 
is the one that is most fruitful, economical, comprehensive, and intellectually 
satisfying. 
Then, as theory grows from a single speculative guess to a general form of knowledge 
that fits many observed effects, we trust it more and more. We are so pleased with 
its consistency and fruitfulness that we say: 'The entities implied by our theories 
must exist.' The realist takes his theories and their implications seriously, whereas 
the instrumentalist regards them as fictions and useful tools. The realist tends to 
hold on to his theories, and will change them only if they continually fail severe tests, 
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whereas the instrumentalist is quite content to change theories with minimal 
empirical evidence. So it seems that instrumentalism is an immature form of 
realism. Hodson (1982, p.26) rightly states that it is the path of science to proceed 
towards a realist theory by way of instrumentalist theories ( or models). Contem-
porary theories are instrumental, but are moving towards realism. 
The task of science can hardly be understood if we are not realists. If our theories, 
that is, our scientific conjectures, can conflict with the facts, then these facts must 
somehow reflect an external real world. 
However, naive realism also has its problems, for it does not take the constructivist 
nature of scientific theory into account. Thus a compromise view between the 
extremes of naive realism and naive instrumentalism, but which also accommodates 
constructivist psychology, will be sought. Such a view is called critical realism. 
2.3.4 Theories and models 
A model may be regarded as a simplified structural representation of a theory. It 
should not be identified with the theory. Models may be used to connect theory and 
experience, experience with imagination, theories with other theories, imaginative 
creations with formal theories. A model is an analogy or metaphor for the real 
situation. It may take various forms: hardware, pictorial, word-metaphorical, math-
ematical. 
The critical realist uses a model in an instrumentalist way. It may be useful even if 
it is not true. The scientist uses it as if it is true. For no model corresponds in every 
way with the phenomenon it is representing. Thus the critical realist distinguishes 
clearly between a model and its broader theory. The model is instrumental and 
useful, whereas the theory is explanatory and more fully real. The instrumentalist, 
however, makes no distinction between theory and model. 
Science often approaches a realist theory by way of tentative instrumentalist models. 
The distinction between model and theory is therefore made in terms of 'degree of 
uncertainty'. A theory is a more certain structure than a model. 
2.3.5 Experiments and theory 
Experiments are conducted within a particular theoretical matrix, which governs 
the choice of a problem, the experimental design, interpretation of the results, and 
so on. No theory-independent experiments are possible. Science is theory-driven, 
rather than experiment-driven. Pre-existing theoretical understanding gives pur-
pose and meaning to experiments. Yet it is still a widely-held view that all science 
results from experimentation. 
The view is now out-dated that theory-generation is little more than "a process of 
looking for regularity in nature" and that theories are "simple guesses about nature, 
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of the kind that children produce for themselves after a few moments of laboratory 
experience". (Hodson 1989, p.55) Theories, in this now-abandoned view, are sub-
ordinated to the facts, and easily validated by observation. 
Another prevalent myth, says Hodson (1989), is that scientists can establish 'truth' 
by means of crucial experiments. A hypothesis can be rejected, and another 
accepted, on the evidence provided by a simple experimental test. This kind of naive 
interpretation of the Popperian notion of falsification carries with it the assumption 
that theory-independent evidence is available. If rival theories are incommensur-
able, there can be no crucial experiment that can decide between them. Such 
experiments ( continues Hodson) would require competing theories to make oppos-
ing predictions regarding the same events. In practice, competing theories address 
the world in different ways ( often using different concepts) and, therefore, make 
different kinds of predictions about observable phenomena. Therefore, it is usually 
only possible to provide an experimental evaluation of a theory on its own terms. 
Experimental testing of theories is not, therefore, an infallible, single-step but a 
multi-step decision-making process monitored and validated by the scientific com-
munity. Scientists who accept a particular theoretical structure may find it difficult 
to recognise deficiencies in that structure, because theoretical biases blind them to 
the theory's shortcomings and prevent them from obtaining suitable counter-evi-
dence. According to Feyerabend (1977), a theory's success in explaining facts is 
guaranteed, because the theory creates its own supporting evidence and excludes 
facts which would refute it. So a new theory is often needed to show up errors in 
the old one by providing an alternative perspective. The new theory may be 
supported by a test which was not even possible within the context of its predecessor, 
and the earlier theory may be rejected on the basis of an observational test that 
would have been quite inconceivable within the conceptual framework of the old 
theory. Thus it may be necessary, on occasions, to introduce theories that are 
inconsistent with the existing theory. As Hodson (1989) points out, whether or not 
we accept Feyerabend's claim, it is clear that correspondence with the experimen-
tally gathered facts does not necessarily afford any increased truth status on a theory. 
It simply means that it may be true. 
2.3.6 Theory is part of reality 
Scientists often treat some theories as real, but others as instrumental models. If 
so, which theoretical entities are, in fact, real, and which are useful fictions? How 
do we decide? Hodson ( 1982b, p.27) suggests that we should perhaps follow 
Dewey's distinction between the statements 'theoretical entities are real' and 
'theoretical entities exist'. The physical world is real and scientific theories are real, 
but they are not identical. There is an ontological distinction between them. 
'Dragons' and 'phlogiston' are real, but they do not exist. Similarly, 'electron' and 
'magnetic field' are real concepts, having an existence independent of individuals. 
But we do not know whether they actually exist or not. We believe that they do, but 
a change in theory may lead us to change our opinion in the same way that a change 
in theory led us to change our views regarding the existence of dragons and 
phlogiston. 
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Both Hodson (1982a,b) and Selley (1981) advocate realism, but their views of reality 
are significantly different (Hodson 1985, p.33). Selley's view is that reality is best 
represented as a continuum from direct sense experience to pure conjecture. The 
reality of an entity depends on the immediacy of our experience of it, which may be 
a mixture of direct observation and theoretical inference. There are degrees of 
reality. Some things are more real than others, but even the least real are neverthe-
less real. Hence electrons and photons are real. 
My own view is that there is a continuum from direct observation to pure conjecture. 
There are levels of reality. Even direct observation is, to some extent, theory-laden. 
So as Popper said, all we know are our theories. But I do agree with Hodson that 
there must be a distinction between conceptual reality and ontological reality. 
Although we may not have direct, untainted access to the existing world, our great 
confidence in our cognitive faculties enables us to cope very well with our world of 
theories. 
2.3.7 Summary 
Scientific theories are not simply inductive generalisations rigorously obtained from 
observational data, and able to be falsified by observational evidence. Rather, 
theories are complex structures produced by the human mind, which may be 
retained in spite of falsifying observations. They need time to grow before being 
severely tested. A new theory may have to be introduced to provide evidence for 
the rejection of an old theory. 
2.4 Origins of instrumentalism 
2.4.1 Saving the appearances 
Instrumentalism has its origins in the compartmentalised thinking, the "controlled 
schizophrenia", as Koestler put it, which began to emerge with the Greek astrono-
mers around the 2nd century AD. 
In order to account for the retrograde loopi ngs of planetary paths, Ptolemy devised 
a complex system of forty wheels-within-wheels or epicycles. He clearly never 
believed that there really were wheels out there, but they did 'save the appearances' 
and provide a mechanism for accurately predicting the position of any planet. He 
therefore 'saved the phenomena' by inventing a suitable hypothesis, regardless of 
whether the hypothesis was true or not, that is, whether it was physically possible or 
not. As Koestler (1959, p.74) pointed out, 
"astronomy, after Aristotle, becomes an abstract sky-geometry, di-
vorced from physical reality ... .It serves a practical purpose as a method 
for computing tables of the motions of the sun, moon and planets; but 
as to the real nature of the universe, it has nothing to say." 
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Ptolemy's theory was concerned only with predicting, and not with a true description 
of the universe. Copernicus, however, put forward a theory which not only pre-
dicted, but also explained. The Copernican theory provided a more comprehensive 
conceptual structure, which had a much greater power for promoting under-
standing. It revealed a physical link between planetary motion and theory. Coper-
nicus believed that his heliocentric theory was a true description of external reality. 
Kepler ( quoted by Koestler 1959, p.169) verifies this: 
"He (Copernicus) thought his hypotheses were true." 
Kepler was commenting on the famous Preface to Copernicus's book "De Revol-
utionibus", which was written by Osiander, a friend who tried to protect Copernicus 
from Aristotelians. Osiander had written: 
"For these hypotheses need not be true ... " 
It seems that Copernicus was shocked by this insertion. Yet there can be no doubt 
that Osiander was acting with the best of intentions, for two years earlier, when 
Copernicus had been hesitating about publishing his book, Osiander had written a 
letter to him, saying: 
"For my part I have always felt about hypotheses that they are not articles 
of faith but bases of computation, so that even if they are false, it does 
not matter, provided that they exactly represent the phenomena ... " (in 
Koestler 1959, p.167) 
Osiander was obviously aware that the Copernican theory was more than a sky-ge-
ometry: it was a true physical description. However, by presenting it as a hypothe-
tical device for prediction rather than a description of how things are, the problems 
of theological confrontation were skirted. 
Thus, even though Copernicus still resorted to the use of epicycles, his heliocentric 
theory was not a mere fictional hypothesis, like Ptolemy's. It did not matter whether 
you believed Ptolemy's epicycles or not. All that mattered was that his theory 
worked. However, the Copernican theory had to be taken seriously, for it attempted 
to describe what was physically really out there. Copernicus's sun-centred system 
was far more than only a computational device. 
This concern with the results of observations from instruments in order to predict, 
without any attempt at physical explanation, is typical of what is now called in-
strumentalism. 
2.4.2 Nominalism and phenomenalism 
Common-sense tells us that there is something behind the surface view of the objects 
we see. We can treat a computer as a black box, and work it quite efficiently without 
knowing how it works. But at the back of our minds we are aware that there is 
something at work deep down. The superficial, sensed experience is called the 
phenomenon. It is what appears directly to the senses. 
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Classical realists held that there is a reality behind appearance. They held that there 
is a real 'substance' of 'computer-ness' within any particular computer which gives 
this machine the form of a computer. The trouble with this type of realism is that 
the existence of such real 'substances' cannot be verified by the senses. Phenomen-
alists, on the other hand, say that there is no reality behind appearance. 
William of Occam (1290-1350) severely criticised the Scholastic tendency to create 
unnecessary metaphysical entities behind appearance. Reality, said Occam, is 
precisely what appears to the sense. All our knowledge about the world comes 
through our senses. All being is thus reduced to what is perceived. 
Occam's desire to get rid of any superfluous principles became known as 'Occam's 
Razor'. His philosophy was the first formal emergence of empiricism, a theory of 
knowledge which based itself on pure sensory experience. It regarded classical 
realism as too metaphysical, for there is no evidence that something lies beyond 
phenomena. Empiricism, therefore, tends to be phenomenalist. 
Occam's contention that concepts were only words gave rise to the term nominal-
ism. The chief argument against nominalism is that it is arbitrary and subjective. It 
leads to a theory of knowledge which concentrates its attention on language and the 
meanings of words. Concepts are merely tools of thought. Similarly, scientific 
theory, for nominalists, is only an instrument for organising our thoughts. Theory 
is not explanatory, nor is it informative about the world. Hence nominalism ends 
up by becoming too inward-looking, too caught up in word games, instead of coming 
to grips with the real physical world. 
Theologians were quick to realise that Occam's radical empiricism meant that 
spiritual beings, and in particular God, were threatened. Naive nominalism propa-
gated a phenomenalism which endangered the whole structure of religion, and was 
understandably regarded with suspicion by the Church of its day. 
2.4.3 Galileo's realism 
Galileo accepted the Copernican heliocentric theory as a true description of the real 
physical world. Because this seemed to conflict with Aristotelian cosmological 
views, as well as certain aspects of Scripture, Cardinal Bellarmine objected to this 
realist interpretation. However, he informed Galileo that it was permissable, from 
the Church's standpoint, to believe in the Copernican system as a mathematical 
device for saving the appearances. To quote Bellarmine (Koestler 1959, p.447): 
"For to say that the assumptions that the Earth moves and the Sun stands 
still saves all the celestial appearances better than do eccentrics and 
epicycles, is to speak with excellent good sense and to run no risk 
whatever." 
In other words, realism can be set against intrumentalism. The Church, which 
usually held a strong realist standpoint, was willing temporarily to accept Galileo's 
theory in a phenomenalist, instrumentalist sense. This neatly sidestepped theologi-
cal problems. Ironically, today it is science, rather than the Church, which accepts 
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instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is thus a convenient, safe retreat from any meta-
physical issue. 
2.4.4 Newton: Instrumentalist or realist? 
Newton's formulation of the Law of Universal Gravitation and his three laws of 
motion is still regarded as one of the greatest scientific achievements of all time . 
Historically, Newton's theory was the first really successful physical theory. The 
seeds of a physical theory were present in Copernicus's system, and these seeds 
germinated and bore fruit in Kepler's work. When Kepler looked for a mathemati-
cal relation between a planet's distance from the sun and its period, he came up with 
his Third Law, which was no more than an empirical law to fit the observational 
facts. But then Kepler asked himself why the planets moved in this way. Koestler 
(1959, p.258) explains it thus: 
"Nobody before Kepler had asked the question why this should be so . 
... Kepler's answer was, that there must be a force emanating from the 
sun which drives the planets round their orbits .... It would be difficult 
to over-estimate the revolutionary significance of this proposal. For the 
first time since antiquity, an attempt was made not only to describe 
heavenly motions in geometrical terms, but to assign them a physical 
cause." 
Kepler did not use the word "force"; he spoke of a "moving soul" of the sun which 
drove the planets, like rotating, sweeping brooms: his ideas were still primitive and 
partial. 
Newton addressed himself to solving the problem of planetary motion. He brought 
the works of Galileo and Kepler together in a powerful, unifying theory. The key 
pieces of the puzzle were Kepler's Jaws of planetary motion, Galileo's laws of falling 
bodies and projectiles, and Descartes's notion that inertia made bodies persist not 
in circular (as Galileo suggested) but in straight line motion. 
Kepler had toyed with the idea of "weight" as the mutual attraction between two 
bodies, but he shrank from the fantastic notion of a gravitational anima mundi. 
Newton applied Kepler's Laws to the orbit of the Moon. At the same time, he drew 
on Galileo's laws of projectiles. He then identified the Keplerian orbit of the Moon 
with the Galilean orbit of a projectile, which he postulated was continually falling 
towards the Earth, but was unable to reach it because of its rapid forward motion. 
The paths of planetary motion were the resultant of the interaction between the 
force of gravity, which was inherent in any mass, and centrifugal force, which was 
not a force at all, but simply a special case of Newton's First Law of Motion. Gravity 
fills the universe, according to Newton, with interlocking forces of attraction, issuing 
from all particles of matter and acting on all particles of matter. 
Newton was aware of the metaphysical problems of his concept of gravitation. He 
did not easily accept the idea of action at a distance. He wrote ( quoted in Koestler 
1959, p.503): 
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"It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the 
mediation of something else, which is not material, operate on, and 
affect other matter without mutual contact." 
He went on to say that it seemed to him to be an absurdity that the innate gravity of 
one body should act upon another at a distance through a vacuum. Gravity, he said, 
must be caused by an "agent", but he did not explain what he meant by this "agent". 
Yet,in spite of this, our textbooks do not hesitate to attribute to Newton the idea of 
gravitational attraction as an intrinsic characteristic of matter, as Powers (1982, 
p.45) points out. 
Similarly, in order to describe "true motions" of bodies, Newton postulated the 
existence of Absolute Space. Although he contended that there was observational 
evidence ( for example, in his famous bucket experiment) that absolute motion could 
be distinguished from relative motion, it is clear that there is a difference in what 
we see (the concavity of the water surface), and our interpretation of it (absolute 
motion). In other words, says the intstrumentalist, absolute space is a metaphysical 
concept. 
The same could be said of Newton's First Law of Motion. It would seem that it is 
impossible to test it, for can a body ever be completely free of external forces acting 
on it? Thus the law is purely axiomatic, speculative and metaphysical in nature. 
Newton assumed that matter was made up of particles. Atomism is a very appealing 
scheme for making 'change' intelligible. Change or motion can be explained in terms 
of the geometrical rearrangements of fundamental particles. However, as Powers 
(1982, p.33) notes, once we are committed to this atomistic approach we are bound 
to distinguish between two sorts of properties: (a) primary qualities, those proper-
ties actually possessed by the real object; and (b) secondary qualities, those proper-
ties produced by interaction with our sense organs. This distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities was first postulated by Galileo, and later expanded 
upon by Locke. Not only is it non-empirical (that is, not given in immediate 
experience), but it has led to the reduction of the real physical world into a dualism 
of mathematical entities on the one hand, and a set of irrelevant characteristics on 
the other. Galileo, and later Newton and Locke, 
"banished the qualities which are the very essence of the sensual world 
- colour and sound, heat, odour, and taste - from the realm of physics to 
that of subjective illusion." (Koestler 1959, p.529) 
Doubtlessly, this enabled science to progress with unprecedented speed and suc-
cess, but, as Koestler pointed out, the price was high. Without a supportive, 
all-embracing, unifying explanation; without a full-blooded theory ( even bordering 
on the metaphysical), science has carried man to the brink of self-destruction. 
Today, science is "sailing without ballast", in Koestler's words, and reality is gradually 
dissolving between the physicist's hands. 
Was Newton a realist, or an instrumentalist? So much of his theory relies upon 
axiomatic deductions and rationalist schemes, that one is tempted to say "instrumen-
talist". If he was merely instrumentalist, then his theory would not really be novel 
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and informative about the world. For example, does his substitution of gravitatio 
mundi for anima mundi add to our knowledge? Does "gravity" explain any further 
than "soul"? Is it more informative about the physical world? It seems that only the 
name has changed. Yet I believe that, in the Newton's mathematical formulation 
of the idea, we have learned something new about the world. The metaphysical 
concept of gravity (and it is metaphysical, for it cannot itself be observed, but only 
its effects), together with the mathematical formulation, point to a realist explana-
tion. 
The mathematical formalism by which Newton related mass, force and acceleration, 
in order to yield reliable predictions, suggests that his empiricism was instrumen-
talist in orientation. But the very fact that he was knowingly willing to adopt a 
metaphysical explanation, such as the notion of universal gravitation, to explain why 
his formulas worked, is convincingly realist. 
To sum up, then, it is clear that Newton was securely empirically based, both in his 
mechanics and his optics. He drew on the empirical data of both Galileo and Kepler. 
He maintained a strong link with the real physical world. He consistently followed 
a strict inductive, scientific method, as Losee (1980, p.81) noted. His mathematical 
formalism enabled computative predictions to be made. In this regard, his theory 
was positivist and instrumentalist. However, Newton's theory not only predicted, 
but it explained. It provided a unifying, satisfying intelligibility, precisely because 
Newton was courageous enough to risk his intellectual integrity on metaphysical 
concepts like gravity. Newton was a scientific realist. Instrumentalists are far too 
cautious, and therefore their theories remain sterile. 
2.4.5 British empiricism reinforces instrumentalism 
Empiricism, as a philosophy of science, holds the apparently down-to-earth, com-
mon-sense view that all our knowledge comes through our sensory experience. At 
first sight, this seems undeniably and obviously true. Empiricism emerged during 
the great rise in science following Galileo and Newton. Physics rapidly became the 
model of how knowledge was obtained. The rationalism of Descartes had been 
fashionable, but now was superceded by the certainty of the inductive, empirical 
approach. Observations and measurements, obtained under specified conditions, 
emphasised that reliable knowledge was gained only through our senses. These 
ideas were taken up by John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. Immanuel 
Kant later further elaborated and criticised these views. 
It is necessary to distinguish between empiricism as a philosophy of science, and 
empirical scientific method. The latter is a well-known procedure in scientific 
inquiry. Its emphasis on sensory observation is a factor in its success. But it easily 
leads to the attitude that only knowledge obtained by sensory observation is valid. 
That is, it is but a short step from empirical method to empiricism. 
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2.4.S.1 Locke's empiricism 
John Locke (1632-1704) may be regarded as the founder of empiricism as a theory 
of knowledge. He maintained that all our knowledge is derived from experience. 
At birth, the mind is a tabula rasa. Our ideas are obtained from two sources: 
sensation, and reflection on other ideas. So all our ideas originate in sensation. 
Knowledge gained in this way seemed to Locke to be far more sound and certain 
than the rationalist approach of Descartes. 
Locke distinguished between our ideas and the things of the external world. It is 
the action of things upon our senses that gives rise to our ideas of things and their 
qualities. Things are not in our minds: ideas are. Locke, therefore, was a realist 
insofar as he held that an external world exists apart from our minds. He also held 
a causal theory of perception, that is, the view that our sense-perceptions are the 
mental effects of the actions of things upon our senses. 
The notion of the mind as a blank slate has overtones of passivity: the mind simply 
absorbs impressions from the senses. However, to form complex ideas, the mind 
must actively join together simple ideas. 
Locke distinguished between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities 
are those that are inseparable from the object, such as solidity, extension, mass, and 
motion. Secondary qualities are those that do not belong of necessity to the object, 
such as colour, sound and smell. The primary qualities, he maintained, are in the 
object; the secondary, however, are only in the observer. Without the eye, there 
would be no colour. 
For Locke, there is a reality behind these qualities, but we can never sense it directly. 
Thus, we can never know the real substance of things. All we perceive are their 
qualities. Reality, for Locke, is purely phenomenal. 
It is important to note that Locke's empiricism has, pragmatically, been useful. The 
strength of the empirical method lies in its attempt to be precise and objective; its 
weakness, in that it does not go far enough. Sensory experience is only part of 
scientific insight, as Bernard Lonergan ( 1957) correctly pointed out. The tendency 
of science to remain fixated on sensory experience alone (that is, so-called objective 
observation and measurement), has been problematic for science. 
Locke's empiricism leads us to a serious problem, namely, that if sensations are 
caused by things outside of us, how can we know this? For we experience the 
sensations, not their causes. Our experience would be exactly the same if our 
sensations were to come about spontaneously. Open-brain stimulation by probes 
can trigger off the sensation of taste, even though the taste buds are not themselves 
used. In other words, if we hold a naive empiricism, we cannot say with any certainty 
that an external world exists apart from us. It may, but all we can say for sure is that 
we experience sensations. We become locked within ourselves, and end in a "forlorn 
scepticism", or even idealism. 
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Locke's contention that without the eye there would be no colour seems to be on 
firm ground, because the observer does "add to" the thing observed, much as 
sun-glasses "add to" the incoming light. But Berkeley (see section 2.4.5.2 below ) 
pointed out that the same argument would also apply to the primary qualities. All 
qualities, maintained Berkeley, are in some way secondary. 
Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is the source of the 
current debate about the theory-dependence of observation. There is much truth in 
Berkeley's criticism, for all observations are interpretations. Although Locke as-
sumes an external reality, he concludes that we cannot know it, because it is not 
accessible to sensory experience. We can only know phenomena, not the reality 
beyond them. Since all we know are our sensations, we remain trapped within our 
own experience, and end up in either scepticism or idealism. 
It is the intriguing paradox of empiricism that, on the one hand, it has produced the 
most powerful and reliable body of knowledge the world has ever known, namely, 
scientific knowledge, and on the other, if followed to its logical conclusions, we paint 
ourselves into a corner and end in doubt and a sense of unreality. This brings us to 
Berkeley. 
2.4.5.2 Berkeley's Instrumentalism 
George Berkeley (1685-1753) was also an empiricist. He, too, held that we can have 
no knowledge of anything that does not first come through the senses. However, 
he rejected Locke's conclusion that we cannot know true reality. He refused to 
wallow in the scepticism of Locke. After all, empiricism was the basis of physical 
science. To end in scepticism was to undermine science. Berkeley suggested that 
scepticism arose only because Locke's assumptions were not sound. Locke had 
assumed that there was a reality behind appearance, but that we could not have 
knowledge of it because it was not directly available to the senses. Berkeley 
questioned the existence of this world beyond the phenomenon. To assume a 
mysterious, unknowable substance behind appearance merely creates unnecessary 
problems. Said Berkeley: "We have first raised a dust and then complain that we 
cannot see." He contended that we can know all that there is to know about things, 
for there is nothing more to know about things than we can observe by our senses. 
Reality is what appears to the senses. Phenomenal reality is the only reality. 
It is important to understand correctly what Berkeley meant. The belief that there 
is something "deep down things", as the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins put it, to 
preserve the regularities of things, is a widely-held common-sense conviction. 
Berkeley never doubted this. What he opposed was the view that the reality behind 
appearance was in some way material or substantial. For him, it was more like an 
idea, or something spiritual. Modern physics, according to Gardner (1983) supports 
his view, for the quantum mechanical view of matter is that it can be regarded as a 
form of energy with wave properties. Berkeley would have said that an electron, for 
example, may (or may not) exist, hut because it is directly unobservable by the 
senses, it cannot exist without a mind to support it. 'To be, is to be perceived", said 
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Berkeley. Indeed, according to Berkeley, nothing can exist without a mind to 
perceive it. Gardner (1983, p.15) summarises Berkeley's views as follows: 
"If we cannot observe it, we cannot know it. In other words, if no mind 
existed in the universe and a single object were suspended in space-time, 
it is meaningless to say that the object exists. To claim existence, matter 
needs to be perceived by a mind." 
Now, this smacks of idealism, or, as Berkeley preferred to call it, "immaterialism". 
Yet he was not denying that stones resist kicks. Something is out there, independent 
of ourselves. For classical realists, it was a real "substance" behind the phenomenon. 
For Berkeley, it was God. 
Berkeley assumed that a material "something" to explain reality is unnecessary. For 
this alleged hidden substance behind reality adds nothing to our knowledge. We 
can get along very well without it, for it performs no explanatory function what-
soever. Therefore it is a useless hypothesis, and, according to Berkeley, we should 
get rid of it. Let reality be simply what appears to the senses. 
Berkeley's brand of empiricism is known as instrumentalism. An instrumentalist 
approach to science is thoroughly phenomenalist. That is, it assumes (and it is an 
assumption!) that reality is fully perceived by observation. Some instrumentalist 
scientists might say that there may be something more to reality than what appears, 
but there are no grounds for assuming this. Therefore, look only at regularities in 
phenomena, so that rules can be made in order to predict. Scientific theory is not 
informative about the physical world. Rather, it is but a useful fiction or tool to aid 
prediction. 
What brought Berkeley to this philosophy was his criticism of Newton's theory. 
Newton himself had distinguished between treating "forces" as formal mathematical 
correlations, and as really existing. Berkeley held that Newton was correct to hold 
this distinction. But what upset Berkeley was that Newton talked about forces as if 
they were something more than terms in an equation. As Losee (1980, p.160) points 
out, Berkeley maintained that forces in mechanics were analogous to epicycles in 
astronomy. These mathematical devices were useful in calculating the motion of 
bodies. But, according to Berkeley, it is a mistake to attribute a real existence to 
these constructions. Newton's reference to "attractive forces" is misleading, for they 
are mathematical entities only. 
The point is that we do not directly perceive "force" by sensory experience. What 
we observe are the effects of the motions of bodies under certain conditions. In 
Berkeley's own words: 
"In this as in other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified 
besides the effect itself." (in Burtt 1939, p.558) 
Empirically, we can have no knowledge of forces. They are mental constructions to 
account for the cause of motion. Minds are the only causal agents, not forces. 
Causality is imputed to things by the mind. Forces do not exist in themselves. They 
are purely useful book-keeping tools. Newton's Laws are nothing but computational 
devices for the description and prediction of phenomena. The terms expressed in 
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the laws need not refer to anything that really exists in nature. Nevertheless, 
Berkeley conceded that such terms as "force", and "impetus", do have an important 
use in mechanics. 
As for "gravitation" and "absolute space", they are unnecessary metaphysical entities, 
mysteriously lying behind the phenomenon. Newton's attempt to explain "true 
motions" in terms of absolute space was invalid, because absolute space did not exist. 
It was only a metaphysical invention. Hence science could deal only with relative 
motions. 
Similarly, the notion of"mass", so important to Newton's theory, was simply a mental 
construct. Locke had suggested that mass was a primary quality, inherent in an 
object. But Berkeley's insistence that all qualities were secondary and existed only 
in the perceptual experience of the subject, meant that mass was in the mind. In my 
view, this was a fore-runner of our contemporary notion that all observation is 
theory-laden. 
Berkeley's criticism of Newton's theory is consistent with his instrumentalist em-
phasis. Berkeley was anxious to defuse any materialist implications of the new 
science, as Powers (1982, p.109) notes. But in doing so, he argued his way from a 
radical empiricism to an idealist metaphysics. Only ideas and mind exist. Ultimate-
ly, the external world is simply a collection of perceptions maintained in existence 
by the mind of God. 
2.4.53 Hume's views on Causality and Induction 
David Hume (1711-1776) also shared (with Locke and Berkeley) the empiricist 
assumption that we never perceive anything except our own ideas. All our knowl-
edge comes from experience. We can know only what we directly perceive. But 
what we directly perceive is only our own sensory impressions. We remain trapped 
within ourselves. We cannot know the true nature of things, because these lie 
beyond our experience. We can continue to do empirical science; hut the conclu-
sions drawn from science never attain the status of genuine knowledge. Thus 
Hume's empiricism led him to scepticism. 
Induction is the mental process of making generalisations from a number of 
particular observations. Aristotle advocated its use in finding general laws. Induc-
tion, says Magee (1973, p.19), "is seen as the hallmark of science". Hume raised 
some awkward questions about induction. He postulated that no number of par-
ticular observations, however large, could logically lead to a universal general 
statement. We may have made a thousand observations of the sun rising, hut that 
does not guarantee that it will rise tomorrow. No number of observations of white 
swans allows us logically to conclude that "All swans are white". In scientific inquiry, 
scientists usually conclude, from a large number of experiments, that all cases hold 
under certain conditions. For example, "Water, at a certain pressure, always boils 
at 100° C", or "All copper objects are good conductors of electricity". Such gener-
alisations go far beyond the evidence. For we have never seen all copper objects, 
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nor tested all water. This "going beyond empirical evidence" is at variance with the 
empiricist doctrine. 
The problem of induction has baffled philosophers of science for centuries. That 
the whole of scientific knowledge should rest on such apparently shaky foundations 
is, as Magee says, "uniquely embarrassing". It turned many into sceptics, or irration-
alists. In practice, scientists are aware that scientific laws cannot be proved with 
certainty. However, every confirming instance increases the degree of probability 
of the law. The important thing is that science works; it delivers the goods. But 
this is like building a house on a foundation known to be insecure. 
Hume also addressed the problem of causality. What do we mean, when we say 
that A causes B? If billiard ball A collides with billiard ball B, can we say "A caused 
the motion of B"? For we cannot empirically experience "cause". There is nothing 
more than the contiguity and succession of events. From many prior experiences, 
we learn that event B always follows event A. We recall their constant conjunction 
in all past instances. So we call the first the "cause", and the second the "effect". The 
important point to note is that, according to Hume, this is simply a psychological 
conjunction. 
Having started from the sensible and empirical, Hume arrived at the disastrous 
conclusion that nothing is to be learned from experience and observation. Such is 
the paradox of empiricism. Empiricism is a common-sense theory of knowledge, 
yet, as Popper (in Miller 1983, p.106) rightly states, "the common-sense theory of 
knowledge is liable to lead to a kind of anti-realism". 
2.4.5.4 Kant's reply to empiricism 
Hume's arguments awoke Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1804) from his "dogmatic slum-
bers". Instead of empiricism leading to knowledge which was certain, it ended in 
uncertainty. Rationalists such as Descartes had held that rationalism was a much 
better way to certainty. But Hume's analysis of cause and effect challenged reason. 
He demonstrated, said Kant, that it was impossible to gain knowledge by pure 
reason alone. 
Kant attempted to marry rationalism with empiricism. He agreed with the empi-
ricists that all our knowledge begins with experience, but he rejected the empiricist 
thesis that it all arises out of experience. He contended that some of our ideas are 
contributed by the mind itself. The mind structures knowledge. Experience is not 
simply an unstructured stream of consciousness, hut rather a unified, organised 
whole. The mind is not the passive copier of impressions that the empiricists 
maintained it was. Rather, it actively structures experience. Order is imposed on 
the world by our minds. 
In order for appearances to be understood at all, they must be structured in terms 
of the categories of the understanding. Experience involves the ordering of our 
impressions in a regular and ordered way, according to certain rules. If it were 
simply random, we would be left with only an unstructured stream of impressions. 
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Our minds add to our sensory experience. Our knowledge of the world is, so to 
speak, filtered through our mental categories. Concepts such as "cause", "space", 
"time", and "substance", are categories of our minds. Our minds impose these 
concepts on the sensory impressions gained from phenomena. But we should not 
extend the application of these concepts beyond the objects of possible experience, 
that is, beyond empirical reality. They have objective validity within the realm of 
phenomenal experience, but not beyond. Thus they are objective, and not merely 
subjective, as Hume had suggested. 
For Kant, empirical reality is phenomenal reality. Our perceptions represent 
appearances only. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. 
What objects may be in themselves, remains completely unknown to us. We can 
know phenomena, but not the reality behind phenomena. Kant thus held a phe-
nomenalist position, while acknowledging the existence of a hidden reality behind 
appearance. 
Kant regarded himself as a realist, and attempted to refute idealism. He could be 
classified as a realist, because he held that there is an external (but knowable, 
phenomenal) reality, which causes our sensory impressions. Kant thus subscribed 
to a causal theory of perception. But because true reality is, for Kant, ultimately 
unknowable, he never actually escaped from idealism. 
Kant is closer to the realism of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, with its emphasis 
on active intellect, than the cold, passive realism of the empiricists. As Lindsay in 
Cn"tique of Pure Reason (1959, p.xvi) says: 
''There is a halfway house between the realism of ... a passive mind and 
the idealism of ... a creative mind." 
As Schacht (1984, p.247) succinctly puts it, we know less than what the rationalists 
say we do, and more than the empiricists think we do. 
2.4.6 The Inductivism of J.S. Mill 
Inductivism is a point of view that emphasises the importance to science of inductive 
arguments. Scientific inquiry is a matter of inductive generalisation from the results 
of observations and experiments. The philosophy of science of John Stuart Mill 
(1806-1873) is an example of the inductivist view. 
Mill stressed the importance of induction in science. He claimed that every causal 
law known to science had been discovered by one of four inductive methods. He 
put forward strict rules governing the use of induction in hypothesis-making, and 
for the verification of hypotheses. Because of his over-emphasis on inductive rules, 
he has been accused of stifling the role of the imagination in hypothesis-making. 
Yet Mill was aware of the importance of deduction in scientific method. Indeed, 
he was convinced that the great Newtonian synthesis was the fruit of hypothetico-
deductive method rather than inductive method. Mill's method was simply a strong 
endorsement of the scientific method advocated by Bacon, in which observation 
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was structured so as to preserve objectivity as far as possible, and generalisations 
were made along inductive lines. 
However, as Popper later pointed out, the use of empirical verification of many 
particular cases to confirm a law, merely gives the impression that scientific laws are 
absolute. In this way, said Popper, inductive verification leads to intellectual 
stagnation. 
Further, Popper maintained that no observation is objective. All observation is 
saturated in prior theory. Thus observation cannot be separated from theory. 
2.4.7 Mach's Instrumentalism 
Ernst Mach (1838-1916) developed a critique of Newton's philosophy of science 
that was strikingly similar to the critique given by Berkeley. Mach shared Berkeley's 
instrumentalist approach to scientific theories. He declared that 
"it is the object of science to replace, or save, experiences, by the 
reproduction and anticipation of facts in thought". (Mach in Losee 1972, 
p.163) 
According to Mach, scientific laws and theories are implicit summaries of facts. 
They enable us to describe and anticipate phenomena, in the most economical way, 
with the least possible expenditure of thought. 
Mach also shared Berkeley's conviction that it is a mistake to assume that the 
concepts and relations of science correspond to that which exists in nature. Theories 
about atoms may be useful for the description of certain phenomena, but this does 
not mean that atoms really exist. 
Like Berkeley, Mach also refused to posit a realm of reality behind the realm of 
appearance. He was a thorough-going phenomenalist. Mach himself stated that 
"What we represent to ourselves behind the appearances exists only in 
our understanding, and has for us only the value of a memoria technica 
or formula, whose form, because it is arbitrary and irrelevant, varies very 
easily with the standpoint of our culture". (Mach in Losee 1972, p.163) 
Mach attempted to reformulate Newtonian mechanics from a phenomenalist stand-
point. He hoped to show that mechanics could be divested of "metaphysical" 
concepts such as atomism, force, gravitation, mass, absolute space and time. He 
used a procedure called operationalism. For example, he attempted to give an 
"operational definition" of "mass". This meant defining mass in terms of the proce-
dures by which it is measured, preferably in mathematical terms. Ao; Powers (1983, 
p.35) notes, 
"His operational definition for 'mass' made use of Newton's Third Law 
of Motion and is often cited as a fine example of a positivist clarification 
of a scientific concept." 
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By combining the Second and Third Laws, we can deduce the law of conservation 
of momentum. Since momentum is defined as the product of mass and velocity, 
Mach argued that we can define the ratio of the masses of two interacting bodies in 
terms of the ratios of their changes in their velocities. In this way we are defining 
mass in terms of measurable quantities. Similarly, we can eliminate the metaphysi-
cal element of 'force' by defining it as the product of mass and acceleration. 
Mach's refinements certainly clarify Newton's ideas. By ignoring metaphysical 
concepts, the theory becomes much more clean-cut. Unfortunately, however, 
operational definitions of mass violate some of the essential mathematical charac-
teristics implicit in Newton's idea of the quantity of matter. As Powers (1983, p.37) 
points out, operational definitions 
"severely restricted the range of ideas that Mach was prepared to 
countenance, and he questioned not only absolute space and time, but 
also the existence of atoms and, later, the theory of relativity as well." 
2.4.8 Positivism 
Positivism is a tough-minded empiricism which holds that nothing can be known to 
be real except what might be observed. It is an anti-realist approach to science which 
is not interested in whether theoretical entities, such as electrons and photons, really 
exist or not. 
Hacking ( 1983, p.41) lists six characteristics of positivism: 
(1) An emphasis on verification. 
(2) An emphasis on observation. 
(3) Against the idea of causality. 
( 4) Downplaying explanations. 
(5) Against theoretical entities. 
(6) Against metaphysics. 
Positivist scientists emphasise verification. Significant propositions are those whose 
truth or falsehood can be settled in some way, usually by evidence gained hy 
observation. Observation is impersonal and objective. There is no causality in 
nature, only constant regularities. One event simply follows another. Explanations 
may help organise phenomena, but do not provide any deeper answer to "Why" 
questions except to say that the phenomena regularly occur in such-and-such a way. 
Entities referred to in theories may or may not exist. Positivists tend to he non-re-
alists, not only because they restrict reality to the observable, but also because they 
are against causes and are dubious about explanations. Finally, they are opposed 
to anything metaphysical. Untestable propositions, unobservable entities, causes, 
deep explanations: these, says the positivist, are the stuff of metaphysics and must 
he eliminated. 
Instrumentalism is closely related to positivism. It also has all of the above six 
properties, but emphasises the one concerning theories. Theories are not true 
descriptions of reality, but rather only fictions to assist computational predictions. 
So, in addition to the above six characteristics of positivism, we can add "emphasis 
on rules and computational predictions". 
37 
For example, a positivist view of Newton's gravitational 'field' states that it is simply 
a calculating device. A field cannot have real existence. For in Newton's theory, a 
change in the position of one object would register instantaneously at the other. 
This is impossible. Therefore, say the positivists, gravitational field is not physically 
real, but only a theoretical fiction for coordinating our predictions. 
In contrast, Faraday believed that fields were real because iron filings sprinkled 
around a magnet fall into curved patterns. Also, Faraday's concept of field implied 
that it carried energy, which seems a strong reason for thinking of his field as real, 
as Powers (1983, p.47) correctly points out. The positivist, instrumentalist view 
cannot properly account for the concept of field. Indeed, the experimental success 
of Faraday with his idea of field meant that it had to be taken seriously. There is 
some truth in Backing's (1983) contention that scientific realism wins the battle with 
instrumentalism when it comes to experimental intervention. 
Positivism regards both realist theories and instrumentalist theories as valid working 
hypotheses. Both work in practice, but instrumentalism is more convenient, and 
this is all that matters. 
2.4.9 Logical positivism 
In the 1920's, a group of physicists and philosophers, called the Vienna Circle, 
proposed a strict form of positivist empiricism, with a strong emphasis on language 
and the logical meaning of scientific statements. This came to be known as logical 
positivism. It reinforced the inductivist view, and held that it is meaningless to talk 
about things that cannot be observed. There is, therefore, nothing behind or beyond 
experience. For logical positivists, such as Rudolf Carnap, phenomenalism is an 
adequate approach to science,just as realism is. Both yield successful results. Both 
work in practice. However, the language of phenomenalism is more convenient. 
For logical positivists, verification and operationalism are central techniques. 
Verification is strongly empiricist, based on objective observation and inductive 
generalisation. Operationalism concentrates on defining concepts in terms of 
measuring procedures. This leads to a definite instrumentalist view of theory. 
Theories are logical constructs. 
Logical positivism has profoundly influenced the philosophical attitude of modern 
science and in particular physics. It advocates a pruning process in order to 
eliminate metaphysics from science as much as possible. Only statements which are 
observationally verifiable should be taken as significant. How then can we speak 
about unobservables such as electrons and photons? Bertrand Russell held that 
unobservables are inferred entities, and should be linked to direct observation 
statements by logic. 
The chief criticism of the verification principle is that it relies strongly on induction. 
As we have seen, inductive statements go beyond the facts. They contain more 
information than the evidence warrants. Also, causality is seen in a very restricted 
38 
light. Physics today plays down causal talk. As Hanson (1971, p.34) observes, 
physics today is concerned with 
"only earlier and later states of affairs, theoretically construed". 
This last point is becoming increasingly noticeable in contemporary science, namely, 
the awareness that science is theory-laden. As for operationalism, in spite of the 
fact that "it works" very well, it reduces science to "a kind of bookkeeping", as 
Medawar (1967, p.137) puts it. 
So, today, logical positivism has fallen from favour. No one today wants to be called 
a positivist. Positivism is now regarded as too impersonal and anti-social, and as 
having been a factor in creating the technological ogre. Unfortunately, its influence 
lingers, especially in school science. Science is still seen as a body of proven 
knowledge which can provide absolute certainty about the world. 
2.4.10 Dewey's instrumentalist pragmatism 
A pragmatic approach to knowledge developed as the result of the American 
frontier experience, in the light of which 
"Americans came to measure success in terms of the consequences 
which accrued from harnessing the environment for human purposes." 
(Gutek 1974, p.106) 
The pragmatism propounded by John Dewey (1929) has many similarities with 
logical positivism. It sought to avoid the metaphysical question of realism by 
denying that there is a dualism of reality and phenomenon. Dewey argued that 
classical realism was a metaphysical ploy to seek stability in a changing, uncertain 
world. It tended to promote theoretical, academic speculation rather than practical 
activity. Children learn through active reconstruction of their experience. Theory 
is tested in experience. Mind is a social process of solving problems. Questions of 
real existence are irrelevant. What matters is, not man's quest for certainty, but how 
he copes with and controls the processes of an imperfect, changing world. Ideas are 
tentative, instrumental plans of action designed to achieve human ends. 
Dewey called his pragmatism instrumentalism. For Dewey, language and theories 
are instruments that mould our experiences to suit our purposes. Our world, and 
our representation of it, is a social construct. An instrumentalist approach to 
scientific inquiry tends to be pragmatic and utilitarian. 
Dewey's phenomenalist standpoint affected his notion of truth. For most realists, 
truth is the correspondence between an assertion and reality. For Dewey, truth is 
that which is confirmed by testing. It is that which works. Truth is created when an 
assertion is confirmed. This can be illustrated by an example given by Gardner 
(1983). Suppose there is a penny in a box. The realist says 'There is a penny in the 
box", whether or not the assertion is verified. The pragmatist says 'There is a penny 
in the box", only when, on opening the box, he sees the penny. Truth is instrumental 
and expedient. Theories are not 
"judged in terms of truth or falsity but rather in terms of their usefulness 
as instruments". (Chalmers 1986, p.147) 
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Karl Popper rejects this notion of truth, for it is relativistic. Popper is a "common-
sense realist", who holds that the world exists out there independently of whether 
we believe it or not. A theory can be true even if nobody believes it. By refusing to 
commit himself to a scientific realism, Dewey has jeopardised scientific knowledge, 
and risked bringing it to the brink of idealism and a superficial utilitarianism. 
2.4.11 Relativity and instrumentalism 
Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity of 1905 suggested the idea that simultaneity 
is relative to a frame of reference. Simultaneity involves measuring times and time 
intervals. The fundamental problem in measuring time intervals is that, two events 
that appear simultaneous in one frame of reference do not appear simultaneous in 
a second frame of reference that is moving relative to the first, even if both are 
inertial frames. Consider a long train moving at constant velocity. Two bolts of 
lightning strike the train, one at each end (A and B). An observer on the ground is 
located midway between A and B. An observer on the moving train is also midway 
between its ends. Suppose the two light signals reach the observer on the ground 
simultaneously. He concludes that the two events took place simultaneously. But 
the observer on the moving train receives the light signal from the front of the train 
before the other. He concludes that the event at the front of the train took place 
earlier than the one at the rear. Hence simultaneity depends on the state of motion 
of the observer, provided that it is assumed that the speed of light does not change. 
Neither length nor time can be regarded as absolute: the measures of each will 
always have to be related to a frame of reference. This preserves Einstein's Light 
Postulate, namely, that the speed of light is invariant. 
These are strange ideas. Even more strange is the fact that Einstein gave them a 
physical interpretation. However, positivists have urged that they must be inter-
preted instrumentally: the theory is merely a mathematical device, with no refer-
ence to reality. They argue that Einstein's procedure for synchronising clocks in 
different locations is an operational definition. Hard-line operationalism seems to 
be arbitrary, dependent on the choice of experimental technique. 
Berkeley had long before rejected the idea of true proper motion. He maintained 
that only relative motion was possible and that absolute space and time were simply 
fictions. So Einstein's theory was well-received by instrumentalists. 
The most disturbing implication of Einstein's theory seemed to be the threat it 
offered to the notion of 'an independent physical reality'. As Powers (1982, p.87) 
points out: 
"Classical physics seemed to have a grip on a picture of the physical 
world as it really is; 'relativity' seems to suggest that this 'real physical 
world' must forever elude our grasp and that we ought to reconcile 
ourselves to merely describing the results of measurements - 'saving the 
appearances' as it was once called." 
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The instrumentalist interpretation given to relativity theory is part of the "slippery 
slope from positivism to idealism", as Powers puts it. This seems to give rise to a 
world of fictions, a case of mathematics putting common-sense to flight. We appear 
to be back to a new kind of scholasticism, where belief in abstruse calculations takes 
priority over the evidence of one's senses. 
And yet, from the fantasy there emerges a ray of light, which brings us back to earth. 
For the theory of relativity reveals quantities which are invariant, which - even in 
common-sense terms - is the best possible reason for saying that it has 'a grip on 
reality'. (Powers 1982, p.97) The chief among these is the concept of "mass-energy", 
the idea of energy that converts into mass, and vice versa in a magnificent conserva-
tion law. Whereas in Newtonian mechanics there are two conservation laws, one 
for energy and one for momentum, in relativity theory they can be replaced by a 
single conservation law. And whereas in classical mechanics mass was a conserved 
quantity, in special relativity the quantity that is conserved is the sum of the masses 
and their relativistic kinetic energies. This new concept subsumes that of mass in 
an overarching conservation law. Far from sounding the death-knell of the real 
physical world, Einstein's theory revives it. 
2.4.12 Quantum theory and instrumentalism 
In 1927 Niels Bohr put forward his famous 'Principle of Complementarity' to 
account for the puzzle of wave-particle duality. The critical point is that the 
complementary descriptions are mutually exclusive. If a theory purports to de-
scribe reality (as a realist would believe it does), then an ambiguous reality is 
suggested. Which one is true, wave reality, or particle reality? Therefore a realist 
interpretation of the wave-particle duality seems to fall, and an instrumentalist 
interpretation seems the only sane alternative. Instrumentalists hold that any 
difficulties in making sense of this duality arise from a misguided desire to 'look 
behind' the experimental results for a 'metaphysical' explanation. 
Bohr believed that there was 'something' physically real there, but that we can never 
penetrate behind the experimental arrangements to reach this 'something'. In other 
words, to escape from the 'metaphysical' problems, he shelved any attempt to apply 
the theory to the real physical world. He adopted an instrumentalist standpoint. 
Popper (1956, p.361) regards Bohr's Principle as a 
"'renunciation' of the attempt to interpret atomic theory as a description 
of anything". 
Bohr's Principle simply avoided certain contradictions by adopting a self-consistent 
formalism. Thus the result of every single experiment was consistent with the 
theory. This, said Popper, is all we could ever get, and all we could ever hope for. 
Bohr used scientific theory in an instrumentalist way. He used it ad hoc in order to 
escape from contradictions. Popper regards instrumentalist theory as obscurantist 
and fruitless. He says 
41 
" the principle of complementarity has ... remained sterile within 
physics. In twenty-seven years it has produced nothing except some 
philosophical discussions ... " (Popper 1956, p.362) 
Einstein himself found the implications of quantum theory very troubling. He 
rejected Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, a stategy modelled on the operation-
alist analysis of simultaneity which Einstein himself had proposed twenty years 
earlier. Positivists accepted Heisenberg's idea, because they held that it was 
meaningless to talk of physical quantities which could not actually be measured. 
Einstein opposed the implicit positivism in Heisenberg's Principle, and continued 
to do so until the end of his life. 
In 1935, Einstein, together with associates Podolsky and Rosen, had set out a 
thought-experiment, the so-called EPR Paradox. If two isolated particles interact 
and then separate again, by measuring the momentum of one, we can infer the 
momentum of the other, even though we did not observe it. We can infer that it has 
this momentum independently of the fact that we made an observation on the other 
particle. Now, according to Powers (1982, p.148) a theory is said to imply that a 
physical property of a system is real if it allows us to predict its value without our 
interacting with the system. Therefore, said Einstein, the momentum is real. 
Bohr, however, interpreted the EPR experiment in a holistic way. Particles which 
were once together in an interaction remain in some sense part of a single system. 
Einstein felt that this was a further retreat from reality. 
In 1982 Alain Aspect and his associates at the University of Paris-South, performed 
an experiment involving measuring the direction of polarisation of a rapidly 
switched beam of light. The polarisers were randomly changed while a pair of 
photons was in flight. The switching was so fast, that measurement of one photon 
could not affect the other. The point was that it was thought that the experimental 
design would affect the photon. The photon remains in an indeterminate state until 
it is observed. The very act of measuring its direction of polarisation brings it from 
its indeterminate state to a real state of polarisation. The experiment was, in a way, 
a test to find the underlying reality below the unreal world of the quantum. 
According to quantum theory, polarisation does not exist until it is measured. 
According to realists, each photon has a real, intrinsic polarisation from the moment 
it is created. The result of this crucial experient showed that polarisation does not 
exist until it is measured. As Gribbin (1984) puts it, "Nothing is real unless it is 
observed." The experiment seemed to prove that there is no underlying reality to 
the world. Even though this experiment was performed after Einstein's death, the 
idea would have been anathema to him. Instrumentalism seems to have won the 
battle with realism. 
We can never recover the world-picture of classical physics. The EPR experiment 
implies that there is instantaneous action at a distance in the underlying field. 
Richard Feynman in his Lectures on Physics, cited by Gribbin ( 1984, p. 231 ), summed 
up the paradox as follows: 'The 'paradox' is only a conflict between reality and your 
feeling of what reality 'ought to be'." 
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Perhaps this means that we should revise our notion of reality. Perhaps we could 
return to the 'holistic agnosticism' of Bohr. Or we could accept a reality in which 
'action-at-a-distance' occurs. Yet one is left with the feeling that a theoretical realist 
like Einstein would somehow find this an unsatisfactory solution. 
2.4.13 Summary 
From this survey of the origins of instrumentalism, several points relevent to this 
study come to light: 
(1) 'Saving the appearances' is arbitrary. It does not matter what theory is 
invented, provided it works. 
(2) Instrumentalists hold theories in low regard. Theories are simply fictions. 
(3) Instrumentalism is a stage on the way toward realism 
( 4) Instrumental ism is phenomenalist. 
(5) There are two types of instrumentalism: strong and weak. 
Strong instrumentalism refers to those scientists ( eg Bohr) who brought forward 
experimental results which were incompatible with a realist interpretation. Weak 
instrumentalists accept that theoretical entities may exist, but they are not interested 
in them. Their published material may be read from either a realist or an instrumen-
talist point of view. This study is more concerned with weak instrumentalism. 
Classical instrumentalism, which denies any kind of ontological status to the the-
oretical entities of science, is sometimes called 'strong' instrumentalism. Many of 
the recent critics of scientific realism are 'weak 'instrumentalists. These allow that 
theoretical entities have an everyday existence of the 'chairs and goldfish' kind, but 
reject that there is any deeper sense of the really real. Their rhetoric is antirealist 
in tone, but their position often seems compatible with scientific realism. They seem 
to have the best of both worlds. As McMullin (in Leplin 1984, p.26) says, "I am 
inclined to think that their effort to have it both ways must in the end fail." It is as 
dangerous to 'hedge one's bets' in the scientific enterprise as it is in anything else. 
2.5 Characteristics of instrumentalism 
Using Hacking's six characteristics of positivism discussed above, the chief char-
acterstics of instrumentalism can be listed as: 
(a) Emphasis on observation: What we can see, touch, taste, smell and hear, 
provides the best foundation for knowledge. Observation is objective and 
impersonal. 
(b) Opposition to causality: There is no cause in nature. What we observe are 
simply constant regularities. 
(c) Downplaying of explanations: Explanations may help organise phenomena, 
but do not provide any deeper knowledge. 
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( d) Rejection of theoretical entities: Reality is phenomenal only, and is 
restricted to what can be observed. 
( e) Downplaying of theories: Theories have no correspondence to reality apart 
from their usefulness as tools for thought. 
In addition to these positivist characteristics, the instrumentalist makes great use of 
operational definitions and calculations for predictive purposes. 
2.6 Implications of instrumentalism 
The indisputable success of science is no doubt due in part to the clean-cut, 'no-frills' 
instrumentalist method, which serves to clarify concepts and tighten arguments. 
However, instrumentalism can easily lead to idealism, phenomenalism, agnosticism, 
relativism, gamesmanship, a spectator attitude, and pragmatism. 
2.6.1. Idealism: If only sensory knowledge is valid, then all we ever know is the 
experience of our sense impressions. We can never be sure that an independant 
world lies outside of ourselves. For example, in open-brain surgery, a touch of a 
probe on a particular part of the brain can trigger off a sensation of smell, even 
though no external smell is there. To postulate the existence of something outside 
us is a metaphysical jump, which is not allowed by empiricist philosophy. So we 
remain forever trapped within ourselves, and our thoughts are the only things we 
know. Reality is in the mind. We become idealists, or, at very least, sceptics. 
2.6.2. Phenomenalism: Our senses experience phenomena directly. What we see 
is what we get. For the empiricist, the directly observed thing is reality. There is no 
underlying reality behind appearance. The surface view is all that there is. Things 
are exactly what they seem. Thus an empiricist/instrumentalist view is superficial. 
2.6.3. Agnosticism: If only sensory knowledge is valid, then the notion of God is 
seriously undermined. Scepticism and atheism follow. 
2.6.4. Relativism: If theoretical knowledge is downgraded into a fiction which has 
no necessary physical counterpart, it need not be taken seriously, for it can be as 
arbitrary as another cog in the wheel of Ptolemy's epicycles. For most people, truth 
is a correspondence to reality, but for an instrumentalist, truth is what works. Truth 
is relative. It depends on the result of inquiry. A statement is not true in itself. It 
is only true if found to be so. 
2.6.5. Gamesmanship: Because an instrumentalist scientist does not take his the-
ories seriously and regards them only as useful devices for prediction, the whole 
scientific enterprise becomes a game. It is not interested in explanation, but simply 
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that it works. If this is all that science is, then it is dishonest. As Powers ( 1982, p.164) 
has commented, it may be viewed as a costly hoax we have played on ourselves. 
Pirsig (1974, p.24) distinguishes between scientists and technologists. Whereas the 
scientist thinks about what he is doing, the technologist performs a job mechan-
ically. The scientist is committed to seeking out the implications of his research; 
the technologist remains uninvolved. The scientist is passionately caught up in his 
work; the technologist is a spectator. The scientist does the research for its own 
sake; the technologist is only interested in whether it works or not. The scientist's 
results may or may not be useful; the technologist's are useful. 
Of course the above assertions are blatant generalisations. But the point is that the 
scientist should have a much deeper perspective than the technologist. His interest 
should penetrate reality. He should be a realist, who cares about research for its 
own sake without any regard for its usefulness. He should be willing to stick his neck 
out and confidentally say, "Electrons do exist!". He should be prepared to make 
bold conjectures, and not be immersed in the wishy-washy attitude of instrumental-
ist science. He should be committed to realism, and not play games. 
A similar phenomenon occurs in the field of computers, and particularly computer 
games. How easily youngsters become addicted to computer games! They seem to 
be thoroughly involved. But are they really? For those asteroids hurtling across 
their monitor screens, and the laser beams flashing their destructive paths, are mere 
simulations, flickering images, obediently following their programmed coordinates. 
The eye predicts, the hand presses a button, a high-speed digital calculation occurs, 
and the asteroid is destroyed in a gigantic explosion. But the pieces of shrapnel 
whizzing past are not real. It is only a game. And as such, it is passive, and the player 
is essentially uninvolved. As a game, it is good and useful, as far as it goes. But it is 
not real life. 
I contend that computer games are prime examples of the instrumentalist attitude. 
This struck me one evening in 1986 when I was using a BASIC program I had written 
to predict the position of Halley's Comet on a given night. It was only a calculus for 
prediction, like Ptolemy's. Data and images could be manipulated in a purely 
geometric way, with little or no reference to physical reality. The computer was 
isolated in time and space from everything else in the universe. It had no relation-
ship with the user, or the Cosmos, except in a superficial, instrumental way. It was 
not interested in the real physical gravitational forces pulling on real masses. It 
merely computed the mathematical models of Newton's Laws, and came up with 
the right answer. It was a spectator, and it made the user a passive spectator as well. 
For instead of going out and observing the night sky for oneself, one tended to 
become an armchair astronomer. And therein lay its danger. 
Powers (1982) encourages us to take a realist stance in science, for we can easily he 
deceived by the escapism and superficiality of the instrumentalist approach. Real-
ism 
"requires us to take very seriously the question of the consistency of the 
assumptions our theories make. A recipe-hook instrumental ism carries 
with it no such injunction. Phenomenalism (or sub- microscopic phe-
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nomenalism) provides a way of brushing problems of intelligibility 
aside, but if the implication is that we are simply investigating ex-
perimental effects we produce in our apparatus and that these can tell 
us nothing about 'what is there', then the whole enterprise may seem 
like a costly hoax we have played on ourselves; and it will be hard to 
believe a positivist who claims that this makes no difference. When 
experimentalists 'bombard' protons with electrons they have to 'be-
lieve' in both their missiles and their targets; though it seems 'hard-
headed', phenomenalism is a theory for spectators rather than actors." 
(Powers 1982, p.164) 
The deliberate lack of commitment to a serious realism suggests that instrumental-
ists are playing games. For Berne (1964, p.44), 
· "A game is an ongoing series of complementary ulterior transactions 
progressing to a well-defined, predictable outcome." 
Games are substitutes for real living. They are governed by rules, and involve 
activity and fantasy. Games are directed towards the manipulation of reality, and 
are evaluated by their effectiveness or payoff. Games may not be intended to convey 
information, but merely to follow a predetermined course to an expected conclu-
sion. Games are basically dishonest, for they tend to be cosmetic and superficial, 
shelving the important issues of life. They can be manoeuvres to attain pragmatic, 
utilitarian goals. 
The parallel of games with instrumentalism is more than mere coincidence. For, 
like games, instrumentalism is a substitute for commitment to realism. Instrumen-
talists are concerned only with manipulation and control of the natural world, and 
are more interested in the practical pay-off than constructing intelligible explana-
tions of the natural world. Their procedures follow a predetermined course and 
yield expected conclusions. Finally, like games, instrumentalism is also basically 
dishonest, for it deliberately ignores whole areas of non-empirical reality in order 
to achieve a type of knowledge which is as objective and as theory-free as possible. 
This is a pretence, for it goes on to imply that non-empirical reality does not exist. 
This pretence is nothing new. It can be traced back to the early Greeks, who put 
forward elaborate cosmological theories to account for certain observations in spite 
of the fact that the theory completely contradicted other known facts. Koestler 
( 1959, p.65) notes that there was "a certain dishonesty" about this. Yet this de-
veloped into the "controlled schizophrenia" of "saving the appearances" at all costs. 
''Their (the Greek astronomers) main concern was to 'save the appear-
ances'. The original meaning of this ominous phrase was that a theory 
must do justice to the observed phenomena, or 'appearances'; in plain 
words, that it must agree with the facts. But gradually, the phrase came 
to mean something different. The astronomer 'saved' the phenomena 
if he succeeded in inventing a hypothesis which resolved the irregular 
motions of the planets along irregularly shaped orbits into regular 
motions along circular orbits - regardless whether the hypothesis was 
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true or not, ie. whether it was physically possible or not." (Koestler 
1959, p.73) 
Ptolemy made it quite clear why astronomy must renounce all attempts to explain 
the physical reality behind phenomena; because the heavenly bodies, being of a 
divine nature, obey laws different from those found on Earth. Ptolemy was a 
whole-hearted Platonist. He divorced sky-geometry from physics, astronomy from 
reality. The split world, says Koestler (1959, p.74), is reflected in the split mind. It 
knows that in reality the sun has a physical influence on the planets; but reality is 
no longer its concern. 
2.6.6.Spectatorship: If scientific theories are mere fictions with no reference to 
reality, then science has no sense of commitment. It is content to remain passive 
and uninvolved. It prefers technology to front-line research, for there is no incen-
tive. It simply becomes isolated in time and space, and has no relationship to the 
user, who is therefore tempted to remain a passive and uninvolved spectator. 
2.6.7. Pragmatism: Instrumentalism emphasises utility: the purpose of science is 
not to explain but to provide useful predictions. Hence nothing is worth doing 
unless it is useful. So Space Shuttles are preferable to Voyager probes, because the 
former have important military and economic spin-offs, whereas there is little 
obvious use in taking a few pictures of distant planet Neptune. Instrumentalism 
does not encourage the search for truly new knowledge. It appeals to the "instant 
success" attitude of modern man. 
Dewey's pragmatic thesis that if a hypothesis works, it is true, is a dangerous one, 
for it easily leads to relativism of the following type: It does not matter whether 
God exists or not; what is important is that the hypothesis works. Similarly, it does 
not matter whether there is a reality behind the phenomenon; the phenomenon is 
sufficient in itself, for it works. It does not matter whether an electron or a photon 
exists or not, as long as the fictitious concept works. But, of course, it does matter. 
For how can any physicist aim a beam of electrons at a cathode-ray screen, and not 
believe that electrons actually exist? Not to do so is essentially dishonest. 
Commenting on the recent cut-backs in the American space-research programme, 
Lago ( 1983) observes that contemporary Western society's emphasis on practicality 
and financial success has led to utilitarian values. Nothing is worth doing unless it 
is useful. Since space-probes to the planets have no obvious, direct usefulness, 
funding for such projects has been considerably reduced. The proposed probe by 
the United States to Comet Halley was cancelled, and America is the poorer for 
this. The entire American exploratory space programme has languished, because 
of pragmatic values. The very frontier mentality of pragmatism which created 
America has sadly blinded that country to any enterprise which is not pragmatic. 
According to a comment in Sky and Telescope (October 1988, p.332), most Ameri-
cans do not think that the space programme is as important as, say, crime, or drugs, 
or AIDS, or even garbage collection. 
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"Practicality has created America's greatness, but we have paid a dear 
price for it - and in the space age, that price is paralysis." (Lago 1983, 
p.28) 
That this is true was borne out by the tragic Space Shuttle Challenger disaster in 
January 1986. The practical success of the space programme was seriously 
wounded, and Americans lost their self-confidence. All major space exploration in 
the United States ceased until September 1988, when Discovery went into orbit. 
During those two years, paralysis set in. Not only did NASA miss a golden oppor-
tunity to send a probe to Halley's Comet, but the unique encounter of Voyager 2 
with planet Uranus was mentioned in passing, as it were, by the media. 
Knowledge for its own sake has a low value in contemporary Western society. This 
materialistic, utilitarian philosophy has spread to all highly technological countries. 
It is reflected in the instrumentalist attitude. This, in turn, is entrenched in our high 
school science textbooks. 
We must break out of this vicious circle, for there are unquestionably certain human 
enterprises which are justifiable in themselves, without having to be obviously 
useful. But the instrumentalist attitude tends to blind us to this, and encourages the 
passivity syndrome which permeates so much of modern society. 
Commenting on Dewey's instrumentalist pragmatism, Bertrand Russell (1979, 
p.782) wrote: 
"In all this I feel a grave danger, the danger of what might be called 
cosmic impiety." 
For Russell, the instrumentalist view of truth about the world lacks the necessary 
element of humility. It is a step 
"on the road towards a certain kind of madness ... I am persuaded that 
this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philos-
ophy which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the 
danger of vast social disaster." (Russell 1979, p.782) 
2.7 Popper's critique of Instrumentalism 
Popper maintains that instrumentalists have no reason to take pride in their appar-
ent victory. For although 
"science is valued, admittedly, for its practical achievements; but it is 
even more highly valued for its informative content, and for its ability 
to free our minds from old beliefs, old prejudices, and old certainties, 
and to offer us in their stead new conjectures and daring hypotheses. 
Science is valued for its liberalising influence." (Popper 1956, p.363) 
Scientists have dared to create theories, or conjectures, which are in striking contrast 
to the everyday world of our senses. Aristarchus and Copernicus conceived the 
heliocentric theory, and held it to be true, in violation of the evidence of their own 
senses. Such theories would be important even if they were only exercises of the 
imagination. But they are more than this. We submit them to severe tests. We try 
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to explain the regularities we observe. And so we reach out to new knowledge. Our 
theories are informative about the physical world. 
Those who regard science as nothing more than glorified plumbing, and scientists 
as only technicians, see it as useful, but of little cultural worth. It does not reveal 
new worlds. The physical world is just.surface: it has no depth. The world is just 
what it appears to be. The instrumentalist attitude prevents fruitfull questions from 
being asked. 
The issue, therefore, lies between a critical and adventurous rationalism and a 
narrow and defensive belief according to which we cannot and need not learn and 
understand more about our world than we know already. The latter creed is 
incompatible with the appreciation of science as one of the greatest achievements 
of the human spirit. 
Popper's criticism of instrumentalism runs as follows: Instrumentalists hold that 
scientific theories are nothing but technological computational rules. There is a big 
difference between pure theories (in the realist sense) and instrumentalist theories. 
Firstly, computational rules (such as navigational rules) are tried out rather than 
rigorously tested by attempts to refute them. Computational rules are tested by 
applying them. But proper theories are tested by selecting for our tests those crucial 
cases in which we expect the theory to fail if it is not true. The expectation is much 
different from that of computational rules. A theory can be falsified by an attempt 
to refute it. If not, it is confirmed. An instrument can break down, or be outmoded. 
But it does not make sense to say that we submit an instrument to the most severe 
test we can design, in order to reject it if it does not stand up to them. Instruments 
cannot be refuted. 
The point is, that the instrumentalist interpretation will say that different theories 
have different applications. But it cannot account for scientific progress. 
This brings us to Popper's second point, namely, the question of new theories. 
Instrumentalist theory is not informative about the world. It does not lead to novel 
facts or new theories. It is just as obscurantist as essentialism. Instrumentalists have 
a cautious attitude which encourages them to assert nothing other than can safely 
be derived from the sure basis of observation. Insofar as the realist is prepared to 
stick his neck out and conjecture that the theoretical entities suggested by his theory 
really do exist, he is much bolder than the instrumentalist. And history has shown 
the realist stance to be more productive and fruitful. For example, Cardinal Bellar-
mine's instrumentalist standpoint avoided problems but led to scientific sterility in 
astronomy for centuries, whereas the realist position taken by Galileo posed many 
problems, but was more fruitful. It was precisely those problems that provided the 
incentive for further development. 
'There is an important distinction which we can make between two 
kinds of scientific prediction and which instrumentalists cannot make; 
a distinction which is connected with the problem of scientific discovery. 
I have in mind the distinction between the prediction of events of a kind 
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which is known, such as eclipses, or thunderstorms, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the prediction of new kinds of events (which the 
physicist calls 'new effects') such as the prediction which led to the 
discovery of wireless waves, or of zero-point energy, or to the artificial 
building up of new elements, not previously found in nature. 
It seems to me clear that instrumentalism can only account for the first 
kind of prediction ... " (Popper 1956, p.385) 
Popper concludes by saying that the search for a reality behind appearance has to 
be discarded once we become conscious of the fact that the world of each of our 
theories may be explained, in its turn, by further theories - theories of a higher level 
of abstraction. We are led to take all these worlds, including our ordinary world, as 
equally real. It is a mistake, says Popper, to regard the phenomenon of my piano as 
real, while its alleged molecules and atoms are mere 'logical constructions'. There 
are levels of reality, or levels of conjecture. All these theories are real, from the one 
of direct phenomenal observation, down to the most abstract theory of quantised 
field of forces. Note that, for Popper, all observation is theory-laden, the result of 
interpretation. He states (1956, p.386): 
"It is my belief that our discoveries are guided ... by theory, rather than 
that theories are the result of discoveries 'due to observation'; for 
observation itself tends to be guided by theory . .. .I cannot but think that 
it is a mistake to denounce Newtonian forces (the 'cause of accelera-
tion') as occult, and try to discard them ... in favour of accelerations. For 
accelerations cannot be observed any more directly than forces." 
In other words, the directly-observed phenomenon is just as theory-dependent as 
the unobservable. There are degrees of conjecture. 
Thus the distinction between Locke's primary and secondary qualities falls away. 
Both qualities are equally real, and equally theory-dependent and in the perceiver. 
Appearance is part of reality, not reality itself. To quote Popper again: 
'There is a reality behind the world as it appears to us, possibly a 
many-layered reality, of which the appearances are the outermost 
layers. What the great scientist does is boldly to guess, daringly to 
conjecture, what these inner realities are like. This is akin to myth 
making." ( in Miller 1983, p.122) 
Popper states that we should hold a state of affairs as real if, and only if, the statement 
describing it is true. But, he notes, it would be a grave mistake to conclude from 
this that the uncertainty of a theory, that is, its conjectural character, diminishes in 
any way its claim to be real. We are not omniscient, and no doubt much of what is 
real is still unknown to us. It is thus indeed the old Berkeleyian mistake (in the form 
'to be is to be known') which still underlies instrumentalism. 
The fact that some of our theories clash with reality, tells us that there is a reality. 
And this, says Popper, is why the re~list is right. 
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Summary of Popper's critique: 
Popper rejects instrumentalism on three grounds: 
(1) Realist theories can be falsified by a crucial test, whereas instrumentalist 
theories are neither true nor false, only useful. 
(2) Realist theories are informative about the world; instrumentalist theories 
yield 'expected' predictions. 
(3) Realist theories accept levels of reality from direct appearance to abstract 
theory, each level being theory-laden; instrumentalists separate observation 
from theory, and hold that appearance is the only reality. 
In my judgement, Popper's notion that theories should be truly informative, and 
that there are levels of reality, is correct. However, according to most contemporary 
philosophers of science, Popper errs in (1). No theory is refutable by a single test. 
For rival theories are often held simultaneously. Therefore a more complete 
critique of instrumentalism needs to take the views of other com temporary philos-
ophers of science into account. This will be done in the following section. 
2.8 Instrumentalism and constructivism relativist? 
Both instrumentalism and constructivism stem from the pragmatic notion of coping 
with the environment. Pragmatism is rooted in empiricism, as the historical survey 
above has shown. Yet in spite of this common heritage, I contend that it is possible 
that a constructivist approach in science education may be a way of off-setting some 
of the empiricist problems inherent in the instrumentalist position. 
Constructivism is a theory of knowledge which holds that human beings build up 
their notion of reality. Knowledg~ of the real word is an intellectual construct, or a 
theoretical structure. From the point of view of this study, its chief characteristics 
are that the construction of theories involves the creative imagination, and is active 
rather than passive, as empiricist theories of knowlege tend to be. 
Therefore, what is now needed is a brief outline of how instrumentalism and 
constructivism are seen in terms of contemporary thinking. Contemporary philos-
ophy of science is chiefly concerned with theory as an over-riding structure. This 
section will look at the part played by theory in both instrumental ism and construc-
tivism. 
Theoretical constructs arise through the interaction between present experience 
and previous knowledge. Theories are invented to make experience viable and 
hence meaningful. Constructivism involves a choice between rival theories. The 
instrumentalist approach to science involves the arbitrary and free interchange of 
theories for the sake of greater convenience. Because theories are held in low 
esteem by both instrumentalists and constructivists, this free interchange is possible 
with little need for inductive testing. 
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The questions this section addresses are: Is constructivism to be preferred to 
instrumentalism? Can constructivism overcome the weaknesses of instrumental-
ism? Is choice between theories a matter of whim? Are instrumentalism and 
constructivism relativist? 
2.8.1 Conventionalism 
When rival theories are to be compared, the scientific community must decide which 
to accept. Such decisions take on the role of conventions, and are left to the good 
judgement of scientists. This approach to science is known as conventionalism. For 
a conventionalist, the question of truth or falsity does not arise. A theory is not 
'provenly true' but only 'true by convention'. The long-term practice of the scientific 
community agrees on a theory's truth status. 
If a conventionalist wishes to retain the idea that science has anything to do with 
objective, factual truth, he must devise some independent metaphysical principle. 
If he does not, he cannot escape from scepticism, or, at least, some radical form of 
instrumentalism. Instrumentalism is a form of conventionalism. So too is construc-
tivism. 
Conventionalism rests on the conviction that "false assumptions may have true 
consequences; therefore false theories may have great predictive power." (Lakatos 
in Hacking, 1981, p.111) For example, Ptolemy's theory, while wrong, had great 
predictive power. But conventionalists had to face the problem of comparing rival 
false theories. Most of them identified truth with what conventionally is true and 
found themselves holding some version of pragmatism. 
In instrumentalist forms of conventionalism, one does not have to adhere forever 
to a given theory. One may abandon it if it becomes unbearably clumsy and if a 
simpler one is offered to replace it. It is in no need of valid inductive inferences. 
The changes on the theoretical level are only instrumental. Theoretical progress is 
only in convenience, not in truth content. Theory replacement becomes a matter 
of whim. 
2.8.2 Bold and cautious conjectures 
Popper maintains that science progresses by making bold conjectures, and then 
thinking up ways of refuting them. A bold conjecture is one which involves a risk, 
one which contradicts the accepted scientific view or the evidence of our senses. 
For example, the Copernican theory was a bold conjecture, because it both went 
against the geocentric theory of Ptolemy and contradicted our sensory experience 
that the sun travels across the sky. It must yield novel information. Predictions are 
novel if they involve some phenomenon that does not figure in, or is perhaps 
explicitly ruled out by, the background knowledge of the time. 
Significant advances are made by the confirmation of bold conjectures, or the 
falsification of cautious conjectures. The former case is informative because it 
marks the discovery of something previously considered unlikely. For example, 
Eddington confirmed Einstein's risky prediction that light rays bend in strong 
gravitational fields, thereby contributing to our knowledge. The information gained 
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was novel. On the other hand, the falsification of cautious conjectures is also 
informative because it establishes that what was regarded as unproblematically true 
is in fact false. For example, the prediction that Mars will be in a certain position in 
the sky on a given date is a cautious prediction, for it is easy to do. Yet if, for some 
reason, this was observationally refuted, the theoretical repercussions would be 
enormous. We would have learned something new. 
In contrast, if a bold conjecture is falsified, then all that is learnt is that yet another 
eccentric idea has been proved wrong. For example, Kepler's theory that the 
spacing of the orbits of the planets was related to Plato's five regular solids, was a 
bold idea. Yet its refutation was not a significant landmark in the progress of 
knowledge. Similarly, the confirmation of cautious hypotheses is uninformative. 
Such confirmations merely indicate that some theory that was well-established and 
regarded as unproblematic has been successfully applied once again. For example, 
if our prediction of the celestial position of Mars turned out correctly, this would 
not be new knowledge in the profound sense. It is only an expected prediction. To 
take another example from Chalmers (1986, p.55), the confirmation of the conjec-
ture that samples of iron extracted from its ore by some new process will, like other 
iron, expand when heated, would be of little consequence. Instrumentalist science 
usually falls into this latter category of cautious hypotheses. Constructivism usually 
involves the falsification of bold conjectures. 
The trouble with Popper's falsificationism is that it relies on observation which, 
being fallible, does not provide the decisive logical rigor that Popper desired. 
2.8.3 Sophisticated falsificationism 
Conventionalism was criticised on the grounds that comparison of theories is too 
subjective and arbitrary. Popper's falsificationism gave a firmer, more objective 
foundation to conventionalism. However, its weakness is that it allows singular, 
rather than universal, theories to be accepted by convention. That is, a theory can 
be refuted by a single, crucial experiment. Lakatos (1970), however, denied this. 
His more sophisticated falsificationism stated that science has a 'hard core' which 
cannot be modified or rejected. It is the decision of the scientific community to 
decide what is unfalsifiable in the hard core. If an anomaly occurs between obser-
vation and theory, it is dealt with by modifying the 'protective belt' of auxiliary 
hypotheses which surround the hard core. A young theory grows in spite of many 
falsifying observations. 
Thus no single experiment alone can lead to falsification. There is no falsification 
before the emergence of a better theory. Hence falsification is not just a relation 
between a theory and an observation, but a multiple relation between competing 
theories. 
Moreover, some of the theories which bring about falsification are frequently 
proposed after the counterevidence. Crucial counterevidence can be recognised as 
such among all the anomalies only with hindsight, in the light of some superceding 
theory. Thus the crucial element in falsification is whether the new theory offers 
any novel information compared with its predecessor. In spite of many anomalies, 
we do not consider a theory as falsified until we have a better one. Thus science 
53 
grows by a proliferation of rival theories rather than by counterexamples or anom-
alies. 
For Popper, an old theory is refuted, then a new one proposed. For Lakatos, an old 
theory cannot be refuted until a new one is proposed. 
2.8.4 Ad hoc hypotheses 
An ad hoc hypothesis usually involves the addition of an extra postulate to an existing 
theory to protect it from falsification. The modification has no testable consequen-
ces that were not already testable consequences of the unmodified theory. To use 
an example given by Chalmers, the generalisation "Bread nourishes" is a low-level 
theory. Suppose people from a particular village ate bread and died. The theory 
that "Bread nourishes" is now falsified. To protect it from falsification, the theory 
can be given an ad hoc modification: "Bread, with the exception of bread produced 
in the particular village, nourishes". It is ad hoc because it cannot be tested in any 
way that was not also a test of the original theory. 
Another example of an ad hoc theory is the addition of another epicycle into a 
planetary orbit, to make that observation fit the theory. Instrumentalists willingly 
accept ad hoc theories. 
Popper accepted saving a theory with the help of auxiliary hypotheses as long as it 
can be tested in a way that is not also a test in the original theory. Otherwise the 
auxiliary theory is ad hoc, and is to be rejected. 
2.8.5 Proliferation of theories 
Proliferation of theories is important for constructivists. Instrumentalists discard 
theories with little regard for their truth status. The criterion of theory choice is 
simply convenience. This is characteristic of pragmatism. Constructivists are in-
clined to choose theories they prefer, with little regard to logic or rational grounds. 
This is characteristic of voluntarism. This needs to be tempered by a severe critical 
attitude. Lakatos (in Lakatos & Musgrave 1970, p.187) said: 
"Scientists dream up phantasies and then pursue a highly selective hunt 
for new facts which fit these phantasies. This process may be described 
as 'science creating its own universe' ... The dogmatic falsificationist 
will throw up his hands in horror at this approach. He will see the 
spectre of Bellarmino's instrumentalism arising ... He may even brand 
it as a revival of the unholy irrationalist alliance of James's crude 
pragmatism and of Bergson's voluntarism ... But our sophisticated 
falsificationism combines 'instrumentalism' ( or 'conventionalism') with 
a strong empiricist requirement, ... the requirement that the - well-
planned - building of pigeonholes must proceed much faster than the 
recording of facts which are to be housed in them. . .. Sophisticated 
falsificationism thus combines the best elements of voluntarism, prag-
matism and of the realist theories of empirical growth." (in Lakatos & 
Musgrave 1970, p.188) 
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In other words, a research programme is said to be progressing as long as its 
theoretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is, as long as it keeps 
predicting novel facts with some success. 
So it may well be that the introduction of a new theory is needed before falsifying 
observations can be made. So long as we think within the confines of a particular 
conceptual framework we may be unable to unearth the evidence that would falsify 
that theory. An alternative perspective is needed to highlight the shortcomings of 
the existing theoretical system. 
This brings us back to Rogers's 'plogglies' theory. The arbitrary nature of the 
'plogglies' theory reveals it as too wild, too unscientific. Popper would regard it as 
unfalsifiable. It is a bold conjecture, but if it could be falsified, all we would learn 
is that yet another way-out theory has been proved wrong. Yet Feyerabend would 
regard it as the result of the pre-scientific, uninhibited, proliferation of ideas. It 
was, perhaps, a first step on the road towards scientific realism. 
Are instrumentalist theories, as fictions, the theories of cranks? Feyerabend (1981, 
p.199) distinguishes between the respectable scientist and the crank. How can we 
tell if a proposed theory is reasonable or absurd? The answer is that the crank is 
content with defending his theory in its original, undeveloped, metaphysical form, 
and he is not prepared to test it, or even admit that there is a problem. However, if 
he tries to adapt his theory to the accepted theory, and look at old problems from a 
new point of view, then he is progressing. In order to avoid being a crank, one must 
know one's subject. A., Chalmers (1986, p.136) says, commenting about this, it is 
not sufficient merely to follow one's whims and inclinations in an uninformed way. 
2.8.6 The principle of tenacity 
When a scientist is confronted by a number of theories, he must select the one that 
promises to lead to the most fruitful results. He should "stick to this one theory even 
if the actual difficulties it encounters are considerable." (Feyerabend in Lakatos & 
Musgrave 1970, p.203). 
When eliminating conjectures, we must use a principle of tenacity together with a 
principle of proliferation. We must be allowed to retain ideas in the face of 
difficulties; and we must he allowed to introduce new ideas even if the popular views 
should appear fully justified. 
2.8.7 The need for an empirical base 
Popper asserts that one theory may he closer to the truth than another, whether a 
particular individual or group of individuals thinks so or not. The approximation to 
the truth is termed by Popper the verisimilitude of the theory and, as science 
progresses, so the verisimilitude of its theories increases. 
Therefore we need to posit some inductive principle to relate - even if tenuously -
the scientific gambit of pragmatic acceptances and rejections to verisimilitude. Only 
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such an 'inductive principle' (says Lakatos) can turn science from a mere game into 
an epistemologically rational exercise. 
Feyerabend follows Popper in holding that theories are not confirmable by obser-
vation, but at best falsifiable. Scientific knowledge grows through the proliferation 
of theories, which can then be exposed to potential falsifiability through the editing 
effects of the world. (Petrie 1981, p.33) 
2.8.8 The critical attitude 
Theories cannot be refuted except with the help of alternatives. But before we 
accept an alternative theory, we must be strongly based in our present one. A critical 
attitude ensures that we do not take on new theories too arbitrarily. Scientists 
should not construct theories at random. Rather they must subject them to criticism 
in order to obtain better theories. 
"Proliferation means that there is no need to suppress even the most 
outlandish product of the human brain. Everyone may follow his incli-
nations and science, conceived as a critical enterprise, will profit from 
such an activity. Tenacity: this means that one is encouraged not just to 
follow one's inclinations, but to develop them further, to raise them, 
with the help of criticism (which involves a comparison of the existing 
alternatives) to a higher level of articulation and thereby to raise their 
defence to a higher level of consciousness." (Feyerabend in Lakatos & 
Musgrave 1970, p.210) 
Popper insists on ruthless rejection of an old theory if severe criticism refutes it. 
Yet he also advises scientists not to let go of old theories uncritically. 
"He who gives up his theory too easily in the face of apparent refutations 
will never discover the possibilities inherent in his theory .... Do not give 
up your theories too easily - not, at any rate, before you have critically 
examined your criticism." (Popper in Miller 1983, pp.126 and 127) 
Instrumentalists tend to release their theories too easily. A-; Popper suggests, we 
must not let go of our theories too readily. We must be very critical. The instrumen-
talist is not critical enough. Perhaps the same charge can be brought against the 
constructivist. It is this persistent critical attitude, together with the stringent editing 
effects of the world, which bolster both instrumental ism and constructivism against 
relativism. 
2.8.9 Constructivism on the way to instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism is a form of pragmatism, and so also is constructivism, but in 
different ways. They both are concerned with the purely pragmatic aim of coping 
with life. In order to cope, outmoded theories must be replaced by newer, more 
useful ones. 
Instrumentalism changes its theories too easily without sufficient regard to self-test-
ing against reality. It is more concerned with internal consistency than whether it 
describes physical reality. If instrumental ism is uncritical (in Popper's and Lakatos's 
sense), it may end in scepticism or idealism. 
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Constructivism psychologically precedes instrumentalism. Constructivist theory 
holds that the person constructs a variety of theories to account for observations, 
then chooses the best. This is achieved by testing the implications of each possible 
theory against each other and against reality. If this is done uncritically, then it may 
lead to an instrumentalist approach. If, however, it is done in a truly critical way, 
then it may go further and lead to full-blooded realism. For, as Popper rightly says, 
we approach reality through severe criticism of the consequences of our theories. 
2.8.10 Instrumentalism on the way to realism 
Instrumentalism is the first stage on the way towards realism. This can be seen both 
in the history of science as well as in the child's learning process. At first, we are 
likely to construct fictional theories without too much regard for testing their 
consequences. Through repetitive criticisms, we reject the more outlandish the-
ories, and come to accept those that are reliable and fruitful. Eventually, our 
confidence in our theoretical constructions entitles us to regard them as true 
descriptions and explanations of reality. 
2.8.11 Summary 
Several points arise from the above discussion. Firstly, instrumentalist theories are 
arbitrary. Therefore, uncritical instrumentalists may let go of their theories far too 
readily. Secondly, constructivist theories are also arbitrary and imaginative, borde-
ring on unreason. Uncritical constructivists may invent theories too readily. So 
there must be two important controls in operation here: (a) the critical guidance 
of the scientific community; and (b) a strong empirical base. Thirdly, uncontrolled 
constructivist theories may lead only to naive instrumentalism, but highly critical 
constructivism may lead, through instrumentalism, to full-blooded critical realism. 
2.9 Conclusions 
( 1) Saving the appearances may involve concocting suitable theories at whim, 
from plogglies, through epicycles, to other fictions. 
Imaginative theory creation needs to take place within certain parameters 
laid down by prior theory. 
(2) Instrumental ism has the following characteristics: 
(a) Observation is objective. 
(b) Observation refers to phenomenal reality only. 
(c) Computative predictions are 'expected'. 
(d) Rules and calculations are recipe-like. 
( e) Definitions are nominalist. 
(f) Definitions are operational. 
(g) Theories are mere fictions. 
(h) Theories are useful devices for predicting. 
(i) Theories are not truly informative (ie novel). 
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(3) Instrumentalism tends to lead to: 
(a) Idealism 
(b) Scepticism 
( c) Relativism 
(d) Agnosticism 
( e) Phenomenalism 
(f) Regarding science as a game 
(g) Spectatorship 
(h) Pragmatism 
( 4) Its chief weakness is that, of its very nature, it does not lead to novel 
information. It is too cautious, and therefore unfruitful. It is only partially 
scientific. 
(5) Instrumentalism is a very shallow realism which is arbitrary, but it works in 
practice. Hence it is a useful starting-point for a realist view of science. 
Instrumentalism is a stage on the way toward realism. 
(6) Central to constructivism is the notion of proliferation of theories and theory 
choice. Both instrumentalism and constructivism have low regard for the status 
of theory. This is why they can discard theories so easily. 
(7) However, constructivism and instrumentalism, while similar, are not the 
same. Constructivism has the edge on instrumentalism. For, being prior, it 
encourages imagination. It is therefore open to fruitful growth, whereas 
instrumentalism in itself is sterile. 
(8) However, constructivism, like instrumentalism, should not be retained simply 
because it works. Uncritical constructivism leads to instrumentalism with all its 
weaknesses. By restricting our thinking to instrumentalist thinking, we stifle 
growth and intellectual satisfaction. By opting for constructivism, we leave 
ourselves open to pragmatic relativism. The best way out of this impasse is to 
complement instrumentalism with critical constructivism. This will give rise to a 
full-blooded critical realism. 
These last three points will be explored in greater detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
CRITICAL REALISM: TOWARDS A CONSTRUCTIVIST REALISM 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the most important themes running through contemporary philosophy of 
science is the well-founded contention that all observations are theory-laden: no 
observation is completely objective and impersonal. The observer's prior knowl-
edge, his presuppositions and prejudices, his unique point of view, his interpreta-
tions, and his very choice of what to observe, all influence, to a greater or smaller 
degree, what he perceives. All observations are made in the light of pre-existing 
theoretical structures. Indeed, it seems that scientific inquiry begins with theory 
rather than observations. 
Thus all knowledge is very personal. Each individual person views the natural world 
through tinted spectacles, as it were. So, in order to make sense of what he or she 
perceives, each person actively constructs his or her knowledge of reality. There 
may be a number of possible theoretical explanations for a given sensory-experi-
ence. The person constructs, what seems to him or her, the best explanation. With 
successive experiences, and by a learning process involving iterative trial-and-error, 
one theory may be rejected and another accepted, or two apparently contradictory 
theories may even be held illogically for some time until the first is superceded. In 
this way, conceptual structures of the real world grow. We construct our own 
knowledge of reality. 
The crucial question which must be asked is, to what extent is the individual's 
knowledge of reality objective? If all observation is saturated in theoretical pres-
uppositions, then surely we live in a world of our own making? If, as Piaget and 
other constructivists hold, we construct our knowledge of reality, then surely such 
knowledge is subjective and exists only in the mind? We are cognitively isolated 
from reality. As Hacking (1984, p.130) puts it, 
"When philosophers begin to teach that all observation is loaded with 
theory, we seem completely locked into representation, and hence into 
some version of idealism". 
Constructivist epistemolgy is, with good reason, currently highly esteemed hy 
researchers in science education. Almost every journal article mentions some 
aspect of constructivism, especially those dealing with misconceptions and alterna-
tive conceptual frameworks. Apart from contemporary philosophy of science, there 
is considerable psychological evidence for constructivism in recent science educa-
tion studies, based on work done originally by Jean Piaget. Constructivist psycho-
logy is the accepted view today in science education. 
Yet if scientific knowledge is created by our mental operations, and if such concep-
tual constructs are indeed subjective and lead to idealism, then obviously a very 
strong warning must be given to science educators not to rush unthinkingly down 
the road to constructivism. The philosophical implications of constructivist psycho-
logy must be thought through before accepting it. Otherwise science education may 
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be careering headlong into the absurdity of Hegelian idealism and all its consequen-
ces. The notion that truth is relative is one of these consequences. For the relativist, 
there is no one-to-one correspondence between our knowledge and the objects in 
the real world. Truth is what works for me. I construct my own truth. So construc-
tivism is a form of pragmatism (Von Glasersfeld 1989, p.124). As Ortony (1979, 
p.1) points out, the constructivist approach to knowledge is "the hallmark of the 
relativist view". Indeed, some constructivists are even encouraging science educa-
tors to accept relativism. For example, Pope and Gilbert (1983, p.259) urge that the 
constructivist view must find "an epistemological base which acknowledges such 
relativity". Such an exhortation as this must be examined very critically. 
Similarly, the contemporary anti-positivist movements in the philosophy of science 
(represented especially by Kuhn and Feyerabend) may be characterised as idealist 
and relativist. That is, they are anti-realist. Kuhn rightly emphasised the social 
aspect of scientific inquiry and practice. But if a theory is accepted by the scientific 
community as true, then its truth value will change if and when the theory is 
superceded by another better one. Truth is therefore relative to the scientific 
community. However, if a realist stance is adopted, then truth cannot be relative. 
For the realist, truth is some type of correspondence of thought with an external 
world. Truth exercises a regulating effect on thought. However, the regulative role 
of the social community cannot be ignored. Consequently, the type of realism 
chosen must take into account the social characteristics of scientific practice without 
ending in a relativist view of truth. 
If a constructivist approach may lead to the notion that scientific knowledge is 
subjective and unreal, then scientific theories would be just as fictitious as those of 
instrumentalists. Instrumentalists can change theories fairly arbitrarily because 
they regard them as convenient devices. Constructivists rely on a choice of the best 
of several theories, unwanted ones being rejected. However, it is very important 
not to do this arbitrarily. The constructivist calls on the scientific community to help 
him decide objectively. But it is also necessary to have a strong empirical base, a 
toehold in reality. We need to show that, by our construction ofreality, we achieve 
a richer view of the world than instrumentalism gives. This may require a revision 
of our notions of reality and objectivity. 
The chief aim of this chapter is to explore some of the various types of realism and 
try to find a way of accommodating current constructivist thinking in science 
education to realism. For science is essentially a form of realism. Scientific inquiry 
assumes that there is a real physical world which exists independently of our minds. 
Yet science must also acknowledge its constructivist (and hence relativist) charac-
ter. So it is very important, from a philosophical point of view, to secure construc-
tivism on a firm and objective, non-relativist, empirical foundation. 
This chapter will therefore seek for a type of realism which will take into account 
(a) constructivist psychology, and (b) the social character of the scientific enterprise. 
This type of realism must be empirically grounded, so that knowledge is objective 
and truth not relative. At the same time, it must allow for the fact that science is a 
very human thing, a product of the creative imagination. It will be seen that a realism 
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known as critical realism, and especially that of the Canadian philosopher-theo-
logian Bernard Lonergan, will satisfy these demands. 
3.2 Constructivism 
3.2.1 Definition 
Constructivism is a philosophy of education whose central theme is that learning is 
an active process 
"by means of which we, individually, literally construct the form and 
substance of our own world out of our experiences." (Gruender 1989, 
p.170) 
Ortony (1979) states that knowledge of reality, whether it is occasioned by percep-
tion, language, memory, or anything else, is a result of going beyond the information 
given. It arises through the interaction of that information with the context in which 
it is presented, and with the knower's preexisting knowledge. 
In contrast with the empiricist view, in which absolute truth is attainable, the 
constructivist approach is one in which direct access to the existing world is denied. 
As Ortony (1979, p.1) says, the objective world is not directly accessible, but is 
constructed on the basis of the constraining influences of human knowledge and 
language. I ts chief characteristic is a relativist notion of truth. In the constructivist 
view, there is no rigid differentiation between scientific language and other kinds. 
Language, perception, and knowledge are inextricably interdependent. 
According to Piaget, knowledge is an operation that constructs its objects. The child 
constructs his notion of reality. Knowledge is a set of conceptual constructs which 
the child invents in order to help him adapt to the environment. For constructivists, 
therefore, 
"knowledge refers to conceptual structures that epistemic agents, given 
the range of present experience within their tradition of thought and 
language, consider viable." (Von Glasersfeld 1989, p.124) 
Constructivism is therefore a form of pragmatism. Piaget never held that knowledge 
is a representation of the real world. Rather it is the collection of conceptual 
constructs which help a person to cope. 
3.2 2 The philosophical underpinnings of constructivism 
There are signs of a constructivist theory of knowledge in the classical realism of 
Plato and Aristotle. This was further elaborated by Thomas Aquinas in the 12th 
century. However, this type of realism dealt with such universal concepts as 
necessity, essences, and absolute truth. Such static concepts led to the stagnation 
of critical thought and tended to stifle inquiry. So metaphysical speculation 
flourished. In the 15th century, a movement opposing metaphysical speculation 
arose. Known as empiricism, this theory of knowledge was strongly against any form 
of constructivism. Kant criticised empiricism, arguing that some of our knowledge 
is indeed constructed. 
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We must be careful to distinguish realism (ontology) from our knowledge of reality 
(epistemology). The two are closely linked, but if we confuse the two, we fall into 
what Bhaskar (1975) calls the 'epistemic fallacy'. 
An exposition of classical realism and its epistemology, empiricist theory of knowl-
edge, and Kant's theory of knowledge follows. The epistemology behind classical 
realism will be treated in some detail, because it is my contention that the Aristote-
lian notion of natural light helps explain Piaget's notion of functional repre-
sentation, as well as Lonergan's view of human knowing. 
(1) Classical realism 
Since early Greek times, there has been a division of opinion as to how our 
knowledge of reality is acquired. These can be broadly distinguished into two 
camps: Platonic and Aristotelian. 
Plato held that this world of sensory phenomena is but a shadow of the real world 
of Ideas or Forms. Only the mind can have true knowledge of these Forms. The 
dualism between the world of Appearance and that of true Reality can thus be traced 
right back to Plato. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, was a common-sense realist. He believed that this 
world is fully real, and that we can have true knowledge of it. For Aristotle, the 
mind is a tabula rasa, a blank slate, and there is nothing in the mind which was not 
first in the senses. All our knowledge comes through our senses. Aristotle rejected 
Plato's notion of innate ideas. Our mind, said Aristotle, abstracts the common 
features from many real examples. This common feature is called the essence of 
the object, and has a real existence within the object itself. For example, the essence 
of 'tableness' really exists within the form of this particular table. Many prominent 
scholars (Guthrie 1978, p.129; Knowles 1962, p.209; Copleston 1955, p.175; Don-
deyne 1958, p.144) hold that Aristotle believed that the intellect is an active agent. 
lntellection requires an active operation of the mind. 
The epistemology of the 12th century philosopher-theologian Thomas Aquinas is 
that of a moderate realism, situated between the rationalism of Plato and the 
empiricism of the Nominalists. 
Aquinas held that knowledge intends reality. This means that, of its very nature, 
our mind knows being. 
"A thing is knowable because existence is pointed to. Therefore being 
is the proper object of mind." (Aquinas in Gilby 1956, p.217) 
In other words, the mind is open to reality, ready to grasp its depth and fullness, and 
confident that what it apprehends conforms to reality as it is. Knowledge is, by 
nature, directed to reality as a whole, not to just a part of it (such as the sensory). 
For Aquinas, the formation of concepts occurs as Aristotle had suggested, as follows. 
External signals impinge on the senses, which present the individual, particular 
object to the mind. The mind actively strips off all that is individual and accidental, 
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and grasps the essence or substance. The essence of the individual object is reached 
by a process called 'abstraction'. 
Whereas sense perception is purely receptive, intellection demands both an active 
(abstractive) and a receptive faculty. To supply this need, Aquinas followed Aris-
totle by introducing the 'active', or as it was later called, 'constructive' intellect, the 
intellectus agens. 
Copleston (1955, p.173) observed that Aquinas insisted that the work of synthesis 
goes on in cognition. It takes place at the level of sensory experience. Discrete 
sense impressions are subconsciously brought together into a unified experience. 
However, these sensory images of particular objects are still disorganised and 
particular. The mind now, in a further stage of the process of synthesis, actively 
abstracts the essence and produces an impression in the passive intellect. The 
passive intellect reacts to the active intellect by forming the universal concept. 
The universal concept is the modification of the intellect by the essence of a 
particular object, the essence residing in the real object. Hence abstraction, for 
Aquinas, does not cut off the mind from reality. The mind is not enclosed in its own 
ideas, as it is for the Empiricists. 
For Aquinas, 'nature' is 'substance' considered as an activity, whereas 'essence' is 
'substance' considered as definable. Substance belongs necessarily to an object, 
whereas there are properties which need not. Such changeable qualities are called 
'accidents'. Aquinas's 'substance' is not the same as that of Locke. Locke's 
substance is an unknowable substratum. For Aquinas, 
"the distinction between substance and accident is a distinction, not 
between an unknowable substratum and knowable modifications, but 
between that which exists, if it does exist, as a subject and that which 
exists only as a modification of a subject". (Copleston 1955, p.82) 
That is, for Aquinas, an object's substance is not an unknowable substratum hidden 
under its accidents. Substance is not situated behind or underneath the manifesta-
tions of the existing thing, but saturates and envelops them. In knowing the object's 
accidents we know something about its substance. A substance is not a phenome-
non. When I look at a tree, I do not and cannot see the substance of the tree apart 
from the tree's colours and so on. But insofar as the colours of the tree manifest 
the substance, I can properly he said to perceive the substance. What I perceive is 
neither an unattached accident nor an unmodified substance. I perceive a modified 
thing. 
Abstraction is the opposite of the Empiricist's associationist doctrine. As Dondeyne 
(1958, p.142) notes, 
"Our ideas are not the product of a process of addition, but rather of an 
illuminating analysis of the perceived datum." 
In other words, the datum is a structured whole and has significance. There is in 
man, not an a priori knowledge of the world, but a lumen naturale, a natural light or 
source of understanding capable of illuminating our perceptive experience. 
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As Dondeyne (1958, p.145) points out, the Thomist view is "worlds away from 
empiricism". The Thomist theory of knowledge is not a representationalist one, 
based on passive copies or mental images. It is not associationist. Nor is it an 
intellectualist a priorism. Aquinas refused to admit any innate ideas. Further, he 
did not end in the scepticism of the later British Empiricists. He maintained a strong 
link with the world. For Aquinas, the natural source of our understanding wakens 
and gives rise to knowledge only by a living contact with the world. Our intellectual 
apparatus does not simply copy reality: it modifies, or constructs, reality. Aquinas 
made use of Aristotle's 'natural light' precisely because he denied that we have 
innate or a priori ideas. Rather, the 'natural light' makes its presence felt only in 
the gaining of knowledge. It is in uncovering the world that cognitive life and all 
that it implies are revealed to us. 
In my view, therefore, Aquinas is, in a mild way, a constructivist. According to 
Aquinas we do not have direct intuitions of essences or substances of things. But 
this does not mean that they are unknowable. They are knowable in and through 
their activities. I come to know another person by listening to his words and 
observing his actions, for his words and actions reveal him in different ways. 
Although Aquinas rejected the notion of innate ideas, he did admit self-evident 
principles which in some way give information about reality. Now, if the doctrine 
that all our knowledge depends on sense experience meant that the process of 
acquiring knowledge about reality was simply a passive process of receiving sense-
impressions and that the mind was simply a passive recipient, these self-evident 
principles would be unnecessary. But Aquinas did not think that the mind is purely 
passive. On the cognitive level, a mental activity, a process of active synthesis, is 
involved. Thus, as Copleston (1955, p.30) says: 
"Aquinas could well have endorsed Kant's famous statement that 
'though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means 
follows that all arises out of experience"'. 
That is, Aquinas's epistemology agrees well with Kant's, provided that Kant's 
phenomenalism is excluded. 
The essence of the classical realist position can be briefly summarised as follows: 
(a) A real world exists independently of our knowledge of it. 
(b) This real world is knowable. 
( c) Knowledge is gained by an active intellectual process, in which conceptual 
construction, or at least modification, occurs. 
( d) Knowledge is of essences or substances, which are far more than Kant's 
lifeless, unknowable noumena hidden behind phenomena. 
Thus classical realism does not agree with the passive representationist theory of 
knowledge of Empiricism, nor with its phenomenalism. Classical realism had a 
distinct constructivist leaning. 
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(2) Empiricist realism 
Empiricism is a theory of knowledge which holds that all our knowledge comes 
through the senses. It is sometimes called empirical realism and naive realism by 
contemporary philosophers of science. 
Empiricism has been discussed at length in Chapter 2 above. To summarise, 
empiricists hold that an external real world exists, and is known by sensory experi-
ence. The objects of the real world impinge on the senses, and the sense-impress-
ions give rise to ideas in the mind which are copies of real objects. Knowledge is a 
passive process, and reality is there waiting to be discovered. Such knowledge of 
reality is cumulative and eventually will lead to absolute truth. 
(3) Kant's transcendental idealism 
Between the classical realist view and that of the empiricists, there lies a third 
standpoint, that of a priorism, a view held by Kant. Kant stated that 
"Although all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means 
follows that all arises out of experience." (Kant 1959, p.25) 
Kant held that the mind actively structures our experience. The immediate objects 
of our perception are due partly to external things and partly to our own perceptive 
apparatus. Locke had stated that secondary qualities ( colours, sounds, smells) are 
subjective, and do not belong in the object itself. Kant, like Berkeley and Hume, 
went further, and made the primary qualities also subjective. Thus what appears to 
us in perception, the phenomenon, consists (said Kant) of two parts: that due to the 
object, which he called 'sensation', and that part contributed by our mental appara-
tus, which orders plurality into a unity. 
Kant held that there are aspects of our knowledge which are not supplied immedi-
ately by the senses. We are born with certain a priori concepts, such as space and 
time and substance, which impose form on phenomena. The a priori categories are 
applied to sensory data. They provide a kind of screening function, as Pirsig (1974, 
p.126) described it. We see the world through the tinted spectacles of the a priori 
concepts. The mind changes, or adds to, our sensory input. We build up our own 
concept of reality, a concept which is being continually modified by fresh inputs. 
If, as Kant suggests, the a priori concepts in our minds are independent of what we 
sense, and if they actually filter what we sense, then the empiricist view of the 
scientist as a passive observer is wrong. As Pirsig ( 1974, p.129) rightly observes, this 
aspect of Kant's metaphysics led to a "much more satisfying understanding of how 
we know things". The chief criticism of Kant's theory of knowledge is that only 
knowledge of phenomena is possible. The world of underlying reality is not able to 
be known. Thus Kant ends in phenomenalism. Cognitive isolation from reality 
makes his theory a form of idealism, but the constructivist notion of a priori.sm, a 
notion which allows sensory experience to go beyond the facts, transforms this into 
what is often called transcendental idealism. 
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3.2.3 Piaget's constructivism 
Jean Piaget approached the epistemological question of constructivism from the 
standpoint of experimental psychology. Piaget ( 1954) showed that children actually 
create their own concept of reality. Piaget believed that it is our prior knowledge, 
our previously elaborated understanding, that enables us to make sense of what we 
perceive. Thus it is not through direct observation alone, but through the actions 
that we carry out upon our perceptions, that is, mental operations, that we come to 
know the world. As Popper says (1983, p.48), our observations are always interpre-
tations. 
The central idea behind Piaget's constructivism is that of equilibration between 
assimilation and accommodation. Equilibration is a self-regulating mechanism 
which governs the development of intelligence (Furth 1969, p.206). When the 
individual perceives some anomaly, cognitive conflict is set up, and various alterna-
tive concepts are constructed in order to adapt to the new situation. Rowell (1989, 
p.142) describes it thus: 
''The mechanisms of equilibration in the individual are triggered by the 
disturbance of a knowledge system when a 'gap' or conflict is recognised 
by matching an anticipation, generated by the application of it ... against 
an interpretation of what occurs. In response ... compensatory (regula-
tory) constructions are produced in a (typically) multi-step process 
involving feedback loops - feedback from the effect of an action pro-
vokes a reassessment of the situation resulting in a continuation of the 
action in a modified form, which is followed by feedback ... and so on." 
Assimilation is the process by which the environment becomes incorporated into 
the organism's cognitive structures. Furth (1969, p.14) describes it as 
"the psychological relation of a stimulus to a reacting organism and 
expresses an inner correspondence or sameness between an environ-
mental phenomenon and the structure within the organism". 
When the knowing organism is able satisfactorily to accept an anomalous situation 
in terms of its existing cognitive schemes (theories), the anomaly is readily inte-
grated. However, if the anomaly cannot be satisfactorily interpreted in terms of its 
existing cognitive schemes, those schemes themselves are rejected and new ones are 
constructed. Accommodation, then, is an organism-outward tendency of the inner 
structure to adapt itself to a particular environmental event. A scheme for Piaget 
is the coordination and organisation of adaptive action, considered as a behavioural 
structure within the organism, such that the organism can transfer or generalise the 
action to similar and analogous circumstances. (Furth 1969, p.44) A scheme is a 
network of concepts or a theoretical structure. 
According to Rowell (1989), Piaget postulated a series of levels of compensatory 
constructions. Alpha behaviour is an attempt to neutralise a disturbance by ignoring 
it, by regarding it as anomalous, by inventing a separate theory to account for it, or 
by deforming it in such a way that it is no longer experienced as a disturbance. Alpha 
behaviour is, in other words, a conservative response. However, this response is 
unstable and fragile. Beta behaviour involves a progressive theory change (accom-
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modation), retaining as much as possible of the original theory while integrating the 
disturbance as a new variation - hence eliminating it as a disturbance. Finally, in 
gamma behaviour, the reorganisation begun in the beta phase is completed, and 
disturbances are now anticipated and not eliminated. 
Piaget later complemented his description of levels of compensation in the process 
of equilibration by a more detailed examination of the mechanisms underlying that 
sequence (Rowell 1989, p.143) He proposed the interactive functioning of two 
cognitive systems concerned with understanding (System I) and succeeding (System 
11). System I consists of concepts, including the structured aspects of operational 
schemata. It constitutes what is real for the individual, and is the system to which 
equilibration applies. System II is geared to bringing about success, and consists of 
procedures, including the procedural aspects of operational schemata. Its potential 
for revision makes it a tool for the reequilibration of System I. It is the source of 
opening up new possibilities in the search for solutions to new problems opened up 
by the mismatch of anticipation and observables, that is, the facts read off from 
reality by application of the individual's knowledge framework. The creation of 
possible solutions, then, essentially falls under the aegis of System II. Possibilities 
are constructions. And since hit-or-miss tactics and mistakes are intrinsic to the 
modus operandi of System II, the potential for making errors is also evident. 
Equilibration must, therefore include a selection mechanism for error elimination. 
Learning and the knowledge it creates are, therefore, explicitly instrumental. This 
is the connection between instrumentalism and Piaget. But we must not interpret 
Piaget too simplistically. His theory of cognition, says Von Glasersfeld (1989, 
p.128), involves a two-fold instrumentalism. On the sensory-motor level, action 
schemes are instrumental in helping organisms to achieve goals in their interaction 
with their experiential world. On the level of reflective abstraction, however, 
operative schemes are instrumental in helping organisms achieve a coherent con-
ceptual network that reflects paths of acting as well as thinking which are viable. 
The first instrumentality might be called utilitarian, the second epistemic. The first 
refers to action skills, the second to understanding. This radical shift in the concep-
tion of knowledge, maintains Von Glasersfeld, eliminates the paradoxical concep-
tion of truth that requires a forever unattainable ontological test. 
If Von Glasersfeld is right in that an ontological test for truth is forever unattainable, 
then we are once again left in the dubious limbo ofrelativism. Piaget (1970, p.15) 
wrote 
"Knowing reality means constructing systems of transformations that 
correspond, more or less adequately, to reality ... (They) are not copies 
of the transformations in reality; they are simply possible isomorphic 
models among which experience can enable us to choose". 
Our conceptual systems, according to Piaget, are possible models, from which we 
choose the most viable. Yet models are testable and hence changeable. They must 
conform to the facts. 
Rowell notes that 'conformity to the facts' again raises the potential problem that 
observables are actually interpretations. This invests knowledge with a potential 
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incestuousness of its constructs. When this is combined with the inherent conser-
vatism of the operation of equilibration and the investment in constructivism, then 
it seems very difficult to escape from cognitive isolation from reality. An inde-
pendent criterion is required for theory testing. The closest we can approach this, 
says Piaget - indeed the only such criterion available to us - is an intersubjective 
one. A social factor is therefore imperative to knowledge construction. This social 
component to knowledge ensures the rationality and objectivity of the individual's 
knowledge. However, the importance of the individual mind as the equilibratory 
seat of novel reorganisations should not be overlooked. 
Cognition must be regarded as an adaptive function. Adaption is an equilibration 
between assimilation and accommodation. In order for the individual to be able to 
cope with his or her environment, knowledge structures are adapted. Knowledge, 
for Piaget, is the collection of conceptual structures that turn out to be adapted or, 
as Von Glasersfeld (1989, p.125) says, viable within the knowing subject's range of 
experience. Viability is tied to the concept of equilibrium. In the sphere of 
cognition, though indirectly linked to survival, equilibrium refers to a state in which 
the knower's cognitive structures have yielded expected results without revealing 
conceptual conflicts. 
Thinking, for Piaget, is an operation. An operation is an action which is an adaptive, 
functional behaviour (Furth 1969, p.55). Operations differ from external actions in 
that they are geared to internal function. The biological function of knowing a thing 
in the environment is to react to the thing in an adaptive manner. In Piaget's 
terminology, the assimilation of a sensory-motor scheme is always simultaneous 
with an accommodation to the external aspects of things. It is commonly held that 
we think in order to act. We plan a trip, then execute it. Thinking is regarded by 
many as a prelude to action. This is a Deweyan instrumentalist notion: thinking is 
for acting. Yet Piaget insists that thinking is action, and not merely for action. For 
him, operational thinking is an interiorised or internal action. But is it internal 
merely in the shallow sense that it does not take place overtly and is not easily 
observable? Furth says no. It is internal in the more profound sense that the object 
of thinking is not outside the thinking scheme, as in the case in sensory-motor 
actions, but remains within and can itself be called a product of thinking. Thinking 
and its functional object are within the same psychological plane. Interiorisation is 
more than internalisation. Interiorisation refers to the gradual formation of gener-
alised conceptual schemes from particular content. It leads from practical to 
operational intelligence, and (states Furth 1969, p.262) is the precondition for 
objective knowledge as well as for symbolic representation. As Furth ( 1969, p.60) 
states: 
'This is, no doubt, the profound reason why the one word 'operation' 
suffices on the operational plane for the two words 'scheme' and 'exter-
nal action' on the sensory-motor plane." 
Piaget rejects the notion of knowledge as a representation of reality. Empiricist 
theory of knowledge postulates that ideas are images, or copies, or pictures of the 
external real world, passively acquired, or mirrors of reality. Piaget dispenses with 
mediational representation. Rather he employs representation in the active sense 
and relates it to the symbolic function of intelligence. It lies midway between 
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operational activities and motoric output. The product of this activity is a symbol. 
For Piaget, the operative process by which we construct reality-as-known and the 
symbolic process by which we re-present known reality are functionally different. 
Piaget refers to internal knowing by different terms: operations when he emphasises 
their being part of a reversible structure; judgement when he considers the assimi-
latory activity that assigns an event as belonging to a structure; concept when he 
focuses on the operational scheme as the common source of assimilations. Psycho-
logically all these terms partake of an identical reality status. An active structure, 
an operation, a concept or judgement are for Piaget one and the same reality, and 
not different reified entities (Furth 1969, p.76). Moreover, these notions enjoy no 
reality status of their own. They are merely ways of expressing the only real event 
which exists, namely the fact that 'a person knows something'. This knowing is one 
of the modes of existence belonging to the living organism as a whole. 
Representation is not passive, but functional. The relationship between symbols 
(concepts) and reality is not one of causal representation. It is a special relation, 
corresponding to the philosophical notion of intentionality (Furth 1969, p.78), 
meaning simply, the relation of knowing. Intentionality is an openness to reality, the 
intellectual grasping of reality with the full confidence that what is apprehended 
conforms to reality as it is. It corresponds to some extent with the classical notion 
of natural light discussed above in 3.2.2. 
Thus representational thinking in the wide sense means simply operative thinking. 
It is identical with thought, that is, with all intelligence which is not simply based on 
perceptions, but on systems of concepts or mental schemes. In the narrow sense, 
representation can be limited to the mental image, that is, to the symbolic evocation 
of absent realities. The concept is an abstract scheme, and the image a concrete 
symbol. Furth (1969, p.79) holds that he would not hesitate to call Piaget's distinc-
tion between the two meanings of 'representation' ontological, implying different 
levels of reality. 
During the past fifteen years, a substantial amount of research in science education 
has been carried out on 'misconceptions' (Helm 1980), 'preconceptions' (Ausubel 
1968), 'children's science' (Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham 1982), 'alternative con-
ceptions' (Driver and Easley 1978), and 'alternative frameworks' (Driver 1981 ). 
Although originally based on Piagetian stage theory, the Alternative Conceptions 
movement is rapidly developing its own paradigm (Gilbert and Swift 1985). 
Alternative conceptions are beliefs which children hold about scientific concepts 
which differ from the currently accepted view. As Driver (1981, p.95) states: 
"Pupils can and do bring alternative frameworks to explain observations 
which are in keeping with their experience ... " 
Various researchers have noted over and over again that there is 
"a creative and imaginative element involved on the part of the child in 
constructing the meaning he imposes on events." (Driver 1981, p.95) 
This whole research programme is contributing 
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"to the increasingly constructivist orientations of educational research." 
(Gilbert and Swift 1985, p.682) 
Ausubel, Novak and Hanesian (1968, p.88) substantiate this view: 
"Anyone who pauses long enough to give the problem some serious 
thought cannot escape the conclusion that we live in a world of concepts 
rather than in a world of objects, events and situations. The reality we 
experience psychologically is related only indirectly to the physical 
properties of our environment and to our sensory correlates. Reality, 
figuratively speaking, is experienced through a conceptual or categori-
cal filter." 
Piaget himself had stated that he was not interested in the question of an external 
reality. All that concerned him was how knowledge is constructed (Gruber and 
Voneche 1977, p.xxii). Yet, in my view, Piaget maintained a firm foothold in the 
world. Furth (1969, p.16) rightly noted that Piaget kept a definite link with the real 
world by holding that the child is part of it. Inhelder supported this view. She said 
(in Furth 1969, p.24): 
"It is thus in acting on the external world that, according to Piaget, the 
child elaborates a more and more adequate knowledge of reality." 
Piaget's experimental findings refute, once and for all, the empiricist standpoint. 
Concepts are not passive copies. They are cognitive constructions. Piaget labelled 
his own position as constructivist or interactionist, rather than a priorist. For the 
child invents rather than discovers his ideas. This distinction separates Piaget from 
empiricism and from pure Kantian a priorism. However, as Gruber and Voneche 
(1977, p.xxxviii) state: 
"No one can read Piaget without thinking of Kant. He is not, of course, 
Kantian in his solutions, but a very considerable portion of his work has 
gone into studying the development of just those fundamental ideas that 
Kant identified and claimed were given a priori." 
Comments on Piaget: Some of the above points are especially relevant to the 
purposes of this chapter, and need to be highlighted: 
( 1) The adaptive nature of equilibration involves a coping with the environment. 
This implies realism. 
(2) The social factor helps ensure objectivity, but is not fully adequate for 
avoiding relativism. 
(3) Piagets' constructivism is pragmatic and instrumentalist. 
( 4) Interiorisation is a more profound concept than external action. Thus 
Piaget's instrumentalism is not superficial. 
(5) Representation is functional, therefore 'intentional'. This implies a 'going 
beyond' or transcendance out of keeping with pragmatic instrumentalism. The 
'intentionality' of functional representation means (a) our minds, of their very 
nature, can get in touch with the external world; and (b) we have the utmost 
confidence in our cognitive powers. 
( 6) Piaget's distinction between concrete symbol and abstract scheme implies a 
hierarchical ontology (levels of reality). 
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All these points, taken together, indicate that Piaget's theory of knowledge is far 
more profound than Dewey's 
3.2.4 G.A. Kelly's personal construct psychology 
Kelly (1955) argues against what he calls 'accumulative fragmentalism', that is, the 
notion that knowledge is a growing collection of substantiated facts. He rejects an 
absolutist view of truth, and holds that scientific knowledge is the result of human 
reconstruction. Scientific knowledge consists of man-made hypotheses which a 
person may choose to review and revise in the light of what might appear to be a 
'better' theory. 
Kelly (1966) describes his own philosophy of knowledge as 'constructive alternativ-
ism'. He states that constructive alternativism is the view that man understands 
himself, his surroundings and his potentialities by devising constructions and then 
testing the tentative utility of these constructions against such criteria as the suc-
cessful prediction and control of events. Knowledge is seen as being produced by 
transactions between a person and the environment. The emphasis is placed on 
active reaching out to make sense of events by engaging in the construction and 
interpretation of individual experiences. 
Whereas Piaget regarded learning as evolution through an invariant sequence of 
stages of intellectual development, Kelly sees no necessary sequence of events for 
learning. Leaming has no particular goal, for each student builds a unique structure 
of knowledge. 
Kelly bases his whole approach to the development of a person on the metaphor of 
man-the-scientist. The Kellyan scientist is a constructivist. People understand 
themselves, their surroundings, and anticipate future events by constructing tenta-
tive models and evaluating these models against personal criteria. For Kelly, any 
event is open to as many reconstructions of it as our imaginations allow. Each 
person erects a personal representational model of the world which allows some 
sense to be made of it and which enables the person to chart a course of behaviour 
in relation to it. These representational models are composed of a series of interre-
lated personal constructs or tentative hypotheses about the world. Constructs are 
used by a person to describe present experience and to forecast events (theory 
building). Constructs also allow assessment of the accuracy of previous forecasts 
after the events have occurred, thereby testing their predictive efficiency (theory 
testing). Kelly's main emphasis is on the uniqueness of each person's construction 
of the world. 
For Kelly, successful communication between people depends not so much on 
commonality of construct systems, but upon the extent to which people can "con-
strue the construct system of the other". That is, communication depends on the 
degree to which people can have some degree of empathy and understanding of 
someone else's constructs, while not necessarily holding the same constructs them-
selves. 
In my view, the importance of Kelly lies in his insistence that students recognise 
their role as theory builders. This aspect cannot be over-emphasised. His idea of 
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constructing reality by means of tentative models comes very close to Selley's type 
of Critical Realism (see section 3.4.1 below). However, in my opinion, Kelly's 
personal construct psychology does not provide a strong enough link with the 
existing world 'out there'. Indeed, like Piaget, he is not particularly interested in 
whether an external reality exists or not. Rather, he is mainly interested in what man 
makes of it (Kelly 1969, p.25). This interest in the individual's personal construct 
tends towards relativism. 
The similarity between Kelly's constructivism and Dewey's instrumentalist prag-
matism (which will be described in section 3.2.5 below) is clear. For Kelly, the 
person constructs his own reality to help him cope. Thus the goal of learning is 
purely a pragmatic one. While the pragmatist's emphasis on activity should be 
applauded, it still leaves much to be desired as far as pedagogy is concerned (Pope 
and Gilbert 1983, 194). For a pupil can be active, but the learning derived from the 
experience may be limited if the person can see little or no relevant links between 
the activity and his own life. 
3.2.5 Dewey's instrumentalist constructivism 
Like Piaget, Dewey held that knowledge has no meaning independently of inquiry. 
That which satisfactorily terminates inquiry is knowledge. Intelligence is the instru-
ment of action. Thinking is a specific event in the movement of experienced things. 
Knowing is but a series of organising acts. Ideas are instruments to be used to alter 
an indeterminate situation. Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of 
an indeterminate situation into one that is determinate. The object of knowledge 
resides in the consequences of directed action. Scientists accept the consequences 
of their experimental operations as constituting the known object, and care nothing 
for reality. Reality is conceived as an unending process of events. Reality is purely 
what is directly experienced. 
When the organism is confronted by a conflicting situation or a problem, thinking 
activity is set up to solve it. Active grappling with the problem leads to a new 
situation. The thought-situation is only a constant movement towards a defined 
equilibrium. The role of thinking is instrumental and functional: it brings about 
the transition from a relatively conflicting situation to a relatively integrated one. 
Its purpose is to change and control the environment. 
In my view, the fact that Dewey's emphasis on activity and experience is based on 
pragmatism leaves it open to the charge of being superficial. Von Glasersfeld (1989, 
p.125) notes that constructivism differs from pragmatism in how the knowledge that 
enables us to cope is arrived at. Dewey had correctly maintained that meaningful 
learning by the child should be carried out by discovery and activity methods. 
Unfortunately, this was later extrapolated by Dewey's disciples to mean that abstract 
knowledge of the real world was impossible unless preceded by direct empirical 
experience. Such a rigid empiricism stifled science. Although Piaget emphasised 
the importance of learning through activity, he would not have agreed with activity 
in itself. For all activity requires a prior theoretical structure to organise it. At 
school level, a naive activity or discovery way of learning science is not nearly 
enough, as Driver ( 1981) points out. It is necessary also to have an overall theore-
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tical scheme to guide laboratory work. Prior theory acts as a filter through which 
sensory experience first passes. Ausubel et al (1968, p.530) point out that 
''The very processes of perception and cognition require that the cultu-
ral stimulus world must first be filtered through each individual's per-
sonal sensory apparatus and cognitive structure before it can have any 
meaning." 
Whereas Dewey ignores reality, or even says it does not exist, Piaget, while holding 
no interest in its existence, implies a multi-leveled reality. Dewey's phenomeno-
logical treatment of knowledge lacks depth, whereas Piaget's cognitive structures 
provide a sound theoretical explanation. Dewey's philosophy, as Santayana has said, 
reduces to a 'philosophy of the foreground'. Ultimately, his theory of knowledge is 
based on an empirical realism. 
Dewey had an early interest in Hegelian idealism. He later rejected the idealist 
notion that the object was subordinate to thought, and turned this around. 'Practice' 
reveals reality, not cognition. Cognition, for Dewey, depended on its capacity to 
satisfy non-cognitive demands. Such is the primary basis of instrumentalism. 
Thought is reduced to events. 
3.3 Scientific realism 
Realism is the theory that the ultimate objects of scientific inquiry exist and act quite 
independently of scientists and their activity. 
During the 1970's and 1980's, there has been a move away from Kuhnian relativism 
towards scientific realism. In view of the prestige of scientific theory, its claims 
must be taken seriously. In Hesse's (1980, p.xii) opinion, one way of getting round 
the problems which scientific theory raises is to abandon positivist epistemology 
rather than the claims of theories. This has led to a metaphysical form of scientific 
realism, which effectively neglects epistemological questions in favour of analysing 
the ontology of theories as if current science is known to have arrived at or 
somewhere near the truth. A feature of current scientific realism, says Hesse, is that 
it still retains the logical presuppositions of empiricism. 
Boyd (in Leplin 1984, p.41) states that scientific realism embodies four theses: 
(1) Scientific theories should be interpreted realistically. 
(2) Scientific theories, interpreted realistically, are confirmable. 
(3) Progress in science is due to successively more accurate approximations to 
the truth. 
( 4) The reality which scientific theories describe is largely independent of our 
thoughts and theoretical commitments. 
Anti-realists in the constructivist tradition, such as Kuhn, deny 4. However, they 
may well (maintains Boyd) affirm 1, 2 and 3 on the understanding that the reality 
which scientists describe is somehow a social and intellectual construct. As Kuhn 
and Hanson both argue, a constructivist perspective limits the application of 3, since 
successive theories can be understood as approximating the truth more closely only 
when they are part of the same general constructive tradition or paradigm. 
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Critical realism's version of scientific realism generally rejects 2, placing its position 
as intermediate between empiricist realism and constructivism. 
33.1 Anti-realism 
There are many variations of anti-realism in science. Among them are instrumen-
talism, pragmatism, constructivism, and idealism. The first two are based on the 
empiricist theory of knowledge. 
(a) Empiricist anti-realism 
If the empiricist assertion that the only knowledge which is valid is that based on 
sensory experience, then knowledge of any object referred to by theory, such as an 
electron, is impossible. Knowledge cannot extend to unobservables. Scientific 
realism promises theoretical knowledge of the world, but, at best, it can deliver only 
computational convenience (Boyd in Leplin 1984, p.42). A reality behind appear-
ances does not exist. Only phenomenal reality exists. If this is so, then theories can 
be interchanged relatively arbitrarily without resorting to rigorous empirical testing. 
Theoretical entities become fictions, and the whole scientific enterprise becomes a 
game. 
(b) Polanyi's Platonic realism 
Michael Polanyi's (1958) Gestalt-based psychology of discovery rejects the mech-
anistic approach to science as a system of causes and effects. It also rightly rejects 
the now orthodox neo-Kantian concept of science as the study of appearances. 
Polanyi argues that there is an independent external reality, and that the criterion 
of truth is whether our claim to have knowledge coincides with that reality. Unfor-
tunately we can never be sure that it does so and therefore we have to rely on our 
beliefs about it (Brownhill 1983, p.31). We see the world from the perspective of 
an interpretive framework. In order to understand reality, we must immerse 
ourselves in it. We do not create reality, but sometimes partially recognise it. Much 
of our scientific knowledge is tacit. We cannot describe it in words, but we have a 
feel for it. We learn best by personal experience through activity. 
Polanyi's concepts of 'indwelling' and 'tacit knowledge' have Platonic overtones. 
According to Brownhill ( 1983, p.45), Polanyi acknowledges that he is a neo-Platonist 
concerned with essences. These cannot be known through the senses, but only in 
an intuitive way. We know more than we can describe. This is our 'personal 
knowledge'. Polanyi's Platonic realism thus comes very close to idealism. 
However, Polanyi maintained that this does not jeopardise the validity of our 
scientific knowledge, for any 'personal knowledge' has to be ratified by the scientific 
community as a whole. Hence the objectivity of our knowledge is guaranteed by 
the scientific community. By entrenching such knowledge in the context of an 
accepted theory, the objectivity is assured. A theory becomes more objective as it 
becomes more abstract, as it breaks away from everyday perceptions and prejudices. 
Theories are subjected to severe tests. Even so, we can never be absolutely certain 
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that our knowledge is truly objective, for such is the human condition. Perhaps it is 
our notion of reality and objectivity which is wrong. 
Polanyi was trying to move away from the notion of objectivity associated with the 
concept of the cool, detached scientist. For Polanyi, greater objectivity is attributed 
to theoretical knowledge than knowledge gained through sense experience. The 
reason for this was that it was revealing a higher level of reality. We move through 
a hierarchy of levels of reality. We no longer need the two-world theory of 
appearances and underlying reality. Rather there is a continuum of interpretations 
of experience, each built on the previous one. The process of indwelling reveals 
different levels of reality, for one moves from the known reality to the unknown 
reality. The traditional notion of objectivity as some impersonal method of making 
judgements is wrong. We need to reappraise our notion of reality. 
Some aspects of Polanyi's thought have considerable merit. Firstly, much of our 
scientific knowledge is far more than the sum of its parts. Secondly, our empiricist-
based notion of reality and objectivity needs to be revised. Thirdly, there are levels 
of reality. Polanyi's weakness, in my view, is his playing down of the empirical basis, 
a fact which, in spite of his emphasis on the function of the scientific community, 
leads to a form of anti-realism. 
(c) Kuhn's constructivist anti-realism 
Thomas Kuhn (1962) was influenced by Polanyi's views ( eg Kuhn 1962, p.44 ), 
particularly those concerning the role of the scientific community. 
Kuhn holds that scientific knowledge is gained in two ways: normal science, and 
revolutionary science. Scientists work within a particular theoretical tradition 
called a paradigm. Most of the puzzling problems they encounter can be easily 
resolved in terms of the existing theories. However, if they come across an anomaly 
which cannot be accounted for in terms of existing paradigm, then the paradigm 
itself must be overthrown. This involves a radical Gestalt switch of theoretical 
framework. It may also happen that both the old and the new theories exist 
side-by-side for some time, until the new one is ratified by the scientific community. 
Kuhn maintains that the history of science shows that science is not governed by 
logic alone. It tends to be irrational in some things. Also, its objectivity is relative 
to the scientific community. For Kuhn, a scientific statement becomes true if the 
scientific community as a whole agrees with it. Truth becomes relative to the 
accepted view. 
Popper strongly opposed such relativism, for it leads to anti-realism. If truth is 
relative to the accepted view, then when one theory is disproved, its truth is falsified, 
and the succeeding theory is now seen as true. However, it is a historical fact that 
rival theories (eg Copernican and Newtonian) often coexist for a long time, as Kuhn 
himself pointed out. If each theory is supposed to offer a true description of reality, 
do we have a case of multiple realities? As Hacking (1983, p.66) puts it: 
"With each paradigm shift, we come, as Kuhn hints, to see the world 
differently - perhaps we live in a different world .... The realist about 
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theories cannot welcome this view, in which the aim of discovering the 
truth about the world is dispersed." 
Thus Kuhn's views turn out to be anti-realist. 
3.3.2 In defence of scientific realism 
Richard Boyd (in Leplin 1984, p.58) argues for scientific realism. His principal 
concern is to show that the instrumental reliability of the theory-dependent meth-
odology of the mature sciences leads inevitably to realism. His realism holds that 
scientific theories are at least approximately true and genuinely referential. Thus 
he argues that neither the empiricist tradition, which invalidates all reference to 
unobservables, nor the constructivist tradition, which denies the independent reality 
of the objects of scientific knowledge on the basis of the theory dependence of 
method, can explain the empirical success of the mature sciences. 
Whereas Boyd argues for scientific realism from the viewpoint of explanation, 
Hacking does so using intervention. Hacking ( 1983) holds that reality has to do with 
our ability to change the world, that is, to intervene. He agrees with Dewey that we 
must grasp reality as it is. He believes that Popper points in the right direction. 
Popper (in Hacking 1983, p.146) said that we extend reality to unobservables 
because 
"the entities which we conjecture to be real should be able to exert a 
causal effect upon the prima f acie real things; that is, upon material 
things of an ordinary size: that we can explain changes in the ordinary 
material world of things by the causal effects of entities conjectured to 
be real". 
In other words, entities conjectured to be real, such as electrons, can physically affect 
other more directly observable entities, such as the chemical coating of a TV screen. 
If they can, then they are real. 
I wish to emphasise the importance of this notion of 'acting on the external world', 
for, in my view, it provides for constructivism the escape route from subjectivism 
and idealism. Hacking (1983, p.130), for example, maintained that if we hold that 
all observation is interpretive and influenced by prior theory, then we can never 
escape from the mind. He rejected the contention that all observation is theory-
laden, and insisted that by intervening and doing we keep in touch with the real 
world. While disagreeing with his view that some observations are theory-free, I 
agree with him on intervening. I hold with Popper that there are degrees of 
theory-ladenness, and with Grove Maxwell (in Hacking 1983, p.170) that there is a 
continuum in observation from direct observation through to theoretical entities. 
The point is that, although a constructivist approach is to a large extent intra-mental, 
it retains a foothold on objectivity and realism by activity in the world. Petrie (1981, 
200) supports this view: 
" ... we triangulate on reality with our representational schemes, and 
some of these representational schemes require activity in the world ... 
If all we had to do was think about the world, then, indeed, we might 
fear for objectivity, but since we must act in the world and coordinate 
our activity with our thought so that activity and thought triangulate on 
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nodes of stability in the world, objectivity and conceptual change are 
possible at the same time." 
3.3.3 Varieties of scientific realism 
(1) Popper's common-sense realism 
Popper is a common-sense realist, a realist not in the classical sense of believing in 
real essences, but in the sense that an independent external world exists. Common-
sense distinguishes between appearance and reality. But common-sense also re-
alises that appearances have a sort of reality. If an unobservable entity such as the 
molecular structure of this typewriter is meaningful because it is theory-laden, then 
so also is its surface appearance theory-laden. Popper ( 1956, p.383) holds that there 
are degrees of theory-ladenness. Some objects are more conjectural than others. 
But even direct sensory observation of surface appearances has some minimal 
degree of interpretation in terms of prior theory. In other words, for Popper ( 1983, 
p.220) there is a surface reality and a depth reality, rather than a real essence behind 
the phenomenon. And every level of conjecture, whether surface or depth, is just as 
real as any other. 
Popper contends that realism is neither demonstrable nor refutable. But it is ar-
guable, and the weight of the argument is overwhelmingly in favour of realism 
and against idealism. Popper holds that: 
( 1) Realism is a matter of common-sense. 
(2) All physical, chemical, biological, and other sciences, imply realism, because 
they investigate the objects of the physical world. 
(3) Human language is essentially descriptive, and description is always 
realistic: it is of something. 
(4) Idealism is simply absurd. It is inconceivable that my mind could have 
dreamed up the beauty of Rembrandt's paintings or Bach's music. 
(5) Our subjective knowledge consists of dispositions to act on and adapt to 
external reality. 
Popper's criticism of instrumentalism (see section 2. 7 above) is that it is basically 
dishonest. Instrumentalism starts by acknowledging that it is interested only in 
phenomena, but ends in saying that phenomena are the only reality. It ignores, or 
gives weak arguments for, the existence of non-observable theoretical entities, such 
as electrons and photons. By deliberately ignoring whole realms of reality, it 
becomes a sham. It is basically dishonest, as Koestler ( 1959, p.65) noted in the 
instrumental ism of Ptolemy's astronomy. 
Popper ( 1983, p.59) postulates "like a naive realist" that there are three worlds: 
Firstly, there is a physical world (world 1 ); then there is a world of states of 
consciousness and subjective experience (world 2). These two interact with each 
other. Finally there is a third world (world 3), the world of theoretical systems, 
problems, critical arguments, and the contents of journals, books, libraries and data 
bases. The knowledge of world 3 is objective knowledge, because it is public. It is 
knowledge without a knower. So Popper claims to be a common-sense realist, hut 
he rejects the common-sense theory of knowledge as a blunder. Instead, he prefers 
an objective theory of conjectural knowledge. 
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(2) Hesse's moderate inductive realism 
Hesse ( 197 4) holds that realist hypotheses do not explain the empirical success of 
science. She proposes, at odds with current fashion, an inductive model of science. 
This model is intended to be a via media between the extremes of formal logical 
science and historical realism. 
"In contrast to the non-inductive Popperian tradition, it defines the 
goals of science primarily in terms of expectations of successful predic-
tion, rather than in terms of the search for more and more powerful 
testable theories." (Hesse 1974, p.284) 
Popperians reject induction, but, as has been pointed out above, Hanson believed 
that induction can be justified precisely because it too is theory-laden. Hanson 
(1971) noted that induction is rarely undertaken aimlessly, without some theoreti-
cally determind goal. It is built on experience which is itself already highly selective. 
Hesse's scientific realism is therefore grounded in solid inductive foundations, 
which links knowledge firmly to the real world. Her scientific realism is a truth 
realism. 
(3) Harre's referential scientific realism 
Harre (1986) holds that we should create a form ofrealism that is close to scientific 
practice, and try to establish that existence is prior to theory. Most realist ap-
proaches, including those of Popper, Hesse and Einstein, are based on the truth-
falsity idea. A realism to suit contemporary needs must be wider than this. It must 
not depend, in any essential way, on the strict concepts of truth and falsity. Harre 
( 1986, p.65) calls this referential realism. 
The demonstration of the existence of a real examplar is at once cognitive and a 
material practice. An object is located in the grid of space-time, and we point to it. 
We draw our attention to the presence of the object. Then there is the cognitive act 
of describing it. The classical formulation of the referential position is Sellars's 
remark that, to have good reason for holding a theory, is to have good reason for 
holding that the entities postulated by the theory exist. 
This is not new, says Harre. St Thomas Aquinas used it, in the sense that all scientific 
propositions have their term in natural matter. However, 
"a truth realism based on propositions has proved vulnerable to scepti-
cal assaults. I hope to create a referential realism based on things. 
Instead of asking 'Are the statements of this theory true or false?' ... I 
believe scientists actually ask 'Do things, properties, processes of this 
sort exist?' and do their best within human limitations to find exemplars. 
Realism is grounded in material practice." (Harre 1986, p.97) 
Three scientific methodologies: Harre's scientific realism states that science has 
three methodologies: 
(a) The first is directed at normal experience of cognitive objects with pragmatic 
properties, for example, Newton's Laws. This involves a realist metaphysics, 
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with a Kantian way of experiencing the world. 
(b) The second embraces unobservable entities, for example, electrons and 
photons. Here theories are treated as real and objective. 
( c) The third is analogical, using mathematical principles, statistical models, and 
other highly-abstract concepts, for example, the strange world of particle 
physics, dealing with quarks, charms, and so on. 
Each of the three different methodologies is appropriate to the study of a specific 
domain of beings, both natural and cultural. 
There are three levels (or realms) of reality. The referents of type 1 theories belong 
to Realm 1, the realm of the actual and possible objects of experience. The moon 
and Pluto, the Grand Canyon, the tongue, and goldfish, belong to Realm 1. For type 
2 theories, we, the users, are committed, not only to the ontology of Realm 1, but 
also to beings which, if real, would be available to the amplified human senses. These 
are objects of possible experience, and their certification as part of the real furniture 
of the world depends on the availability of the necessary technology. Micro-organ-
isms and X-ray stars belong in Realm 2. For type 3 theories, we, the users, are 
committed, not only to the ontologies of Realms 1 and 2, but also to beings which, 
if real, could not become phenomena for human observers, however well-equipped 
with devices to amplfy and extend the senses. Realm 3 is a domain of beings beyond 
all possible experience. Quantum states and naked singularities are denizens of 
Realm 3. 
Thus Harre's multi-leveled reality ends in a Kantian transcendental idealism. For 
Harre, ultimate reality is unknowable. 
3.3.4 Some comments about today's scientific realism 
An important theme common to most of the above philosophies of science is the 
notion that there are levels of reality. It can be seen, to greater or lesser degrees, in 
Piaget, Polanyi, Popper and Harre. For all of these, theoretical structures are part 
of reality, and the more theoretical, the more objective they are. 
3.4 Critical realism 
Man's quest for certainty gives rise to a desire for an absolutist view of truth. Man 
wishes for a direct one-to-one correspondence with reality. He wants to feel that 
his knowledge corresponds exactly with the world he knows, that electrons and 
photons exist just as surely as the water he observes boiling in a kettle. Yet there is 
a subjective element in all our knowledge. 
We live in a world of concepts. So we need to revise our concept of reality to take 
this subjective element into account. For we, the knowing subjects, are part of the 
objective world we know. The organism is part of the environment. We are part of 
reality itself, immersed in it. We therefore are compelled to reject an absolutist view 
of truth, for scientific knowledge consists of tentative hypotheses and trial-and-error 
gropings towards truth, without ever reaching absolute truth. Each person con-
structs his own representational model of the world. G.A. Kelly (1955), the personal 
construct psychologist, proposed a model of 'man-as-a-scientist', a model which 
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breaks down the distinction between observer and observed. The observer is caught 
up by his immersion in his environment, whether he likes it or not. Piaget had a 
similar view, namely, that the organism is part of the environment and interacts with 
it. So did Dewey. Reality does not cause experience: it is itself part of the 
experience. All our observations are saturated in our theoretical presuppositions. 
For Kelly and Piaget, the question of the existence of an external reality is not 
important. Kelly is quoted by Pope and Gilbert (1983a, p.197) as saying that 
"the open question for man is not whether reality exists or not but what 
he can make of it". 
On the other hand, Gruender (1989, p.175) makes the point that, if conceptual 
construction of reality is a way of coping with or adapting to the environment, or 
surviving, then surely this is a realist stance? 
However, an honest discussion of the question reveals an important fact: our 
concept of reality as completely independent of us is outmoded. We therefore need 
to review our notion of reality. 
3.4.1 Historical overview of critical realism 
The naive empirical realist view of truth holds that there exists 'out there' a real 
world which it is the task of scientists to discover. According to this view, absolute 
truth about nature can be attained, and nature is eternally waiting to be uncovered. 
Many of our current scientific theories may be true and will never be disproved. 
Hence scientific knowledge is cumulative. 
According to classical empiricism, represented by John Locke and David Hume, 
the ultimate objects of knowledge are atomistic events. Such events constitute given 
facts. Knowledge and the world may be viewed as surfaces. On this conception, 
science is conceived as a kind of behavioural response to the stimulus of given facts. 
Even if, as in positivism, such a behaviourism is rejected as an account of how science 
originated, its valid content can still be reduced to such facts. 
An alternative classical philosophy of science is Kant's transcendental idealism. 
This teaches that the objects of scientific knowledge are models, ideals of natural 
order. Such objects are artificial constructs and though they may be independent of 
individual men, they are not independent of human activity in general. On this 
conception, knowledge is seen as a structure rather than a surface. But the natural 
world becomes a construction of the human mind, or, in its modern version, of the 
scientific community. 
A third position is that of Critical Realism, or, as Bhaskar (1975, p.25) calls it, 
transcendental realism. It regards the objects of knowledge as structures. These 
objects are neither phenomena ( empiricism), nor human constructs imposed on the 
phenomena (idealism), but real structures which endure and operate independently 
of our knowledge. According to this view, both knowledge and the world are 
structured; both are differentiated and changing. 
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Critical realism, then, must be distinguished from, and is in direct opposition to, 
empirical realism. Both classical empiricism and transcendental idealism subscribe 
to empirical realism. For empirical realists, a real entity is a particular object of 
perception. For classical realists, a real entity is some general feature or property 
of the world (universals). For the critical realist, a real entity is an object of scientific 
discovery and investigation, such as causal laws. Realism about such entities entails 
a particular realist position in the theory of perception and universals. 
Whereas naive constructivism is reluctant to acknowlege that the knowing subject 
has access to the external word and therefore tends to end in relativism, critical 
realism can sustain the idea of a world independent of man, and is able to uphold 
the objectivity of facts. 
Selley (1981, p.253) maintains that critical realism is more consistent with the 
historical development of science. Critical realism teaches that theories are at-
tempts at representing the regularities in natural phenomena, through suggested 
pictures of what the natural world might be like in order that it should give rise to 
the observable effects. According to Selley, the subtle difference in this critical 
realism is that although a real world exists out there independently of human 
thought, there is no possibility of our ever knowing just what it is like. We can only 
hypothesise, examine our hypotheses for self-consistency, and devise experimental 
tests. In recognition of this change in meaning, the word 'theory' is often replaced 
by 'model'. 
Figure 3.1: A critical realist interpretation of scientific knowledge (after Selley 1981, 
p.253). 
Model A3 .. 
Model A2 .. REALITY (unknown and 
Model A1 .. Lnknowable) ~ Model B1 
Figure 3.1 depicts a critical realist interpretation of scientific knowledge, showing 
two different models for some limited aspect of the world. Of these, Model A is 
shown as having greater explanatory scope than Model B, though the latter may 
have some merits, such as greater simplicity or familiarity, which makes it worth 
retaining. The arrows represent observable facts which are the data base for each 
model. Models A1 and B1 (and perhaps also C1, ... ) explain the same ohservable 
phenomena, while Models A2 and A3 are elaborations of A1, able to explain a wider 
range of phenomena. (The ohservahle phenomena, or 'facts', are not necessarily 
theory-free sense data, hut may he interpretations based on some taken-for-granted 
theory.) 
British critical realism emerged in Scotland in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century (Passmore 1986, pp.279-297). Andrew Seth tried to be a realist without 
ceasing to he a Kantian. There is both an empirical and an intellectual component 
to our knowledge. Our knowledge of reality transcends the empirical experience. 
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Although what we are aware of is in our minds, it points to a world independent of 
ourselves. Seth held that, whereas Locke had thought that knowledge is of ideas, in 
fact it takes place through ideas. Seth's main critical attack was directed against 
phenomenalism. If our experience is not of objects themselves (as opposed to 
appearances), our knowledge would be merely an incoherent succession of transi-
tory states. 
Another 19th century Scot, Robert Adamson, maintained that experience does not 
at first contain any clear-cut distinction between mind and its objects. Yet experi-
ence is not intrinsically indifferent to this distinction. We gradually come to realise 
that our experience has two components: the inner and outer. We must not say that 
all our knowledge is of the inner, as the subjectivist maintains, or that what we know 
is independent of the inner, as the naive realist maintains. Thus critical realism, for 
Adamson, is a compromise between naive realism and subjectivism. 
G.Dawes Hicks published his philosophy in Critical Realism (1938). Perception, he 
said, contains three contents: the content of the object, the content we immediately 
apprehend, and the content of the perceiving act. Perception is an act of selection 
from the complexity of our environment. Different observers will pick out different 
sets of qualities from the same scene. A naive realist would say that one perception 
is as good as another. Thus there is no positive reason for believing that what we 
immediately apprehend is a sense-datum. Dawes Hicks's critical realism, says 
Passmore (1986, p.283), rests on a sharp distinction between qualities and objects: 
the quality is what we immediately apprehend, the object is what stimulates us to 
that apprehension. 
American critical realists (G. Santayana, R.W. Sellars, C.A. Strong) opposed any 
sort of naive realism as well as idealism. They agreed that there are three distinct 
ingredients in perception: the perceiving act, something given (the datum) and the 
object perceived. The perceived phenomenon is apprehended from the very begin-
ning as pointing beyond itself to a physical object. 
The critical realist position may be summarised as follows: Scientists aim at a true 
description of the world and a true explanation of observable events. A description 
of these events must be deducible from the theory. But scientists cannot know for 
certain that their findings are true. Theories are conjectures, which are subjected 
to tests; they are guesses about reality, which may be wrong. Theories are instru-
ments for calculating and predicting, hut scientists hope that they are also descrip-
tions and explanations of reality - though they may subsequently find that they are 
not. Critical realists can be realist about some theories (those they believe to be 
true) and instrumentalist about others, which they find useful but not true ( ie. 
theoretical models). Instrumentalists, however, are always instrumentalist. For a 
critical realist, it is not illogical to retain a falsified theory in an instrumentalist 
capacity, provided that its status is acknowledged. The fact that it is useful does not 
mean that it is true. It may be that within a restricted domain of application a 
falsified theory is more useful than a true one because it is simpler to use. In other 
words, it has instrumental value. Science often approaches a realist theory by way 
of tentative instrumentalist models. 
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While critical realism has many advantages over naive empirical realism, it still 
seems to end in relativism. For critical realists hold that we can never know the 
world out there. How does this Kantian position affect the validity and objectivity 
of human knowledge? Are we back to square one? 
Not if we accept the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar (1975) and Bernard Lonergan 
(1957), which will now be presented in greater detail. 
3.4.2 Two significant critical realists 
(a) Bhaskar's critical realism 
Roy Bhaskar (1989) is a contemporary British critical realist. He shows how the 
critical realist account of natural science can be derived by a critique of the main 
contemporary philosophies of science. 
Bhaskar notes that, during the 1980's, scientific realism has become fashionable in 
the philosophy of science. This is a reaction to post-Kuhnian relativism. This new 
scientific realism is, however, actually empiricist. Bhaskar calls it 'empirical real-
ism', which is: 
"a form of realism which fails to recognise that there are enduring 
structures and generative mechanisms underlying and producing ob-
servable phenomena. and events. In other words its realism is of the 
most superficial sort." (Bhaskar 1989, p.2) 
So contemporary scientific realism turns out to be wanting. For, being basically 
empiricist, it still cannot satisfactorily account for theoretical entities. 
The empiricist tradition holds that scientific knowledge grows linearly and cumula-
tively until absolute truth is attained. As Bhaskar observes, there is some merit to 
this view. It is a historical fact that the fund of scientific knowledge has grown over 
the years. This fact must be acknowledged. Yet, as Kuhn pointed out, science grows 
by rejecting old theories and accepting new. Plurality of theories, even incommen-
surable theories, is what counts. 
Only critical realism (maintains Bhaskar) can sustain the intelligibility of both the 
experimental and theoretical work of science. Only critical realism is able to save 
the cumulatiYe character of science wit hour resorting to empiricism, and at the same 
time account for pluralism of scientific theories without plunging into suhjectivism. 
Critical realism is, for Bhaskar, far more than the 'internal' realism of those scientists 
(like Kuhn) who believe in a socially-constructed reality. Rather, it is a metaphysical 
realism, holding that there is an independent world prior to scientific investigation. 
Critical realism conceives the world as being structured, differentiated and chang-
ing. It is opposed to empiricism, pragmatism and idealism alike. 
There are two sides of knowledge: the social, and the objective. Knowledge is a 
social product. Human beings in their social activity produce knowledge. It is as 
much a cultural product as a motor car, chair or book. The other side of knowledge 
is that knowledge is of things which are not produced by men at all: the density of 
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mercury, electrolysis, the mechanism of light propagation. None of these objects 
depend on human activity. If men ceased to exist sound would continue to travel 
and heavy bodies fall to earth. These are, says Bhaskar, the intransitive objects of 
knowledge. The intransitive objects of inquiry are the mechanisms of the produc-
tion of phenomena in nature. Science must be seen as a social process whose aim 
is the production of the knowledge of these mechanisms. The transitive objects of 
knowledge are Aristotelian material causes. They are the raw materials of science 
- the artificial objects fashioned into items of knowledge by the science of the day. 
They include the antecedently established facts and theories, paradigms and models, 
available methods and techniques of inquiry. 
Classical empiricism can sustain neither the transitive nor the intransitive dimen-
sions. For empiricists, events must be analysed in terms of sensations. Kant's 
transcendental idealism tries to uphold the objectivity of facts. However, it cannot 
sustain the intransitive dimension. For its objects of knowledge do not exist inde-
pendently of the human mind. Transcendental idealism holds that the order in 
nature is imposed by the mind. Critical realism holds that order in nature exists 
independently of humans. If there were no science, there would still be a nature. 
Whatever is discovered in nature must be expressed in thought, but the structures 
and causal laws discovered in nature do not depend upon thought. 
Experience presupposes the intransitive and structured character of objects. Epi-
stemic access to independent objects is possible, but they must be structured. The 
intelligibility of experiments presupposes the structured character of objects. Ex-
planation is the production of the knowledge of the mechanisms of the production 
of some phenomenon. The construction of an explanation will involve the building 
of a model, using antecedently existing cognitive resources and operating under the 
control of analogy and metaphor. 
The world consists of mechanisms, not events. Mechanisms and structures are real 
and distinct from the events that they generate. Also, events must occur inde-
pendently of the experiences in which they are apprehended. Mechanisms, events 
and experiences thus constitute three overlapping domains of reality, namely, the 
domain of the real, the actual, and the empirical. For empiricism, all three domains 
are identical. For critical realism, the domain of the real is greater than that of the 
actual, which in turn is greater than that of the empirical. Empirical realism depends 
on a reduction of the real to the actual. And in doing so it presupposes a closed 
world and a completed science. 
Bhaskar ( 1975, p.58) emphasises that he is not saying that experiences are less real 
than events, or events less real than structures. This is the kind of mistake Eddington 
(1928) encouraged with his 'two table' problem. Every object has two faces, its 
familiar face, and its scientific face. Which is real? For the instrumentalist, the 
scientific object is an artificial construct; for the naive realist, the familiar object an 
illusion. For the critical realist, however, the question is a pseudo-problem. The 
relationship is not between a real and imaginary object, but between two kinds of 
real object. Thus our knowledge is set in the context of the ongoing activity of 
scientific practice. 
84 
The process occurs in three phases as follows: Science identifies a phenomenon, 
constructs explanations for it and empirically tests its explanations, leading to the 
identification of the generative mechanism at work. The classical empiricist tradi-
tion restricts itself to the first phase, the neo-Kantian tradition sees the need for the 
second, but it either denies the need for, or does not draw the full implications of, 
the third. Critical realism differentiates itself from empirical realism in interpreting 
the first phase as the invariance of a result rather than a regularity, and from 
transcendental idealism in allowing that what is imagined at the second phase need 
not be imaginary but may be real. Now in this continuing process (says Bhaskar 
1989, p.20), as deeper levels or strata of reality are successively unfolded, scientists 
must construct and test their explanations. 
On the critical realist view, the essence of science is the movement at any one level 
from knowledge of manifest phenomena to knowledge, produced by means of 
antecedent knowledge, of the structures that generate them. Now knowledge of 
deeper levels may correct, as well as explain, knowledge of more superficial ones. 
As Bhaskar (1989, p.20) says: 
"But only a concept of ontological depth ( depending upon the concept 
of real strata apart from our knowledge of strata) enables us to reconcile 
the twin aspects of scientific development: growth and change." 
It is clear that for an adequate account of scientific development, both the concepts 
of a stratified and differentiated reality and of knowledge as a produced means of 
production must be sustained. 
Bhaskar points out that realism involves an ontology which is distinct from epi-
stemology. However, the two are closely connected. The type of epistemology we 
hold affects the type ofrealism we choose. If we hold constructivism, then we must 
choose critical realism. 
For empiricism, the natural order is what is given in experience; for idealism, it is 
what we make or construct; for critical realism, it is given as a presupposition of 
our causal investigations of nature, but our knowledge of it is socially constructed. 
For critical realism, it is the nature of objects that determines their cognitive 
possibilities for us; it is humanity that is the contingent phenomenon in nature. 
In science humans come to know human-independent nature, fallibly and variously. 
Only critical realism, hy setting humanity in nature, is consistent with the historical 
emergence, and causal investigation, of science itself. Now such an investigation 
presupposes an intransitive (and so non-human) ontology. This ontology is realism. 
And it is (says Bhaskar) a necessary presupposition of natural science. 
Critical realism, for Bhaskar, is an attempt to re-orient the sciences away from the 
positivist and instrumentalist goals of prediction and control to the realist ones of 
depth explanation and intellectual emancipation. 
Summary of Bhaskar's critical realism: 
( 1) It is grounded in the objects of the world. 
(2) It takes constructivism into account. 
85 
(3) It regards theory as part of reality. 
( 4) It gives theory a high status. 
(5) It guarantees objectivity. 
(6) It avoids relativism. 
(7) It holds that reality has levels. 
(8) It takes pluralism of theories into account. 
(b) Lonergan's critical realism 
Bernard Lonergan was born in Canada in 1904, and lectured theology students in 
Montreal (1940-46), Toronto (1946-53) and Rome (1953-65).His main work, In-
sight, published in 1957, was written with theological method in mind, but treated 
epistemological questions in some detail. Lonergan put forward a type of critical 
realism which leaned heavily on the philosophies of St Thomas Aquinas and Kant. 
Lonergan (1957) believed that the mistake of naive empiricists is that they regard 
only sensory experience as knowledge, and this leads to all the Humean problems 
about induction and causation. Kantian phenomenalism is also a direct result of 
this empiricist view that the real world is the object of sensation only. However, 
said Lonergan, the thinking subject actively brings to bear on the real world more 
than pure observation. For Lonergan, 
"the real world is not that which is apprehended by mere observation; 
but ... the real world is that which is known through the three-fold 
process of experience, understanding and judgement." (Meynell 1976, 
p.7) 
The process of knowing, says Lonergan, is a cognitively structured whole, consisting 
of sensory experience, an intelligibly constructed theory, and an assessment of the 
truth of the theory. In Lonergan's words: 
"Now, human knowing involves many distinct and irreducible activities: 
seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, inquiring, imagining, under-
standing, reflecting, weighing the evidence, judging. No one of these 
activities, alone and by itself, may he named human knowing." (Loner-
gan in McShane (ed.) 1973, p.16) 
Human knowing is, therefore, not this or that operation, hut a whole whose parts 
are operations. It is a dynamic structure. 
"Human knowing is also formally dynamic. It is self-assembling, self-
constituting. It puts itself together. .. .It leads from experience through 
imagination to insight ... In turn, concepts stimulate reflection, and 
reflection is the conscious exigence of rationality." (ibid., p.17) 
It is a mistake to compare one cognitive operation with another. For example, 
knowing is not ocular vision, that is, looking. 
Experience is of the given: we can have experience of sensing ( eg hearing, seeing), 
or experience of intellectual activities ( eg thinking, inquiring, understanding), or 
experience of reflecting ( eg judging, assessing). That is, there are external and 
internal experiences. 
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According to Meynell (1976), Lonergan distinguished between two types of know-
ing: direct observations, and theoretical constructions. He called the first 'experi-
ential conjugates', and the second 'explanatory or pure conjugates'. Experiential 
conjugates appeal directly to sensory experience for verification. Pure conjugates, 
on the other hand, are defined not by direct appeal to experience, but by appeal to 
empirically established laws and theories. That is, they are verified by insights into 
series of experiences. An example of a pure conjugate is 'mass': one does not have 
direct experience of mass. 
Unfortunately, Galileo (and Locke) distinguished between primary and secondary 
qualities, instead of between pure and experiential conjugates. This gave a one-
sided view to scientific method, because it gave a special privilege to experiential 
conjugates. This is the basis of modern materialism, which regards the very essence 
of scientific explanation to be the reduction of all phenomena to that of matter in 
motion. Lonergan objected strongly to this, for it involves either the postulation of 
what is entirely beyond our experience, or the uncritical according of special 
privilege to one kind of experience over another, that is, that a directly observed 
object is more real than a theoretical entity. 
Knowledge in the proper sense is knowledge of reality. Of its very nature, knowl-
edge is directed towards reality. When we know, we have confidence that our 
judgements about the real are in full accord with the real as it is. So knowledge 
'intends' reality. That is, knowledge is intrinsically objective. 
'The instrinsic objectivity of human cognitional activity is its intention-
ality. Human intelligence actively greets every content of experience 
with the perplexity, the wonder, the drive, the intention, that may he 
characterised by such questions as, What is it? Why is it so?" (ihid., p. 
22) 
Of its very nature, human knowing goes beyond data to intelligibility, beyond 
intelligibility to truth, and through truth to reality. But though it goes beyond, it 
does not leave behind. It unites what is beyond with what is behind. 
"From the partial knowledge we have reached it sends us back to fuller 
experiencing, fuller understanding, broader and deeper judements, for 
what it intends includes far more than we succeed in knowing. It is 
all-inclusive, but the knowing we achieve is always limited." (ihid., p.23) 
Objectivity is grounded in the totality of the knowing process. It does not reside in 
a single operation hut in a structured manifold of operations. 
"Empiricists have tried to find the ground of objectivity in experience, 
rationalists have tried to place it in necessity, idealists have had recourse 
to coherence. All are partly right and partly wrong, right in their 
affirmation, wrong in their exclusion. For the objectivity of human 
knowing is a triple cord: there is an experiential component that resides 
in the givenness of relevant data; there is a normative component that 
resides in the exigences of intelligence and rationality guiding the 
process of knowing from data to judging; there finally is an absolute 
component that is reached when reflective understanding combines 
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with the normative and the experiential elements into a virtually uncon-
ditioned." (ibid., p.24) 
Because human knowing reaches such an unconditioned, it transcends itself. And 
so we distinguish between what is, and what appears. When we say that something 
is, we mean that its reality does not depend upon our cognitional activity. In what 
appears, what seems to be, what is imagined or thought, the object is still tied down 
by relativity to the subject. Human knowing, then, intends the transcendant. A 
grasp of the dynamic structure of human knowing is therefore essential to a grasp 
of the objectivity of our knowing. 
Meynell (1976) notes that Lonergan's distinction between the thing-for-us and the 
thing-in-itself, between the thing-as-described and the thing-as-explained, seems to 
have something to do with Kant's distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. 
Exactly what Kant meant by this distinction is disputed; it seems likely to be derived, 
through successive alterations, from the Galilean and Lockean distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities. But Lonergan's distinction is not identical either 
with the Galilean/Lockean, nor with the Kantian. It is simply between things-as-de-
scribed and things-as-explained. Kant's unknowable things-in-themselves are the 
residue of real things as constituted by their primary qualities, subjected to a 
criticism which is not quite thorough enough. Kant did not go far enough into the 
cognitional process. Part of the cognitional process involves reflection and insight. 
For Lonergan, scientific knowledge is what is derived from inquiry into and reflec-
tion on experience. Materialistic philosophy results from the notion that scientific 
knowledge is obtained by unreflective affirmation of the reality which it immediately 
confronts. A materialist (positivist) is just critical enough to see the reason for 
saying that sensation pertains to the perceiver rather than the object perceived; 
hence, what exists is not the direct object of sensation, but is something which 
somehow gives rise to sensations in us. Phenomenalism, said Lonergan, is more 
sophisticated. Phenomenalism is the inevitable result of consistent application of 
the principle that the real world is the object simply of sensation. It holds that the 
real world is nothing more than what is known by the senses. Lonergan rejected 
this, saying that the real world is that which is known by the fullness of sensory and 
reflective experience. Phenomenalism errs in mistaking one part of the process of 
knowing for the whole. 
Lonergan rejected the phenomenalism of Kant. Yet he acknowledged that reality, 
for Kant, was not the direct object of experience, as it had been for the empiricists. 
Kant held that we can know only phenomenal reality, and that this knowledge is a 
compound of sensation and the a priori categories of our thought. The phenomenal 
world, for Kant, is partly sensed, and partly constructed. But we could not know the 
reality behind phenomena. 
According to Meynell (1976) Lonergan took Kant's approach further. He main-
tained that we can know reality itself as well as phenomena. The real world is that 
which is known by the three-fold process of sensation, understanding, and judge-
ment. Reality is constructed as well as sensed. Many scientific objects ( eg electrons, 
photons) are not directly observable. However, the understanding grasps by insight 
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the intelligible unity in the data in the act of constructing a theory to account for 
them. Hence electrons and photons are real objects with an existence independent 
of the thinking subject. Theory is part of reality. 
''The naive realist correctly asserts the validity of human knowing, but 
mistakenly attributes the objectivity of human knowing not to human 
knowing, but to some component in human knowing. The idealist, on 
the other hand, correctly refutes the naive realist claim that the whole 
objectivity of human knowing is found in some component of human 
knowing, but mistakenly concludes that human knowing does not yield 
valid knowledge of reality."(ibid., p.25) 
For the naive realist, the starting point of this confusion is the myth that knowing is 
analogous to looking. The eye sees what is to be seen. That is objectivity for the 
naive realist. He assumes that knowing, if objective, is like seeing. He places the 
ground for objectivity in the notion that there is direct access to things as they are. 
The idealist distinguishes between appearance and reality. By appearance he means 
precisely what the observer sees or even feels. He may report that a green field is 
green or that it looks green. The latter does not involve any commitment about its 
objective properties. Knowledge of appearance is one thing, knowledge of reality 
another. 
However, as Lonergan comments, whether one is knowing what is, or knowing what 
appears, the act of knowing is more than mere seeing. A judgement is also involved. 
Higher cognitional operations are involved at any level of knowing. There is no such 
thing as pure sensory experience. As Lonergan puts it: 
"An act of ocular vision may be perfect as ocular vision; yet if it occurs 
without any accompanying glimmer ofunderstanding, it is mere gaping." 
(ibid., p.16) 
The critical realist, unlike the naive realist, does not hold that human knowing 
consists in any one single cognitional operation. Also, the critical realist contends 
that intellectual operations are not necessarily similar to sensitive operations. 
Against the idealist, the critical realist maintains that sense does not know appear-
ances. It is just as much a matter of judgement to know that an object is not real hut 
apparent, as it is to know that an object is not apparent hut real. Sense does not know 
appearances, because sense alone is not human knowing, and because sense alone 
does not possess the full objectivity of human knowing. In Lonergan's words: 
"By our senses we are given, not appearance, not reality, but data. By 
our consciousness, which is not an inner sense, we are given, not 
appearance, not reality, but data. Further, while it is true enough that 
data of sense result in us from the action of external objects, it is not 
true that we know this by sense alone; we know it as we know anything 
else, by experiencing, understanding, and judging. Again, it is not true 
that it is from sense that our cognitional activities derive their immedi-
ate relationship to real objects; that relationship is immediate in the 
intention of being; it is mediate in the data of sense and in the data of 
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consciousness inasmuch as the intention of being makes use of data in 
promoting cognitional process to knowlege of being." (ibid., p.30) 
Finally, against both the naive realist and the idealist, the critical realist brings the 
charge of picture thinking. The naive realist seeks the ground of objective knowl-
edge of reality in looking and perceiving. The idealist asserts that it is by perceiving 
that our cognitional activities have their immediate relationship to objects. For 
both, their world is a picture world. If their world were the universe of being, they 
would agree that the original relationship of cognitional activity to the universe of 
being must lie in the intention of being. They forget about being. 
Subjectivity was once a pejorative term. It denoted a violation of the normative 
exigences of intelligence and rationality. But it has come to denote a rejection of 
misconceived objectivity and a reaffirmation of man's right to be himself. So 
conceived, the problem of objectivity tends to vanish. It is more acceptable today 
to revise our notions of reality and objectivity, and describe them in terms of our 
understanding and judgements. However, even though subjectivity has gained 
ground in recent philosophy, and rightly so, to condemn objectivity outright under-
mines authentic human existence. Lonergan puts it thus: 
"It is quite true that objective knowing is not yet authentic human living; 
but without objective knowing there is no authentic living." (ibid., p.32) 
A real exclusion of objective knowing destroys personalist values. We need objective 
knowing. 
Lonergan distinguishes between "the subject's world" and "the world". The latter is 
what is there to be known and that is unchanged by its being known. But the subject's 
world is correlative to the subject: it may be a world that is mostly fantasy; it may 
be the real world; but, either way, it is the world in which the subject actually lives. 
There are therefore different worlds. The first world is the world of immediacy. 
This is the world of the infant, the world of immediate experience, of the given as 
given. A second world is this world mediated by meaning, and it has two forms. 
Initially it is an extension of the world of immediacy, but gradually, through active 
involvement with the world, the distinction between subject and object grows. The 
world mediated by meaning is far more than the sum of all the worlds of immediacy. 
It is the whole of the worlds of literature and science, of history and philosophy and 
art. It is a universe of being, that is known not just by experience, but by the 
conjunction of experience, understanding and judgement. 
''The difference between the world of immediacy and the world medi-
ated by meaning is the source of the critical problem of philosophers. 
The world mediated by meaning is for the naive realist just an abstrac-
tion; for the idealist it is the only world we know intelligently and 
rationally, and it is not real but ideal; for the critical realist it is the world 
we know intelligently and rationally, and it is not ideal but real. The 
world of immediacy is but a fraction of the real world."(ibid. p. 38) 
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A third world is not only mediated but also constituted by meaning. Language is 
constituted by meaning. But not only language is constituted by meaning. So also 
are human acts. These include acts of the will. Human acts occur in a socio-cultural 
context. Human institutions and mores and values have a determination from 
meaning. Hence the third world is a world of community. Common meanings have 
histories. They become common only through communication, clarification. It is 
through the available common meanings of community that the individual becomes 
himself. 
This world mediated by meaning is the domain of theory. It is far more than the 
sum of the previous worlds. For meaning goes beyond experiencing. What is meant 
is not only experienced but also somehow understood and, commonly, also affirmed. 
It is this larger world mediated by meaning that we refer to when we speak of the 
real world, and in it we live our lives. 
For Lonergan, there are levels of reality. At each level of reality, there are things 
judgements about which may be more or less verified in experience. One rises from 
the level of direct observation and description, to that of explanation and theory. 
Dynamic trolleys on a laboratory bench are real, just as are the unobservable forces 
which give rise to their accelerations. Theories like Newton's mechanics or Ein-
stein's relativity are forms of explanation which have not been achieved simply by 
looking at the external world. They have been achieved by reiterated putting of 
questions to experience, and by multiple verifications or falsifications couched in 
terms of their underlying theories. 
Thus critical realism bridges the gap between naive realism ( empiricism) and 





Comments on Lonergan's critical realism: Lonergan manages to keep a firm 
toehold on the world of empirical objects. The component of sensory experience is 
one of the three components of human knowing, and must be present together with 
the other two. This ensures an objectivity which rests on rationality and avoids 
falling into the relativism that infects Selley's brand of critical realism. And, 
regarding what Von Glasersfeld calls "the organism's cognitive isolation from 
reality", Lonergan's levels of reality more than adequately avoids Hegelian idealism. 
Also, Lonergan goes much further in his realism than do pragmatists such as John 
Dewey. Dewey's constructivism ends when knowing successfully achieves its goal: 
coping with real life. For Lonergan, this pragmatic goal is also important, hut it does 
not end with an understanding only. It must end with full-blooded judgement, so 
that the learner can become fully human. 
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Lonergan's critical realism is, in my view, a superb synthesis of the best in the 
epistemologies of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Popper, Kuhn and Harre. It 
also agrees well with Piaget's constructivism, for insight is an active, creative, 
Gestalt-type process. Lonergan has redefined reality in a wider way, and has moved 
away from the effete notion of reality which we have inherited from empiricism. His 
idea of 'levels of reality' is similar to Popper's 'degrees of conjecture'. Indeed, it is 
the concept of 'levels of reality' and 'degrees of conjecture' which enables us to 
escape from the impasse of instrumentalism. 
Summing up: Lonergan's critical realist philosophy emphasises several import-
ant points. 
( 1) All observation is theory-laden. 
(2) There are levels of reality. 
(3) There are levels of cognitive operations. 
( 4) These are, broadly, sensory experience, understanding, judgement. 
(5) Human knowing is not one single operation alone, but a totality of all three. 
( 6) Knowledge and reality are not the same. 
(7) Knowledge, by its very nature, is open to reality. 
(8) Reality is more than the sum of the empirical and the theoretical. 
(9) Theoretical entities are part of reality. 
(10) Objectivity is not grounded in sense experience alone, but also in 
understanding and judgement. 
( 11) A new notion of reality and objectivity allows problems about reality and 
observation to vanish. 
(12) Modern man tends to sense and understand, but not to judge, thus 
remaining superficial. 
3.5 Instrumentalism and Constructivism 
Piaget held that thinking is internalised in a profound way. An operation, for Piaget, 
is not just an external action or event. Dewey, on the other hand, held that thinking 
is an event. Piaget's notion of interiorisation involves the movement from surface 
experience to theoretical knowledge, from practical knowing to operational sche-
matic knowing. It is the precondition for objective knowledge. Dewey's theory of 
knowing remains at the surface. 
Piaget's use of structures, and the equilibration between assimilation and accom-
modation, provides a far more satisfying account of cognition than does Dewey's 
interactionism. 
Al thou th Piaget was not interested in questions of reality, his distinction between 
the wide and narrow senses of representation implies that there are levels of 
ontological reality. For Dewey, reality is superficial, a kaleidoscope of actions and 
events. 
Both Dewey and Piaget proposed views which were constructivist. Thus whether 
the learner takes the pragmatist (that is, instrumentalist) route, or the assimilation-
accommodation route, he will still construct his reality. However, the Deweyan 
version cannot account for the construction of unobservables. Although not pas-
sively representational, its theory of knowledge is still empiricist. The activity 
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advocated by Dewey results in a purely instrumental success. Piaget's constructiv-
ism also provides understanding as well as instrumental success. 
Finally, the role of scientific theory is regarded by each approach in a subtly different 
but important way. Both constructivism and instrumentalism are forms of pragmat-
ism. Therefore both hold theory in low regard. For the constructivist, a theory is 
easily rejected in favour of another better one. This is the whole idea behind 
plurality of theories. For the instrumentalist, a theory is arbitrary and fictional, and 
therefore can be discarded if it is more convenient. From a pedagogical point of 
view, this has its merits. But there must come a time when arbitrary swopping of 
theories must stop, and one theory chosen which conforms to the objective norms 
of the scientific community. It must be tested against reality. 
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Reality is not 'already out there now'. What is 'out there' is the existing physical 
object. In the process of acquiring knowledge of the object, reality is created. The 
objectivity of this reality is guaranteed, not by sense alone, but by the totality of 
cognitive operations, including sense. 
Hence it is important to distinguish between: (1) the existing physical object; (2) 
the act of knowing; and (3) the real world. Reality and knowledge are distinct, but 
are closely related. Knowledge is knowledge of reality more than of the physical 
object. But because objectivity is grounded in the whole dynamic structure of 
knowing operations (and not sensory experience alone), and is ratified by the 
community, our knowledge of reality is well-founded. 
By revising our notions of reality and objectivity, we have not bowed down to 
relativism. Indeed, all we have done is to reclaim a more correct, fully human 
notion. The notions of reality and objectivity based on out-moded empiricist theory 
of knowledge, were incomplete and misleading. 
Since reality has a hierarchy oflevels, and since our know ledge ofreality is obtained 
by sensory as well as theoretical experience, theoretical entities are part of reality. 
Therefore a critical realist takes his theories seriously. 
In my opinion, Popper's 'degrees of conjecture' and Lonergan's 'levels of reality' 
overcome the problems of crass phenomenal ism found in the instrumentalist ap-
proach. The implication is that instrumentalism is itself a degree of conjecture. For 
there is a certain truth and value in the instrumentalist view. But it chooses to ignore 
the fact that there are other deeper levels of reality which also matter. 
The many-world reality suggested by Popper and Lonergan is also found in many of 
the other philosophers examined: Polanyi, Harre, Bhaskar, and possibly even in 
Piaget. It is a useful concept, enabling the notion of reality and objectivity to be 
broadened. 
The chief point made by critical realism is that theoretical entities are as real as 
those directly observed: theory is part of reality. 
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In conclusion, we can say: 
(1) Constructivism is a well-established theory of education. 
(2) Constructivism is relativist. 
(3) Constructivism is a form of instrumentalism. 
( 4) Piagetian constructivism is better than Deweyan. 
(5) Piaget's reality is constructed. 
( 6) Piaget's reality is has levels. 
(7) Critical realism links empirical realism with constructivism. 
(8) Lonergan's critical realism is consistent with a wider notion of realism. 
(9) Lonergan's realism guarantees objective knowledge. 
( 10) Lonergan's realism is non-relativist. 
( 11) Critical realism is consistent with plurality of theories. 
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY OF THE SCHOOL SCIENCE TEXTBOOK 
STUDY 
4.1 Introduction 
The task is now to examine some recent high school physical science textbooks, 
especially those used in South African schools, for signs of instrumentalism. 
A science textbook may incorporate an explicit as well as an implicit account of 
scientific inquiry. This study will therefore search for the philosophy of science in 
textbooks under two main headings: (a) Explicit reference to the philosophy of 
scientific inquiry; and (b) Implicit presentation of the philosophy of science. 
Those texts which do not include an explicit mention of their philosophy are 
naturally far more difficult to analyse, for the reader must judge for himself what 
philosophical approach is being adopted by the author. This, as Herron (1971, 
p.198) says, 
" ... opens the possibility of a variety of interpretations of what is said." 
No study, including the present one, is theory-free. This study is searching for signs 
of instrumental ism in school science textbooks. It may therefore be biassed towards 
an instrumentalist interpretation wherever there is doubt about the author's 
meaning. Every reader approaches a book with certain preconceptions, as Popper 
has pointed out: 
"One never reads or understands a book except with definite expecta-
tions in one's mind .... We approach everything in the light of a precon-
ceived theory. So also a book. As a consequence one is liable to pick 
out those things which one either likes or dislikes or which one wants 
for other reasons to find in the book ... " (Popper in Lakatos and Mus-
grave 1970, p.51) 
The language used by authors who are naive realists is very similar to that used by 
those who are instrumentalists. This compounds the difficulty even further, espe-
cially if the author provides no explicit indication of his philosophical stance, as is 
usually the case. The reader can interpret the language as he prefers, either in a 
realist sense or in an instrumentalist sense. Young children are generally naive 
realists, and so would read a textbook written by either kind of author in a purely 
realist way. Indeed, most teenagers as well as adults (including most science 
teachers) would almost certainly also interpret a textbook in a naive realist way. It 
would be unconsciosly assumed by most readers that the author is a naive realist, 
even though they are not aware of the term as such. As Selley ( 1989, p.29) says: 
"It is tempting to interpret this confident, assertive style as being conse-
quent upon the author's naive realist metaphysics. However it is 
possible to read into school science a very different interpretation, 
namely instrumentalism." 
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For this reason, this study will attempt to objectify the readings as far as possible, 
by making use of analytical instruments devised by previous researchers, as well as 
of one devised especially for this study. By using several such tools, and assessing 
their results jointly, an overall impression of the philosophy of science portrayed in 
school science textbooks will be obtained. 
A schema for the present study is as follows: 
TABLE 4.1: Schema for this study 
4.2 Selection of the Textbooks 
(1) Implicit philosophy: 
A. Level of laboratory inquiries 
B. Level of reader involvement 
-Questioning style in text 
-Involvement indices 
-Philosophy checklist 
(2) Explicit references: 
A. Quotation of specific examples 
B. Pref ace analysis 
C. Metaphor analysis 
Twenty-three high school physical science textbooks were chosen. Seven of these 
are texts widely used in British schools, as well as in English-speaking schools in 
Thi rd World countries, such as Lesotho and Swaziland. Eleven are texts widely used 
in South African high schools, three are well-known American science textbooks, 
and two are science textbooks originating in other African countries (Nigeria and 
Kenya). 
One of the aims of this study is to ascertain whether there is a greater or lesser degree 
of empiricism and/or instrumentalism in recent high school science textbooks 
specifically designed for educationally disadvantaged pupils in an African context. 
Selley ( 1989, p.29) noted that, even in Britain, there has been a return to textbooks 
having a non-participatory, transmission style, textbooks which portray a meta-
physics which is naive realist and instrumentalist. This may also be a trend in African 
science textbooks, and in particular, South African science textbooks. The chief 
characteristic of such textbooks might be factual content, the provision of simple 
rules to be able to solve scientific problems, and emphasis on calculations. In other 
words, they might be highly instrumentalist. 
For this reason, this study has included some textbooks with a distinct African 
orientation. Textbooks from the Nigerian Secondary Schools Project, as well as the 
Kenyan School Science Project (SSP), were examined. Other textbooks with an 
African Third-world orientation include Broster and James's Successful Science for 
Standards 8, 9 and 10, which are recent high-quality South African textbooks 
specifically orientated towards academically disadvantaged pupils. Other South 
African books which are becoming increasingly popular, especially in schools 
lacking adequate laboratory facilities, are Science Education Project (SEP). These 
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consist of Workbooks (such as SEP 8,examined in this study) which are used with a 
specially-designed portable kit of basic laboratory hardware for scientific inquiry 
practicals as well as teacher-support materials. Finally, also belonging to this group 
of specifically African textbooks are Jansen and Dekker's Understanding science for 
Standard 6 and 7. 
All of the South African textbooks, including Successful Science and Understanding 
science, are designed to cover the "new" 1985 Standard 8, 9 and 10 Physical Science 
Syllabus. The average age of pupils in Standards 8, 9 and 10 is 15, 16 and 17 years 
old respectively. The reason for choosing these Standards was to align the textbooks 
with corresponding British 0-level and GCSE, as well as the American Project 
Physics, CHEM Study and PSSC Physics. 
Eight of the books were read from cover to cover, in order to obtain an overall 
assessment of their philosophical stand- point. These were A, B, C, D, E, F, Kand 
R in the list below (Table 4.2). The other books were speed-read or skimmed from 
cover-to-cover, and then certain chapters or topics were read in detail. 
All the textbooks in Table 4.2 were subjected to the Philosophy Checklist test 
described below, but only six books (namely A, B, C, J, Kand R) were selected from 
the twenty-nine for elaborate analysis. 
Most of the textbooks studied contain practical laboratory inquiries which the 
pupils are expected to perform. As the approach taken in practical work can portray 
a definite image of the nature of science to pupils, a systematic analysis of laboratory 
inquiries should reflect something about the philosophy of science of the author. 
Also characteristic of scientific inquiry are questions about natural phenomena, and 
about how we investigate them. Questions posed in textbooks can elicit specific 
types of inquiry behaviour, such as by directing emphasis to observation, or creative 
imagination. Therefore an ordered procedure for analysing questions in the text 
may also be an indicator of the underlying philosophy present. 
An analytical tool, specifically designed to detect the presence of empiricism and 
instrumental ism adds to the objectivity of a study such as the present one. Such an 
instrument, known as the "Philosophy Checklist", was specially devised for this 
study. 
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TABLE 4.2: TEXTBOOKS SELECTED FOR THIS STUDY 
South African 
A. Brink and Jones, 1985, Physical Science Standard 8, Juta. 
B. Pienaar, Walters, de Jager, Schreuder, 1985, Senior Physical Science 8, 
Maskew Miller/ Longman. 
C. Broster and James, 1987, Successful Science (Physical Science) 8, Oxford 
University Press. 
D. Brink and Jones, 1986, Physical Science Standard 9, Juta. 
E. Pienaar, Walters, Schreuder, de Jager, 1986, Senior Physical Science 9, 
Maskew Miller/ Longman. 
F. Broster and James, 1987, Successful Science (Physical Science) 9, Oxford 
University Press. 
G. Brink and Jones, 1987, Physical Science Standard 10, Juta. 
H. Pienaar, Walters, de Jager, Schreuder, 1987, Senior Physical Science 10, 
Maskew Miller / Longman. 
I. Broster and James, 1987, Successful Science (Physical Science) JO, Oxford 
University Press. 
J. Science Education Project (SEP), 1986, Physical Science Standard 8. 
British 
K. Duncan, Tom, 1987, GCSE Physics, 2nd Edition, John Murray. 
L. Pople and Williams, 1980, Science to Sixteen, Oxford University Press. 
M. Atherton, Duncan, Mackean, 1983, Science for today and tomorrow, John 
Murray. 
N. Lewis and Waller, 1986, Thinking Chemistry (GCSE Version), 
Oxford University Press. 
0. Pople S., 1986, Explaining Physics (GCSE Version), Oxford University Press. 
P. Warren P., 1985, Physics Alive, John Murray. 
Q. Lambert, 1985, Physics for first examinations, Blackie. 
American 
R. The Project Physics Course (Harvard), 1970, Concepts of Motion, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
S. CH EM Study, 1968, Chemistry an experimental science, Freeman. 
T. PSSC, 1960, Physics, Heath. 
African 
U. Physics, Books 1, 2 and 3, 1980, Nigerian Secondary Schools Science Project, 
Lagos, Nigeria. 
V. Physics, Years 1 to 4, 1971, School Science Project, Nairobi, Kenya. 
W. Jansen E.G. and Dekker J., 1986, Understanding Science 6 and 7, Maskew 
Miller Longman. 
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Finally, the above three analytical instruments are amply supported by the quotation 
of relevant examples in the textbooks of various aspects of scientific method and 
philosophy, both by random sampling as well as by cover-to-cover reading. A close 
reading of all the Prefaces was undertaken, in order to analyse the authors' explicit 
aims from a philosophical and methodological perspective. It was also felt that 
absence of any reference to philosophy would also indicate the author's philosop-
hical position. The type of language used, whether it was literal or metaphorical, 
could also be used as an indicator of the author's philosophical aims, literal language 
being the preferred expression of the empiricist scientist. 
All of these tests and instruments of analysis, taken together, should provide a result 
which is as objective and reliable as possible. They should, at the very least, act as 
a control over the cover-to-cover reading and interpretation of the textbooks. 
43 Previous studies of this type. 
4.3.1 Levels of Inquiry: Herron 
Herron (1971) conducted a study on three textbooks, namely, CHEM Study, PSSC 
Physics, and BSCS Biology (Blue Version). These textbooks claimed to confer on 
pupils some knowledge or mastery of the nature of scientific inquiry. Herron wished 
to determine the 
"clarity and coherence with which the doctrine is set forth and to 
determine the extent to which the doctrine is incorporated in the actual 
structure of the textual materials". (Herron 1971, p.172) 
He first developed a conceptual framework for analysing accounts of scientific 
inquiry. This was, in effect, a checklist of aspects or topics at issue which any 
reasonably complete account of scientific inquiry should be expected to treat. He 
described scientific inquiry as 
"that disciplined form of satisfaction of human curiosity which involves 
scientists in 'on-going, self-correcting and revisionary processes' which 
result in 'bodies of currently warranted fact and theory'. The bodies of 
fact and theory accruing from such activities are contingent on the 
investigator, the 'operations he performs', and 'the conceptions which 
organise and control his operations"'. (Herron 1971, p.179) 
In scientific inquiry, a set of questions or problems is posed to an agent about some 
pre-selected subject-matter. The agent uses a method to investigate the phenome-
na, which yields scientific knowledge. Herron then expanded these five categories 
into a checklist which can be used to identify whether any procedure is genuine 
scientific inquiry or not. 
Herron emphasised that the traditional 'five-step' Baconian method given in most 
textbooks is far from actual practice in scientific inquiry. 
The five Baconian steps are: 
(1) Problem 
(2) Formulating a hypothesis 
(3) Selection of method 
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( 4) Experimental procedure 
(5) Conclusion (Knowledge) 
There are times when application of this traditional method may be useful. How-
ever, one of its weaknesses is that it severely limits the creative aspect. Indeed, the 
only opportunity for using creative imagination is the stage of making a hypothesis. 
This Aim-Method-Conclusion procedure prevalent in our textbooks gives the im-
pression that there is only one conclusion, and that absolute knowledge is attained. 
The pupil-scientist is left with the idea that scientific knowledge is closed. The 
laboratory inquiry gives no indication of revisionary feedback that is, that the 
hypothesis or the experimental method itself is open to modification. Herron noted 
that what is unique to science is its "built-in dynamic revisionary component". If this 
most important self-correcting aspect of laboratory work is omitted, scientific 
knowledge may be seen merely as cumulative, which it certainly is not. 
Herron's review of the philosophy of science in Einstein, Dewey, Peirce and 
Whewell revealed the ideational aspect of scientific inquiry. No description of 
science should omit this. Herron emphasised Schwab's point that inquiries are 
guided by substantive structures which are partially tied to phenomena. These 
conceptions are either borrowed from the pre-existing fund of cultural knowledge, 
or are invented by the inquirer. The scientist brings different substantive structures 
to his inquiry, that is, different ways of viewing phenomena which affect his decisions 
about how to operate on them. Thus, scientific inquiry is theory-laden. It is guided 
by Schwab's "substantive structures" or Kuhn's "paradigms". 
Herron then examined the three textbooks. He did not describe the procedure he 
used to examine the textual content of the textbooks, but it seems he read them 
carefully, with the checklist beside him as a guide and a way of achieving uniformity. 
As for the laboratory exercises, he examined them for their content and their stated 
purpose. He constructed a useful device for analysing laboratory texts, based on 
Schwab's (1962) continuum of 'openness and permissiveness'. On the one hand, a 
textbook laboratory inquiry may pose a problem, provide the method of solving it, 
as well as the answer itself. On the other hand, the pupil may be left to pose his own 
problem, and work out his own method and solution. There are various combina-
tions between these extremes. This results in a four-point scale which can be used 
to determine the level of inquiry or degree of openness. A diagram of this analytical 
device is shown in Table 4.3. 
In their treatment of the philosophical attributes of scientific realism, both Lcmer-
gan and Popper advocated personal activity in the process of acquiring knowledge. 
Piaget and Dewey also emphasised active learning. Therefore it seems that any 
school science textbook emphasising active inquiry would portray science as being, 
at least in parts, a creative adventure of the imagination, as this would get away from 
the passive empiricist approach. Therefore an examination of the level of inquiry 
in practical laboratory work along the lines of Herron's analysis seemed relevant 
as an indicator of the type of philosophy of science present. 
My method followed Herron's exactly, but went one step further and interpreted 
the various Levels in terms of empiricism. Levels O and 1 convey the impression 
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TABLE 4.3: LEVELS OF INQUIRY 
Level of Problem Method Answer 
mqmry given given given 
0 yes yes yes 
1 yes yes no 
2 yes no no 
3 no no no 
that science is a passive procedure leaving little or no scope for imagination. Thus 
in this study, Levels O and 1 were interpreted as being empiricist. Levels 2 and 3, 
on the other hand, being more open-ended, were seen as more ideational, imagin-
ative and constructivist, although there is some overlap. 
Six books were selected from the twenty-three as being representative of the whole 
set. They are: 
1. Brink & Jones 8 Text A 
2. Pienaar & Walters 8 TextB 
3. Broster & James 8 TextC 
4. SEP8 TextJ 
5. Duncan GCSE Physics TextK 
6. Harvard Project Physics Text R 
The first two are widely-used South African science textbooks. The third is a recent 
South African science textbook orientated towards the educationally disadvantaged 
pupil. SEP 8 is a South African laboratory exercise workbook, also orientated 
towards the academically disadvantaged pupil. The last two are representative of 
British and American textbooks respectively. 
The number of Laboratory Inquiries in a given textbook at a given Level was counted 
(see Appendix A), and then expressed as a percentage of the total number of 
Laboratory Inquiries in that book (see Table 5.1 below). These percentages were 
then compared and finally all textbooks were arranged in Rank Order, 1 repre-
senting a high Level of Inquiry, and 6 representing a low Level. 
4.3.2 Analysis of Laboratory Inquiries: Tarnir and Lunetta 
Tamir and Lunetta ( 1978) extended and refined Herron's ( 1971) analysis of labor-
atory inquiries. They developed a 16-item instrument based on task analysis (Table 
4.4) and a 4-item 
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TABLE 4.4: TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES 
Laborato rv Inouirv No 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Recognise and define 
problem 
2. Formulate hypothesis 
3. Predict 
4. Design observation and 
measurement procedures 
5. Design experiments 
6. Carry out observations 
measurements, experiments 
7. Record results, describe 






10.Make inferences I 
11.Formulate generalisa-











14.Perform quantitative work 
1--- ---- -- ---------- - ·---- ----- ----- -- - ----- --·-- --~ - ----- --------
15.Perform "dry" lab I . . . 
mqumes 
I 
16.Work according to own i 
design ____ , 
----- ---
instrument that measures the degree of integration of the laboratory work with the 
other components of the course (Table 4.5). The sixteen task categories include 
inquiry skills and actual behaviours. The laboratory inquiries were taken at their 
face value. No attempt was made to consult the Teacher's Guide. 
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I 
TABLE 4.5: INTEGRATION OF LAB INQUIRIES IN TEXTBOOK 
Laboratory Inquiry No. I 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
10 l 11 I 
I.Precede text I , 
\ 
2.Integrate with text 
3.Groups pool results 
4.Post-lab discussion 
The total number of laboratory inquiries was counted in each particular textbook. 
In each laboratory inquiry, Tamir and Lunetta noted as present each of the 20 items 
if the instructions to the students called for performing that task at least once. 
Hence, the highest possible score for a single laboratory inquiry is 20 (the number 
of items in the two instruments) and the highest possible score for each item is the 
number of laboratory inquiries in that textbook. 
The instrument devised by Tamir and Lunetta has been adapted slightly for the 
purpose of this study. As with Herron's test, the same six textbooks were selected 
for this analysis, these being regarded as being representative of the whole set. 
As with Herron's Levels of Laboratory Inquiry, levels O and 1 were interpreted as 
portraying an empiricist standpoint, because empiricism involves a more passive 
observational procedure and has more limited and closed thought patterns. Levels 
1 and 2, being more open-ended, were deemed for the purposes of this test, to reflect 
a more correct, ideational philosophy of science. · 
Each practical laboratory inquiry was read, and the sentences were classified 
according to the 16 items in Table 4.4. If a characteristic was deemed to be present 
at least once in the inquiry, a value of 1 was awarded in the appropriate cell. (Thus 
each count is a minimum value.) If a characteristic was absent, a O was awarded. 
Various items were then re-grouped into broader categories, in order to bring them 
back into llerron's format of four items. Although it is recognised that this is just 
the opposite of what Tamir and Lunetta originally intended, it served the purpose 
of this study well. This was done according to the schema outlined in Table 4.6. The 
justification for this re-grouping is explained in detail in section 4.3.4 below. 
The way the various items are grouped into Levels is shown in Table 4.6. The 
number of items encountered ("flags") was added vertically for each Level. These 
totals were recorded at the bottom of the page in the table called x, Level O having 
a maximum score of 5, Levels 1 and 2 each having a maximum of 4, and Level 3 
having a maximum of 3. Each score obtained was then divided by the maximum 
possible, to obtain a fractional factor. If this fraction turned out to he greater than 
or equal to 0,4, a value of 1 ( called they-value) was awarded at that Level. If x was 
less than 0,4, then they-value was given as 0. The 0,4 cut-off point is arbitrary, but 
103 
TABLE 4.6: TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES (Adapted) 
1. Recognise and define 
problem 
2. Formulate hypothesis 
3. Predict 
4. Design observation and 
measurement procedures 
5. Design experiments 
6. Carry out observations 
measurements, experiments 
7. Record results, describe 
8. Transform results into 
standard forms 
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
I 11. Formulate generalisa 
-lions or models I 







Lab Inquiry No 







13. Learn techniques I 
I 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 






------------ ·- - -I 





Ifx > = 0,4 
let y = 1 
lfx < 0,4 
let y = 0 
{ 0 (Max 5) 
x { 1 (Max 4) 
{ 2 (Max 4) 
----------1------1----i-----1-----+--+--------1---1 
{ 3 (Max 3) ------t-----l--__J____---ll------l--+---+--+-----1 {0-
y { 1 
{ 2 
___{_3 -- -- -~----+----+---.___----+--+----+----t----+----t 
(Totals A) OVERALL LEVEL: 
was selected after many trials as being a suitable reflection of the total contribution 
of "flags" to that Level. These were recorded in the lower-most table (y). Finally, 
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the overall Level was awarded on the following basis: 
Flags 0 0 0 0 = Level 0 
1 0 0 0 II 0 
0 1 0 0 = II 0 
1 1 0 0 = II 1 
1 1 1 0 = II 2 
1 1 1 1 II 3 
This system of flagging and interpreting combinations of flags yielded a reasonably 
consistent set of results of overall Level of Laboratory Inquiry which agreed well 
with a straight-forward reading. 
From the set of Overall Levels at the bottom of each page of Table 4.6, the number 
of Laboratory Inquiries in a given textbook at a particular Level was counted and 
recorded in RESULT A (Table 4.7), and expressed as a percentage of the total 
number. These percentages were then compared for all the textbooks studied, and 
presented in Rank Order (see Table 5.3A below). 
In addition to this procedure, an independent technique of determining overall level 
of inquiry was carried out. This was done by adding all scores horizontally along 
rows for each of the 16 items. Those belonging to a particular Level were added 
together, giving rise to Collective Totals B. These were then summarised in the 
Table RESULT B (Table 4.7). The percentage of each group of items of the total 
number of items in that group was also calculated and recorded in RESULT B. 
(Table 4.7) 





1 Recognise & define 
I 2 Formulate hypothesis 
3 Predict I I 










._ Design experiments 
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8 . Transformresults 
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1 rDvtake inferences 
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All actual results are shown in Appendix B. A comparison of the results of 
RESULTS A and RESULTS Bis given in Table 5.3 below. 
4.3.3 Analysis of Questioning Style in Textbooks 
Lowery and Leonard (1978) maintain that inquiry teaching enables students to study 
natural phenomena with the same approach and spirit as that of the scientist. This 
approach involves the scientific processes of observing, comparing, classifying, 
experimenting, communicating, inferring, etc. If many teachers rely heavily on the 
textbook to shape their science programme, then 
"the science textbook must be examined as to its ability to stimulate 
students to inquiry." (Lowery and Leonard 1978, p.1) 
Questions can be effective in eliciting inquiry behaviour. Lowery and Leonard 
examined the questioning style of textbooks in terms of types, frequency, and 
placement of questions in textual reading materials. To do this, they devised the 
Textbook Questioning Strategies Assessment Instrument (TQSAI) (see Table 4.8). 
Lowery and Leonard studied a 10% random sample of pages from each textbook. 
On a selected page, the number of sentences was counted. A ratio of questions per 
total sentences and a mean number of questions to sentences per page were 
computed. 
Each question encountered was identified as to type, as follows: Experiential 
questions are those whose answers lie within the past or current experiences of the 
student. Non-experiential questions are those that focus pupils' attention upon 
phenomena that they have not experienced. 
Within these broad groups, there are two sub-categories: 
(i) The first identifies types of questions, each type being defined as follows: 
rhetorical questions are those that do not require an answer or are immediately 
followed by an answer; direct-information questions ask the student to recall 
specific facts, concepts, or other information; focusing questions guide the student 
toward an answer the author intends to develop later in the text; open-ended 
questions invite the student to explore freely without restrictions; valuing questions 
ask the student to make a cognitive or an affective evaluation. 
(ii) The second set of sub-categories identify basic science inquiry processes. These 
are: observing, communicating, comparing, organising, experimenting, inferring, 
and applying. 
Textual questions were also categorised for their placement: initiatory (at the 
beginning of a paragraph); contextual (embedded within a paragraph); terminal 
(at the end of a paragraph); and captional (within a caption). 
To facilitate an analysis of overall questioning style, frequencies of questions within 
all categories were converted to a percentage of total questions for the sample. In 
parts A and B of Table 4.8, the figure shown in each cell represents the percentage 
occurrence of questions in the given category compared to the total number of all 
questions in the 10% sample. An empty cell indicates no occurrence of questions 
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TABLE 4.8: TEXTBOOK QUESTIONING STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT 
INSTRUMENT (TQSAI) 
Textbook: ______________________ _ 
No. of Sentences: ___________ _ 
No. of Questions: ------------
Ratio S/Q: ___ _ Q/S: -----
A. Non-experiential 
1.Rhetor- 2.Direct 3.Focusing 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 







! Information ing Ended 
' 
I I 
I a. Observing I I 
th. Communicating ' 
i-c. Comparmg ! 
id. Organising 
I e. Experimenting 
. f. Inferring I 
[ g.Applying I 
C. Position of Questions 




D. Comparison of Questioning Style in Reading Content 
--
I I 
I TEXTBOOK: I I 
' I 
i I ------------- I ----------+--i-------------- Ji 
· No. of Questions ___ _ __ 
1 1--~ii 
No. of Sentences I I --i,
1
· 
%-c>tOu-es.-pe_r Se-nC~ - -=-=- ___ -i -----1 J 
_ %_of Ex2erientl. Ques. ---+ _ ~-- __ l----+-----1111. 
_% of Initiatory Ques. i--=T---+----+--· ----11--
% of Contextual Ques. , 1 
1
. 
% of Terminal ()ues. - -- - I: i . 
%---of Captional Ques. ----




Parts C and D of Table 4.8 provide a summary comparison of all texts examined 
with regard to the criteria under consideration: frequency of questions, frequency 
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of sentences, ratio of questions to sentences, frequency of experiential questions, 
and a distribution of the placement of all questions. 
To gain insight into a particular questioning style of a given text or to contrast one 
or more texts on certain categories, an inspection of the frequency or percentage of 
questions asked within those categories was made. One can compare the percent-
age of questions a textbook asks in a particular category to that of another category, 
or to the percentage of questions another textbook asks in the same category. 
Significant differences become an evaluative judgement, not a statistical one. 
The authors note the following: 
(a) If one assumes that Piaget's 'active experience' is valuable to learning, then 
textbooks that ask experiential questions are more desirable (ie Part B of Table 4.8). 
(b) Other studies suggest that questions placed at the beginning or end of paragraphs 
have more learning value to the reader than contextual questions. (Part C of Table 
4.8). 
(c) 'Higher level' questions occur on the right side of Parts A and B of Table 4.8. 
( d) The 'higher order' scientific inquiry processes lie toward the bottom of Part B 
of Table 4.8. This would reveal 'levels of inquiry', and would be important if our 
aim is to portray to high school pupils a more correct image of science. 
In the present study, Lowery and Leonard's method was adapted as follows. Instead 
of a 10% sample of pages, only 10 pages from each textbook (the same six books 
used in the previous tests) were randomly selected. The number of questions as a 
percentage of the total number of sentences was recorded. Each question was 
classified as being Non-experiential or Experiential. The former type of question 
does not draw on the student's prior experience, whereas the latter does. For the 
purposes of this study, Experiential questions were deemed to be more construc-
tivist. 
Non-experiential questions were graded from closed to open-ended. Open-ended 
non-experiential questions were interpreted in this study as being instrumentalist 
( calculative, fictional, thought-experiments, etc). 
Experiential questions were recorded on a type of matrix (Part B, Table 4.8). Each 
row was graded from closed to open questions (from left to right), and each column 
was graded from low to high order of inquiry-type questions (from top to bottom). 
iar -B. Experient 
Observing __ 
Communicat 









-- ---- ---- ----- --- Focusing-~· Valuing Direct Open-
lnformtn ended 
--~·~--






The upper-left part of this matrix was interpreted as being more empiricist in 
orientation, and the lower-right as more constructivist. This is based on Lowery 
and Leonard's similar interpretation above regarding Piaget. The choice of the line 
of demarcation between these (see bold line in diagram) was guided by several trials. 
The final result was essentially a "best-fit" choice. 
Since the judgement required on how to classify a particular question was sometimes 
far from easy, many variations being possible, the results of this test should not be 
taken as conclusive in themseives, but should be seen in relation to all the other 
tests performed. Results are summarised in section 5. 3. 1. 
The percentage of Questions to Sentences (Q/S), as well as Sentences to Questions 
(S/Q), was also recorded. (Appendix C) 
4.3.4 Correlation of meanings for this study 
As mentioned above, it is suggested here that Level of Inquiry (Openness), as 
discussed by Herron (1971) and Tamir and Lunetta (1978), provides a way of 
determining the image of science portrayed in the textbook, and hence its philos-
ophy of science. In this study, I shall interpret Herron's Levels O and 1 as giving to 
the pupil an image of science that is cumulative, factual, and proven knowledge. 
Because Levels 2 and 3 are more open-ended, they give the pupil more opportunity 
for imaginative hypothesis-making. This provides a more correct and up-to-date 
view of science, namely, that scientific inquiry begins with theory and not with 
observation. Similarly, Tamir and Lunetta's instrument can be used to assess the 
philosophy of science portrayed. 
It is further postulated that any school science textbook, which uses the 'learning by 
inquiry' approach, should convey a better view of the philosophy of science than a 
'factual knowledge' type. Therefore any instrument which can distinguish between 
"higher" and "lower" orders of scientific inquiry processes (Lowery and Leonard 
1978, p.9) can be used to assess the philosophical standpoint of the author. Lowery 
and Leonard's ( 1978) analytical tool can be used to achieve this. 
"Levels of openness" and "orders of scientific inquiry processes" are, however, not 
the same. "Level" is concerned about which stage of the process is given, whereas 
"order" refers to the type of skill used. There is clearly a positive correlation: Level 
0 corresponds roughly to Low Order, Level 3 to High Order. Yet it is conceivable 
that many Low Order processes (eg observing, recording) are used in Level 3 (ie 
open-ended, self-initiated) inquiries. 
Herron (1971, p.197) himself did not show clearly the difference between the three 
'categories' he used to classify the laboratory inquiries in CHEM Study, and the 
'levels of openness', based on Schwab ( 1962), he used in his analysis of PSSC Physics. 
In 'category' 1, the student was expected to 'discover', that is, make an inductive 
generalisation, see patterns. In 'category' 2 are exercises involving inference and 
problem-solving with no pre-determined, unique solution. In 'category' 3 are 
exercises used to 'illustrate', that is, 'see-for-yourself type observations, as well as 
to give practice in laboratory skills. These are clearly 'orders' rather than 'levels', 
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category 3 being low order. Yet Herron states that his Level O would involve low 
order exercises. He said: 
"Into such a category (ie Level 0) would also fall laboratory exercises in 
which students are simply to observe or 'experience' some unfamiliar 
phenomena or to learn to master some particular laboratory technique." 
(Herron 1971, p.200) 
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, I shall, in this study, interpret Level O as Low 
order, and Level 3 as High Order, bearing in mind that there is some degree of each 
Order in each Level. In addition, Tamir and Lunetta's Item Categories (1978, 
p.355) will be classified as follows: Low Order (Categories 6, 7, 8, 13, 14); Medium 
Order (Categories 9, 10, 11, 12, 15); Higher Order (Categories 1, 2, 3, 4); and 
Highest Orders (Categories 5, 16). 
To summarise, this study will accept the correlations shown in Table 4.9 below: 
TABLE 4.9: CORRELATION OF MEANINGS 
,--
Herron Herron Tamir and Lowery and 
(1971, 197) (1971,200) Leonard (1978) Lunetta (1978) 
Category 3 Level 0 Low Order 6, 7,8, 13, 14 
. Category 2 Level 1 Medium Order 9, 10, 11, 12 
i Category 1 i Level2 Higher Order 1, 2, 3. 4 
i --- Level3 I Highest Order 5, 16, 15 I 
4.3.5 Textual Analysis: Romey 
Romey ( 1968, pp.44-51) proposed a way of assessing the degree of student involve-
ment in reading textbooks. He drew up an instrument which yielded an Index of 
Involvement (Table 4.10). This concentrated on contextual content. 
Romey randomly selected a sample of ten pages from a textbook. Ignoring headings 
and captions, he counted twenty-five sentences. From these sentences, the number 
of factual sentences, conclusions, definitions, questions, and statements directing 
· the reader to perform a certain activity, were counted and recorded on Table 4.10. 
Sentences of types e, f, g and h were taken as being interactive, whereas sentences 
of types a, b, c, and d were regarded as being passive, non-interactive, and factual. 
An Involvement Index was calculated as follows: 
Involvement Index = No. of interactive sentences 
No. of non-interactive sentences 
= (e + f + g + b) 
(a+ b + C + d) 
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a. Facts ! 
I 
b. Conclusions I I i 
c. Definitions 
d. Questions asked but 
answered immediately 
e. Questions requiring 
student to analyse data 
i 
f. Statements requiring i 









g. Directions to pupil to per-
i 
I 





h. Ques to arouse interest 
I 
-not answered immediately 
i I 
I. Sentence directing I 
student to figure 
I I i 
I 
j. Rhetorical questions I I i I I 
Overall Involvement = (e + f + g + h) 
Index for Text (a + b + c + d) 
TABLE 4.11: ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS AT CHAPTER ENDS 
Page Number 
--------+~-l~---+------+-1 L4---i=-~1~ - c- -
a. Answer in text 1 1 1 1 : : 
h. Definition 
--~-·-----·---~ -- -- -- i-- - -------~f --+- ------+---- -~- ---1---- -L-- 4--
C -R-equfr-es pupil fo apply - - 4-- --~- ---- - i --- ----;--
learning to new situation __ --------1~- . 











e. None of the above 
Overall Index for Questions = (c + d) / (a + b) 
A high value suggested a high level of reader-involvement. 
Similarly, a further test on questions at the ends of chapters was carried out. This 
was done according to the format given in Table 4.11. Romey classified each 
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question at the end of a chapter as being of the type asking for a factual answer 
( closed question) or of the type instigating further activity ( open-ended or interac-
tive question). An Index for Questions was calculated as follows: 
Index for Questions = No. of open-ended questions 
No. of closed questions 
= (c + d) 
(a+ b) 
A high value would indicate a high level of reader-involvement. 
The same six textbooks (A, B, C, J, Kand R) were subjected to Romey's tests. The 
results of the tests are contained in Appendix D, and are summarised in section 
5.3.2 below. 
4.3.6 The Philosophy Checklist 
In order to be as objective as possible, it was deemed desirable to draw on the 
previous work done in this area. The combined results of these tests should yield as 
comprehensive and as objective a conclusion as possible. However, the original aim 
of the afore-mentioned studies was not specifically to analyse textbooks for the 
philosophy of instrumentalism. Therefore a further instrument, called The Philos-
ophy Checklist, has been designed specifically for this purpose. 
From the discussion of inductivism, empiricism and instrumentalism in Chapter 2 
above, the essential features of each were listed, so that a systematic checklist or 
questionnaire could be drawn up. This checklist will be used to try to ensure a more 
uniform and systematic approach to the reading. 
Since instrumentalism is a type of positivism, the six characteristics of positivism, as 
suggested by Hacking (1983, p.41), are useful. They are: (1) emphasis on verifica-
tion, (2) emphasis on objective observation, (3) opposition to causality, (4) down-
playing of theories as explanations, (5) reluctance to admit the existence of theore-
tical entities, (6) opposition to metaphysics. 
Instrumentalists put great emphasis on (4), (5), and (6). The role of theory is 
downplayed. Theories do not explain reality; they are useful fictions. Explanations 
arc speculations which verge on the metaphysical. 
Inductivists and empiricists emphasise (1), (2), and (3). Science begins with obser-
vation which is as objective as possible. Generalisations are made from many 
particular observations, and these laws are verified by further observations. This 
gives rise to factual knowledge. 
The following characteristics were chosen as being properties of the inductivist-em-
piricist view: 
1. Science begins with observation. 
2. Observation is objective (theory-free). 
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3. Inductive generalisations arise from several instances. 
4. Experimental data yield a unique conclusion. 
5. Observation leads rigorously to laws and theories. 
6. Laws are mature theories. 
7. Science produces proven knowledge. 
The following characteristics were chosen as being representative of the instrumen-
talist view: 
1. Observation is objective (theory-free). 
2. Observations refer to phenomena only. 
3. Computative predictions are 'expected'. 
4. Procedures are recipe-like. 
5. Definitions are nominalist. 
6. Definitions are operational. 
7. Theories are mere fictions (ie do not explain reality) 
8. Theories are not informative (ie only rules of thumb) 
9. Theories are only convenient instruments (ie pragmatic) 
On the basis of these criteria, the Philosophy Checklist (Table 4.12) was drawn up. 
All the textbooks listed in Table 4.2 were analysed using this Checklist. 
Using random number tables, ten pages were selected from each of the twenty-three 
textbooks (see Table 4.2 above). Thus, over the twenty selected textbooks, 230 
pages were examined for their philosophy of science. Two distinct types of feature 
were sought on each page: ( a) inductivist-empiricism; and (b) instrumentalism. 
(a) lnductivist-empiricism 
As far as the categories 1 to 4 in section A of Table 4.12 are concerned, if any of 
these features was encountered at least once, it was awarded a value of 1. If not 
encountered, a value of O was awarded. The 'face-value' reading of the texts was 
taken in each item. For example, 'observation' was interpreted phenomenally. 
Unless otherwise indicated, it was assumed that theories lead rigorously to laws. 
Similarly, any 'factual' knowledge was taken at face-value to be 'reliable'. If any 
impression was given that science can solve all contemporary problems (the 'tech-
nological fix' of Factor and Kooser), then this property was regarded as present. 
Emphasis on logical inference was assumed to show that science is 'always rational, 
logical'. That is, an instrumentalist interpretation was assumed. 
Justification for accepting the above 'face-value' interpretations can be found in the 
positivist view that both the' explanatory' (realist) approach and the 'phenomenal ist' 
(empiricist/instrumentalist) approach are valid hypotheses. Both can account for 
the facts. Hence it is legitimate to read a textbook in an empiricist or instrumentalist 
way. 
This point is important and needs to be elaborated in more detail. I have already 
referred to Herron (1971, p.198) saying that texts, at face-value reading, can he 
interpreted in a variety of ways. Also already noted above is Selley's (1989, p.29) 
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point that it is possible to read into a science textbook both a naive realist approach 
as well as an instrumentalist approach. Hacking (1983, p.41) notes that positivists 
sometimes say that there are no electrons, at other times that we have no good 
reason to suppose that they exist. Gardner (1983) makes the point that, for positivist 
science, the language of phenomenalism and the language of realism both yield 
successful results. Powers (1982, p.164) also notes that positivists accept both 
interpretations. Helmholtz is quoted by Hacking (1983, p.53) as saying that realism 
is "an admirably useful and precise hypothesis". Since both phenomenalism and 
realism are good hypotheses, a neutral scientific statement will be interpreted 
realistically by a realist, and phenomenally by a positivist, empiricist or pragmatist. 
A pragmatist, especially, will accept both hypotheses if they are useful. Since I have 
made the initial assumption that textbooks are empiricist-inductivist and instrumen-
talist, it seems consistent and legitimate to interpret the textbooks in a 'face-value' 
way. 
On a given page, all sentences in which the words "observe", "observation", or similar 
observational words, occurred, were counted, and recorded under lb of Table 4.12. 
These were totalled for a given textbook, and converted into a percentage of the 
total number of sentences in the ten pages examined in that text. These percentages 
were then summarised in lb of Table 4.13. · 
Totals for the ten selected pages of a given textbook thus have a maximum of 10 
points. All the 10 values in a particular row were added. (These totals were then 
transferred to Table 4.13 for the sake of comparison, and averaged over the 23 
textbooks.) These 19 totals were then added and divided by 190, and multiplied by 
100, to find the percentage of empiricist characteristics encountered of the possible 
190 in a given textbook. 
It must be remembered that these percentages are minimum values. Detailed 
results are presented in Appendix E, and a summary is shown in Table 5.9 below. 
(b) Instrumentalism 
The categories 1 to 4 under section B of Table 4.12 were similarly awarded a value 
of 1 if such feature were encountered at least once. If not encountered, a value of 
0 was awarded. All the 10 values for each item were added across a row. Totals for 
each textbook had a maximum score of 10. (These totals were transferred to Table 
4.13, and averaged over the 23 textbooks.) Because there were 11 items, these were 
out of a maximum of 110. They were also recorded as percentages of the total 
number of sentences. These reflect the percentage of an instrumentalist approach 
in each textbook. Again, these are minimum values.The detailed results are shown 
in Appendix E, but a summary is provided in Table 5.9 below. 
Classification of statements according to the criteria in the Text Analysis often 
called for perceptive judgements. Therefore, in addition to these results, a detailed 
set of written notes (section 5.5.1 below) was kept, justifying these judgements, 
especially where observation, computative predictions, definitions, induction, and 
theories and laws were concerned. 
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TABLE 4.12: PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST 
Instance 
Random Page Number: I i Tot 
' 






Observation ' I 
I 
a. Science begins with observation ( 1) I 
b. "Observation" mentioned (2) i 
c. Observation objective (3) l 
Inductive 2eneralisations 1 
a. Inductive generalisations made 1 : 1 ( 4) I ,c___---l-------1-----+--l-----+--+----+--+---+--+--+---+--'-l--t 
b. No. of instances few I I (5) i 
c. Verification : (6) 
Laws and theories : I : 
a. "Law", "theory" mentioned ____ -+-----1----1-------1----1-------1---+----,1-----+-__,l _ __,l_(~7---'---i') , 
b. Obs. leads rigorously to law_s __ ----l----+-----J--+---+---+--+---+--+-+i -+-! --'-( 8_,)-, 
c. Laws are mature theories (9) 
·.::e.._ __ --l--+----+--+---+--+---+---+----+--+----t-->.-C---1---1 
d. Data yield unique con cl usion=------1------+--+---+--+----f--+--1-----+--1-----+-"-"(l'-"-J()'_; 
Proven knowled2e : 1 
a. Proven knowledge=-----------+----+-----Jf-----+--1---+--t----+--+--t--t-'1 (ill 
b. Science "discovers" facts I I ( 12) 
c. Tone is "factual" I : (13); 
d. Questions answered immediatelv I f 
1 
: ( 14) 
e. Science is reliable i L(l5): 
f. Technological "fix" (solves all) 1 1 i (16) 
g. Linear accretion of knowledge I I _JJll), 
h. Science always logical _____ --i--+----+-' -+--+-
1
1 -+---+--+--_L_; _,J1 ~), 
1. Science leads to absolute truth __ __J.___ _ L__,___L_:1 --~-~-.!~~-~-~' __ , _ ~1 __ ( 1_9} 




1. Observation: Assumed objective 
Phenome nal only 
2. Computative prediction s -------
d" Predictions "expecte 
Recipe-like procedu 
Only terms in an equ 
res 
ation 
3. Definition: Nominali stic 
Operatio nal 
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Textbook (SeeTable 4.2: 
INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
Observation 
a. Science begins with observation 
b. "Observation" mentioned 
c. Observation objective 
Inductive gener!!lisations 
a. Inductive generalisations made 
b. No. of instances few 
c. Verification 
Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentioned 
b. Obs. leads rigorously to laws 
c. Laws are mature theories 
d. Data yield unique conclusion 
Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 
b. Science "discovers" facts 
c. Tone is "factual" 
d. Questions answered immediatelv 
e. Science is reliable 
f. Technological "fix" (solves all) 
g. Linear accretion of knowledge 
h. Science always logical 
l. Science leads to absolute truth 
Instance 











h~~~~ive~~~ J=~ ·~~ - ~- ------ -i--------T-
Computatiye predictions ___ ___ __ t--1------~--------+-----+---+-




0nly terms in an equation 
Definition: Nominal is tic - + --+----+---------1~--+----+-----+------t-------t 
Operational _____________ ---+---l--+---~l------+--+----+--
Theories: Fictions (no reality) 
Rules of thumb 
Convenient, pragmatic ___ _ 
As in (a) above, if any statement could be interpreted in either a realist or an 
instrumentalist sense, the latter was assumed. This was deemed to be a legitimate 
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! __ __J 
procedure, because (1) positivism accepts both the realist theory or the instrumen-
talist theory as workable scientific hypotheses; and (2) the aim of this study involves 
reading the textbooks from an instrumentalist perspective. The justification for this 
has been discussed above. For example, if the word 'observe' was used in the text, 
it was assumed to refer to objective observation. In the same way, any calculation 
of the rote, plug-in type was interpreted as being a convenient computational device 
with no necessary connection with the real world, and hence not necessarily infor-
mative about the world; that is, as instrumentalist. 
Any references to words like 'observe', 'look', 'measure', were carefully noted and 
counted. Similarly, any historical assertion about a scientist 'discovering' something 
was recorded. Any conclusions, or rules, or laws, were regarded as inductive 
generalisations. 
The lack of any discussion of the meaning or role of theory, or law, as well as of the 
theory-ladenness of observation, was also taken to be a sign of instrumentalism 
4.4 Philosophy determined by direct reading of Texts 
4.4.1 Preface Analysis: (Lynch and Strube) 
Lynch and Strube (1985) drew attention to the fact that the majority of modern 
science textbooks include statements in their prefaces which emphasise that they 
were written to suit a specific syllabus or were appropriate for a certain range of 
pupil ability. In some cases 
"authors claim something more than a mere functional role, and indicate 
that they wish to present a particular view of science or a certain 
relationship between theory and experiment in their writing". (Lynch 
and Strube 1985, p.121) 
Lynch and Strube did not devise an elaborate method. They simply read the preface 
of each textbook to determine what the authors claimed they would do in the text. 
The prefaces often revealed assumptions about the nature of science, either by 
explicit mention, or even by omission. They found that, in formalist and experimen-
talist textbooks, the authors usually defined their purpose in the preface and rarely 
intruded after that. In more conversationalist texts, however, the author was more 
likely to comment on the nature of scientific method, metaphysical commitments, 
and so on, both in the preface and within the text. 
The present study makes extensive use of the Preface Analysis devised by Lynch 
and Strube. The results, contained in section 5.5.2 below, are most revealing as far 
as the various authors' philosophy of science is concerned. Indeed, of all the tests 
carried out in this study, this Preface Analysis is one of the most fruitful. 
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4.4.2 Value presuppositions in science textbooks 
Factor and Kooser (1981) conducted a study of value presuppositions in science 
textbooks. They maintain that, in scientific texts, there are explicit and tacit asser-
tions about, among other things, the nature of scientific method ( eg its rationality, 
objectivity, and practice). They see textbooks as the teacher's "most important 
teaching vehicle". Indeed, 
"textbooks are the primary and sometimes the only pedagogic vehicle. 
As such, they play a large role in shaping student opinion about science 
... " (Factor and Kooser 1981, p.1) 
The methodology of Factor and Kooser was "arduous, sometimes tedious, but not 
elaborate". They read each book from cover to cover, and took notes on any mention 
of value judgements on social, political and economic issues. 
When a large amount of space was devoted to an issue, they counted the number of 
paragraphs describing that issue. They emphasise that it is important to note that 
these paragraph counts often called for borderline judgements about content 
because authors often mix many issues. Consequently, their charts at the end of 
their study should be regarded as thumb-nail sketches which reveal differing direc-
tions and areas of emphasis. An author who has devoted fewer paragraphs to a topic 
than another author should not be seen as producing an inferior treatment. The 
quantitative method used is rough. In a general way it shows which issues are 
regarded by the particular author as important. 
However, in the main, Factor and Kooser simply read the textual material, making 
notes as they proceeded. 
4.4.3 Metaphor Analysis 
Following the ideas of Pope and Gilbert (1983a) that metaphors are often used to 
go beyond the facts, and lead a person from the known to the unknown, it seemed 
possible that an analysis of the frequency of usage of metaphor, and a classification 
of their type, might reflect whether a textbook was "realist" or "constructivist". (The 
type of realist that Pope and Gilbert refer to is the naive realist, or better, empirical 
realist.) Thus textbooks lacking in metaphors, or using metaphors in a way to be 
explained below, might be seen as empiricist. 
It is important to emphasise that my own interpretation ofrealism takes a construc-
tivist stance. As pointed out in Chapter 3, I believe in a critical realism such as 
Lonergan advocates. Reality is not simply that which is given, it is the totality ( and 
more) of that which is experienced by sensation, understanding, and judgement. In 
other words, reality is a construct rooted in an independently existing world. Thus, 
whereas Pope and Gilbert oppose "realist" and "constructivist", I would use the terms 
"empirical realist" and "critical realist" respectively (Bhaskar 1989, p.11 ). 
For Pope and Gilbert, the (empirical) realist views reality as a stable arrangement 
of objective facts. Truth is the correspondence of facts to reality. The real world 
exists independently of the knowing subject. Observation is objective and theory-
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free. A teacher (or author of a textbook) who is an (empirical) realist, is mainly a 
transmitter of information, rules or values which have been collected in the past. 
The learner (or reader) can acquire truth by means of a process of iterative 
accumulation. The learner ( or reader) is seen as having no previous knowledge of 
the subject. His mind is a tabula rasa, which absorbs presented knowledge passively. 
Even teachers and textbooks which advocate a 'discovery' approach to learning 
assume that there is out there a physical world waiting to be revealed. The (empiri-
cal) realist teacher might see understanding as an ability to recall facts and apply 
them algorithmically. Understanding depends on the proper sequencing of materi-
al. Explanations might be more descriptive. That is, the teacher might see the task 
of understanding as involving the transfer of a set-piece justification into the 
student's mind. Expository teaching is the teaching style used. 
On the other hand, a teacher or textbook which takes a "constructivist" approach 
will be more conjectural. It will try to foster imagination and self-generation of 
justification by means of problem-solving, giving the pupil the option of multiple 
explanations, and cognitive conflict. Such a teacher or author might use metaphors 
in a more interpretive way. Metaphors may be designed to promote anomalous 
ideas, that is, cognitive conflict. This will encourage the learner ( or reader) to 
change preconceived notions. 
Pope and Gilbert note that Black (1979) distinguishes three types of metaphor. 
Firstly, there is the substitution view, in which the entire sentence that is the focus 
of the metaphor can be replaced by a set of literal sentences. In the comparison 
view, the sentence containing the metaphor can be reduced to a paraphrase which 
contains an implicit literal statement of some similarity or analogy. In a third type, 
the interactive view, the primary subject of the metaphor causes the learner to select 
some of the secondary subject's properties and causes construction of a parallel 
implication to fit the primary which induces changes in the secondary. 
Both the ( empirical) realist as well as the constructivist teacher or author use 
metaphors. But they perceive the way they operate differently. The (empirical) 
realist tends to use metaphors as an heuristic aid, but not necessarily to yield greater 
cognitive understanding. He uses it to compare two things (the comparative 
metaphor). It is implied that two apparently dissimilar things have some similarity 
in common. The constructivist might make more use of the interactive charac-
teristic of some metaphors. The learner ( or reader) is confronted with a choice on 
how to interpret the metaphor. The metaphor is deliberately used to make the pupil 
think, to force him to generate his own interpretation. Also, the constructivist 
designs metaphors to introduce an element of 'make-believe'. 
The way a metaphor is presented can affect the way it is interpreted. Kelly (1969) 
distinguishes two modes of presentation: the interpretive and the invitational. 
Using the phrase "the floor is hard", the interpretive mode implies that the floor is 
hard, irrespective of who says so. The sentence's validity stems from the floor, not 
the speaker. The invitational mode might suggest to the listener a certain novel 
interpretation. For example: "Suppose we regard the floor as if it were hard. If ... " 
The listener is invited to make the experience, and all its ramifications, his own. 
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Petrie (1981, p.208) notes that a metaphor demands that the material be looked at 
in a new way. In a way, it creates the similarity. Petrie asks whether or not a 
metaphor can be identified by some set of linguistic features independent of its use. 
The criterion is not its literal meaning, but its figurative meaning. The pupil ( or 
reader) is presented with an assertion, which in the classroom ( or textbook) is 
expected to be true. However, a metaphor will always tum out to be false, because 
the world is simply not the way it is represented in the metaphor. In short (says 
Petrie), a metaphor is anomalous on its face. It is the anomalous character of an 
interactive metaphor that distinguishes the way the metaphor transfers chunks of 
experience from the way in which literal language or comparative metaphor trans-
fers chunks of experience. 
Finally, a word of warning is given. A listener or reader may interpret any metaphor 
in either a realist (empiricist) or constructivist way if it is known beforehand whether 
the speaker or textbook author favours a cultual transmission or an open-ended style 
of teaching. Also, the context in which a metaphor occurs may affect its meaning. 
It seems to me that the use of metaphors in textbooks may reflect the degree of 
empiricism (or instrumentalism) therein. Those with a low frequency of metaphor 
use, or those using comparison metaphors, might be classified as more empiricist 
(instrumentalist) in their approach. Those with high counts, or those using inter-
pretive metaphors, might be seen as constructivist ( that is, truly critically realist, in 
Lonergan's sense of the term). 
The method followed in the search for metaphors was to read (a) the Introduction 
to each textbook; (b) the first few paragraphs of each chapter in each textbook; and 
( c) specific topics which deal with "accepted" scientific metaphors (such as field, 
current, frame of reference, planetary model). Also, the way the textbook treated 
the notion of models was examined. These results were recorded in section 5.5.3 
below. 
4.5 Summary of the procedure followed in the textbook study 
This study first searched for implicit signs of the philosophy of science present in 
the above textbooks. It did so in three distinct ways: 
(i) Level of laboratory inquiry 
Using Herron's (1971) and Tamir and Lunetta's (1978) instruments, a textual 
analysis of laboratory inquiries (ie practical experiments as described in the texts) 
was carried out. For these analyses, only six of the selected texts were examined. 
The philosophy of science present was interpreted according to the discussion in 
4.3.4 above, and especially Table 4.9. 
(ii) Level of reader-involvement in the Text 
Using Lowery and Leonard's (1978) and Romey's (1968) instruments, the question-
ing style and the proportion of interactive material of each textbook chosen in (i) 
above, was determined. Only textbooks A, B, C, J, Kand R were examined. Not 
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every test of Lowery and Leonard was relevant to this study, so attention was 
focussed on the "Orders of scientific inquiry processes" (Table 4.8 B). Also, it was 
deemed sufficiently meaningful to use a smaller sample: instead of 10% of the total 
number of pages being used, only 10 pages were selected from each text. Any bias 
created by the smaller sample would be offset by the fact that many other instru-
ments were used. As with the first two tests (Herron's and Tamir & Lunetta's), the 
interpretation of the philosophy derived was correlated according to Table 4.9. 
(iii) Type of philosophy determined by direct reading 
Firstly, the Philosophy Checklist was used exactly as described above, in order to 
determine the degree of empiricism and instrumentalism. 
Secondly, the books were read to find explicit references to the philosophy of 
science. This was done by using three techniques: 
(a) Any example of any relevant scientific inquiry process (such as observing, 
theory-building, model-making, scientific laws), found either in a sampled 
page, or in topics deliberately chosen (eg Atomic Theory), was recorded 
and classified. 
(b) Following Lynch and Strube's (1985) method, all prefaces were read to see if 
explicit mention was made of the philosophical stance of each author. If 
nothing was explicitly mentioned, an attempt was made to discern the 
tacit philosophy of the author. 
( c) A search for any metaphors used anywhere in the texts was made. 
The assumption made was that lack of metaphors (that is, literal language) 
was favoured by authors using an empiricist methodology. 
In conclusion, it is worth recalling here what the specific objectives of this part of 
the study are: 
( 1) to ascertain whether physical science school textbooks from Britain, America 
and South Africa are strongly empiricist and/or instrumentalist; 
(2) to discover whether a particular country's textbooks have a stronger 
emphasis on empiricism and/or instrumentalism; 
(3) to determine whether recent textbooks (of the 1980's) do have a trend 
towards instrumentalism; and 





RESULTS OF THE SCHOOL SCIENCE TEXTBOOK STUDY 
5.1 Introduction 
The main body of the results of this school science textbook study is to be found 
in the Appendices . Summaries of each analysis will be presented and discussed in 
this chapter. 
The order of presentation of results is as follows: 
1. Level of Laboratory Inquiry 
A. Level of Laboratory Inquiry 
B. Task Analysis of Laboratory Inquiries 
2. Level of Reader Involvement 
A. Textbook Questioning Strategies Assessment 
B. Text Analysis 
C. Questions at Chapter Ends 
D. Philosophy Checklist 
3. Direct reading survey 
A. Examples quoted 
B. Preface Analysis 
C. Metaphor Analysis 
5.2 Results of the Levels of Laboratory Inquiry Analyses 
5.2.1 Level of Laboratory Inquiry 
(a) Herron's Test: 
From the twenty-three textbooks involved in this study, six were selected for 
Herron's Test: these were A, B, C, J, K and R. The examination of these six, 
regarded as being representative of the whole set, revealed that most of the 
laboratory inquiries in these texts were at Level O and Level 1. (See Appendix 
A, for detailed listing of results.) 
TABLE 5.1 
Total No. of 
----=--==-=---=----------- Lab I nqu i ri es~~-
SEP 8 68 
Harvard Physics 
Duncan GCSE Physics 
Pienaar & Walters 8 
Broster & James 8 














Percentages of lab inquiries at Level: 
0 l 2 3 Rank Order 
SEPS 4 96 0 0 1 
Harvard Physics 23 69 8 0 2 
Duncan GCSE Physics 67 33 0 0 3 
Pienaar & Walters 8 84 16 0 0 4 
Broster & James 8 91 9 0 0 5 
Brink & Jones 8 97 3 0 0 6 
There is a heavy predominance of Levels O and 1 in these textbooks. Using the 
interpretation scheme suggested in Table 4.9, it seems that most of these labor-
atory inquiries portray science as consisting of cumulative, factual and proven 
knowledge. That is, the general philosophy of science portrayed is empiricist. 
It should be noted, however, that this is based on the text alone, and does not take 
into account the possibility that the teacher might have pre-practical and post-
practical discussions. Also, although most of the practical inquiries were open-
TABLE5.2 
Overall 81 % 
Level 0: 56 64 
Level 1: 28 32 
Level 2: 3 4 
Level 3: 0 0 
South 38 % 
African Level 0: 25 66 
Level 1: 12 31 
Level 2: 1 3 
Level 3: 0 0 
British 21 % 
Level 0: 17 71 
Level 1: 6 25 
Level 2: 1 4 
Level 3: 0 0 
American rn % 
Level 0: 2 20 
Level 1: 7 70 
Level 2: 1 10 
Level 3: 0 0 
African 15 % 
Level 0: 12 80 
Level 1: 3 20 
Level 2: 0 0 
Level 3: () 0 
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ended in themselves, their integration into the textbook meant that, in every case, 
the answer was given immediately afterwards. 
Herron (1971, p.196) found that CHEM Study was decidedly empirical in its 
orientation. Accurate, objective observation and controlled experimentation are 
emphasised. Although the textbook treats "models" in science at some length, it 
does not point out the ideational or constructive aspects of "control" and "obser-
vation". It neglects the creative factors which guide scientific inquiry. The 
textbook gives the impression that eternal truths are discovered from phenome-
na. 
Herron found that, apart from a discussion of models near the end of the first 
section, PSSC Physics makes no explicit mention of how scientific inquiry pro-
ceeds. This makes the task of analysing its inherent philosophy more difficult. 
Thus it may be interpreted either realistically or instrumentally. In general, 
this textbook portrays science as uncovering unchanging laws in the natural world. 
Laws are subject to change, more because of limitations in measuring procedures 
than intrinsic tentativeness of theories. The reader is left with the impression 
that one day, when technology is more refined, absolute truth will be attained. 
Thus, PSSC Physics also has an empiricist orientation. 
Besides the six textbooks analysed in detail, randomly sampled pages from all 
the textbooks studied here (listed in Table 4.2) contained altogether 87 laboratory 
inquiries. These are shown at the end of Appendix A. The results of these 
sampled pages are summarised in Table 5.2. 
From this broad picture obtained from a small sample of pages, it seems that 
the African books have low Levels of Laboratory Inquiry, followed closely by the 
British and South African books. The overall philosophy of science is empiricist. 
The American books contain a higher Level of Inquiry, yet nevertheless remain 
basically empiricist. 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from applying Herron's adapted test 
to these books is that there is a strong underlying current of empiricism in these 
textbooks. However, SEP 8, Harvard Physics, and Duncan's GCSE Physics possess 
a greater proportion of higher levels of inquiry. That is, they have a stronger 
leaning towards constructivism 
5.2.2 Results of Task Analysis of Laboratory Inquiries: 
The results of this more refined Level of Laboratory Inquiry, following Tamir and 
Lunetta's instrument, are contained in full in Appendix B, especially on pages, 
17, 24, 32, 40, 46, and 49. 
Two sets of Results were obtained, those from totalling columns vertically (Result 
A), and from adding rows horizontally (Result B). The Level of Laboratory 
Inquiry was derived from Result A by means of the formula described in Chapter 
4 ( 4.3.2). The Level of Laboratory Inquiry was derived from Result B by 
grouping items according to the scheme given in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
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Results of these Task Analyses, performed on the six selected textbooks, are 
summarised in Table 5.3A below. Results A and B agree reasonably well, in the 
sense that they both show similar relative proportions of each Level in particular 
textbooks. Table 5.3B summarises only Results A. 
TABLE5.3A 
LEVEL RESULT A RESULTB 
Brink & Jones 8 0 55 50 
1 45 40 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
Pienaar & Walters 8 0 74 51 
1 26 27 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
Broster & James 8 0 73 55 
1 27 29 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
SEP8 0 62 71 
1 22 31 
2 16 25 
3 0 3 
---·-~--- ------------~~-
Duncan 0 83 75 
1 17 15 
2 0 1 
3 0 0 
Harvard 0 46 88 
1 46 44 
2 8 17 
3 () 5 
----- -~- -~~-----
Table 5.3B may be interpreted as follows. SEP 8 has the highest Level of Labor-
atory Inquiry, therefore is the least empiricist. Duncan's GCSE Physics, having 
the greatest number of low-level inquiries, is therefore the most empiricist. 
The high values obtained in the Task Analysis in categories 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14 
indicate, from Table 4.9, that emphasis is placed on the basic skills of recording 
and classifying, and not so much on the open-ended, critical, imaginative skills. (See 
Appendix B). These textbooks suggest that observation provides unique factual 
knowledge. Observation is seen as being objective, and leading unerringly to 
hypotheses and theories. Science is generally portrayed as not requiring imagin-
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TABLE 5.3B 
Percentages of lab inquiries at Level: 
Q l 2 3 Rank Ord~r 
SEP8 62 22 16 0 1 
Harvard 46 46 8 0 2 
Brink & Jones 8 55 45 0 0 3 
Broster & James 8 73 27 0 0 4 
Pienaar & Walters 8 74 26 0 0 5 
Duncan 83 17 0 0 6 
ation. In general, Tamir and Lunetta's adapted tests reveal the six selected 
textbooks as being largely empiricist. 
5.3 Level of Reader Involvement in Text 
5.3.1 Textbook Questioning Strategies 
The analysis of questioning style in the chosen textbooks shows that there is a 
greater emphasis on questions asking for direct information. (See Appendix C, 
parts A and B of each test). A summary of these results follows: 
TABLE5.4 NON-EXEL EX£ERIENTIAL Rank Order 
lnstrnmtl Empiri,ist CQastrn,t 
Duncan 55% 30% 15% 1 
Harvard 38 36 26 2 
Broster & James 8 26 57 17 3 
Pienaar & Walters 18 54 28 4 
Brink & Jones 8 15 55 30 5 
SEP8 7 66 27 6 
In general, the left side of Parts A and B of Table 4.8 have higher scores than the 
right. Also the top part of B has higher scores than the bottom. According to 
Lowery and Leonard, this means that Lower Order questions predominate, a trend 
which gives the reader the impression that science does not ask open-ended ques-
tions, that science is a 'closed book', that scientific knowledge is proven knowl-
edge. 
Duncan is hy far the most instrumentalist, SEP 8 the least. Surprisingly, SEP 8 is 
the most empiricist. This is due to the many questions directed at the pupil about 
observations (for example, "What do you observe?What is the reading on the 
ammeter?") These were regarded as factual, direct-answer types, and hence empi-
ricist. However, taking SEP's overall philosophy into account, in which the 
authors of SEP recognise that all observation statements are loaded with prior 
theory, the high proportion of empiricism in SEP 8 should not be interpreted too 
literally. In other words, SEP 8 contains a large amount of empirical as opposed to 
empiricist material. 
127 
TABLE 5.5 Comparison of Questioning Style in Reading Content (See Appendix C) 
TEXTBOOK: Brink Pien Bros SEPS Dunc Harv 
No. of Questions 20 11 23 15 27 27 
No. of Sentences 220 160 251 74 217 225 
Noof Ques. per Sent. 9% 7% 9% 20% 12% 12% 
%of Experiential Ques 85% 82% 74% 93% 45% 66% 
% of Non-Expertl. Ques 15% 18% 26% 7% 55% 34% 
% of Initiatory Ques. 40% 9% 17% 20% 0% 26% 
% of Contextual Ques. 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 30% 
% of Terminal Ques. 60% 91% 83% 60% 100% 44% 
% of Captional Ques. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Total Sent: 1147 Total Oues: 123 Overall % 0/S: 11 % 
Using the percentage of Questions per Sentences found in Table 5.5, the follow-
ing ranking order is obtained: 
% of Ouestjon/Sentences 





Pienaar 7 Least constructivist 
The percentage of Non-Experiential questions is an indication of the degree of 
instrumentalism present. The ranking order is as follows: 
% of Non-Experiential Ouestions 





SEP 8 7 Least instrumentalist 
Table 5.5 also reveals that most questions are initiatory or terminal (rather than 
contextual). This means (following Lowery and Leonard) that all six textbooks 
make good use of High Order questions. That is, they all tend to have high levels 
of reader-involvement. 
Terminal questions predominate. If these are ranked, the following ranking order 
is obtained: 
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% of Terminal Questions 





Harvard 44 Least constructivist 
Placed side-by-side for easier comparison we get: 
Ranking % of OLS %ofN-E % of Term 
1 SEP8 Duncan Duncan 
2 Harvard Harvard Pienaar 
3 Duncan Broster Ernster 
4 Ernster Pienaar Brink 
5 Brink Brink SEP8 
6 Pienaar SEP8 Harvard 
Duncan features high on both constructivism and instrumentalism. So does 
Harvard. This suggests that there are two ways of achieving constructivism: 
(1) By an empiricist textbook making good use of questions and calculations. 
(2) By an empiricist textbook making use of rule-of-thumb, instrumental proce-
dures. 
This conclusion differs from my initial view that instrumentalism is opposed to 
constructivism, and therefore requires an explanation. A tentative explanation 
is that there are two opposing philosophies behind constructivism: the Deweyan 
and the Piagetian, or better, the pragmatist and the critical realist. Both lead to 
constructivism, but the instrumentalist version contains inherent philosophical 
dangers that the critical realist version does not. 
To summarise the conclusions from this test of questioning styles: 
Firstly, lower-order questions predominate. Therefore the textbooks emphasise 
the science-as-proven-knowledge idea. That is, they are empiricist. 
Secondly, Duncan's textbook is the most instrumentalist. 
Thirdly, it seems that an instrumentalist book may also be constructivist. 
5.3.2 Textual Analysis 
The results of Romey's Text Analysis reveal that there is a strong preponderance 
of facts, conclusions and definitions in the high school textbooks examined. (See 
Appendix D). Once again, this can be interpreted in terms of science as proven 
knowledge. 
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(a) Involvement Index 
The Involvement Index is defined as follows: 
TABLES.6 
Involvement Index = No, of interactive sentences 
No. of non-interactive sent 





Pienaar 0,2 (low involvement) 
The abnormally high Index for SEP 8 reflects the fact that this book is specifically 
designed as a practical workbook. It is therefore in a class of its own. Nevertheless, 
SEP 8, Harvard and Duncan are reflected here as the most constructivist. 
(b) Index for Questions at Chapter Ends 
This Index is defined as follows: 
TABLES.7 
Index for Questions = No. of open-ended questions 











1, 1 (low involvement) 
(no questions at Chapter Ends) 
-~-~-----
These results suggest that Harvard and Duncan are the most constructivist. 
(c) Textual analysis 
(All values in the first four tables are expressed as a percentage of the total 
number of sentences. The number of calculations per page are not percent-
ages, but average values.) 
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TABLES.8 
Ea~ls DdinitiQns OuestiQns 
SEP8 13% SEP8 0% SEP8 28% 
Broster 42 Harvard 2 Broster 15 
Harvard 49 Duncan 2 Duncan 10 
Pienaar 50 Pienaar 4 Pienaar 8 
Duncan 55 Broster 4 Brink 8 
Brink 57 Brink 6 Harvard 5 
Instru~tiQns N Q, Qf ~al,ulaliQDS :per :page 
SEP8 59% Duncan 3,9 
Brink 29 Broster 2,2 
Broster 23 Pienaar 1,0 
Duncan 21 Brink 0,9 
Pienaar 18 SEP8 0,6 
Harvard 17 Harvard 0,4 
These results show the textbooks placed in rank order. A few tentative conclusions 
from the Textual Analysis are that SEP 8 is the most reader-involved book, 
followed closely by Duncan and Broster. That is, these are the most 
constructivist. At the same time, Duncan is the most instrumentalist. 
Once again these results are consistent with the previous conclusion that in-
strumentalism is not necessarily opposed to constructivism, but indeed may be a 
means of promoting it. 
5.3.3 Philosophy Checklist 
The detailed results are found in Appendix E. A summary of the Philosophical 
Checklists for each textbook is given below in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. 
The totals of all the instances of the various philosophical characteristics relating 
to lnductivist-empiricism and Instrumentalism are summarised below in Tables 
5.11 and 5.12, expressed as percentages. The main results are in Appendix E. 
It must he borne in mind that these figures are minimum values. That is, they 
reflect the minimum amount of empiricism or instrumentalism found in each 
text hook. 
It is interesting comparing the set of results (in Tables 5.11 and 5.12) for the 
selected six, with the average number of calculations per page from Table 5.8 



























The similarity between the ranking orders of the two right-hand columns is 
significant. A high frequency of calculations in a science textbook seems to be 
a good indicator of the degree of instrumentalism. 
The degree of correlation between the two left-hand columns is less marked, but 
is nevertheless present. Very generally, it seems that there is a slight positive 
correlation, namely, that a high degree of empiricism is linked with a high degree 
of instrumentalism. 
TABLE 5.9: PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST: SUMMARY 
Totals for each book 
Textbook (See Table 4.2): A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A. 'INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with observation 5 5 4 4 6 5 7 3 5 7 3 6 
b. "Observation" mentioned 4 5 4 2 6 5 2 1 3 3 2 0 
C. Observation objective 5 5 4 2 7 5 7 3 5 6 3 8 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive generalisations made 3 2 3 2 4 5 4 2 4 0 2 4 
b. No. of instances few 2 2 3 2 4 4 4 1 2 0 1 4 
C. Verification 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 1 3 0 3 3 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentioned 5 2 2 3 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 2 
b. Obs. leads rigorously to laws 4 1 1 2 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 
C. Laws are mature theories 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique conclusion 3 4 2 2 4 3 5 7 4 0 0 0 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 6 6 4 5 6 8 7 8 7 0 4 8 
b. Science "discovers" facts 5 3 4 4 5 5 5 4 6 7 2 7 
C. Tone is "factual" 7 6 4 6 7 8 7 9 7 1 3 8 
d. Questions answered immediately 0 2 2 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 5 4 0 2 2 
f. Technological "fix" (solves all) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 0 0 1 
g. Linear accretion of knowledge 2 1 1 1 2 1 5 3 5 0 1 () 
h. Science always logical 2 1 0 0 1 0 2 7 4 0 0 0 
I. Science leads to absolute truth 2 2 1 1 2 0 4 3 6 0 1 1 
%TOTAL: 31 27 23 21 33 29 36 34 39 13 14 28 
~--·---
--·-~-·----~-·~-·. - ···-------· 
B 
INSTRUMENTALISM: 
I. Observation: Assumed objective 4 5 4 4 8 5 7 3 5 7 4 8 
Phenomenal only 1 () 1 0 1 0 4 4 4 5 3 
2 Computative predictions 4 4 5 5 4 3 4 5 5 4 8 9 
Predictions "expected" 5 5 3 7 5 6 5 5 5 2 8 4 
Recipe-like procedures 3 4 4 5 4 6 3 5 4 1 6 3 
Only terms in an equation 2 2 4 5 2 6 4 5 4 2 6 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 3 4 6 2 4 3 2 4 3 0 3 2 
Operational 4 5 1 1 2 2 6 2 3 0 3 3 
4. Theories: Fictions (no reality) 5 2 1 5 2 2 3 5 3 1 5 2 
Rules of thumb 5 5 6 4 6 5 4 5 3 0 4 7 
Convenient, pragmatic 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 5 2 7 9 
%TOTAL: _IL_3.~7 38 42 43 40 22 52 45 
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TABLE 5.10: PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST: SUMMARY 
Totals for each book 
Textbook (See Table 4.2) M N 0 p Q R s T u V w Tot Av 
A. INDUCTMST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with observatn 8 8 9 9 9 3 9 8 6 8 8 145 6 
b. "Observation" mentioned 5 2 0 4 5 3 9 6 0 4 2 77 3 
C. Observation objective 8 6 8 9 7 2 9 8 6 8 8 139 6 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive generalisations made 6 7 0 9 7 4 9 5 3 5 5 95 4 
b. No. of instances few 6 2 0 1 3 1 3 3 0 2 3 53 2 
C. Verification 5 4 0 7 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 72 3 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentioned 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 3 1 0 30 1 
b. Obs. leads rigorously to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 3 22 1 
C. Laws are mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 9 0 
d. Data yield unique conclusion 5 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 6 4 60 3 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 6 9 9 7 8 1 5 4 8 8 9 143 6 
b. Science "discovers" facts 5 8 9 8 5 1 7 7 4 6 5 122 5 
C. Tone is "factual" 8 9 9 7 6 0 5 2 9 3 8 139 6 
d. Questions answered immediately 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 18 1 
e. Science is reliable 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 5 32 1 
f. Technological "fix" 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 14 1 
g. Linear accretion of knowledge 1 6 9 7 7 0 0 0 6 5 1 64 3 
h. Science always logical 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 5 0 2 29 1 
I. Science leads to abs. truth 0 6 9 7 7 0 0 0 7 6 5 70 3 
%TOTAL: 34 41 33 41 18 10 33 21 18 16 44 133358_ 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: 
1. Observation: Assumed objective 8 6 8 9 7 2 9 8 5 8 8 142 6 
Phenomenal only 5 8 1 3 3 0 1 0 4 4 5 58 3 
2. Computative predictions 4 2 7 5 1 4 6 4 6 5 4 108 5 
Predictions "expected" 4 2 7 5 2 2 4 2 6 4 4 102 4 
Recipe-like procedures 4 5 7 3 6 3 0 2 6 4 5 93 4 
Only terms in an equation 4 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 6 4 4 75 3 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 3 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 3 3 5 57 2 
Operational 3 2 4 2 2 2 0 1 4 2 3 57 2 
4. Theories: Fictions (no reality) 3 5 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 73 3 
Rules of thumb 5 7 6 7 8 0 1 3 4 3 4 ]()2 4 
Convenient, pragmatic 7 7 4 8 7 0 () 2 5 3 9 110 5 
- -----~--·----
%TOTAL: 45 42 45 44 42 17 24 25 47 39 49 977 42 
- --- -- -- --




Jansen & Dekker 
Warren 
Lewis & Waller 
Broster & James 10 
Lambert 
Nigerian Physics 
Brink & Jones 10 
Kenyan Physics 
Pienaar & Walters 10 
Atherton 
Pople (Expl. Physics) 
CHEM Study 
Pienaar & Walters 9 
Brink & Jones 8 
Broster & James 9 
Pople (Sci. to 16) 
Pienaar & Walters 8 
PSSC Physics 
Broster & James 8 







Jansen & Dekker 
Nigerian Physics 
Pople (Epl. Phys.) 
Atherton 
Pople (Sci. to 16) 
Warren 
Lambert 
Lewis & Waller 
Broster & James 10 
Kenyan Physics 
Brink & Jones 9 
Pienaar & Walters 10 
Brink & Jones 10 
Broster & James 9 
Pienaar & Walters 9 
Pienaar & Walters 8 
Brink & Jones 8 























































(Those marked with an asterisk 
are the six selected textbooks) 
22 * (Those marked with an asterisk 
17 * are the six selected textbooks) 
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Condensed summaries of the Philosophical Checklist results are given below in 
Tables 5.13 and 5.14. 
Table 5.13: 
Condensed Philosophy Checklist: Raw Scores 
TEXTBOOK: A B C DE F G H I J K 
A. INDUCTMST-EMPIRICISM 
1. Observation 14 15 12 8 19 15 16 7 13 16 8 
2. Inductive generalisation 7 6 8 7 11 13 11 4 9 0 6 
3. Laws & theories 13 8 5 7 6 3 7 12 7 1 0 
4. Proven knowledge 25 23 18 18 27 24 34 41 45 8 13 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM 
1. Observation 5 5 5 4 9 5 11 7 9 12 7 
2. Computative predictions 14 15 16 22 15 21 16 20 18 9 28 
3. Definitions 7 9 7 3 6 5 8 6 6 0 6 
4. Theories 15 12 12 14 11 11 11 14 11 3 16 
L M N 0 p 0 R s T u V w TOT Av Max 
A. 
1. 14 21 16 17 22 21 8 29 22 12 20 18 363 16 30 
2. 11 17 13 0 17 13 8 16 12 7 11 13 220 10 30 
3. 2 5 6 0 0 2 1 0 4 11 9 10 119 5 40 
4. 27 22 42 45 38 37 2 17 13 42 28 42 631 27 90 
B.~ 
1. 9 13 14 9 12 10 2 10 8 9 12 13 200 9 20 
' 18 16 10 23 16 11 11 11 10 24 17 17 378 16 40 
3. 5 6 3 4 3 7 2 0 1 7 5 8 114 5 20 
4 18 15 19 14 17 18 4 5 8 12 9 16 285 12 30 
Percentages of each of the above values were calculated as follows. The value in 
each cell was divided by the maximum for that cell and multiplied by 100. This 




Condensed Philosophy Checklist: % of Totals 
TEXTBOOK: A B C DE F G H I J K 
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM 
1. Observation 47 50 40 27 63 50 53 23 43 53 27 
2. Inductive generalisation 23 20 27 23 37 43 37 13 30 0 20 
3. Laws & theories 33 20 13 18 15 8 18 30 18 3 0 
4. Proven knowledge 28 26 20 20 30 27 38 46 50 9 14 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM 
1. Observation 25 25 25 20 45 25 55 35 45 60 35 
2. Computative predictions 35 38 40 55 38 53 40 50 45 23 70 
3. Definitions 35 45 35 15 30 25 40 30 30 0 30 
4. Theories 50 40 40 47 37 37 37 47 37 10 53 
I L M N 0 p Q R s T u V w TOT AV % 
A. 
1 47 70 53 57 73 70 27 97 73 40 67 60 1210 53 41 
2. 37 57 43 0 57 43 27 53 40 23 37 43 733 32 25 
3. 5 13 15 0 0 5 3 0 10 28 23 25 303 14 10 
4. 30 24 47 50 42 41 2 19 14 47 31 47 702 31 24 
I 2948 130 100 
B. 
1. 45 65 70 45 60 50 10 50 40 45 60 65 1000 43 29 
2. 45 40 25 58 35 28 28 28 25 60 43 43 945 41 27 
3. 25 30 15 20 15 35 10 0 5 35 25 40 570 25 16 
4. 60 50 63 47 57 60 13 17 27 40 30 53 952 41 28 
3467 149 100 
Extracting the results for textbooks originating in various countries, we get Table 
5.15. The percentages for each item per country were added and averaged thus: 
(A+B+D+E+G+H)/6; (R+S+T)/3; (K+L+M+N+O+P+Q)/7; 
( C + F + I + J + U + V + W) / 7. The values for each country were then added down 
a column. The number in brackets reflects the percentage of Inductivist-empiri-
cism or of Instrumentalism contributed by the textbooks of that country. Note 
that for this Table (5.15), all Broster and James's textbooks (C, F, I) as well as 
SEP 8 (J) were included under "African" and not included under "South African". 
Thus A, B, D, E, G, Hare South African; K, L, M, N, 0, P, Q, are British; R, S, T, 
American; and C, F, I, J, U, V, Ware African Third World. 
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Table 5.15 
Averages of the percentage totals for each country 
S.Afr Brit Amer African 
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 44 57 66 50 
2. Inductive generalisation 26 37 40 29 
3. Laws & theories 22 5 4 17 
4. Proven knowledge 31 35 12 33 
TOTALA: 123 134 122 129 
(24%) (26%) (24%) (25%) 
B. INSTRUMENTALIST 
1. Observation 34 53 33 46 
2. Computative predictions 43 44 27 44 
3. Definitions 33 24 5 27 
4. Theories 43 56 19 35 
TOTALB: 153 177 84 152 
(27%) (31%) (15%) (27%) 
TOTALA + B: 276 310 206 281 
(26%) (29%) (19%) (26%) 
A tentative conclusion from Table 5.15 indicates that the textbooks from all three 
countries are approximately equally inductivist-empiricist. As for instrumental-
ism, South African, African and British textbooks have a stronger emphasis 
than do American textbooks. The British textbooks lead in the degree of 
instrumentalism present, followed closely by the African and South African 
textbooks. 
5.4 Summary of all quantitative results 
All the texts examined revealed a predominance of an inductivist-empiricist 
approach. It should be recalled that these values are minimum values, the sought 
characteristic being noted at least once in the sampled page. Table 5.14 reveals 
that between 29% and 41 % of the sentences sampled reflect a repeated assump-
tion on the part of the authors that observation is impersonal and objective. 
Inductive generalisations, either as Laws, but more often as the conclusions of 
practical experiments in the laboratory, occupy 25% of the sentences sampled. 
24% of the statements sampled suggest that science is a body of proven facts, that 
is, achieved, non-revisable knowledge. Only 10% made any mention of the term 
"theory" or "law", but the role of theory was not discussed. 
Table 5.14 also reveals an emphasis on computative predictions (27% ), and 
both nominalistic and operational definitions (16%). This, taken together with 
the implication that observation is theory-free, and also with the 28% reflecting 
that physical science makes great use of mathematical relationships as con-
venient devices for prediction rather than explanation, implies the existence of 
instrumentalism in high school physical science textbooks. 
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Virtually all of these laboratory inquiries were at Level O or 1, implying a strong 
commitment to empiricism. 
About 55% of the sentences sampled were factual (see Table 5.10). Questions 
formed a large proportion of some texts (eg Duncan's GCSE Physics), but on 
average, onlyl 1 % of the total number of texts examined comprised questions (see 
Table 5.5). 
All of the above results are now placed alongside each other to facilitate compari-
son. In order to simplify the procedure, only the six textbooks (A, B, C, J, K 
and R) selected from the main set of twenty textbooks, will be compared in the 
following ranking orders. 
5.4.1 Levels of Involvement 
TABLE5.16 
Textbook Herron Tamir Romey 
Level Level (High= Involved) 
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 Inv.Ind Qu.In 
A Brink & Jones 97 3 0 0 55 45 0 0 0,6 1,3 
B Pienaar & Walt 85 15 0 0 74 26 0 0 0,2 1,1 
C Broster & James 91 9 0 0 73 27 0 0 0,7 1,0 
J SEP 4 96 0 0 62 22 16 0 19,3 -
K Duncan GCSE 67 33 0 0 83 17 0 0 0,8 13.2 
R Harvard Physics 23 69 8 0 46 46 8 0 0,9 47,0 
The six textbooks were placed in ranking order according to the data in the above 
Table 5.16: 
CONCLUSION .. 
DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT 
Herron: Brink Broster Pienaar Duncan Harvard SEP 
Tamir: Duncan Pienaar Broster Brink Harvard SEP 
Romey Text: Pienaar Brink Broster Duncan Harvard SEP 
Romey Ques: Broster Pienaar Brink Duncan Harvard 
This ranking order strongly suggests that, on the whole, SEP, Harvard and Duncan 
are the most constructivist. 
5.4.2 Textual analysis 
Similarly, the data from the Table 5.8 above were set alongside each other in 




TEXTBOOKS Total No % % % % 
Sentences Facts Ques Defn Inst Obsvn Cales 
A Brink & Jones 100% 57 8 6 29 9 9 
B Pienaar & W 100 50 8 4 18 17 10 
C Brost er & J a 100 42 15 4 23 13 22 
J SEP 100 13 28 0 59 4 6 
K Duncan GCSE 100 55 10 2 21 2 39 
R Harvard Phys 100 49 5 2 17 5 4 
RANKING ORDER BY USING PERCENTAGES FROM TABLE 5.17 
Low% High% 
Facts SEP Broster Harvard Pienaar Duncan Brink 
Questions Harvard Brink Pienaar Duncan Broster SEP 
Defintns SEP Harvard Duncan Pienaar Broster Brink 
Instruct Harvard Pienaar Duncan Broster Brink SEP 
Calculns Harvard SEP Brink Pienaar Broster Duncan 
If we assume that a high degree of instrumentalism leads to a high level of 
involvement, and if we interpret that a high degree of involvement correlates with 
(a) a low% of facts, (b) a high% of questions, (c) a low% of definitions, (d) a high 
% of instructions to pupils, and ( e) a high number of calculations, then a ranking 
of degree of involvement becomes: 
DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT 
Empiricist Instrumentalist 
Facts Brink Duncan Pienaar Harvard Broster SEP 
Questions Harvard Brink Pienaar Duncan Broster SEP 
Defns Brink Broster Pienaar Duncan Harvard SEP 
Instructs Harvard Pienaar Duncan Broster Brink SEP 
--~---~-~~~~~ -
This interpretation of Table 5.17 suggests that SEP, Duncan, Broster are the most 
instrumentalist. 
5.4.3 Correlation of all Ranking Orders from all Tests 
The six selected textbooks were placed in rank order for each of the above tests. 
In this summary of all results, Rank Order 1 = Most involved, that is, most 
constructivist. 
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TABLE5.18 SUMMARY OF RANKING ORDERS 
(Rank 1 = Most involved) 
RANK Herron Tamir Romey Romey Textual %Q/S 
lnvolv Ques Facts Defs Ques Instruct 
1 SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP SEP 
2 Harv Harv Harv Harv Bros Harv Bros Brink Harv 
3 Dunc Brink Dunc Dunc Harv Dunc Dunc Bros Bros 
4 Pien Bros Bros Brink Pien Pien Pien Dunc Brink 
5 Bros Pien Brink Pien Dunc Bros Brink Pien Pien 
6 Brink Dunc Pien Bros Brink Brink Harv Harv Dunc 
The above Table awards each textbook a particular ranking number for each test. 
These ranking scores were then added across for each textbook, to obtain a total 
score for that textbook. For example, the respective scores are as follows: 
SEP 1+1+1+0+1+1+1+1+1 = 8 
Harvard 2+2+2+2+3+2+6+6+2 = 27 
Broster 5+4+4+6+2+5+2+3+3 = 34 
Duncan 3+6+3+3+5+3+3+4+6 = 36 
Pienaar 4+5+6+5+4+4+4+5+5 = 42 
Brink 6+3+5+4+6+6+5+6+4 = 45 
This gave rise to the final overall order of placement for degree of involvement 
in Table 5.19 below. The right-hand listing in Table 5.19 below for ranking 
order for instrumentalism is taken directly from the results of the Philosophical 
Checklist in Table 5.12 above. That for empiricism is taken directly from Table 
5.11 above. 
TABLE 5.19 FINAL UNIFIED SUMMARY 
-------~ ------------
INVOLVEMENT INSTRUMENTALISM EMPIRICISM 
~~--------- ~---- -------
1. SEP 8 1. Duncan 1. Brink 
2. Harvard 2. Pienaar 2. Pienaar 
3. Broster 3. Broster 3. Broster 
4. Duncan 4. Brink 4. Duncan 
5. Pienaar 5. Harvard 5. SEP 8 
6. Brink 6. SEP 8 6. Harvard 
This final ranking order suggests that there might be an inverse relationship 
between degree of involvement and degree of instrumentalism. SEP 8 and Har-
vard are most involved (that is, constructivist), yet are also least in-
strumentalist. Yet Broster & James 8 and Duncan suggest just the opposite, 
namely, that a high degree of constructivism correlates well with a high 
degree of instrumentalism& 
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Perhaps the fairest conclusions that can be drawn from the above quantitative 
study are that: 
( 1) The textbooks which are most empiricist (Brink, Pienaar) are the least 
involving. 
(2) A strongly instrumentalist approach (Duncan) can raise a fairly strong 
empiricist textbook to a higher level of involvement (Duncan). 
(3) An instrumentalist approach can be used to promote constructivism. 
5.5 Results of the direct reading survey 
5.5.1 Examples in the Texts of key scientific concepts 
Some of the textbooks were read from cover to cover in order to extract references 
to their philosophy of science. In others, specific chapters, or topics, were closely 
read, especially where references to 'observation', 'theory' or 'model-building' 
were made - such as in chapters dealing with the historical development of the 
atomic theory, and the various models of acids and bases. 
Some examples and quotations from the various textbooks are now presented, 
illustrating their authors' views of observation, computative prediction, de-
finition, induction, and theory. 
(a) Observation 
Most of the texts assume that observation is objective and completely unaffected 
by previous theoretical presuppositions. Statements suggesting this are: 
"Because the scientist cannot directly observe the atoms ... an atomic 
model has been devised which explains the different observations." 
(Text B, p.229) 
"You have observed evidence for this ... " (Text E, p.96) 
"Human beings find out things by using their senses." (Text N, p.3) 
"We see that ... " (Text C, p.16) 
"We observe that ... " (Text B, p.188) 
"Note ... Measure ... " (Text M, p.204) 
"Measure the ... " (Text K, p.18) 
The three exceptions, which briefly but clearly discuss the limitations and sub-
jectiveness of observation, are the American books (Texts R, S and T). The 
Project Physics Course (Text R) stands out from all the others in that it shows that 
observation is theory-laden by giving a detailed historical treatment of the Aris-
totelian versus the Galilean view (eg. Text R, p.43). 
Once again it must be pointed out that the above examples could be seen to be 
nit-picking. We all know that the author realises that sensory observation is 
influenced by external and internal factors which modify its objectivity. Yet in 
a study like this, we can only read the words as they stand, and take them at their 
face-value, unless the author has explicitly tried to explain his meaning. 
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(b) Computative prediction 
There are naturally many examples of the use of mathematical equations in most 
of the texts. These may (or may not) be used by the pupil in a rote, 'plug-in', 
instrumental way, merely 'to get the right answer', with little thought of relating 
it to real life. If this is done, the computations are 'expected' predictions (that is, 
not really informative about the world). They are simply convenient devices. 
Worked examples abound in most of the texts. There are examples on Ohm's 
Law, Boyle's Law, heat calculations, chemical calculations, as well as large 
numbers of Exercises at the end of chapters. 
Calculations using equations like v = U , R = V/I, may be interpreted as 
non-causal. That is, there is no indication that V causes I, but only that I always 
accompanies V. The focus of interest implied here is the relationship between 
the variables. This instrumentalist technique sidesteps problems involving 
whether I or V actually exist or not. 
Predictions of another kind, namely, inductive predictions, are also found in 
several of the texts. Inductive predictions are those in which, on the basis of 
having observed the regularities of some past events, we can predict the occur-
rence of a future one. Here are some examples: 
"We can therefore predict that fluorine will be even more reactive." 
(Text B, p.188) 
"A precipitate will be formed if ... " (Text B, p.285) 
From the regularities of observed phenomena, rules can sometimes be made in 
order to predict. For example: 
"Can we predict when a precipitate will be formed and when not? Do 
any rules exist in connection with solubilities?" (Text B, p.282) 
(c) Definitions 
Among the many types of definition, only two were systematically sought 
for in the textbooks: nominalist definitions, in which a name is given to a 
phenomenon or relationship; and operational definitions, which define a concept 
in terms of the actual operations carried out to obtain it. These are sometimes 
closely connected. For example, 'density' is the name given to 'mass per unit 
volume', and also the operation of dividing mass by volume. Operational defini-
tions are also related to mathematical equations, such as resistance using Ohm's 
Law. 
Here are some nominalist definitions from the textbooks: 
"Upthrust is the name we give ... " (Text Q, p.94) 
" ... called the critical angle." (Text M, p.204) 
" ... are called allotropes." (Text E, p.316) 
" ... is called a nuclide." (Text Q, p.249) 
" ... is called the time base." (Text P, p.221) 
" ... are called hydrogen bonds." (Text N, p.277) 
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" ... is called the cut-off potential." (Text D, p.92) 
" ... called the anode." (Text A, p.202) 
" ... is called the latent heat." (Text B, p.326) 
Examples of operational definitions: 
" ... Resistance R is defined by R = V/1." (Text K, p.172) 
"(Refractive Index) ... is defined by the equation ... " (Text K, p.18) 
" ... covalent radius, where the radius (r) is half the distance ( d) between 
two nuclei ... " (Text D, p.285) 
'The following equation defines resistance: ... " (Text C, p.62) 
"l mole of any gas ... " (Text M, p.240) 
"A conductor has a resistance of 1 ohm if ... " (Text B, p.106) 
"Acceleration = change of velocity 
time taken for change "(Text M, p.151) 
Operational definitions define concepts in terms of the procedures required to 
measure them. Operational definitions have the instrumentalist property of 
avoiding difficult questions of a metaphysical nature, for example, that of real 
existence. But operational definitions have a severe weakness: not all the 
conditions required to define them can be specified. 
Usually, a definition should be informative about the real world. It asks the 
question "What is it?" of the term on the left side of the definition, and answers it 
by the defining formula on the right. However, according to Popper (1983, p.92), 
this is not the way modern science works. Modern science asks: "What shall we 
call 'mass per unit volume'?" and answers with the name: 'Density'. It starts with 
the defining formula, and calls for a name for it. Hence in modern science, 
definitions are merely shorthand symbols or succinct phrases, to make language 
less cumbersome, rather than ways of providing information. Now there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with this approach. Indeed, elimination of 'excess 
baggage' is one of the reasons for the enormous success of science. 
However, the cost of using nominalistic definitions is great, because the tendency 
to give names to complex relationships and phenomena can lead to discussions 
about the meaning of words, rather than about the physical phenomena to which 
the words refer. Also, the danger of any definition is that it gives the impression 
that knowledge is a closed hook, no longer open to revision. Definitions that 
seek the essence of things, ultimate truth, are wrong. For of its very nature, truth 
is always provisional and tentative. 
This applies especially to scientific inquiry, with its built-in self-correcting 
approach. Every author who uses definitions should therefore make it quite 
clear that definitions are always open to revision. This was not done in any of the 
textbooks examined. 
(d) Induction 
Induction is the process of generalising from a relatively few instances. It includes 
drawing conclusions, formulating laws and rules, verification, and the idea that 
scientific knowledge is established hy many confirmations. 
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Popper endorsed Hume's criticism of induction: by its very nature, it goes beyond 
the facts. It is logically invalid to assert a universal property on the basis of a 
comparatively few observations. However, inductive generalisations abound in 
science. As Hanson (1971) pointed out, there is nothing wrong with this, because 
the risky leap into the unknown is balanced by the fact that the leap takes place in 
the context of an umbrella theoretical structure. Induction, like all scientific 
processes, is saturated in theory. Therefore induction is a valid scientific 
technique. But its limitations should be pointed out by authors of science 
textbooks. 
Examples of inductive generalisations in the texts: 
''The wave phenomena we observed ... are characteristic of all 
types." (Text B, p.4) 
"All waves ... " (Text B, p.4) 
"It is clear that there are certain properties which are common to all 
chemical combination ... " (Text B, p.230) 
"In general, surfaces that are good absorbers of radiation are good 
emitters when hot." (Text M, p.182) 
"It is found that ... " (Text M, p.240) 
"All masses attract ... " (Text L, p.82) 
In those texts containing practical laboratory inqumes, many experiments con-
clude with an inductive generalisation. On the basis of the single experiment 
performed by the pupil, there emerges a universal law, without any precautionary 
statement, or any reference to the many thousands of scientists 'out there' 
whose experiments provide many confirmatory instances. Every textbook should, 
at least once in the text, make it quite clear to the pupil that inductive generali-
sations are problematic and must be used with care. 
Examples of verification: 
Many of the practical experiments are provided merely so that the pupil can verif)' 
a law or principle. That is, they are of the 'see-for-yourself type, for example: 
Verification of Faraday's Law (Text C, p.80) 
Tests for anions (Text B, p.285) 
''This can be checked by ... " (Text M, p.342) 
References to scientific laws: 
Various laws are mentioned (eg Newton's Laws of Motion and Gravitation, Ohm's 
Law, Faraday's Law, Boyle's Law, Snell's Law, Lenz's Law), but none of the texts 
discusses the notion that laws are inductive generalisations, with the Humean 
characteristic of enlarging 
"the information content of the axioms and premises or the observa-
tion statements from which it proceeds." (Medawar 1984, p.79) 
Examples of the proven knowledge idea: 
High school physical science textbooks are often accused of portraying scientific 
knowledge as proven knowledge, with little if no room for further research. Of 
course, science does have a 'body of knowledge' which is very reliable. But the 
self-critical nature of scientific method ensures that even this 'body of knowledge', 
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is always open to change or refinement. Yet, if the history of science, as described 
in textbooks, suggests that scientific discoveries led cumutively, inexorably and 
linearly to our contemporary store of scientific knowledge, then it follows that such 
knowledge is established and unrevisable. Further, the notion that phenomena 
were waiting to be discovered implies that, when discovered, that is the end of 
the story. Here are some examples: 
" ... experimentation established finally that ... " (Text A, p.15) 
"Soon afterwards Madame Curie discovered radium." (Text I, p.379) 
"(Oersted) ... discovered ... " (Text A, p.87) 
" ... it was concluded that ... " (Text E, p.100) 
''Today radioactivity is used ... " (Text M, p.379) 
''Towards the middle of the 17th century, Robert Boyle and Issac 
Newton began to realise that scientific theory could be based only 
on accurate experimental observations." (Text A, p.136) 
"In 1932 Chadwick discovered that ... " (Text A, p.150) 
The only explicit reference to the term 'induction' that could be found in any of 
the texts was in CHEM Study. On page 3, induction is described as an elemen-
tary logical thought process, and the bounds within which inductive generali-
sations are valid are given. 
(e) Theories and models 
Discussion about the role of theory, or the interaction with, and priority of, theory 
in all stages of the scientific inquiry process, is most conspicuous by its absence 
in most of the textbooks examined. There is also a noticeable lack of any 
explanation about models and their importance. The exceptions are The 
Project Physics Course (Harvard), and to a lesser degree, CHEM Study and PSSC 
Physics. 
In actual fact, most scientific theories are arrived at, not by generalising the 
sensory data, but by modifying already-existing theories. This is Popper's 
view (Magee 1973, p.32). Popper defends the priority of theory. Science begins 
with a pre-existing theoretical framework, not crass observation. Observation is 
always selective and interpretive. It needs a point of view or interest, which, in 
turn, 'colours' the observation. Some kind of theory exists in the mind before 
any observation is made. The mind is not a tabula ram, as the empiricists maintain. 
"All observation involves interpretation in the light of our theoreti-
cal knowledge ... " (Popper 1983, p.48) 
Yet, in spite of this, we read statements like the following in our textbooks: 
"A theory is a set of ideas formed from facts or reasoning in an 
attempt to prove something." (Clarke, Hurst, Thoka, 1987, Successful 
Science 6 , p.221) 
"Initially the existence of electrons was determined by experiment 
... " (Text B, p.219) 
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Of course, this is true, but the theory-ladenness of experiment is not men-
tioned, either here, or anywhere else in the text. The British and South African 
textbooks make an occasional mention of 'theory' in passing, without any 
attempt to highlight its imaginative role, or any other role, for that matter. They are 
the poorer for this neglect. 
Explicit mention of theory is made only in the following textbooks: 
'Theories are ideas which are used to explain facts." (Text J, p.3) 
"(A model) is an idea, a picture, a system of concepts which creative 
intuition and hard work lead us to think (about and) describe the 
things we investigate." (PSSC Physics, p.151) 
CHEM Study talks briefly about the tentative, revisable nature of theories and 
models. ( CHEM Study, p.4) 
Harvard Project Physics again excels itself, not only by showing how theory develops 
historically, but also by its helpful marginal notes, for example, those on theory on 
page 48 of Text and Handbook 1, Concepts of Motion. 
The relationship portrayed in the texts between theory and the real· world is an 
ambiguous one. Most people, as Gardner (1983) states, are naive realists. When 
we talk about an electron, we believe that there is something out there, existing 
independently of our thinking, called an electron. And certainly, school pupils, 
particularly younger ones, are naive realists. No doubt, the authors of these 
textbooks believe in the independent reality of electrons and photons and other 
unobservables. In this sense, they too are realists. So when they talk about 
'kinetic theory', they surely hold that matter really consists of particles in 
constant, random motion. Yet, as was mentioned in some previous collaborative 
research (Jacoby and Spargo 1989, p.47), it is possible to read their words in 
a purely instrumental way. Their 'kinetic theory' could refer to reality, but 
equally it might not. It could be regarded as a convenient fiction only, with no sense 
of commitment to a common-sense reality. Selley ( 1989, p.29) also found this 
realist/instrumentalist ambiguity in school textbooks. British (and South Afri-
can) authors of high school physical science textbooks are caught up in the 
atmosphere of British empiricism and now out-moded logical positivism. Tex-
tbooks tend to capture the philosophical atmosphere of past rather than present 
philosophies. Hence it is not surprising that the science textbooks of today still 
contain an instrumentalist slant, even though it is now out of fashion. The philos-
ophy of Popper and Kuhn has not yet permeated into the high school classroom. 
It must be pointed out that references in the textbooks to 'unobservable', theore-
tical entities may be regarded by the authors equally in a realist or anti-realist 
way. For example, statements about the Law of Conservation of Energy: 
"All the energy essentially ends up as heat." (Text L, p.92) 
"Heat lost equals heat gained." (Text B, p.294) 
These can be either convenient bookkeeping devices, or a true description of 
reality. The words themselves do not suggest which interpretation the author of 
the textbook believes. Even in a textbook like the Harvard Project Physics, which 
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continually emphasises the theory-dependence of observation, we can read about 
Galileo's kinematics in an instrumental, rather than a realist, way. Indeed, it could 
be argued that Galileo was an instrumentalist as far as kinematics was concerned, 
but a realist as far as astronomy was concerned. Perhaps all scientists (and hence 
also school science educationists) experience Koestler's "controlled schizophre-
nia", sometimes behaving as instrumentalists, at other times as realists. 
In the Harvard Project Physics Text and Handbook 1, Concepts of Motion, we read 
Galileo's definition of acceleration in an instrumentalist way: 
"A motion is said to be uniformly accelerated when, starting from rest, 
it acquires during equal time intervals, equal increments of speed." 
(p.48) 
Sagredo, one of the three characters taking part in the dialogue, a man of good 
will and open mind and eager to learn, says that all definitions are arbitrary. 
He asks whether Galileo's arbitrary definition of acceleration actually corre-
sponds to the way real objects fall. Sagredo, therefore, notes that it is possible to 
interpret Galileo's theory in an arbitrary, instrumental way. Further, Sagredo 
suggests that they should look for the cause of acceleration. But Salviati (speaking 
for Galileo) replies that this invites too many speculative answers. All such notions 
of cause are "fantasies". Instead of looking for causes, they should simply describe 
the properties of accelerated motion. 
It is obvious that this is nothing more than an instrumentalist approach. 
Ignore metaphysical speculations about causality. Theories about causes are 
fantasies. Explanations are not wanted, only descriptions. Even Galileo's 
experiments with accelerated motion continued this instrumentalist approach, for 
his experiments, though dealing with real objects, gave rise to descriptions rather 
than explanations. 
What was needed to take Galileo's theory beyond instrumentalism and 
towards realism, was a physical theory. Dynamics had to supercede kinematics. It 
took Newton to do this. Although Galileo did prepare the way for Newton, 
nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Galileo's world-view was realist: he 
believed that the sun was at the centre of the orbiting planets, and that some kind 
of force caused the planets to move. He tried to substantiate this with his theory 
of tides (Koestler 1957, p.4 77). He came very close to a correct theory of impetus, 
namely, Newton's First Law of Motion. But Galileo stated that if a body is left to 
itself, it will continue, not in a straight line, but in a circular path. It can be seen 
that although Galileo was still very much influenced by Aristotelian ideas, he 
was nevertheless struggling to liberate himself from them. Although he never fully 
reached a true physical theory, he was tending towards it, and on these grounds 
can he regarded as a realist. 
• 
The authors of the Harvard Project Physics obviously assume that Galileo's theory 
is an attempt to reach a true description of reality. Galileo's theory is better 
than Aristotle's. On page 153, the authors invite the student to decide for himself, 
on the basis of preceding experiments, whether it was Aristotle or Galileo who 
was correct. The experiment described on page 153 is clearly meant to be taken as 
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more than a mere manipulation of variables. It affects reality. Taken as a whole, 
the authors of Project Physic project a realist view rather than an instrumentalist 
one. 
Similarly, in PSSC Physics, there is also an explicit commitment to realism: 
"We therefore test all models to see how well they represent the real 
thing." (p.152) 
"Our models, the physical theories that we now have, describe much 
of our world." (p.152) 
The scientific realism portrayed in the Harvard Project Physics and the PSSC 
Physics, however, does not fully take into account the theory-ladenness of scien-
tific inquiry. They adopt what Bhaskar (1989) calls empirical realism, making 
no allowance for the constructive element of cognition. The British and South 
African books, following the line of British empiricism, assume that a real physical 
world exists independently of the observer. Like the American books, they 
make no explicit reference to it. When they do say that we observe the natural 
world, the implication is that observation is pure, impersonal and theory-free. 
(f) Pragmatism and utilitarianism 
There are many references in most of the textbooks examined to industrial 
applications of science. For example, on the pages sampled, the uses of transfor-
mers and electric motors, as well as the industrial preparation of ammonia and 
sulphuric acid, are described. 
Although it could be argued that these are direct references to the realism of 
science, this is not so. Usefulness of science in real life is not the same as an 
explanatory understanding of the real natural world. Truth is more than usefulness. 
5.5.2 Results of the Preface Analysis 
A reading of the preface to each textbook reveals a general unawareness on the 
part of the author(s) of the philosophical implications and weaknesses of the 
instrumentalism present in the corresponding text. Those few who do ref er to 
scientific method have a notion of scientific method which is strongly criticised by 
contemporary philosophers of science. 
Text A: Brink and Jones 8: The separation of observation and theory, and the 
notion that observation leads rigorously and inexorably to theory, is clearly stated: 
"It is important in the study of Physical Science that concepts and 
theories be developed from actual experimental observation and dis-
covery." 
The role of prior theory as a guide to investigation is not mentioned. The authors 
emphasise understanding of phenomena, rather than learning of facts. They main-
tain that questions asked in the text amd during practicals will enable pupils to 
discover for themselves the theories and principles. However, as Driver (1983) 
points out, experience alone is not enough in activity methods. The authors were, 
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however, very close to doing what they should have explained more explicitly, 
namely, that the teacher must supply the theoretical framework and guiding 
principles. Pupils cannot obtain this from the textbook alone, for the textbook is 
too condensed and consequently instrumentalist. 
Text B: Pienaar, Walters et al, 8: There is no explicit reference to the nature or 
method of science in this preface, only that the presentation is pupil-orientated, 
both as regards text and experiments. There is no suggestion that class discussion 
should both precede and follow laboratory work. 
Text C: Broster and James 8: Because the text is written for the pupils, and 
especially for the more socially disadvantaged pupils, the authors have aimed 
to keep it as brief as possible. The authors believe that science must be experienced 
to be understood. Therefore the emphasis is on doing experiments. The pupils 
should do these experiments themselves. Pupils are also encouraged to keep a 
list of definitions for study purposes. All comments in the preface are of a similar 
pragmatic nature. There is no explicit reference to scientific method or the 
authors' philosophy of science. 
Text D: Brink and Jones 9: This preface expresses the same sentiments as in Text 
A above. Understanding and pupil involvement, particularly in practical work, 
are regarded by the authors as important. Concepts and theories should be 
developed from actual experimental observation and discovery. Again, these auth-
ors come close to a discussion of the philosophy of scienctific observation and 
theory, but do not devote nearly enough attention to it. 
Text E: Pienaar, Walters, et al, 9: The authors state that they have made this text 
pupil-orientated. New concepts appearing for the first time are fully explained. 
Summaries and questions are designed to assist pupils. Practical experiment are 
integrated into the text. 
Text F: Broster and James 9: No preface whatsoever is provided in this 
textbook. Since these authors obviously wrote their textbook with a wide pupil-
population in mind, including the more disadvantaged pupil, this is a glaring 
omission. The content and presentation of the material are very good indeed, but 
the philosophical approach is clearly instrumentalist. Some sort of preface is 
therefore necessary, to guide teachers - and particularly the under-qualified tea-
chers who all too frequently form the majority of staff in schools for disadvantaged 
pupils. 
Text G: Brink and Jones 10: As in their Standards 8 and 9 textbooks, the authors 
reiterate the need for the pupil to understand scientific concepts. This is best 
achieved through actual active observation and discovery. Again, there is need 
for a brief but more comprehensive treatment of the history and philosophy of 
science. 
Text H: Pienaar, Walters, et al, IO: The authors merely summarise the fact that 
they have kept to the "new" Syllabus. There is no explicit reference to scientific 
method, nor to the history or philosophy of science. 
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Text I: Broster and James 10: In "Notes to the Teacher", the authors suggest that 
many scientific principles can be demonstrated using very simple apparatus. 
"After all, the early scientists such as Dalton, Newton, Galileo, Archimedes and 
Copernicus had no sophisticated equipment but were able to demonstrate their 
theories by using simple home-made apparatus ... " Although the reader could 
perhaps question whether Copernicus used simple, home-made equipment, and 
also whether theories are demonstrated (rather, their consequences are tested), 
nevertheless it is refreshing to see at least some reference to the history of science 
and the role of practical work. However, such a reference is far too brief, and needs 
further elaboration. 
Text J: Science Education Project (SEP) 8: This preface has an up-to-date view of 
the philosophy of science. It makes it clear that the book is not a textbook, but rather 
a practical workbook of laboratory inquiries. Science is seen by SEP as something 
the pupil does. It is a problem-solving process. Certain skills are needed for this, 
like deciding how to classify, inferring something new, looking for patterns, make 
hypotheses (reasoned guesses) to explain what you observe, thinking of ways to 
test hypotheses. SEP emphasises pre-lab discussions to decide on a way to solve 
the problem posed. It is implied that there is no one method, and that words are 
understood in different ways by learners. This mention of alternative conceptions 
implies that theory is prior, but this point could have been elaborated more fully, 
even though it is treated in some detail in the Teacher's Guide. 
The Teacher's Guide explains how "scientists create science". (My emphasis. The 
word create is important.) The authors continue: 
"Scientists are people who are full of curiosity about the world. A 
scientist focuses on a particular interesting event and asks QUES-
TIONS about the event and turns these questions into a clear PROB-
LEM. She investigates the problem and debates her results with other 
people. Out of the DEBATE comes a summary of the results that 
other scientists have accepted but the results raise MORE QUES-
TIONS!" (SEP Teacher's Guide p.2) 
Further on, on page 3, we again read: 
"Scientists create science. Science is not 'discovering facts' we make 
those facts because we decide to study some things and ignore other 
things. We also make the facts when we make up new words to describe 
our ideas." ... "We should not speak of facts as though they have always 
been there, waiting to be discovered. Rather, we have created ideas, 
or concepts, that are useful lo us in describing the world." 
'The scientist asks, above all, 'What was the CAUSE of that happen-
ing?'" 
Various process skills are discussed, and then the point is again made that 
people create science. The teacher is left with three points: 
(1) We should not give students the idea that science is just a collection of 
principles and results. 
(2) We should tell the students some of the history of science and scientists, 
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especially decisions being made about science in South Africa nowadays. 
(3) We as teachers should try to understand and practice some of the process 
skills in our own thinking. This is followed by a 12-page interesting 







Stating relationships and patterns 




Another 12 pages are devoted to scientific method and the philosophy of science. 
Topics such as: what science is, the role of hypothesis, science as what scientists 
do, the role of the scientific community, the tentativeness of scientific knowl-
edge, are well covered. 
All this is in the Teacher's Guide and not in the pupil's Workbook. Yet it 1s so 
important that it should be in the pupil's book, at least in a shortened form. 
Text K: Duncan GCSE Physics: In his preface, the author states that the 
emphasis in this textbook is on answering questions, over 800 being provided! 
Hints for pupil revision are given. There is no mention of scientific method or the 
philosophical aims of the author. However, immediately following the preface 
is a two-page (mainly photographs) discussion of Physics and Technology. Here 
we read that physicists 
"find the facts by observation and experiment (and) try to discover the 
laws that summarise ( often as mathematical equations) these facts. 
Sense has then to be made of the laws by thinking up and testing 
theories (thought-models) to explain these laws". 
The author feels that this leads to a better understanding of the physical world. He 
says that technologists use physics to solve practical problems for the benefit of 
mankind. This interesting preface serves two good purposes: it suggests that 
theories are thought-models and thus imaginative; and it suggests that the aim of 
science is to give an explanatory understanding of the real natural world. By doing 
this, this preface offsets to some extent the strong instrumentalist line of the 
content material of this textbook. 
Text L: Pople and Williams: These authors state that science is about asking 
questions. Answers are found using experiments or looking up a reference 
book. The authors believe that the information that scientists have gained is 
important. This information can be used to help understand the world. No other 
mention is made regarding philosophy, but the overall impression gained by 
reading this preface is that the aim is pragmatic rather than one of understanding. 
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Text M: Atherton, Duncan, Mackean: In this preface, the authors describe the 
practical usage of this textbook. Each chapter contains essential facts, ideas, 
details of experiments, everyday applications, and questions for revision. The 
authors' primary concern has been to provide access to information. They see their 
textbook as a body of achieved knowledge rather than as an inquiry. 
Text N: Lewis and Waller: These authors say that their text is designed to 
encourage the formation of concepts and to show the applications of chemistry. 
The aim of this book is understanding rather than memorisation of facts. The main 
concepts are developed through analysis of experimental facts. Facts and theory 
are carefully kept apart, and are presented in a way that reflects the traditional 
scientific approach, where observation comes first, then inference. This preface 
clearly reflects the philosophical standpoint of the authors, which is inductivist-em-
piricist. This, as well as an instrumentalist approach, is also evident in the body of 
the text itself. 
Text 0: Pople: The preface informs us that this book deals with physics and its 
applications. However, the author does not expand on this, nor does he mention 
his philosophical standpoint. The preface merely discusses the structure of the 
book. It notes that practical work is not included, as it is assumed that the school 
would have its own practical programme. This textbook is thus seen as a body 
of established facts. 
Text P: Warren: The author's aim in this text is vocational, as well as to promote 
understanding of the natural environment. Each new idea is introduced grad-
ually, and investigated by simple experiments. The emphasis is on active 
involvement and learning from first-hand experience. Summaries identify a "body 
of knowledge" to be learned. Many questions are provided, to give the pupil 
practice in problem-solving. Physics is shown as a human enterprise in which man 
grapples with the puzzling and unexpected. The reader of this preface is, unfor-
tunately, left hoping in vain for a brief treatment of Kuhn's 'puzzle-solving' or 
Popper's 'conjecture'. This omission leaves the reader with mixed impressions: 
the text seems to be instrumentalist with a science-and-society orientation. 
Text Q: Lambert: This author states that this book is full of questions, which 
encourage hard thought. Summaries are given at the end of chapters. No reference 
at all is made to any philosophical standpoint. The overall impression given is that 
science is nothing but problem-solving and formal logic. 
Text R: Harvard Project Physics: The declared three main aims of this course 
were: to design a humanistically orientated physics course; to attract more 
pupils to physics; to find out more about the factors affecting the learning of 
science. Instead of concentrating on isolated pieces of information, the focus 
is on ideas that characterise science at its best, and as a human activity. Hence 
it is presented in a historical and cultural way in this course. The authors clearly 
intend to give the student a feel for real science. 
Text S: CHEM Study: These authors state that they wish to show that chemistry 
affects our daily lives. A study of chemistry will not only help us to understand 
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our environment more fully, but also to show us how scientific inquiry works. The 
emphasis is on experimentation. Principles grow out of observations. By under-
standing principles, the need for memorisation of facts falls away. Active engage-
ment permits the student to some extent to become a scientist at school. The 
excitement of explaining unexpected observations will develop in the pupil a habit 
of questioning. This preface was helpful in providing a fairly well-balanced, 
up-to-date philosophy of science. 
Text T: PSSC Physics: This text aims to present physics not as a body of facts but 
as a continuing process by which men seek to understand the nature of the 
physical world. Concepts grow through exploration in the laboratory, and ana-
lysis of the text. Science is a very human thing. How we grasp and measure physical 
quantities, and how instruments are extensions of our senses, is explained. 
Direct experience is provided, and the use of the imagination is encouraged. 
The role and development of theory and models is described. In kinematics,pupils 
learn to predict. Thus armed, pupils can follow the extraordinary story of the 
discovery of universal gravitation, Newton's 'educated guess' with which he jumped 
from known laws of motion to the Law of Universal Gravitation. Models are 
discussed in areas where direct experimentation .becomes harder, for example, 
atoms and light. The reader of this preface is given a brief but comprehensive 
view of contemporary philosophy of science. 
Text U: The Nigerian Secondary Schools Science Project (Physics Books 1 to 
3) has about two pages of preface. The authors summarise the content of their 
textbook. The text serves as a laboratory book, thus providing a discussion of the 
"science that the experiments reveal". This is done by posing questions about the 
experiments. Activities should involve the pupil, arouse his curiosity, and help him 
acquire skills. Mathematical calculations are deliberately avoided, for the auth-
ors believe that "tedious arithmetical calculations disguised as physics prob-
lems do not help the young learner. It is preferable that the pupil should be able 
to give a conceptual explanation of a physical phenomenon". Apart from these 
general statements, the authors do not raise any questions about the philosophy of 
science. 
Text V: Kenyan School Science Project: The prefaces of this course emphasise 
that the concepts of science should be discovered by pupils. This means that 
students should he able to perform experiments, and analyse their observations 
and measurements. No explicit mention is made of philosophy. It appears that the 
authors assume that all observations are objective and that science leads to 
absolute truth. 
Text W: Jansen and Dekker's textbook summarise the aims of the "new" 1985 
South African General Science syllabus. These aims are that the pupil should 
acquire, among other things: ( 1) a knowledge of the facts of science; (2) skills in 
using materials and apparatus; (3) understanding of certain concepts; ( 4) an 
interest and satisfaction in the study of science. The authors then go on to say 
that science cannot be learnt from a book alone. Good science teaching is based 
on observation and experiment. Practical work is therfore important. The text 
includes a summary for systematic revision. It is clear from this preface that this 
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is a "skills-and-drills" type textbook, and that the authors' philosophy of science 
is empiricist. 
Discsussion of the Prefaces: 
Apart from the three American texts above, and the Teacher's Guide for SEP, all 
the others reflect a strong separation between observation and theory. Their 
implicit approach is inductivist-empiricist. Even PSSC Physics, while acknow-
ledging the limitations of scientific procedures and the importance of creativity, 
follows an inductivist line. It does not mention that observation is always done in 
the context of a pre-existing theory. Only SEP 8 does. 
Indeed, the lack of discussion of the processes of scientific inquiry or the philos-
ophy of science suggests that the authors are either unaware of the current 
issues in the philosophy of science (issues such as theory-ladenness of observa-
tion, facts are created rather than eternal truths uncovered, scientific realism 
versus Kuhnian relativism, etc), or are unconcerned about their effects. 
The prefaces generally reveal a strong commitment to traditional Baconian 
scientific method. Since this inductivist-empiricist approach has serious 
inherent philosophical weaknesses, I feel strongly that a brief discussion of its 
educational implications should be included in the preface of every high school 
physical science textbook. 
5.5.3 Results of the Metaphor Analysis 
A comparison of randomly selected pages of four of our textbooks reveals the 
following: 
The textbook Physical Science 8 by Brink and Jones contains many good explana-
tions. These explanations are of the type which give literal answers and reasons. 
For example, on page 103 we read: 
'The magnetic field caused by the magnet passes through the coil and 
cuts through the windings of the coil". 
This use of "field" is obviously intended in a literal sense. There is no metaphor 
here. On page 157, the authors use a comparison of a dartboard to illustrate 
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. They say: 
'To understand the uncertainty principle more clearly, look at the 
dartboard in Fig 13.1 It is obvious that when we look at the distribution 
(density) of holes on the board, that the dart has in the past struck the 
central portion more frequently than the outer area of the board. 
Should a person now prepare to throw at the board, we may with 
reasonable certainty predict that the dart will probably strike the 
board close to the centre, where the holes are more numerous." 
The metaphor is clear. A comparison is made between a dartboard and a 
probability-density diagram. The reader is, to a small extent only, invited to 
"look at". A degree of involvement is present, but it is small. The metaphor is 
comparative rather than interpretive, for the justification is given rather than 
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elicited. Nevertheless, there is a worthwhile attempt on the part of the authors to 
involve the reader. 
Comparing this with corresponding topics in Senior Physical Science 8 by Pienaar 
and Walters, we read on page 134: 'The induced current flows only while the 
magnetic field moves relative to the solenoid". In a way, "current" is a meta-
phor, but it is so widely used that it is usually meant literally, at least at high school 
level. Again, on page 206, we read: 
"In 1925, the Austrian Erwin Schrodinger, proposed a wave-mech-
anical model in which the moving electrons form a three-dimen-
sional wave (wave space) surrounding the nucleus of the atom." 
This sentence is completely literal and expository. There is absolutely no attempt 
to involve the reader by any kind of invitation to reason or link separate ideas. 
No metaphor whatever is present. 
Peter Warren's Physics Alive as well as Tom Duncan's GCSE Physics are purely 
expository. The information is presented as factual. There was no detectable 
use of metaphor. Explanations are factual. For example, in Duncan (p. 219): 
"Although it is still useful for some purposes, the Rutherford-
Bohr model has now been replaced by a mathematical model " 
And again ( on p. 109): 
'This is Newton's second law of motion. When using it two points 
should be noted. First, F is the resultant ( or unbalanced) force causing 
the acceleration a." 
There is no attempt to use metaphor. Indeed, both textbooks are highly in-
strumentalist, consisting largely of brief, literal descriptions, questions, rules, and 
calculations. The overall impression is one of bare-bones science, practical utility, 
suspended belief. 
In contrast, the Harvard Project Physics Course make abundant use of interpretive 
metaphors. In their Concepts of Motion there are many examples of the following 
style: 
" ... the disk fails to live up to our Aristotelian expectations. It is 
always surprising to see this for the first time." (Harvard, p. 75) 
'Take, for example, a tug-of-war. Suppose two teams were sitting on 
the deck of a barge that was drifting with uniform velocity down a lazy 
river. Two observers - one on the same barge and one on the shore -
would each give a report on the incident as viewed from his own frame 
of reference. The observer on the barge would observe that the forces 
on the rope were balanced and would report that it was at rest. The 
observer on the shore would report that the forces on the rope were 
balanced and that it was in uniform motion. Which observer is right? 
They are both right; Newton's first law of motion applies to both 
situations." ( p. 77) 
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"Now imagine for a moment a ridiculous but instructive thought experi-
ment: as you stand on the scale, the floor (which, sagging slightly, has 
been pushing up on the scale) suddenly gives way, and you and the scale 
are dropping into a deep well in free fall. At every instant, your fall 
speed and the scale's fall speed would be equal, since you started falling 
together and fall with the same acceleration. Your feet would now 
touch the scale only barely (if at all), and if you looked at the dial you 
would see that the scale registers zero. This does not mean you have 
lost weight - that could only happen if the earth suddenly disap-
peared, or if you were suddenly removed to far, interstellar space. No, 
Fg still acts on you as before, accelerating you downward, but 
since the scale is accelerating with you, you are no longer pushing 
on it - nor is it pushing on you." (p. 84) 
The Harvard textbook uses language which involves the reader ("imagine", "sup-
pose") and confronts him with anomalous situations, inviting him to construct his 
own interpretation. However, at the end, the textbook provides the 'right' answer 
in usual textbook fashion. But the approach and the use of metaphor is refreshing. 
The following is the set of results obtained from the metaphor search. 
Harvard Text and Handbook 1 (Concepts of Motion): 
"flood of information" (p.5) 
"light beams dart..." (p.9) 
"earth, our majestic spaceship ... " (p.9) 
"Material bodies have, so to speak, a stubborn streak." (p.77) 
'The proper language of nature is mathematics." (p.104) 
Harvard Text and Handbook 2 (The Triumph of Mechanics): 
On pages 71 to 73 we are told that theoretical models help make predictions which 
can be tested. By treating gas molecules as if they were tiny billiard balls, such 
a theory can lead to (1) explanations in terms of empirical laws (eg Boyle's Law), 
(2) prediction of new relationships (eg fluid friction), (3) calculation of the sizes 
and speeds of gas molecules. A theory is regarded as successful and useful if 
relevant models are consistent with it. A model is not valid for all phenomena and 
conditions. Therefore it is in the nature of models that they are tentative and 
subject to revision. On p.74: 
"In our model we visualise the gas as consisting of a large number of 
very ... "A theoretical model exists only in our imagination and 
helps us to understand the real world of experience. 
Harvard Text and Handbook 4 (Light and Electromagnetism): On pages 2 and 3 
there is a general discussion of metaphorical-type links between knowns and 
unknowns. For example, action at a distance is contrasted with direct contact. 
On p.35, "models" are discussed. A model is "a set of invented ideas which help 
us to describe and summarise what we can see happening." For example, the 
concept of charge or the rules of attraction and repulsion constitute a model. 
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On p.42 the metaphorical function of scientific language is discussed. Many terms 
in physics are really adaptations, with important changes, of commonly used 
words (eg. work, force, body). Because of these specialised meanings, bridges 
are needed. This idea is illustrated by discussing the concept "field" in terms of a 
football field as a region of interaction, or a sphere of influence in politics, or what 
happens to the brightness of a streetlamp when you walk towards it along a street. 
On p.53, we read: 'The obvious explanation is to imagine that the charges move ... " 
This is the only explicit reference to the current-as-river analogy. Yet it is good in 
that it conveys the idea of explanation in terms of imagination, albeit very 
briefly. 
On p.126, the progression.from models to more comprehensive theories, which 
goes well beyond models, is alluded to. Then follows a quotation from Richard 
Feynman on what a field might look like. 
" ... Disparity between common-sense ideas that develop from direct 
human experiences and the subtle mathematical abstractions de-
veloped to deal with effects that we cannot sense directly .... Yet these 
highly abstract theories do ultimately have to make sense when 
couched in ordinary language." 
For the consequences of such theories are subjected to concrete tests, and they 
have practical effects (eg the space programme, TV sets, microwave ovens), and 
they also contribute to our understanding. This excellent philosophical discus-
sion is what should be included somewhere in every textbook. 
Ha,vard Text and Handbook 5 (Models of the Atom): The whole book gives a fairly 
detailed account of the history of the development of the atomic model, but no 
specific treatment of "models" could be found. The notion of "model" is implicit. 
Pople: Explaining Physics: In general, the language is literal. The accepted meta-
phors (eg electric current as a water flow (p.239), the plum-pudding atomic 
model (p.357)) are assumed as understood. No explicit discussion of metaphors, or 
models, or theories, is given. The instrumentalist notion that a theory is a useful 
fiction is given on page 25: 
"It is sometimes useful to think of the Earth being surrounded by a 
gravitational field which exerts a force on any mass in it." 
Similarly, scientific realism as reference is implied in: 
"Atoms are far too small to be seen, but a great deal is now known 
about their structure. Much of the early information was gained by 
bombarding atoms with alpha particles." 
This is reminiscent of Hackings point that, if you can bombard them, they are real. 
PSSC Physics: While the introductory chapters, as well as the introductory para-
graphs of most chapters, display some metaphorical language, the main body 
of the text is purely literal. On page 2 we read an extended metaphor of the 
human tentativeness of scientific inquiry: 
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"So the subject grows. It is like a great building under construction, 
not a finished structure around which you have only to make a 
guided tour .... (It is) useful and beautiful. ... Once in a while, a finished 
room in this structure known as physics is found unsafe ... and the room 
is abandoned or rebuilt." 
"It (physics) fathers other sciences." ... ''The key tool of the physicist 
is his mind." (p.4) 
A model is "an idea, a picture, a system of concepts which creative 
intuition and hard work lead us to think describe the things we 
investigate." ( p.151) 
For example, "electron cloud" is more than what it might look like. It includes 
what happens in clouds, the turbulence, movements, etc. and is consistent with all 
our tests and conclusions. 
This textbook, while basically empiricist, contains a worthwhile account of the 
constructivist aspect of scientific knowledge. It is basically empiricist in the sense 
that its language is mostly literal, 'unobservables' are able to be observed by 
extending our senses through appropriate instrumentation, absolute truth 
eludes us at present only because of limitations in our measuring techniques. 
CHEM Study: On page 1 we read that experiment is "the mother of all certainty", 
and on page 2 that 
"the activities of science begin with observation. ... A controlled 
sequence of observations is called an experiment All science is built 
upon the results of experiments". 
This empiricist viewpoint is further substantiated by its almost complete use of 
literal language. This overall impression, gained from its lack of metaphorical 
language, is gained in spite of a fairly detailed treatment of the role of scientific 
method, explanation and models. 
As opposed to school textbooks, popular science books for the educated layman 
abound with metaphors. For example, Isaac Asimov's Guide to Science 1: The 
Physical Sciences contains the following examples among many of metaphorical 
language: 
''The higher the temperature, the faster they moved, the more 'elbow 
room' they required." (p.266) " 
" ... they (alpha particles) brushed aside this froth of light particles ... " 
(p.296) 
On the metaphor 'frame of reference': 
"One is tempted to ask which planet would really be foreshortened 
and doubled in mass, but the only possible answer is: that depends on 
the frame of reference. If you find that frustrating, consider that a man 
is small compared to a whale and large compared to a beetle. Is there 
any point in asking what a man is really, large or small?" (p. 378) 
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This is a good example of an interactive metaphor, designed to create an anomaly. 
In John Gribbin's In search of Schrodinger's cat we come across these metaphors, 
among many others: 
p.31: " ... Thomson's watermelon model" (A new one!) 
p.32: " ... retinue of electrons" 
p.70: 'The cloud of electrons provides the outward face of the atom" 
p.70: " ... the heart of the electron cloud ... " 
p.124:" ... even without understanding why the recipes work people are 
able to cook so efficiently with quanta." 
(Indeed this is a good metaphor for instrumentalism!) 
In Nigel Calder's Einsteins Universe: 
p.24: " ... the waves are crowded together." 
p.30: "Matter is frozen energy." This is a breathtakingly simple idea, 
yet it stops one in one's tracks while reading the text. 
p.64: In free fall "there exists for him during his fall no gravitational 
field." 
Perhaps the gravitational field does exist, but he does not experience its effect as 
weight. It does not exist for him. The anomalous nature of this statement 
makes it highly interactive with the reader. 
p.76: "Picture now a little particle of light ... " The reader is involved. 
There is no doubt that such popular science books for the layman gain much from 
a warmer, more human, metaphorical approach. They interact with the reader 
through their textual content. However, what they gain in interaction (and perhaps 
constructivism through metaphor), they frequently tend to lose through loss of 
precision. They lack precision particularly in their deliberate avoidance of 
any mathematical treatment. However, this is precisely where the school science 
textbook exercises its interactive aspect: through calculations and questions at 
chapter ends. 
To summarise this point: school science textbooks are constructivist insofar as 
they are instrumentalist, whereas ordinary popular science books are construc-
tivist through their use of metaphorical language. The ideal would be to combine 
both approaches in one textbook, much as Harvard has attempted to do. But the 
two chief disadvantages would perhaps be cost, and too much for the average high 
school pupil to read. Perhaps a reason why Harvard Project physics has not been as 
popular as it should have been is that there is simply too much reading material 
there. Too many students are unfortunately chiefly concerned with the very 
instrumental aim of passing a final examination. For them, the more condensed 
the textbook, the better. 
It seems that there is a definite trend towards bare "skills and drills" type textbooks 
both in Britain and in South Africa. The South African and African textbooks 
almost lack any attempt to use metaphorical language: literal language is 
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preferred. Even the accepted metaphors of science ( eg current, field) are not 
explained or compared with the basic idea. 
5.6 General discussion and conclusion 
Both the quantitative and the qualitative results obtained in this study are consistent 
with the hypothesis made at the start, namely, that school science textbooks have 
a definite leaning towards empiricism and instrumentalism. 
PSSC Physics and CHEM Study are strongly empiricist (Herron 1971). Selley 
(1981 and 1989) pointed out that the earlier Nuffield textbooks were discovery-
orientated, but lacked any philosophical discussion. However, the recently pub-
lished Nu/field Science 11-13 (Lyth, 1986, pp. 11, 12, 26) shows "considerably 
greater sophistication and breadth in its treatment of philosophical matters". 
(Selley 1989, 27) 
The quantitative analyses suggest that SEP 8 and Harvard Physics have the 
highest overall Level of Involvement, both in practical laboratory work and in 
reader-interaction in the text itself (Table 5.19). That SEP 8 takes first place comes 
as no surprise, not only because it is not a textbook as such but a practical work-
book, but also because of the soundly thought-out philosophy revealed in its 
Teacher's Guide. It is therefore in a class of its own in relation to all the other 
textbooks examined in this study. Harvard Physics, as a textbook, stands head and 
shoulders above the other textbooks as far as its treatment of the history and 
philosophy of science is concerned. 
It was a surprise to see Broster & James 8 and Duncan GCSE Physics in 3rd and 
4th place respectively. My initial cursory reading of both of these would have 
placed them below Brink & Jones 8. However, they obviously earn their place 
because of their emphasis on questions, particularly questions at the end of 
chapters. Both are very attractive textbooks, but their philosophy of science 
seems more empiricist and instrumentalist than does that of Brink & Jones 8. 
From this paradox I can only conclude that a textbook may be highly instrumen-
talist and also have a high level of involvement. In other words, a highly 
instrumentalist textbook may promote a high degree of constructivism. Thus it 
would seem that there is indeed some truth in Selley's ( 1989) point that 
instrumentalism may be a good and useful way of leading to constructivism. The 
results of Table 5.5 also corroborate this adjustment of my view in which in-
strumentalism was opposed to constructivism. 
The final unified summary of instrumentalism (Table 5.19) shows SEP 8 and 
Harvard Physics as the least instrumentalist. Of the South African textbooks, Brink 
& Jones 8 portrays the best, most up-to-date philosophical standpoint. It is far 
from perfect philosophically, but it is more well-rounded than the others. 
Duncan GCSE Physics turns out to be the most instrumentalist, an impression I 
also gained from a cover-to-cover reading. It is generally representative of all the 
other British textbooks examined. British textbooks still seem to be saturated 
with the heritage of British Empiricism. 
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However, it should be pointed out that it is a little unfair to compare general British 
textbooks with three undoubtedly 'special' United States textbooks, namely, PSSC 
Physics, Harvard Project Physics, and CHEM Study. One suspects that many 'normal' 
United States school science textbooks are just as instrumental as Duncan's GCSE 
Physics. 
Taking the results of all the Textual Analyses together, as well as the readings of 
specific topics and Prefaces, it seems that the dominant image of science port-
rayed in all the British and South African textbooks examined is strongly induc-
tivist-empiricist and instrumentalist. 
The qualitative research shows that, in these books, there is a sharp distinction 
between observation and theory. Observation is perceived to take place prior 
to theory, and done in an objective, impersonal way. The impression is given that 
any observation yields a unique result, and that multiple interpretations are out 
of the question. Alternative conceptions are not acknowledged in any way. This 
separation of observation from theory is the chief characteristic of a positivist 
approach, and the main attribute of inducth'ist-empiricism and instrumen-
talism. 
There is also ample evidence from direct reading of the texts that calculations are 
of the plug-in, recipe-like type, leading deductively to a solution that is isolated 
from the real world. Such rote, mechanical calculations may easily become mere 
computative devices for prediction and control; nothing but 'puzzle-solving'; in a 
way, only games. This procedure is characteristic of instrumentalism. 
Also characteristic of instrumentalism is the abundant use of definitions in the 
textbooks. Analysis revealed the existence of a number of operational and 
nominalistic definitions. As discussed above, such definitions may be only con-
venient shorthand for complex terms, that is, names for a procedure. They may 
have little interest in the real objects. 
An interesting by-product of the study is that there may he a link between in-
strumentalism and constructivism. The possibility of using an instrumental-
ist approach in collaboration with a critical realist approach in order to promote 
constructivism will be explored in the next chapter. 
Conclusion: 
There are clear signs of a mild but widespread instrumentalism as well as 
a strong underlying empiricism in the selected British, South African, African 
and American high school physical science textbooks examined. The British 
textbooks contain an even stronger emphasis on an instrumentalist attitude 
than the South African. The three American textbooks examined, while not 
nearly as instrumentalist as the British and South African textbooks, nevertheless 
do show signs of it. 
The most important finding as far as this present study is concerned is that there 
1s a definite trend towards empiricism and instrumentalism in recent 
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textbooks, especially those designed specifically for educationally disadvantaged 
students. The implications of this will be discussed in the next chapter. 
This conclusion corroborates the hypothesis made at the start of this study. 
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Chapter 6 
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
From the kind of textbook presentation revealed in Chapter 5, the pupil could 
perhaps perceive science as essentialy a method for verifying facts already known. 
He might obtain a view of science as being completely objective and unimaginative. 
And he could possibly regard science as a convenient tool for predicting and 
calculating in a rote fashion, with little relevance to real life. 
However, it is difficult to see how any textbook can be written in any but an 
inductivist-empiricist, instrumentalist way. The very aim of a textbook is to be a 
condensation of the current state of scientific knowledge. It is a reference book, 
and so must of necessity contain a large proportion of facts. Kuhn (1970, p.188) 
believes that one of the primary tasks of textbooks is to introduce the future scientist 
into the scientific community by means of exemplars (that is, typical problems and 
solutions agreed upon by the scientific community). The student needs to act on 
such problems, in order to get a feel for science. 
Similarly, Ravetz ( 1971) acknowledges that, while a textbook is a caricature of real 
science, it is necessary for condensation and standardisation to occur. As desirable 
as it may be for every pupil to discover every scientific law for himself, it would be 
absurd to expect this. There is simply not enough time in the few years of high 
school. Ravetz (1971, p.200) says that standardisation 
" .. .is quite necessary, if the fact is to be useful to those who lack the time, 
skill or inclination to master the elaborate theoretical context..." 
Something is inevitably lost in this process. School science textbooks, in particular, 
are "standardisations of standardisations", according to Ravetz. Vulgarisation of 
science can easily occur in schools, where many teachers - and particularly in the 
Third World - are not science specialists and lack sufficient training in physics and 
chemistry. 
''These inherent limitations of the schoolteaching situation, along with 
its function of imparting basic craft skills rather than 'understanding', 
must be recognised if there is to be any fundamental improvement in 
its quality." (Ravetz 1971, p.207) 
To write a good textbook requires a special skill. Ravetz makes a plea for the 
inclusion of historical case studies in textbooks in order to humanise them a little 
and give a more correct notion of scientific inquiry. However, cost factors unfortu-
nately impose a severe limitation on this. 
In the end, therefore, it seems that textbooks cannot be otherwise than largely 
inductivist, empiricist and instrumentalist. So the responsibility rests squarely on 
the teacher to counteract the philosophical disadvantages of these. Hence the 
teacher must be aware of the dangers involved. For this reason, I believe that all 
authors should, at the very least, provide some guidance in their preface. This is 
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often especially desirable in Third World countries where teachers lack the required 
training in science and rely particularly heavily on the textbook. This study there-
fore recommends that all physical science textbooks should include in their preface 
a short summary of the danger~ of instrumentalism. 
6.2 Gathering the threads 
In Chapter 2, the characteristics and philosophical implications of instrumentalism 
were examined. The following main points emerged: 
( 1) Weak instrumentalism reserves judgement on the real existence of 
theoretical entities ( eg electrons), but works with them as if they exist. 
(2) It is more interested in operational definitions and rules for predicting, and 
internal self-consistency. 
(3) It does not take the implications of scientific theories seriously, regarding 
them only as useful fictions, easily discardable. The instrumentalist 
identifies theories and models. 
( 4) It is not truly informative about the world because, by confining itself to 
only sensory experience, it is too cautious. It does not yield novel facts. 
(5) Its limited view is inclined to lead it towards an inward-looking attitude, 
resulting in scepticism, idealism, and pragmatism. 
(6) Because it does not take its theories seriously, the scientific enterprise may 
be regarded as a game. 
(7) Instrumentalism is a form of pragmatism. Truth is usefulness and 
convenience, that is, what works. Thus it is relativist. 
(8) Instrumentalism and constructivism are both forms of pragmatism. Both 
have low regard for the role of scientific theory, and therefore may discard 
old theories in an uncritical way. Uncritical constructivism may lead to an 
instrumentalist approach. But a severely critical constructivism may lead 
to a full-blooded realism. 
Chapter 3 explored in more detail the relationship between constructivism, in-
strumentalism and realism. A major concern was the premise that both construc-
tivism and instrumentalism are relativist and subjective. That is, they are both 
anti-realist. A survey of the philosophical and psychological underpinnings of 
constructivism and scientific realism revealed that: 
(1) The problem about subjectivity arises only because of the prevailing 
empiricist attitude which still pervades science today. By over-emphasising 
sensory experience, objectivity is seen as an impersonal view of an external 
natural world which exists 'out there' independently of the mind. Reality, 
according to this view, is 'already out there now'. In fact, reality is what we 
make of the world. Reality is an intellectual construct, soundly rooted in the 
world out there, and ratified by the severe and constant criticism of the 
scientific community. Likewise, the objectivity of our personal knowledge is 
guaranteed by the constant and severe critical attitude of the community. 
Hence objectivity is the result of authentic subjectivity. So, by revising our 
notion of subjectivity and objectivity in terms of contemporary philosophy 
and psychology, we have returned to a more well-rounded notion of reality. 
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(2) This critical realist approach has an important corollary relevant to this 
study, namely, that theory is part of reality. There are degrees of reality. 
All scientific knowledge, like any human knowledge, is theory-laden. 
(3) Constructivism deals with comparison of rival theories. Choice of the best 
theory depends on the decision of the community. Constructivism is 
therefore relativist, but this is counteracted by its revised objectivity. 
( 4) Piagetian (but not Deweyan) constructivism accepts the 'degrees ofreality' 
idea. Further, and more important, it regards theories as structures, and not 
as functional events or passing interactions, as instrumentalists do. 
(5) Critical realism ( especially that of Bernard Lonergan) offers an acceptable 
solution to the problems of relativism, subjectivity, and anti-realism inherent 
in the constructivist and instrumentalist approaches to scientific knowledge. 
The quantitative and qualitative results of the textbook study, described in Chapters 
4 and 5, are consistent with the hypothesis that high school physical science tex-
tbooks have a strong bias towards empiricism and instrumentalism. Although the 
literal wording has a realist import, most of the textbooks may be read from an 
instrumentalist point of view, as mentioned earlier by Jacoby and Spargo (1989, 
p.47; refer Appendix F) and Selley (1989, p.29). Further, it seems that, during the 
latter half of the 1980's, there has been a growing trend towards a greater degree 
of instrumentalism in British and South African textbooks. This accords with 
Selley's contention that there is a growing non-participatory transmission style in 
science textbooks, in which it is implied that the information in the textbook is simply 
the truth, as far as it is known. (Selley 1989, p.29) 
Putting all this together, we obtain the following synopsis: 
(a) Our textbooks are largely instrumentalist. 
(b) Instrumentalism has advantages (it is successful), but also has disadvantages 
(unsound implications). 
( c) Critical constructivism may help overcome the weaknesses of 
instrumentalism. 
( d) Critical realism may be the means as well as the end of this process. 
6.3 Possible strategies to promote critical realism 
Science education, especially as presented in textbooks, is heavily biased towards 
empiricism. It over-emphasises sensory experience. It needs to be broadened to 
include other cognitive activities, such as understanding,judging, imagining, and so 
on. The following contains some practical suggestions on how to promote critical 
realism in science education, particularly through textbooks. 
6.3.1 Theory and model-building activities 
School science textbooks should pay far more attention, not only to an explicit 
account of the role of scientific theory, but also to ways of actively eliciting theory-
building in pupils. A clear distinction should be drawn between models and 
theories. For the critical realist sees models as introductory phases on the way 
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towards theories. Theories are not the same as models, as some instrumentalist 
textbooks suggest. Theories are far more comprehensive than models. 
What kind of reality status do models have? This is a question which must be 
addressed in textbooks, even if very briefly. In most textbooks, reality status is 
attributed to such defined quantities as density, electrical resistance, specific heat 
capacity, force, and kinetic energy. Selley (1989) suggests that students should be 
invited to question whether something, like Centre of Gravity, is real, and be asked 
by what means they might test its reality. This would help students to be aware of 
the instrumentalist attitude, where theories can be arbitrarily changed with minimal 
regard for critical testing. As Selley (1989, p.29) points out: 
" ... the more reflective reader must become aware that at least a number 
of these theoretical terms, ideas, and procedures are human inventions, 
devised for convenience. This entails the recognition that any part of 
the body of theory could be changed, not necessarily through refutation 
by newly discovered phenomena, but simply because some new theore-
tical statement comes to be accepted as working better." 
Selley maintains that this instrumentalist attitude could be developed into a philos-
ophical view which he sees as at least as comprehensible as inductivist convergent 
realism. He suggests that critical realism is the way to do this: 
"By abandoning the untenable distinction between observed and the-
oretical entities, and by at the same time denying any one-to-one 
reference to an external world, we arrive at critical realism, in which 
all concepts are regarded as constructed, though constrained by empiri-
cal data obtained by human interaction with the natural world. All 
scientific knowledge - indeed all knowledge - is to be regarded as a set 
of more or less well-established models: not only is the electron a 
constructed model, but so is the television picture which it produces." 
(Selley 1989, p.29) 
According to Hodson (1985), it is quite common to have, in school science, a realist 
theory (for explanation) and an instrumentalist model (for prediction) for the same 
phenomenon. Also, it is sometimes found that school science has alternative, 
conflicting instrumental models for different aspects of the same phenomena ( eg. 
wave and particle models of light). What is confusing to children (says Hodson) is 
that the role and status of theories and models are not defined. In order to avoid 
an excessively instrumentalist view without falling into the trap of naive realism, 
Hodson proposes that theory in school science should pass through several stages: 
( 1) Tentative introduction as a model. 
(2) A search for evidence through observation and experiment. 
(3) Further elaboration of the model into a theory. 
( 4) Acceptance of the theory into the body of scientific knowledge. 
(5) Use of the sophisticated theory to explain phenomena. 
( 6) Testing of the theory's predictions and applications of the theory in new 
situations. 
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I interpret this strategy of Hodson as follows: As confidence in a particular model 
grows, it increasingly takes on the status of a fact, that is, an object of scientific 
inquiry in itself. For example, at junior high school level, the pupil may be sceptical 
about the particle nature of matter. (He may have heard about it, by watching TV 
programmes about atoms, and so on. But his out-of-school concept may be at 
variance with the scientifically accepted view.) Having performed several simple 
practical activities, such as diffusion of ammonia and hydrochloric acid in a closed 
glass tube, the pupil builds a tentative model. Being doubtful, this model is usually 
in theory-free terms. That is, the pupil says "I see a white cloud forming near the 
middle of the tube". Only after many such illustrations will the pupil's confidence 
in the idea of particles grow, and he can talk about "particles moving". Eventually 
he can use this particle model to explain why calcite cleaves so neatly. As the 
curriculum progresses, the pupil will be introduced to atomic theory. And so theory 
grows and develops, and his observation language takes on a higher status. He talks 
about atoms as if they exist. No doubt, the notion of their real ontological existence 
follows very closely. 
Similarly, the theory of elecricity develops something like this. In junior high school, 
the concept of electric charge is introduced, and through various simple practical 
illustrations, a model is constructed to explain flow of charge ( electric current). In 
later years, experiments with the simple electric circuit demand the construction of 
a model for resistance. At first, resistance is seen simply as the opposition to current. 
As resistance increases, current strength decreases. This is a simple model to 
predict what happens if another resistor is connected in series with the first. Then, 
the following year, resistance is defined operationally as the ratio of potential 
difference to current (R = V /I), and is used instrumentally. This is a more 
sophisticated model. In the final year of the science curriculum, the notion of 
resistance is analysed in terms of atomic theory, that is, the movement of electrons 
between the atoms of the conductor. This may be done by a thought- experiment 
or analogy (a person trying to push his way through a crowd). This third model of 
resistance is far more sophisticated, and its value lies in its explanatory power, and 
in its consistency with electrical theory as a whole, as well as with a wider scientific 
theory, namely, atomic theory. This is not only intellectually far more satisfying than 
instrumental models, but it will, in my view, lead to the notion of real existence of 
the theoretical entities concerned. 
My own view, therefore, concurs with those of Selley and Hodson. The instrumen-
tal ism present in our textbooks must be used to our advantage. Wherever possible, 
the constructivist nature of certain concepts should be highlighted, as well as the 
notion that we choose between rival theories. However, the aim should not be to 
encourage an instrumentalist attitude per se, but rather to use instrumentalism to 
reach a critical realism. Jnstrumentalism in textbooks, together with a constructivist 
approach, and restrained by both the critical community and a sound empirical base, 
should lead to critical realism. By a feedback process, a growing critical realist 
attitude will encourage a constructivist approach. 
It is vitally important to emphasise the critical attitude and the social aspect of 
model-building. In other words, if a constructivist approach is adopted in order to 
encourage the 'proliferation of theories', it is important to emphasise to the pupil 
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that this should be done critically and tested against the physical world. A full-
blooded critical realism involves a proper perspective of the notion of objectivity. 
Therefore pupils should not read in their textbooks that any part of a theory could 
be changed, not necessarily through refutation by newly discovered phenomena, but 
simply because another theory works better. We must retain the empirical base. 
If textbooks were to adopt a critical realist position, it would assist in closing the gap 
between the student's common-sense beliefs and scientific knowledge. It would 
make feasible a science curriculum designed to develop the student's personal 
exploratory model gradually, through clarification, comparison with data, and evalu-
ation against suggested improvements. This would be a radical shift from the 
present transmission mode, which ignores the student's out-of-school under-
standing of the subject. 
However, this must be done with care, for two reasons. Firstly, it would be disastrous 
to undermine a child's confidence in his thought processes before they are fully 
capable of handling such tenuous questions. Secondly, if a textbook author adopts 
a constructivist approach in one section of the book, it should be sustained in 
subsequent sections. For example, consider a textbook inviting pupils to make a 
guess in order to explain their observations in Brownian motion, and saying that 
scientists can never be sure about their guesses about atoms. But by the next 
chapter, atoms and their motions are regarded as real. The original doubts are 
forgotten, because now we need to use the model to explain other observations. Is 
the student to infer, therefore, that atoms really exist? Not quite, says Selley. He is 
meant to accept their existence for the sake of the argument. He is asked to suspend 
his judgement. For it is not helpful to raise questions about real existence at this 
point. This approach is instrumentalist. 
On the one hand, this is a good tactic, for it leaves the pupil to get on with the science. 
Yet on the other, says Selley, it leaves the pupil in an awkward predicament, for 
when the detailed structure of matter is under discussion, the tentative nature of the 
basic model becomes an encumbrance, and dogmatic assertions begin to clash with 
make-believe. 
The question arises whether this is indeed a problem for the pupil. In my experience 
most pupils are naive realists, and would accept the reality of atoms without 
question. And surely any attempt to make guesses ( conjectures) and then to decide 
which is the be~t ( comparison of rival theories) must be put to two tests: one to test 
the consequences of the guess, and the other to obtain the ratification of the 
scientific community. In this case, the latter is the textbook author. In other words, 
while maintaining a critical attitude, there are times, perhaps many, when the pupil 
must rely on the authority of the teacher ( or textbook author). After all, there is a 
'hard core' of scientific knowledge. The pupil must be shown that there is no way 
that he can find out about the whole of scientific knowledge on his own. As Popper 
said, we can never make a fresh start. We build on what has gone before. 
So the problem is not to try to get the pupil to accept the reality of atoms, but rather 
to try to bring him to the notion that they are intellectually constructed entities. 
Perhaps, as Selley suggests, textbooks ought to distinguish between their presenta-
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tion of theoretical (inferred) entities and that of conventions and constructs. On 
the other hand, an explicit treatment of theoretical entities might do more harm 
than good to an immature mind. It might be counterproductive to teach a pupil the 
'Particle Model of Matter ' or 'Atomic Theory ', and then proceed to undermine the 
foundations by saying that electrons are 'only' intellectual constructs. The way for 
textbooks to treat this, in my view, is to offer material of theory-building simulations 
which require the active involvement of the reader. 
Something which I have successfully used in class, which a textbook might include 
is as follows: 
A model-building exercise: Rutherford's Scattering Experiment 
The square in figure A below represents a piece of stiff cardboard or masonite, 
about 500 mm x 500 mm. It is placed on a smooth floor, and supported at each 
corner so that it lies horizontally about 50 mm above the floor. 
You are told that there is a solid object hidden under the cardboard, and that 
you want to find out its shape without looking. All you are allowed to do is roll 
the marbles along the floor (ABCDEF) and watch the way they emerge after 
colliding with the hidden object (A'B'C'D'E'F'). From the pattern of emerging 
marbles, you can guess the shape of the object. 
Determine the shape of the object under the cardboard in Figure A below: 
A 
B B ' 







Make a guess ahout the ohject. 
What is its shape? 
Are you sure? 
Is this the only explanation? 
A' 
F' 
How could you find out if there is more than one possible answer? 
One possible way to find out more about the object's shape is to roll the marbles 
from another direction. Suppose we roll them as shown in Figure B, and obtain 
the pattern shown below. 
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II 11 II 






Has your theory about the shape of the object changed? 
What shape do you now think it is ? 
Is this your final answer, or could there still be another possible shape there? 
Look what you have done. You came to the problem with the knowledge that 
under the cardboard was a solid object of unknown shape, and that marbles 
would bounce off it. So, before you started, you had a simple idea or theory. 
After the first experiment, a picture began to form. Perhaps you guessed that 
the object was square. If you were content to stop experimenting further, that 
theory would have remained in your mind. 
But after the next experiment, you might have been surprised to see the resulting 
pattern. Your theory that it was a square was demolished ! Yet you could not 
ignore the results of the first experiment. Indeed, you had to adjust your theory 
to fit the new evidence. You had to choose the better theory. 
Each theory you invented added a little more to the picture building up in your 
mind. Each theory was only a mental picture that you constructed. That is, the 
object was 'only' a theory for you. But what a powerful thing a theory is! It was 
almost as if you began to know exactly what was hidden under that cardboard. 
Of course, there is still much you do not know about the object (for example, 
its mass, or colour, or whether it is iron or copper). Perhaps you can think up 
ways of finding this out, without looking under the cardboard. 
As you gather more information, the theory you are building up about the object 
will grow and develop, and the object will seem to become more and more real 
to you. Eventually your confidence in your theory will be so great that you might 
talk about it as if you had actually seen the object. You might say 'There is a 
rectangular, copper block there" and not just 'There is a solid object there". 
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Remember, theories are inventions you make up in your mind about what you 
think is going on in the world. Theories grow and change, until you trust them 
so well that you know they actually exist the way you think. Have you ever heard 
somebody say about scientific theories: "Oh well, you don't have to believe it. 
It's only a theory." Beware! That object under the cardboard is only a theory! 
But you would certainly hurt your foot if you had accidentally kicked it! The-
ories are real! 
It is very important, when trying to lead children to a critical realism, to emphasise 
and reinforce the positive aspects of theory-construction, that is, confidence in one's 
cognitive faculties, and trust in one's corroborated theories. Avoid any reference 
to relativism or subjectivity. Of course, to obtain the greatest benefit from the above 
exercise, it should be done in groups, so that the pupil can experience the criticisms 
and discussions of the social group around him. 
6.3.2 Practicals, laboratory inquiries, experiments 
The way most current textbooks deal with laboratory practical work causes some 
confusion in the mind of the pupil. They tend to call such pupil-performed practical 
activities 'experiments'. These are rarely hypothesis-testing procedures at all. 
Rather they are demonstrations of the 'see-for-yourself' type. Although there is a 
place for these, perhaps it would be more honest to drop the pretence that they are 
'experiments', and leave the term 'experiment' only to describe a few student 
investigations which are truly open-ended hypothesis-testing procedures. I believe, 
with Selley, that the major purpose of practical work is not to prove or test any 
propositions, but to give operational definitions to the concepts involved, that is, to 
clarify the meaning of the theoretical terms involved. As mentioned before, it is 
tempting to regard this as a naive realist stance on the part of the author. However, 
as Selley rightly states, it is possible to read into school science an instrumentalist 
interpretation. 
According to Hodson (1989), children ought to know the role played by experiments 
in science. We should therefore take active steps to avoid reinforcing several 
prevalent myths about experiments. Such myths include the idea that all science 
results from experiment; that experimentation is completely objective; and that 
theory is built up from experiments. Such myths should, in my view, be pointed out 
explicitly in every school science textbook. 
Textbooks should inform pupils that all experiments are conducted within some sort 
of theoretical framework, be it weak or strong. But it should be pointed out that 
many major theoretical advances in science did not arise from experimentation. 
Science does not always use experiments. For example, in astronomy, meteorology 
and geology, much theory-creating work is done through computer simulations and 
modelling, rather than by direct experimentation. 
A note should be provided in the textbooks for teachers (and perhaps also for 
students) to the effect that observation is never objective. Observation is loaded 
with prior theory. Otherwise the prevalent view that observation has priority will be 
strengthened, and the generation of theory will be seen as a process of looking for 
regularities and patterns by making simple guesses. The type of approach taken in 
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the textbooks reviewed in this study suggests that children can refute a major theory 
by means of a single experiment. No theory can be refuted by a single experiment. 
The decision to judge between competing theories is a complex one. Pupils should 
be made aware of this. 
Pupils could be exposed to activities designed to make them aware of the unrelia-
bility and theory-dependency of observations. This may be done using optical 
illusions, and can be great fun for pupils. Indeed, for most pupils, it is simply of great 
interest, but brighter pupils recognise the relevance to scientific inquiry. However, 
it must be done with care, and not overemphasised, for it must not result in loss of 
confidence in one's cognitive faculties. It could then be counterproductive. 
As Hodson (1989, p.57) rightly observes, children should be encouraged to regard 
theory and experiment as being inter-dependent: experiments assist theory build-
ing; and theory, in turn, determines the kind of experiments that should be carried 
out. In theory construction, experimentation has a two-fold significance. Firstly, in 
testing the empirical adequacy of the developing theory and providing retrospective 
evidence for theoretical propositions. Secondly, in guiding the continued develop-
ment of theory towards coherence and completeness. For example, says Hodson, 
experiments assist the refinement of concepts and the quantification of conceptual 
relationships, and establish the limits of applicability of a theory. Thus, experiment 
is seen to be an integral part of the decision-making of theory construction. In turn, 
theory has a two-fold role in experimentation. First, in the generation of questions 
to be investigated and problems that require theoretical elucidation and explana-
tion. Second, as a guiding factor in the precise design of experiments to answer 
those questions and solve those problems. This holistic, interactive view of the 
experiment-theory relationship provides a fruitful model for concept development 
in individuals. 
Textbooks help sustain the myth that the path in science from experiment to theory 
is linear, simple and clear-cut. Hodson suggests that part of learning about science 
should involve reading actual accounts of experiments. 
6.3.3 Instrumentalism and realism in school science 
In order to bring about a proper understanding of science, it is necessary that the 
role of theory he made apparent to school pupils. That role is essentially to explain 
phenomena. Merely to learn theory without examining how it works is little better 
than rote memorisation. This is why I advocate the use of such exercises as the one 
presented in section 6.3.1 above (Rutherford's Scattering Simulation) when dealing 
with Atomic Theory. 
In school science, unfortunately, theories are often represented as simple state-
ments open to straightforward tests based on observation. A more appropriate and 
philosophically sounder view is that they are imaginative guesses which stand or 
fall on their ability to explain and predict, without being dependent on any single 
observation. In practice, theories are seldom, if ever, refuted by a single anomalous 
observation or experiment. It is only when these anomalies are long-standing, 
socially significant, and strike at the fundamental assumptions of the theory that the 
theory comes under threat of falsification. 
172 
Pupils should also recognise that theories grow and develop in order better to 
accommodate observational evidence. This process of growth and development 
should be recognised in the science curriculum and in textbooks. In teaching 
science, therefore (says Hodson), the degree of theoretical sophistication at any 
particular stage should be determined by the capacity of the theory to explain 
phenomena the learners will encounter. It need not go beyond. Do not introduce 
a theory until the phenomena that the pupil is dealing with demands it. Thus, year 
by year during the school science curriculum, theories will grow and develop, 
perhaps along similar lines to their historical development. 
The process does not end here, for it is imperative to show to the pupil the social 
aspect of theory growth. Science, says Hodson (1985), proceeds in three distinct 
phases: creation, validation, and the incorporation into the body of knowledge. 
Scientific knowledge is the result of a complex social activity. The work of an 
individual must withstand the criticism of his fellow practitioners. The criteria of 
truth and objectivity are derived from the validation by the scientific community. 
In this way, the community of scientists exerts "quality control" over the activities of 
individual scientists. This is usually done in practice by free discussion and creative 
criticism in the 'private language' of individual scientists. When this work is 
presented in written form, in journal papers, it becomes 'public science', and is again 
subjected to ruthless testing and criticism. Eventually, this public knowledge 
becomes incorprated in condensed form in textbooks. 
I agree with Hodson that the pupil should be explicitly told about these phases. Also, 
it should be implicit in textbooks, in the form of problem-solving exercises. Such 
exercises (as, for example, given in 6.3.1 above) will expose the pupil to (i) hypo-
thesis generation (by creative speculation), (ii) hypothesis testing (by critical ex-
perimentation), and by (iii) the social processes of acceptance and recording of 
scientific knowledge. In this way, many of the problems of mismatch between school 
science, real science, and the philosophy of science, would be minimised. 
Our science textbooks tend to emphasise the acquisition and understanding of 
concepts and theories and the methods and processes of science. Relatively little 
attention is given to individual phases of scientific creativity (hypothesis generation, 
experimental design etc.), and even less to the community phase of criticism, 
validation and the achievement of concensus. According to Hodson, in order to 
ohtain a philosophically more valid approach to science, textbooks should take 
account of the following activities: 
( 1) The exploration of children's existing views, contemporary scientific views, 
and new theories of science education. 
(2) Experimental work, using procedures accepted and validated by the 
scientific community to test the adequacy of various alternative theories. 
(3) Recording and reporting of findings and ideas, using language styles 
approved by the community and the achievement of consensus by discussion 
and criticism. 
It is the first and third of these activities which are neglected in school. Fortunately, 
there is rapidly growing research into children's alternative views of science. Thus 
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the first neglect is being addressed. But the third needs to be emphasised. It should 
be a goal of science education that children are brought to an awareness that science 
is pre-eminently a social activity. Children must be made aware that, for theories 
to be accepted as valid scientific knowledge, they must be recognised and approved 
by the scientific community. If this procedure is followed in the classroom, children 
will not perceive the scientist as dispassionate, unbiassed and independent, with 
little or no interest in ethical or social concerns. Rather they will begin to see that 
science is a very human activity. 
Further, they will get rid of the commonly-accepted notion that reality is 'the world 
already out there' and objectivity as a subject-free view of the world out there. They 
will (hopefully) gradually evolve from an instrumentalist approach to a full-blooded, 
critical realist view. This may take years, and may only be fully achieved after school. 
Perhaps the naive realist stage of childhood must evolve, through an instrumentalist 
approach, to a fuller realism in which there is a growing awareness that reality is 
constructed, and is not already out there. As this notion matures, it will be seen that 
relativism is avoided by the critical, open-minded attitude. The objectivity of 
science is ensured, not by requiring individuals to be free from personal preferences 
or interests, but by insisting that hypotheses be open to experimental testing and are 
made available for testing by fellow practitioners. This, as Hodson rightly points 
out, is a far more appropriate and realistic view of scientific open-mindedness than 
the traditional inductivist view that scientists have no pre-existing theoretical views 
or expectations. 
6.3.4 Recommendations for textbooks 
Historical case studies, the reading of actual experiments done by scientists, as well 
as explicit discussions of the role of theory as seen by realists or instrumentalists, 
might be useful in helping children to be more aware of the contemporary view of 
science. 
For this reason, a few examples have been assembled which are the sort of material 
I believe textbooks should contain in order to attempt to portray a more correct 
view of the nature of scientific theory. Using theory as a starting point, this approach 
may hopefully lead to a better notion of the nature of science and scientific method 
in general. Finally, perhaps children may be led, through such readings, to a richer, 
more full-blooded type of realism. 
The textbook material presented below consists of: 
( 1) Two or three (not more) good case studies, such as the phlogiston theory of heat, 
to be included in an appendix in every textbook. This would not take up much space 
in the textbook, and each need not require more than one lesson. Suggestions are 
provided in 6.4 below. 
(2) A short journal article, suitably edited to reduce conceptual and linguistic 
complexity, should be presented in every textbook. An example is given in 6.5 
below. 
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(3) Every textbook should contain, in a preface or introduction, a short treatment 
of the now out-dated traditional view of scientific theory and scientific method, 
followed by the contemporary view. A possible outline is provided in 6.6 below. 
This preface should also briefly discuss the instrumentalist versus the realist views 
of theory, and the constructivist nature of scientific knowledge. The important role 
of theory must be emphasised. Perhaps the critical realist view of science may be 
raised. (Seethe example in 6.6 below). 
( 4) Several "compulsory" enrichment readings should be encouraged. Popular 
books or articles dealing with the personal accounts of the work of particular 
scientists should be read. For example: 
The Double Helix by J.D. Watson (1970) 
The Sleepwalkers (perhaps only the part called 'The Watershed') by A. Koestler 
(1959) 
Lucy: the Beginnings of Humankind by D.C. Johanson and M.A. Edey (1981) 
The Voyage of the Beagle by Charles Darwin 
Adventures with the missing link by Dr R. Dart. 
The panda's thumb by J.S. Gould (1983), pp.105-111 
The Piltdownforgery by J.S.Weiner ( 1955) 
Also the articles such as that in Sky and Telescope (January 1988, pp.38-43) on the 
'Halton Arp controversy'. 
These books and readings describe how theories grow in the realities of everyday 
scientific intercourse. 
What is presented below in Sections 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, and 6. 7 is the kind of material which 
textbooks might include in order to try to portray a more up-to-date philosophy of 
science. Of these, Section 6.6 is regarded as a sine qua non for textbooks, and should 
be incorporated in a preface or introduction in every senior school textbook. This 
could be aimed at both students and teachers. In order to overcome the dangers of 
an increasing tendency towards instrumentalism in recent textbooks, the focus of 
attention should be on the role played by scientific theory. 
6.4 Historical case studies 
By emphasising that current scientific views are no more than the latest in a series 
of views shaped and influenced by personal and social conditions and attitudes, 
historical studies would reinforce the notion that scientific knowledge is created 
rather than discovered. But we must not present the history of science in contem-
porary terms, otherwise pupils may see the past as simply quaint and ill-conceived. 
Historical case studies must as far as possible be seen from the perspective of the 
time. Pupils need to see the various fruitless routes that were followed, "the reasons, 
subterfuges, and lucky hazards which led me to my discoveries" (Kepler), and to 
appreciate the part played by personal ambition and social pressures. Many writers, 
such as J.B. Conant, have encouraged the use of historical case studies, but their 
calls for inclusion of materials into textbooks have largely gone unheeded. There 
seems to be a scarcity of resource materials. 
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6 .4 .1 Galileo versus Aristotle 
The following condensation of a section in the Harvard Project Physics (Concepts 
of Motion) could perhaps be included in a textbook in order to highlight the notion 
of theory change. 
Galileo's theory of free fall versus Aristotle's 
Galileo was brought up on a science which believed that all terrestrial matter 
was made up of a mixture of four 'elements': Earth, Water, Air, and Fire. Each 
of these four elements was thought to have a natural place in the terrestrial 
region. The highest belonged to Fire, below which was Air, then Water, and 
bottom-most was Earth. Each was thought to seek its own place. Thus, if fire 
were displaced below its natural position, it would tend to rise through Air. 
Similarly, Earth would tend to fall through both Air and Water. So a stone, for 
example, would fall through Fire, Air and Water in order to reach Earth, its 
natural place. 
The medieval thinkers also believed that the stars, planets, and other celestial 
bodies, were made up of a fifth element called the quintessence. The natural 
motion of celestial bodies was not rising or falling, but endless revolutions in 
perfect circles. For a circle is the perfect shape. Heavenly bodies, though 
moving, were at all times in their natural places. 
A falling stone has 'natural' motion, because it is moving towards its natural 
place. But a stone moving upwards is undergoing 'violent' motion, because it is 
moving away from its natural position. To maintain this upward motion, a force 
had to be continuously supplied to the stone. Anyone lifting a large stone is very 
much aware of this as he strains to raise the stone higher. It is common-sense. 
Also, a falling stone does not have any force on it. 
Now, a theory 'explains' an observation if the latter is consistent with the theory. 
The Aristotelian ideas were consistent with many common-sense observations. 
But there were difficulties. Take, for example, an arrow shot into the air. 
Aristotelian physics required that the arrow be continuously propelled by a 
force. Otherwise, if the force were removed, the arrow should fall directly to 
the ground in 'natural' motion. But the arrow does not fall immediately to the 
ground after losing contact with the bow-string. What then is the force that 
propels it? Here the Aristotelian offered an ingenious explanation: the motion 
of the arrow through the air was maintained by the air itself! As the arrow starts 
to move, the air is pushed aside, and the rush of air to fill the space being vacated 
by the arrow maintains it in its flight. 
So in all motion, a force was required to sustain uniform motion. It was 
sometimes difficult finding a suitable force. Consider accelerated motion. How 
is acceleration explained? As a falling body approached its natural place, it 
speeded up, just as a tired horse returning to its stable starts galloping. 
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When a falling body reaches its natural place, it stops. Rest was regarded as the 
natural state, and required no further explanation. 
This theory, which Galileo studied at the University of Pisa, was originally put 
forward by the Greek philosopher Aristotle in the fourth century B.C. It seemed 
perfectly plausible in the societies in which Aristotle and Galileo lived, where 
rank and order were dominant in human experience. 
Galileo was born in Pisa in 1564, the same year as Shakespeare's birth. He was 
a medical student at the University of Pisa, but was lured to physical science. 
At the age of 26 he was appointed Professor of Mathematics at Pisa. He 
specialised in mechanics and astronomy, and in 1638 he wrote his second book, 
Two New Sciences. 
In this, he states that both a heavy and a light body, falling freely, reach the 
ground at slightly different times. Aristotle had explained this in terms of the 
heavier body having a greater need to find its natural place. Galileo, however, 
suggested that, because the times were so slightly different, perhaps we should 
change our point of view of the problem. Perhaps all falling bodies actually 
reach the ground at the same time, and the slight difference is due to air 
resistance. He took a brand-new, refreshing perspective on an old problem. 
He tried to imagine what would happen if there were no air. This may be easy 
for us, but in Galileo's day it was almost inconceivable to think like this. Air is 
always present. Galileo's imaginative guess went against common-sense. 
Similarly, Galileo realised that, in horizontal motion, it is friction that stops a 
moving body. Take away friction, and the body will move forever. (This eternal 
motion was, for Galileo, circular. It was Newton who later modified the axiom 
into straight-line motion.) The point again is that Galileo went againt sensory 
experience. He said that constant motion is the natural state of a moving body, 
and coming to a stop required another explanation. This was exactly contrary 
to the Aristotelian view. Galileo's guess was a bold conjecture, whose conse-
quences were confirmed by thought-experiments as well as observations. 
See if you can think up logical arguments to refute Aristotle or Galileo. Try to 
put yourself in the world of Galileo, and argue against Galileo. 
(Modelled after Harvard Project Physics) 
Note the following few points: 
(1) Aristotle's theory was not stupid. It accounted well for many observed 
phenomena. 
(2) Galileo's evidence did not immediately refute Aristotle's. 
(3) It was only after Galileo had constructed a new theory, which enabled him to 
look at old questions in a new way, that the old theory began to be refuted. 
( 4) Long after the old theory had been refuted, it was still believed in 
simultaneously with the new theory. Even today, hundreds of years later, 
many people still think along the lines of Aristotle's theory. We often hold 
two opposing theories, working with one on one occasion, and the other on 
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another occasion. For example, we still use Newton's theory to launch Space 
Shuttles, even though it has been superceded by Einstein's theory. 
6 . 4 . 2 Kepler's Laws 
Another example, taken from Koestler's The Sleepwalkers, shows how scientific 
theory is constructed in a very human way. 
Kepler's Laws: A sleepwalker's road to theory-construction 
In his book The Sleepwalkers, Arthur Koestler describes how Kepler arrived at 
his laws of planetary motion. The following consists of brief extracts from this, 
in order to show the very human way in which scientific theories grow: 
The manner in which Kepler arrived at his new cosmology is fascinating. 
Fortunately, Kepler did not cover up his tracks as Copernicus, Galileo and 
Newton did. Kepler was incapable of exposing his ideas methodically, in 
textbook fashion. He had to describe them in the order they came to him, 
including all the errors, detours, and the traps into which he had fallen. His 
book, The New Astronomy, is a unique revelation of the ways in which a creative 
mind works. Kepler writes: 
"What matters to me is not merely to impart to the reader what I have 
to say, but above all to convey to him the reasons, subterfuges, and lucky 
hazards which led me to my dis~overies." 
When he arrived in Prague in 1601, he found the world-renowned astronomer 
Tycho Brahe's senior assistant, Longomontanus, trying to unravel the orbit of 
Mars. 
"I believe (writes Kepler) it was an act of Divine Providence that I 
arrived just at the time when Longomontanus was occupied with Mars. 
For Mars alone enables us to penetrate the secrets of astronomy which 
otherwise would remain forever hidden from us." 
The reason for this key position of Mars is that, among the outer planets, its 
orbit is the most elliptical. 
He first attacked the problem of trying to find the shape of Mars's orbit on 
traditional lines. When he failed, he began to get rid of the whole load of ancient 
beliefs on the nature of the universe and replace it with a new science. 
As a preliminary, he made several revolutionary innovations. Kepler did not 
know as yet that the orbit was an ellipse. He still regarded it as a circle. He 
asked himself the question that, although the sun was not at the centre, why did 
the planet insist on turning around the centre? He answered this by assuming 
that the planet was subject to two forces, one from the sun, and the other located 
in the planet itself. Today we know these forces are gravity and inertia. But 
gravity had not yet been invented to explain this. 
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A second innovation was his assumption that the plane of the orbit of Mars does 
not oscillate (as Copernicus had suggested), but forms a fixed angle with the 
plane of the Earth's orbit. He confirmed this by many observations, remarking 
somewhat smugly that 
"the observations took the side of my preconceived ideas, as they often 
did before". · 
The third innovation was the most radical. To get away from the traditional idea 
of 'uniform motion in perfect circles', he let circular motion stand, but he threw 
out uniform speed. This bold conjecture was guided by mainly physical consider-
ations. If the sun ruled the motion, then its force must act more strongly when 
the planet is closer to the source, making the planet move faster. 
These three bold moves cleared away a considerable amount of rubbish that 
had obstructed progress since Ptolemy. Kepler felt confident that victory was 
just around the corner. 
Kepler's first attack on the problem is described in great detail in the New 
Astronomy. The task before him was to define the orbit of Mars by determining 
the radius of the orbit and the direction of Mars on a given date relative to the 
fixed stars. He used four observed positions of Mars. It was a problem involving 
many trial-and-error procedures. Kepler's draft calculations, preserved in 
manuscripts to this day, covered nine-hundred folio pages in small handwriting! 
At times he was despairing. He felt, he says, that a demon was knocking his 
head against the ceiling. He wrote: 
"If you ( dear reader) are bored with this wearisome method of calcula-
tion, take pity on me who had to go through with at least seventy 
repetitions of it, at very great loss of time; nor will you be surprised that 
by now the fifth year is nearly past since I took on Mars ... " 
Now, at the very beginning of the hair-raising computations, Kepler absentmin-
dedly put three erroneous figures for three vital longitudes of Mars and happily 
went on from there, never noticing the error. Yet the correct results differ little 
from Kepler's. The reason is, that toward the end of the chapter, Kepler 
committed several mistakes in simple arithmetic- errors in division which wou Id 
bring bad marks to any schoolboy - and these errors very nearly cancelled out 
his earlier mistakes. 
After seventy trials, he arrived at values which gave the correct position of Mars 
for all ten oppositions recorded by Tycho Brahe. The problem seemed to have 
been conquered. But then a major problem arose. Said Kepler: 
"Who would have thought it possible? This hypothesis, which so closely 
agrees with the observed oppositions, is nevertheless false ... " 
In the following chapters, Kepler explains, with great thoroughness and an 
almost masochistic delight, how he discovered that the hypothesis is false, and 
why it must be rejected. In order to prove it by a further test, he had selected a 
further two of Tycho's observations, but they did not fit. And when he tried to 
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adjust his model to them, this made things even worse, for now the observed 
positions of Mars differed from those which his theory demanded by magnitudes 
up to eight minutes arc. 
This was a catastrophe. Ptolemy, and even Copernicus, could afford to neglect 
a difference of eight minutes, because their observations were only accurate 
within a margin of ten minutes of arc, anyway. But Kepler felt that he had to 
acknowledge Tycho's greater degree of precision. Kepler writes: 
"Since it was not permissible to ignore them, those eight minutes point 
the road to a complete reformation of astronomy ... " 
It was the final capitulation of an adventurous mind before irreducuble, obsti-
nate facts. Earlier on, if a minor detail had not fit into a major hypothesis, it was 
cheated away or shrugged away. Now, this time-hallowed indulgence of saving 
the appearances at any cost (that is, treating facts instrumentally) had ceased to 
be permissible. A new era had begun in the history of thought: an era of 
austerity and rigour. 
In Kepler's previous work, facts had been forced to fit the theory. In the New 
Astronomy, a theory, built on years of labour and torment, was instantly thrown 
away because of a discord of eight miserable minutes arc. What caused this 
change of heart in him? It was his introduction of physical causality into the 
formal geometry of the skies which made it impossible for him to ignore the 
eight minutes of arc. So long as cosmology was guided by purely geometrical 
rules of the game, regardless of physical causes, discrepancies between theory 
and fact could be overcome by inserting another wheel into the system. In a 
universe moved by real, physical forces, this was no longer possible. The 
revolution which freed thought from the stranglehold of ancient dogma, imme-
diately created its own, rigorous discipline. 
Kepler closes the Second Book of the New Astronomy with these words: 
"And thus the edifice which we erected on the foundation of Tycho's 
observations, we have now again destroyed ... This was our punishment 
for having followed some plausible, but in reality false, axioms of the 
great men of the past." 
But the shape of Mars's orbit still eluded him. The final assault took him two 
years. At first, he once again returned to the old idea that the orbit was circular, 
but failed. He writes: 
''The conclusion is quite simply that the planet's path is not a circle - it 
curves inward on both sides and outward again at opposite ends. Such 
a figure is called an oval. The orbit is not a circle, but an oval." 
But now a dreadful thing happened, and the next six chapters of his book are a 
nightmare journey through another labyrinth. This oval orbit is a wild, frighte-
ning new departure for him. To mock the Aristotelian circle is one thing; but 
to opt for an entirely new, lopsided path for planets is quite another. 
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Why indeed an oval? He must find a physical cause, and invents the idea that, 
while the sun's force sweeps the planet around its orbit, a second antagonistic 
force, seated in the planet itself, resulted in an oval path. 
He tried for a year to make the oval hypothesis work, but could not. In despair, 
he even tried repudiating his own Second Law - to no avail. Finally, a kind of 
snowblindness seemed to descend on him: he held the solution in his hand 
without seeing it. On 4 July 1603, he wrote to a friend that he was unable to 
solve the problem using the oval; but 
"if only the shape were a perfect ellipse all the answers could be found ... " 
A full eighteen months later, he again wrote to the same correspondent that the 
truth must lie somewhere halfway between an oval and a circle "just as if the 
Martian orbit were a perfect ellipse". 
Then an amazing breakthrough occurred. He was comparing the difference 
between a circle and an oval, and noticed than the greatest difference was 
0,00429 of the radius. Then Kepler noticed that the secant of a particular angle 
when Mars is halfway along the oval is precisely 0,00429. Suddenly he felt as 
though he had been awakened from a sleep. Now at last, after years of work, 
he held the secret of the Martian orbit. He was able to express the distance of 
the planet from the sun in a simple mathematical formula. But he still did not 
recognise the shape as being an ellipse. He had reached his goal, but did not 
realise that he had reached it. 
He went off on one last wild goose chase. He tried to construct an orbit that 
would correspond with his newly-found equation. But he did not know how. 
He made a mistake in the geometry, and arrived at a wrong answer. 
We have now reached the climax of the comedy. In his despair, he threw out 
his formula (which denoted an elliptical orbit) because he wanted to try out an 
entirely new hypothesis: to wit, an elliptical orbit. He constructed an ellipse by 
a different geometrical method. And then, at last, he realised that the two 
methods produced the same result. 
With his usual disarming frankness, he confessed what had happened: 
"Why should I mince my words? The truth of Nature, which I had 
rejected and chased away, returned by stealth through the backdoor, 
disguising itself to be accepted. That is to say, I laid (the original 
equation) aside, and fell back on ellipses, believing that this was a quite 
different hypothesis, whereas the two, as I shall prove in the next 
chapter, are one and the same ... I thought and searched, until I went 
nearly mad, for a reason why the planet preferred an elliptical orbit ... 
Ah, what a foolish bird I have been !" 
Note the following: 
(1) Kepler's invesigation began with preconceived ideas ( or thories), not 
with observation. Science usually begins with theory, not with observation 
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and experiment, as we often think. 
(2) The long investigation was not a cold, calculating procedure, following a 
clean-cut, straight line of thought. Rather, it was filled with passion. It 
went backwards and forwards. 
(3) The "lucky hazards" that Kepler refered to were not really lucky, in a 
gambling sense, although there were some strange coincidences along the 
way. Rather, Kepler's luck was due to the fact that he was so caught up in 
his problem, his mind was so filled with the facts, that when some external 
fact came to his notice, he recognised its relevance immediately. 
As Pasteur said: "Chance favours the prepared mind", or in our own day as 
Gary Player wisely said: ''The more I practise, the luckier I get!" 
6 .4 .3 The Phlogiston Theory 
It is important to point out to pupils that theories which might appear strange to us 
today were once regarded as sensible. They were quite suitable for their time. 
The Phlogiston Theory 
A theory which is not refuted when the bold predictions to which it gives rise 
are tested is said to be corroborated. Such a theory represents new knowledge. 
All such discoveries (eg Eddington's calculations on the 1919 eclipse observa-
tions corroborated Einstein's theory) are corroborations by severe tests - hy 
predictions which were highly improbable in the light of our previous knowl-
edge. 
Other important discoveries have also been made while testing a theory, even 
though they did not lead to its corroboration but in fact to its refutation. 
Lavoisier's classical experiments which show that the volume of air decreases 
while a candle burns in a closed space, or that the weight of burning iron filings 
increases, did not establish the oxygen theory of combustion; yet they tended to 
refute the phlogiston theory. 
In order to explain combustion, a theory was put forward which postulated the 
existence of a principle or substance of inflammability supposed to exist in 
combustible bodies. This substance was called 'phlogiston'. 
In order to test for the existence of phlogiston, the mass of a piece of copper 
was measured before combustion. If it lost mass, then it confirmed that phlog-
iston, which was needed for combustion, had been used up. If it gained mass, 
then the phlogiston theory was refuted. But another theory was needed to 
replace it, namely, the oxygen theory. The fact that the copper does indeed gain 
mass corroborates the oxygen theory, but does not prove it, for there may he 
another explanation. 
It is important for us not to scorn the phlogiston theory as a stupid guess, or 
simple-minded error, or superstition. It was suitable for its time, and made 
sense of the facts known then. 
182 
Also, as Thomas Kuhn points out, it is simplistic for us to say "Oxygen was 
discovered". This statement misleads because it suggests that discovery is a 
single simple act in which the oxygen 'out there' was simply waiting from all 
eternity for someone to find it. In fact, the concept 'oxygen' resulted from a 
series of interrelated constructions. It happened like this. 
In the early 1770's, several chemists had enriched air in a laboratory without 
knowing it. The earliest claimant to prepare a relatively pure sample of the gas 
was the Swedish apothecary C.W. Scheele. We may, however, ignore his work, 
since it was not published until oxygen's discovery had repeatedly been an-
nounced elsewhere. The second in time to establish a claim was the British 
scientist, Joseph Priestley, who collected the gas released by heated red oxide 
of mercury as one item in a prolonged investigation of the 'airs' evolved by a 
number of solid substances. In 1774, he identified the gas thus produced as 
nitrous oxide and in 1775, led by further tests, as common air with less than its 
usual quantity of phlogiston. The third claimant, the French scientist Lavoisier, 
started the work that led him to oxygen after Priestley's experiments of 1774 -
possibly as the result of a hint from Priestley. Early in 1775, Lavoisier reported 
that the gas obtained by heating the red oxide of mercury was "itself entire 
without alteration (except that) ... it comes out more pure, more respirable." By 
1777, Lavoisier had concluded that the gas was a distinct species, one of the two 
main constituents of the atmosphere, a conclusion that Priestley was never able 
to accept. 
Who, then, 'discovered' oxygen? Priestley isolated a gas that was later recog-
nised as a distinct species. Lavoisier isolated the gas and was able to say what 
the gas was. He insisted that oxygen was an atomic 'principle of acidity' and was 
formed only when that 'principle united with 'caloric', the matter of heat. But 
the principle of acidity was not banished until 1810, and caloric lingered until 
the 1860's. So can we say that Lavoisier discovered oxygen? His concept of 
oxygen was a primitive one, oxygen-in-the-making, as it were. 
More important, did the discovery lead to a change in theoretical structure, that 
is, a new theory? What Lavoisier announced in his papers of the late 1770's 
was not so much the discovery of oxygen as the oxygen theory of combustion. 
Long before he played any part in the discovery of oxygen, Lavoisier was 
convinced both that something was wrong with the phlogiston theory and that 
burning bodies absorbed some part of the atmosphere. This was recorded in 
1772. That theory resulted in a chemical revolution. This earlier work on 
combustion gave additional form and structure to his growing concept of oxygen. 
6.5 A Journal Article 
The purpose of showing a simple journal article to pupils is three-fold: firstly, to 
show the accepted format of such an article; secondly, to reinforce the idea that 
when a theory becomes public and is presented in published form, it takes on a social 
character which lends it objectivity; and thirdly, to use it as a means of criticising 
the inductive nature of scientific inquiry along the lines of Medawar (1963). 
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The following is an article taken from a journal published by the Geological Society 
of America, and was shortened and simplified to exclude technical jargon as far as 
possible. 
GEOLOGICAL SOCIE1Y OF AMERICA BULLETIN December 1974 
RELICT AND RECENT BEACHROCK FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA 
William G. Siesser 
Dept of Geology University of Cape Town 
ABSTRACT 
Beachrock is a calcium carbonate rock found along beaches in the 
inter-tidal zone. It is the remains of a larger formation formed during 
withdrawal of the sea during an ice-age 25000 years ago. This is con-
firmed by carbon-14 tests. 
INTRODUCTION 
Previous studies are referred to, all names and sources being given. Its relev-
ance to the present study is briefly described. 
SOUTH AFRICAN BEACHROCK 
Occurrence: Where is beachrock found in the south-western Cape. Petro-
graphy and mineralogy: Its chemical composition and crystalline structure is 
described. 
METHODOLOGY 
The aim and method of the present study is described in some detail. This is 
done so that the logic of the experimental procedure may be criticised by 
other scientists, also so that the study may be repeated by the reader if he so 
wishes. 
RESULTS 
All the results of the study's experiments ( eg the radioactive dating) are listed 
in detail, again not only for the information-content, but also so that other 
scientists can criticise and evaluate them. 
DISCUSSION 
These results are now applied to the hypothesis contained in the first part of 
the paper. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is decided from the results whether or not the hypothesis has been 
supported. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Thanks to all who funded the research. 
REFERENCES 
All sources are listed 
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There are several methods used in science: one is the inductive experimen-
tal method of Francis Bacon and John Stuart Mill; another is the hypothesis 
and deduction method of Karl Popper; a third emphasises the method of 
comparingcompeting theories. Bacon's method emphasises verification of 
theories; Popper's emphasise falsification of theories. (A more detailed 
account is given in section 6.6 below.) 
Which method or combination of methods do you think was used in the above 
journal article? Give reasons for you answer. Why do you think the scientific 
community (represented here by the editors of this journal) insist on a 
particular format? Does the fact that scientists are expected to publish their 
results and theories in writing, or present them as "papers" at conferences, have 
any importance for science? 
6.6 Traditional and contemporary views of science 
The following could be included, either verbatim, or in a shortened summary 
form, in all high school science textbooks: 
Scientific method? 
What is scientific method? Most people think that all scientists follow a 
strict method. This is simply not true. For there are many different scientific 
methods. 
The traditional view of science 
Traditionally, it has been supposed that science followed the method put 
forward by Francis Bacon and elaborated by John Stuart Mill. This goes as 
follows: 
(1) Observation and experiment 
(2) Inductive generalisation 
(3) Hypothesis 
( 4) Attempted verification of hypothesis by experiment 
(5) Proof or disproof 
( 6) Knowledge 
This is known as the inductive method, but it also includes deduction. Induc-
tion is the mental process of passing from observations of particular events 
to universal laws or generalisations. For example, from our observations 
of thousands of dogs, we make the generalisation that all dogs have four legs. 
Deduction is the reverse process, that is, the inference of particular conclusions 
from a general law. For example, if all dogs have four legs, and this animal here 
is a dog, then it must also have four legs. 
Traditionally it has been believed that science begins with objective observa-
tions. These observations yield the data in which patterns may be revealed. It 
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is permissible to make such generalisations, provided that the number of 
observations is large, and the observations must be reproducible under a 
variety of conditions. Generalisations lead to theories, which, when verified 
many times over, become laws. These theories and laws enable predictions to 
be made. If these deductions are confirmed by testing, the theory is affirmed. 
In this way scientific knowledge is built up. 
This rigorous scientific method leads to the following ideas: 
(1) Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge. 
(2) Scientific knowledge is based on sensory experience. 
(3) Scientific theories are derived directly from observations and 
experiments. 
( 4) Observation is objective and impersonal. 
(5) A scientific theory can be refuted by a single falsifying observation or 
experiment. 
(6) Scientific knowledge is reliable. 
(7) Scienctific knowledge leads to absolute truth. 
In 1934 Karl Popper, a physicist and philosopher of science, suggested that 
induction is an invalid process. It is wrong to say, for example, that "All copper 
objects are good conductors of electricity", because we have never observed 
all copper objects. No number of observations of white swans allows us 
logically to say "All swans are white", because it is possible that the next swan 
we observe may be black. If we do come across a black swan, what we can say 
is "Not all swans are white." Hence, generalisations cannot be verified by 
further evidence, but they can be falsified. That is, scientific laws cannot be 
proved, but they can be tested by attempts to refute them. 
So Popper emphasises falsification of theories rather than verification of 
theories. We make an imaginative guess (or conjecture, or hypothesis) about 
our problem, then seek ways of trying to prove it wrong (falsify or refute it). 
His conjecture and refutation scientific method goes like this: 
( 1) Problem posed (usually to try to refute an existing theory). 
(2) Proposed solution (that is, a new theory). 
(3) Deduction of testable consequences of the new theory. 
( 4) Severe testing, by attempted refutations, through observation and 
experiment. 
(5) Preference established between competing theories. 
This is much closer to real scientific practice than the Baconian method, 
although neither is used exclusively. There are three important differences 
between them. (a) Science begins with theory, not observation. (b) This 
means that observations are influenced by prior theory and are not totally 
objective. Observation is fallible. ( c) A single experiment cannot verify a 
theory, but it can falsify it. 
This brings us to the contemporary view of scientific method. 
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The contemporary view 
Popper's scientific method fails because (i) it depends on a single falsifying 
observation, and (ii) observations are fallible. Therefore an observation 
cannot conclusively refute a theory. Hence a new theory is needed before 
falsifying observations can be made. This means that, so long as we think 
within the confines of a particular theory, we may never be able to think up 
evidence that would falsify it. So another perspective is needed to highlight 
the shortcomings of the existing theory. In other words, we need to think 
laterally and creatively. We need to 'brain-storm'. The more alternative the-
ories we invent, the better. 
Scientists work within the current set of accepted theories. This is called 
'normal science'. Problems encountered are dealt with in terms of the existing 
theories. However, if a problem (anomaly) arises which resists being solved in 
terms of the current theories, a crisis develops, and a new theory may emerge 
to resolve the difficulties. Such a change of theories is called a 'scientific 
revolution', because a completely new way of thinking is required. For 
example, a revolution occurred when Newton's theory could not account for 
certain phenomena, and Einstein's relativity theory replaced it. However, 
scientists are reluctant to let go of old theories. So old ones are sometimes 
retained simultaneously with the new for some time. Indeed, the new one may 
be used instrumentally for some time until confidence in it grows. The new 
theory should not be accepted too readily or uncritically. 
There is a basic 'hard core' of scientific knowledge which cannot be modified, 
falsified or rejected. The scientific community agrees on what belongs in this 
hard core. Any mis-match between a theory and an observation is dealt with 
by modifying the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses which surround the 
hard core. Early work on a theory often takes place in opposition to 
apparently falsifying observations. An old theory cannot be falsified until 
we have a new, better theory to replace it. So, for a time, we hold on to both 
the old and the new theories simultaneously. Time has to be allowed for a 
theory to develop before it is subjected to rigorous testing. When the new 
theory has been developed sufficiently to permit rigorous testing, it is con-
firmations rather than falsifications that are significant. A theory is 
progressing if it predicts some novel facts. We must gain new information 
about the world from our theory. 
Theories grow and develop. At first, they may be the result of imaginative 
guesses. For example, a story is told of a certain village, whose inhabitants 
were perplexed by two facts: firstly, whenever they wanted to use a pencil, 
one could never be found; and secondly, if one was found, the pencil sharp-
ener was always found to be full of pencil shavings. A wonderful theory 
was invented to account for these two observations. At night, while the 
inhabitants slept, some fairy-like 'Plogglies' emerged, took every pencil in sight, 
ground them up, and shoved the shavings into the pencil sharpeners. This 
theory was successful, because it accounted for the two observed facts. 
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However, inventing 'Plogglies' is too arbitrary. The theory could not be 
tested, because 'Plogglies' simply do not exist. 
Similarly, suppose you watch a ball roll across a table, and see it come to a 
stop. A friend suggests that friction stopped it. Another friend tells you that 
small invisible demons brought it to a halt. How do you know it is friction, not 
demons, that brought the rolling ball to rest? Suggest experiments to test or 
support your view. This problem, which looks like a joke at first sight, raises 
the whole question of the nature of scientific explanation. Try to make a 
logical defence - but remember that an opponent defending demons could 
claim a variety of properties for them. 
As theories grow and our confidence in them grows, a greater degree of reality 
is given to the guessed object. At first we construct a simple model, possibly 
a hardware model. Then we might build a more mathematical model which 
is more informative than the first one. We are content to use our invented 
models in an instrumental way, simply to describe or to predict. For example 
we may say that electrical resistance is like a partial blockage in a water pipe 
(Model 1). Then, after further experimentation with simple circuits, we define 
resistance as potential difference divided by current (Model 2). We make 
use of these models quite happily to predict facts about electrical circuits. 
Our models enable us to treat resistance as if it were a real thing. That is, at 
first, we accept the existence of resistance in a superficial way. But as we 
investigate further, we build other models (for example, the model that the 
electrons collide with atoms of the resistance wire - that is, we link our models 
with the well-established Atomic Theory). As our models develop, they take 
on the form of a broader, more comprehensive theory. And along the way, 
we have tied our various models in with another comprehensive theory, 
namely Atomic Theory. The consistency of our theory of resistance with 
another well-tried theory, adds strength to our theory. 
As our trust in our theories increases even further by constantly criticising 
and testing their consequences, we acknowledge the reality of the concept 
which we originally constructed. And so we readily agree that the world of 
electrons, atoms, resistance, current, and so on, really exist objectively. A 
scientist working in this way is called a realist. 
A realist scientist who is critical can be realist about some theories (those 
which he believes to be true) and instrumentalist about others (which he 
finds useful but uncertain about their truth). The latter he calls a model. 
For a realist scientist, a model is different from a theory. A model is less 
certain than a theory. Scientists who are not realists, but who are instrumen-
talists, are instrumentalist about all theories. 
Many scientists today prefer not to be realists. They hold that it is not the 
business of science to talk about the real existence of things we cannot see, for 
example, electrons. For such a scientist, a theory is only an imaginative 
fiction, a tool for solving a problem. It has no reality. He suspends his 
judgement about their real existence, and treats such things as if they existed. 
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This procedure works, but does not tell the full story about the physical world. 
Such a scientist does not have the confidence in his theories he should have. 
Therefore he does not distinguish between theories and models, since he is 
equally uncertain about theories and models. 
On the other hand, the critical realist scientist does not find it illogical to 
retain a falsified theory in an instrumentalist capacity, provided that its 
status is acknowledged. The fact that it is useful does not mean that it is true. 
It may be that, for certain applications, a falsified theory is more useful than 
a true one because it is simpler to use. In other words, it has instrumental value. 
For example, Newton's laws of motion may be quite adequate to solve certain 
problems, without calling on the more correct theory of relativity. Or Ruther-
ford's model of the atom may be simpler and therefore more useful than the 
wave-mechanical model, even though the latter is more precise. As Popper 
puts it: Suppose it is one minute to noon. Then the statement "It is twelve 
o'clock" is false. Yet, though false, it is far more useful than the true 
statement ''The time is now between ten in the morning and four in the 
afternoon". Science approaches truth, but can never attain it. Nevertheless, 
such knowledge can be immensely useful and intellectually satisfying. 
So, although there is no one accepted scientific method, contemporary 
scientists agree about the following points; 
(1) Science begins, not with observation, but theory. 
(2) Observation is not objective, and is therefore fallible. 
(3) Theories are imaginative constructions. They are inventions of the mind, 
intelligent guesses. 
( 4) The consequences of our theories are subjected to rigorous testing and 
criticism. They need time to develop before being tested. 
(5) In the meantime, rival theories may be retained in spite of falsifying 
evidence. 
(6) A new theory may have to be introduced to provide evidence for the 
rejection of an existing theory. 
(7) A theory must be criticised and approved by the scientific community. 
Only then is a theory validated. Once produced publicly, it has an 
objective existence independent of individual minds. 
(8) We have full confidence in our theories. They tell us about the real 
world. Theories are part of reality. 
The role of scientific theory 
From the above, it can be seen what a high regard is placed on the role of 
theory in science. The chief role of scientific theory is to explain. A 
scientific theory provides a context or framework in which various facts are 
linked together in a logical way in order to give reasons for certain phenomena. 
The things that theories talk about (for example, forces, electrons, electric 
current) are regarded by the critical realist type of scientist as actually existing. 
These scientists take the implications of their theories seriously - which is, 
of course, is what they should do! But some (instrumentalist) scientists hold 
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that scientific theories are only useful devices for relating their observa-
tions. They do not take theories seriously, and can discard them very easily, 
even arbitrarily, without sufficient experimental evidence. This often oc-
curs when there is still some uncertainty about a phenomenon. But when the 
theory has been fully accepted and ratified, a theory can become an object of 
scientific inquiry. 
Implications of instrumentalism 
Most scientists today use an instrumentalist approach to science. Instrumen-
tal ism works, and is very successful. It is a major factor why science has made 
such wonderful progress. 
However, instrumentalism can easily lead to idealism, phenomenalism, 
agnosticism, relativism, gamesmanship, a spectator attitude, and pragmatism. 
1. Idealism: If only sensory knowledge is valid, then all we ever know is the 
experience of our sense impressions. We can never be sure that an independant 
world lies outside of ourselves. For example, in open-brain surgery, a touch 
of a probe on a particular part of the brain can trigger off a sensation of smell, 
even though no external smell is there. To postulate the existence of something 
outside us is a metaphysical jump, which is not allowed by empiricist 
philosophy. So we remain forever trapped within ourselves, and our thoughts 
are the only thing we know. Reality is in the mind. We become idealists, or, at 
the very least, sceptics. 
2. Phenomenalism: Our senses experience phenomena directly. What 
we see is what we get. For the empiricist, the directly observed thing is 
reality. There is no underlying reality behind appearance. The surface view 
is all that there is. Things are exactly what they seem. Thus an empiricist/in-
strumentalist view is superficial. 
3. Agnosticism: If only sensory knowledge is valid, then the notion of God 1s 
seriously undermined. Scepticism and atheism may well follow. 
4. Relativism: If theoretical knowledge is downgraded into a fiction which 
has no necessary physical counterpart, it need not be taken seriously. It can 
be as arbitrary as another cog in the wheel of Ptolemy's epicycles. For most 
people, truth is a correspondence to reality, but for an instrumentalist, truth 
is what works. Truth is relative. It depends on the result of inquiry. A statement 
is not true in itself. It is only true if found to be so. 
5 Gamesmanship: Because an instrumentalist scientist does not take his the-
ories seriously and regards them only as useful devices for prediction, the 
whole scientific enterprise becomes a game. Science becomes interested 
only in that it works, rather than in explanation. If this is all that science is, 
then it is dishonest. It may indeed be a costly hoax we have played on ourselves. 
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6. Passive spectatorship: If scientific theories are mere fictions with no 
reference to reality, then science has no sense of commitment. It is content 
to remain passive and uninvolved. Technology is preferred to front-line 
research, for there is no incentive to carry out the latter. It simply becomes 
isolated in time and space, and has no relationship to the user, who is therefore 
tempted to remain a passive and uninvolved spectator. 
7. Pragmatism: Instrumentalism emphasises utility: the purpose of science 
is not to explain but to provide useful predictions. Hence nothing is worth 
doing unless it is useful. So Space Shuttles are preferable to Voyager probes, 
because the former have important military and economic spin-offs, where-
as there is little obvious use in taking a few pictures of distant planets. 
Instrumentalism does not encourage the search for truly new knowledge. It 
appeals to the "instant" success attitude of modern man. 
Conclusion: As scientists, we study the natural physical world. We should 
be realists, and take our theories seriously. 
Of course, this synopsis of scientific method and the nature of science can be 
shortened. School pupils may find the paragraphs dealing with realism and 
instrumentalism a little too abstract. Yet we should include such material with the 
teacher in mind. This may be the only contact most teachers have with contempor-
ary philosophy of science. 
6.7 A contemporary example of science in action 
The following shortened extract from Sky and Telescope (January 1988) illustrates 
the social nature of scientific theory construction: 
The Arp controversy: The social nature of science 
Theory-construction is very much a social affair. The scientific community 
monitors and controls the work of individual scientists, not in a dogmatic, 
authoritarian way, but by criticism. The editors of scientific journals act as 
referees, and thus exercise a quality control over what is good science, or 
whether the scientist is working within the bounds of the current theoretical 
structures. 
In order to illustrate the way the scientific community works, the following 
is a summary of an article, in the form of a book review with defensive argu-
ments, taken from Sky and Telescope (January 1988, pp.38-43 ). It also reveals 
the very human foibles of stubborness, anguish, disappointment, and even 
partisanship, involved in the scientific decisions which affect theory con-
struction. 
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Quasers, Redshifts, and Controversies 
Halton Arp is a distinguished observational astronomer. In the first part of 
his career he worked on various aspects of stellar evolution - his Ph.D. thesis 
at Mount Wilson on the frequency of novae in the Andromeda galaxy was a 
fundamental contribution in this field. For thirty years he devoted himself to 
the study of extragalactic astronomy. Arp ranked among the top twenty 
observational optical astronomers in the world. 
In 1966, in collaboration with Fred Hoyle and Geoffrey Burbidge, he found 
what was believed to be physical associations between some of these 
galaxies and previously-identified powerful radio sources. He also noted 
many cases of apparent associations between galaxies and quasars. 
All of this would have been completely acceptable if the objects all had the 
same redshifts, but they did not. A redshift is interpreted as being due to the 
Doppler effect, in which the wavelength of the light emitted by a body moving 
away at high speed increases. This suggested that the Universe is expanding. 
But why, then, did some galaxies not have the same redshift? Yet Arp believed 
in the reality of the associations. He tried to publish articles about it in 
scientific journal, and after struggles with the referees, his papers were 
published. In the 1970's, other astronomers found similar results. Arp 
claimed that not all galaxy-redshifts were due to the expansion of the 
Universe. He maintained that redshifts are not always correlated with distan-
ces, and that some quasars were localised. However, his theory went against 
the stream. His standing in astronomy began to drop. 
About four years ago, in 1984, came the final blow. His whole field of 
research was deemed unacceptable by the scientist-committee at the Cali-
fornia Institute of Technology in Pasadena. The directors of Mount Wilson 
and Palomar observatories refused to assign him any more telescope time. 
After abortive appeals all the way up to the trustees of the Carnegie Institu-
tion, he took early retirement and moved to West Germany. 
Evidence to support Arp's theory continued to grow. Facts about periodicities 
and peaks in the redshift distribution were very hard to explain in terms of 
conventional theory. By the early 1980's, Burbidge and Arp were convinced that 
the evidence for local quasars was too great for it all to be wrong. At the 
same time, Burbidge felt that evidence that other quasars did have cosmologi-
cal redshifts was compelling. So he believed in Arp's hypothesis while 
trying to accommodate some part of the conventional view. 
Yet Arp's treatment by the astronomical community was extremely un-
pleasant. Perhaps the astronomical community exercised good judgement, 
but their tactics to try to maintain the status quo gave all the appearances of 
being unfair. These include unending refereeing, blackballing of speakers at 
meetings, distortion and misquotation of the written word, and denial of 
telescope time to those who were investigating what some believed was 
outside of the commonly-accepted theory. Arp suffered all of these. 
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Arp has recently written a book called Quasars, Redshifts, and Controversies, 
giving an account of his major thesis. Towards the end, he gives a painfully 
honest account of the way in which he was barred from using the great United 
States telescopes. He writes, ''The six-person telescope allocation committee 
... sent me an unsigned letter stating that my research was judged to be 
without value and that they intended to refuse allocation of further observing 
time." 
Burbidge says: "I remember very well when Arp called and told me this. At the 
time I was director of Kitt Peak National Obervatory. I told him that in my 
experience telescope allocation committees were only advisory to directors, 
and I could not imagine the directors in Pasadena accepting such biassed 
advice. But they did, and Arp's research career in the United States abruptly 
ended. No responsible scientist I know, including many astronomers who are 
strongly opposed to Arp's thesis and many scientists outside the field, believes 
that justice was served." 
How will this episode be seen fifty years from now? Everything depends, of 
course, on how far astronomy has advanced. If the 'Arp effect' is only the tip 
of the iceberg, then it will look very similar to the case of Alfred Wegener 
and Alex du Toit and the theory of continental drift. If not, then all that will 
be remembered will be the star atlases Arp has compiled for the scientific 
community. 
In the May 1988 edition of Sky and Telescope, the following letter appeared: 
"After reading Geoffrey Burbidge's account of how Halton Arp was 
blacklisted for his unconventional theories about quasar redshifts, I 
can't help but wonder if astronomy has returned to its pre-Renaissance 
ways. The severe resistance to Arp's work simply appalls me. Wasn't 
it the rebel thinkers throughout history who broke our bonds of 
ignorance and rid us of our dependence on assumption? 
I am especially disturbed by Burbidge's remark that, in order to succeed, 
professional astronomers must agree with the ideas promoted by 
their more senior colleagues. This seems to parallel the persecution of 
Galileo by the Catholic Church because his ideas differed from what it 
wanted the people to believe. Must scientists again fear to challenge 
convention? 
Astronomers must discard their prejudice and be willing to consider 
new ideas and observations. With time and effort bad theories will be 
weeded out. Let us not allow what happened to Halton Arp to 
befall any other astronomers who have insights that don't suit the party 
line." 
What do you think? Do you agree with the letter-writer? Suppose the 
scientific community had indeed been willing to consider new ideas, but had 
found Arp's theory just could not be accepted. Is this not a justifiable exercis-
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ing of the scientific community's right to monitor and control in order to keep 
a high standard? 
The materials presented in Sections 6.4 to 6.7 above are suggestions for textbook 
authors to consider including in their textbooks in order to try to move away 
from their inherent empiricist-inductivist and instrumentalist approach, towards a 
critical realist approach. As mentioned before, in order to do this, the focus must 
shift towards the role of theory in scientific inquiry. 
6.8 The danger of science as a modern ideology 
There is no doubt that Westernised society is saturated with the materialistic values 
of our scientific and technological era. In many ways, science today has the same 
mystique as religion had in medieval times: science has become an ideology 
(Feyerabend, in Hacking 1981, p.156). Science is being taught at schools as if it 
were reliable knowledge, absolute truth, and not to be criticised. There is only one 
scientific method, a method which is based on cold logic and closed to any 
creative, imaginative influence. Science is seen by many people as the panacea for 
overcoming all human problems. This perceived ability of science to solve all 
problems is called the "technological fix" by Factor and Kooser (1980). It is most 
obviously seen in advertising media, where the marketing of consumer products, 
from detergents to motor cars, from audio CD players to margarines, depends 
heavily on appeals to this technological fix. 
Paradoxically, it was science which helped liberate mankind from ancient and rigid 
forms of thought. Yet science has now perhaps become as oppressive as the 
ideologies it once had to fight. This may to a large extent be due to the inductivist-
empiricist and instrumentalist approach taken by science as entrenched in science 
textbooks and science education. Regretfully, much of the science, both in 
textbooks and as taught in classrooms, is still saturated by an outmoded view 
of science. This study has shown that the high school physical science textbooks in 
use in 1989 still reflect a philosophy of science which was criticised by Popper in 
1934 and by Kuhn in 1962. Our science education is out of line with current 
thought. 
There is much truth in Feyerabend's claim that modern science inhibits freedom 
of thought. Thus we must teach our children to think critically, and to be aware 
that we are immersed in and strongly influenced by the technological materialism 
of our age. 
One concrete way of doing this is to provide guidelines in our textbooks. The 
textbooks should communicate the notion that science does not work simply by 
collecting facts and inferring theories from them. Theories do not necessarily 
follow from facts in the strict logical sense. Rather, theories shape and order facts. 
However, this must be done in terms of the standards agreed upon by the scientific 
community. But the fact remains that we can adopt a theory which may be "pretty 
lousy", as Feyerabend puts it, and which may still conflict with well-known facts, 
but still be better than any other theory available at the time. We can choose 
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between alternative theories. This forces our mind to make imaginative 
choices and thus makes it grow. It makes our mind capable of choosing, imagin-
ing, and criticising. 
This is a contemporary view of science, a view I strongly advocate that authors of 
school science textbooks should study and communicate to teachers, through their 
prefaces and Teacher's Guides as well as in their contextual material. For it is vital 
that we present an up-to-date philosophy of science to our pupils. Only by 
showing that science is, in fact, ''a very human form of knowledge" (Bronowski 1973, 
p. 374 ), full of human judgements and creative imagination as well as rationality, 
will we convey to our pupils that science is worth studying and choosing as a career. 
6.9 Scientific realism and science education 
As personal thinking matures, the reality of things long held as real, is slowly 
questioned. What, then, are electrons? What are orbitals? What are photons? 
Indeed, even at at more elementary level, does Brownian motion "prove" that 
atoms or molecules exist? 
Children, even when they reach the Piagetian stage of formal thought, still retain 
a strong belief that there is a real world outside of themselves. Of course atoms 
and electrons exist! Yet at first this is based on the affirmation of authority. As 
the critical skills of young people develops, we must be very careful not to go too 
fast too soon. There is a very real danger that pupils could become anxious and 
insecure if they try to wrestle with questions involving the reliability of their 
knowledge. So I believe that we must take a ( critical) realist stand in science 
education, simply in order to help our pupils take their first steps along the path of 
epistemology. I realise that this is a pragmatic reason for realism, but there are 
more fundamental reasons, as follows. 
The best argument in favour of realism in science education that I have found is 
that of Ian Hacking (1983) when he said: If you can shoot a beam of electrons at a 
target, then they are real. Photons and quarks, and other 'unobservable' entities, 
are real if you can actively intervene with them in an experiment in the laboratory. 
Thus electrons, atoms, photons, and so on, are as real as stones, and toenails, and 
love and pain. An electron is far more than the instrumentalist's notion that 
it is only a theoretical fiction. It is real, for it collides with my TV screen and 
makes it work! 
Because the instrumentalist attitude in science is so convenient, it is easy to 
get caught up in its snares. For, in itself, it encourages rote learning, and 
performing calculations in a mechanical, plug-into-the-formula way. Its attempt to 
portray observation and experimental method as objective, helps remove science 
from the real life of the pupil. For children, there are many interpretations to a 
given observation, yet the textbook gives only one. Thus imagination is all too 
frequently stifled, and a passive acceptance of facts is encouraged. So instrumen-
tal ism must be complemented by a critical constructivism. 
As science educators, we should not allow our pupils to leave school as passive 
spectators, able only to turn switches, adjust voltage levels, or check instruments. 
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Our pupils should be more than technologists. They should learn to become 
involved in and care about what they do. They should be full-blooded realists, 
joining in the fruitful, productive quest for knowledge. They must reject sterile, 
passive, instrumentalist spectatorship and gamesmanship. 
I believe, with Pirsig (1974), that it is somewhere in this strange separation of 
realist from instrumentalist, of what man is from what man does, that we have a 
clue as to what has gone wrong in this twentieth century. 
6.10 Conclusion 
This study has investigated the following problems: 
( 1) Our science textbooks are instrumentalist, and are becoming increasingly 
so. This was confirmed by the empirical part of this study. 
(2) Instrumentalism was found to be a safe retreat from the problems 
involving realism. Although its clean-cut method helps science to progress, 
its limited view of reality obstructs human knowledge. 
(3) Constructivism was envisaged as a way out of the impasse caused by 
instrumentalism. However, constructivism and instrumentalism have the 
same pragmatic roots, so share in all its shortcomings, such as relativism, 
subjectivism and anti-realism. Is the prevalent constructivist view therefore 
the cure for the ills of contemporary science education? 
( 4) After a detailed examination of the relationship between instrumentalism 
and constructivism, as well as an appraisal of the characteristics of 
constructivism in terms of Piaget, it was concluded that the only way to 
overcome the problems of relativism, subjectivism, and anti-realism 
inherent in the constructivist approach, was to revise our notions of 
objectivity and reality. This was done in terms of contemporary philosophy 
of science, and led to critical realism. 
(5) The underlying aim of the study was to try to present to pupils a better view 
of the nature of science and scientific method than that of the 
inductivist-empiricist view. The finding that critical realism provides a sound 
foundation and method suggests several practical strategies with regard 
to how textbooks can achieve these goals of science education. 
Contemporary views on the nature of science differ in many important ways from 
the traditional views. The point of departure taken in this study was the role 
of theory in science, the way it is seen by instrumentalists and naive realists, the 
need to accommodate current views of constructivist psychology, and the 
resultant notion of critical realism. 
One way of helping pupils to gain a more correct perspective on the importance 
of scientific theory, its nature, and how it grows, is through textbooks. Contem-
porary textbooks are empiricist and increasingly instrumentalist. Therefore it is 
important that pupils (and the large number of teachers who rely on textbooks -
particularly in the Third Word) be given an explicit but brief account of the contrast 
between traditional and contemporary views of science. Also, a practical exer-
cise such as the 'thought-experiment' of the Rutherford scattering experiment 
described in 6.3.1 above, may be a useful way of illustrating the role of scientific 
theory. Finally, the social aspect of scientific theory can be gained through the 
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inclusion in all textbooks of one or two short enrichment readings of case studies, 
a simplified journal article, and a short list of recommended books as suggested 
in 6.3.4 above. 
It is hoped that textbook authors might take some of these points to heart, and 




Aikenhead G., 1985, 'Collective decision making in the social context of science', 
Science Education 69 (4), 453-475. 
Anderson H.O., 1969, Readings in science education for the secondary school, Mac-
millan, NY. 
Asimov I., 1975, The physical sciences, 1, Penguin, London. 
Ausubel D., Novak J. and Hanesian H., 1968, Educational psychology: a cognitive 
view, 2nd Ed., Holt, Rinehart, Winston. 
Ayer A.J., 1982, Philosophy in the twentieth century, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London. 
Bentley D., Ellington K. and Stewart D., 1985 (June), 'Where are we going? An 
examination of some Secondary Science Curriculum Review philosop-
hies of science education', School Science Review, 66, 658- 664. 
Berne E., 1964, Games people play, Penguin. 
Bhaskar R., 1975, A realist theory of science, Leeds Books, Leeds. 
Bhaskar R., 1989, Reclaiming reality, Verso, London. 
Bigge M., 1976, Leaming theories for teachers, Harper & Row, New York. 
Braithwaite R., 1960, Scientific explanation, Harper, New York. 
Brock W., (ed.), 1972, Case histories in science, Hulton Educational Publications, 
Amersham, Bucks. 
Bronowski J., 1961, Science and human values, Hutchinson. 
Bronowski J., 1973, The ascent of man, British Broadcasting Corporation, Lon-
don. 
Brownhill R., 1983, Education and the nature of knowledge, Crown Helm, London. 
Burbidge G., 1988 (January), 'Quasars, redshifts, and controversies', Sky and tele-
scope, 38-43. 
Burtt E., ( ed.), 1939, The English philosophers from Bacon to Mill, The Modern Li-
brary, New York. 
Calder N., 1982, Einstein's Universe, Penguin, London. 
Capra F., 1975, The Tao of physics, Flamingo. 
Cawthron E. and Rowell J., 1978, 'Epistemology and science education', Studies 
in Science Educ., 5, 31-59. 
Chalmers A., 1986, What is this thing called science?, Open University Press, Mil-
ton Keynes, England. 
Conant J., 1951, Science and common sense, Yale University Press, New Haven, 
Conn. 
Copleston F., 1955, Aquina'I, Pelican. 
Dart R., 1959, Adventures with the missing link, Hamish Hamilton, London. 
Darwin C., 1955, The voyage of the Beagle, Everyman, London. 
Dewey John, 1929, The quest for certainty: a study of the relation of knowledge and 
action, Minton, Balch and Co., New York. 
Dondeyne A., 1958, Contemporary European thought and Christian faith, Du-
quesne University Press. 
Driver R., 1981, 'Pupils' alternative frameworks in science', Eur. J. Sci. Educ., 3 
(1), 93-101. 
Driver R., 1983, The pupil m scientist?, The Open University Press, Milton 
Keynes. 
199 
Driver R. and Easley J., 1978, 'Pupils and paradigms: A review of literature re-
lated to concept development in adolescent science students', Studies 
in Sci. Educ., 5, 61-84. 
Driver R. and Erickson G., 1983, 'Theories in action: some theoretical and em-
pirical issues in the study of students' conceptual frameworks in 
science', Studies in Sci. Educ., IO, 37-60. 
Eddington A.S., 1928, The nature of the physical world, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Factor L. and Kooser R., 1981, Value presuppositions in science textbooks - a criti-
cal bibliography, Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois. 
Feder K., 1986 January, 'The challenges of pseudoscience', ]CST, 180-186. 
Feyerabend P., 1977,Against method, New Left Books, London. 
Feyerabend P., 1986, Realism, rationalism and scientific method, Volume 1, Cam-
bridge University Press, London. 
Furth H., 1969, Piaget and knowledge: theoretical foundations, Prentice-Hall, 
New Jersey. 
Gardner M., 1983, The whys of a philosophical scrivener, The Harvester Press, 
London. 
Gilbert J., Osborne R. and Fensham P., 1982, 'Children's science and its conse-
quences for teaching', Science Education, 66 (4) 623-633. 
Gilbert J. and Swift D., 1985, 'Towards a Lakatosian analysis of the Piagetian and 
Alternative Conceptions research programmes', Science Education, 69 
(5), 681-696. 
Gilbert J. and Watts D., 1983, 'Concepts, misconceptions and alternative concep-
tions: changing perspectives in science education', Studies in Sci. 
Educ., IO, 61-98. 
Gilby T., ( ed.), 1956, St Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts, Oxford University 
Press. 
Gillispie C.C., 1960, The edge of objectivity, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey. 
Good R., Herron J., Lawson A., Renner J., 1985, 'The domain of science educa-
tion', Science Education, 69 (2),139-141. 
Gould S.J., 1983, The panda's thumb, Penguin, London. 
Gribbin J., 1984, In search of Schrodinger\ cat, Corgi. 
Gruber H. and Voneche J., 1977, The essential Piaget, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Gruender C., 1989, 'Some philosophical reflections on constructivism', Proceed-
ings: The history and philosophy of science in science teaching, Florida 
State University, Tallahassee. 
Gutek G., 1974, Philosophical alternatives in education, Merrill, Columbus, Ohio. 
Guthrie W.K., 1978, The Greek Philosophers, Methuen. 
Hacking I., (ed.), 1981, Scientific revolutions, Oxford University Press. 
Hacking I., 1983, Representing and intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge. 
Hamlyn D., 1978, Experience and the growth of understanding, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
Hanson N.R., 1965, Patterns of discovery, Cambridge. 
Hanson N.R., 1971, Observation and explanation: a guide to the philosophy of 
science, George Allen and Unwin. 
200 
Happs J., 1987 March, 'How can science educators compete with sensationalist 
journalism and pseudoscience?', The Australian Science Teachers Jour-
nal, 32 ( 4 ), 40-44 
Harre R., 1986, Varieties of realism: a rationale for the natural sciences, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Harvey D., 1969, Explanation in geography, Edward Arnold, London. 
Helm H., 1980, 'Misconceptions in physics amongst South African students', 
Physics Education, 15, 92-105. 
Hempel C., 1965,Aspects of scientific explanation, New York. 
Herron M., 1971 (Febuary), 'The nature of scientific inquiry', School Review, 19, 
171-212. 
Hesse M., 1961, Forces and fields, Nelson. 
Hesse M., 1974, The structure of scientific inference, Macmillan, London. 
Hesse M., 1980, Revolutions and reconstructions in the philosophy of science, The 
Harvester Press, Sussex. 
Hewson P., 1985, 'Epistemological commitments in the learning of science: exam-
ples from dynamics', Eur. J. of Sci. Educ., 7 (2), 163-172. 
Hirst P., 1972, 'Liberal education and the nature of knowledge', in Dearden 
R.,Hirst P., Peters R. (eds.), Reason, Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Hodson D., 1982a, 'Is there a scientific method?', Education in chemistry, 19, 112-
116. 
Hodson D., 1982b (June & September), 'Science - the pursuit of truth?', Parts I 
and II, School Science Review, 643-652 and 23-30 respectively. 
Hodson D., 1985, 'Philosophy of science, Science, and Science Education', 
Studies in Science Education, 12, 25-57. 
Hodson D., 1986a, 'The nature of scientific observation', School Science Review, 
68, 17-29. 
Hodson D., 1986b, 'Rethinking the role and status of observation in science edu-
cation', Journal of Curriculum Studies, 18, 381-396. 
Hodson D., 1986c, 'Philosophy of science and science education', Journal of 
Philosophy of Education, 20, 215-225. 
Hodson D., 1988, 'Towards a philosophically more valid science curriculum', 
Science Education, 72 ( 1 ), 19-40. 
Hodson D., 1989, 'Experiments in science and science teaching', Educational 
philosophy and theory, 20 (2), 53-66. 
Holton G. and Roller D., 1958, Foundations of modem physical science, Addison-
Wesley. 
Horner J. and Rubba P., 1978 January, 'The myth of absolute truth', The Science 
Teacher, 45, 29- 30. 
Horner J. and Rubba P., 1979 February, 'Laws are mature theo- ries: a fable', 
The Science Teacher, 46, 31. 
Hurd P. de Hart, 1971, New directions in teaching secondary school science, Rand 
McNally, Chicago. 
Jacoby B.A. and Spargo P.E., 1989, 'Ptolemy revived? - The existence of a mild 
instrumentalism in some selected British, American, and South Afri-
can high school physical science textbooks', Interchange, 20 (2), 33-
53. 
Jansen C.P., 1979, Objectives of physical science teaching at secondary school'I in 
the RSA, H.S.R.C., Pretoria. 
201 
Jansen E., 1981, 'Some preliminary thoughts on the evaluation of science 
textbooks', Spectrum 193, 2-4. 
Jenkins E. and Whitfield R., 1974, Readings in science education, McGraw-Hill, 
London. 
Johanson D.C. and Edey M.A., 1981, Lucy: the beginnings of humankind, Grana-
da, London. 
Jones R., 1983, Physics as metaphor, Abacus, London. 
Kant I., 1959, Critique of pure reason, Everyman, London. . 
Kelly G. A., 1955, The psychology of personal constructs, W.W. Norton & Co., 
New York. 
Kelly G. A., 1969, 'Ontological acceleration', Clinical psychology and personality: 
the selected papers of George Kelly, Maher B. ,( ed), Wiley, New York. 
Kelly G. A., 1970, 'Behaviour as an experiment', Perspectives in personal construct 
theory, Bannister D. , ( ed), Academic, London. 
Kimball M., 1967-1968, 'Understanding the nature of science: a comparison of 
scientists and science teachers', J. of Res. in Science Teaching, 5, 68-
75. 
Knowles D., 1962, Evolution of medieval thought, Longmans. 
Koestler A., 1959, The sleepwalkers, Hutchinson, London. 
Koestler A., 1978, Janus - a summing up, Hutchinson, London. 
Krige J., 1980, Science, revolution and discontinuity, The Harvester Press, Sussex. 
Kuhn T.S., 1962, The structure of scientific revolutions, 2nd Edition, University of 
Chicago Press. 
Lago D., 1983 November, 'The tragedy of the American Space Program',Astron-
omy, 11, 24-28. , 
Lakatos I. and Musgrave A., (eds.), 1970, Criticism and the growth of knowledge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Laudan L., 1977, Progress and its problems, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Leplin J., (ed.), 1984, Scientific realism, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Lindsay A.D., 1959, introduction to Kant I., 1959,A critique of pure reason, Every-
man, London. 
Lonergan B., 1957, Insight: a study of human understanding, Darton, Longman 
and Todd, London. 
Lonergan B., 1967, Collection, (edited by F. Crowe), Herder and Herder, New 
York. 
Losee J ., 1980, A historical introduction to the philosophy of science, Oxford 
University Press. 
Lowery L. and Leonard W., 1978, 'A comparison of questioning styles among 
four widely used high school biology textbooks', J. of Res. in Sci. 
Teaching, 15, . ( 1 ), 1-10. 
Lynch P. and Strube P., 1985, 'What is the purpose of the science textbook? A 
study of authors' prefaces since the mid-nineteenth century', Eur. J. 
Sci. Educ., 7, (2), 121-130. 
Magee B., 1973, Popper, Fontana/Collins, Glasgow. 
Magee B., (ed.), 1986, Modem British Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford. 
Martin M., 1972, Concepts of science education, Scott Foresman, Illinois. 
McShane P., (ed.), 1973, Introducing the thought of Bernard Lonergan, Darton, 
Longman & Todd, London. 
202 
Medawar P., 1963 September, 'Is the scientific paper a fraud?', The Listener, 
BBC Publications, 377-8. 
Medawar P., 1967, The art of the soluble, Methuen, London. 
Medawar P., 1985, The limits of science, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Meynell H., 1976,An introduction to the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan, Macmil-
lan, London. 
Millar R. and Driver R., 1987, 'Beyond processes', Studies in Science Education, 
14, 33-62. 
Miller D., (ed.), 1983,Apocket Popper, Fontana, Oxford. 
Moshman D., and Thompson P., 1981, 'Hypothesis testing in students: sequen-
ces, stages, instructional strategies',]. of Res. in Science Teaching, 18, 
(4) 341-352. 
Nagel E., 1961, The structure of science, New York. 
Newton D., 1983, 'The sixth-form physics textbook 1870-1980', Parts 1 and 2, 
Physics Education 18, 241-246. 
Novak J., 1978, 'An alternative to Piagetian psychology for science and mathema-
tics education', Studies in Science Education, 5, 1-30. 
Ortony A., (ed.), 1979, Metaphor and thought, Cambridge University Press. 
Osborne R. and Wittrock M., 1983, 'Learning science: a generative process', 
Science Education, 67 (4), 489-508. 
Passmore J., 1986,A hundred years of philosophy, Penguin. 
Petrie H., 1981, The dilemma of enquiry and learning, University of Chicago Press. 
Piaget J., 1954, The construction of reality in the child, Basic Books, New York. 
Piaget J., 1970, Psychology and epistemology, Penguin. 
Pirsig R., 1974, Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance, Corgi, London. 
Polanyi M., 1958, Personal knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Pope M. and Gilbert J., 1983a, 'Personal experience and the construction of 
knowledge in science', Science Education, 67 (2), 193-203. 
Pope M. and Gilbert J., 1983b, 'Explanation and metaphor: some empirical ques-
tions in science education', Eur. J. of Science Education, 5, (3), 249-
261. 
Pope M. and Keen T., 1981, Personal construct psychology and education, Aca-
demic Press, London. 
Popper K., 1959, The logic of scientific discovery, Hutchinson, London. 
Popper K., 1956, 'Three views concerning human knowledge', from Lewis H., 
(ed.), Contemporary British philosophy, Allen and Unwin, London. 
Popper K., 1970, 'Normal science and its dangers', in Lakatos I. and Musgrave A, 
( eds.), 1970, Criticism and the growth of knowledge, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
Popper K., 1974, Unended quest: an intellectual autobiography, Flamingo (Fonta-
na/Collins), Glasgow. 
Popper K., 1983, in Miller D., (ed.), A pocket Popper, Fontana, Oxford. 
Posner G., Strike K., Hewson P., Gertzog W., 1982, 'Accommodation of a scien-
tific conception: toward a theory of conceptual change', Science Edu-
cation, 66 (2), 211-227. 
Powers J ., 1982, Philosophy and the new physics, Methuen, London. 
Ravetz J., 1971, Scientific knowledge and its social problems, Oxford University 
Press. 
203 
Robinson J., 1968, The nature of science and science teaching, Columbia Univer-
sity, Wadsworth Publishing Co., Belmont, California. 
Rogers E., 1977, Physics for the inquiring mind, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
Romey W., 1968, Inquiry techniques for teaching science, Prentice-Hall, New Jer-
sey. 
Rowell J., 1989, 'Piagetian epistemology: equilibration and the teaching of 
science', Synthese, 80, 141-162. 
Rowell J. and Cawthron E., 1982, 'Images of science: an empirical study', Eur.1 
of Sci. Educ., 4, (1), 79-94. 
Rowell J. and Dawson C., 1979, 'Skill integration, Piaget and education', Studies 
in Science Education, 6, 45-68. 
Rowell J. and Dawson C., 1980, 'Mountain or mole hill: Can cognitive psycho-
logy reduce the dimensions of conceptual problems in classroom prac-
tice?', Science Education, 64, 693-702. 
Rowell J. and Dawson C., 1981, 'Volume, conservation and instruction: a class-
room based solomon four group study of conflict', J. of Res. in Science 
Teaching, 18, 533-546. 
Rowell J. and Dawson C., 1983, 'Laboratory counterexamples and the growth 
of understanding in science', Eur. J. of Science Education, 5, (2), 203-
215. 
Rubba P. and Anderson H., 1978, 'Development of an instrument to assess sec-
ondary school students' understanding of the nature of scientific 
knowledge', Science Education, 62 (4), 449-458. 
Russell B., 1952, The problems of philosophy, Oxford University Press. 
Russell B., 1946 (1979), History of Western Philosophy, Unwin, London. 
Rutherford F., 1964, 'The role of inquiry in science teaching', J. of Res. in Science 
Teaching, 2, 80-84. 
SAA TPS, 1978, A science education policy for South Africa. 
SAP A, Science: A Process Approach. 
Schacht R., 1984, Classical modem philosophers, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Lon-
don. 
Schilpp P., (ed.), 1939, The philosophy of John Dewey, Northwestern University, 
Chicago. 
Schwab J., 1964, 'The teaching of science as inquiry', in The teaching of science, 
Harvard University Press. 
Screen P., 1986 September, 'The Warwick Process Science Project', School 
Science Review, 12-16. 
Selley N., 1981a (December), 'The place of alternative models in school science', 
School Science Review, 252-259. 
Selley N., 1981b, 'Models, theories and Nuffield Chemistry', Education in Chem-
istry, 18, 169-171. 
Selley N., 1989, 'The philosophy of school science', Interchange, 20 ,( 2), 24-32. 
SEP, Science Education Projec (South Africa), 1980, Teacher's Guide. 
Shapere D., 1965, Philosophical problems of natural science, Collier-Macmillan, 
Toronto, 25-26. 
Smolicz J., 1970 October, 'Paradigms and models: a comparison of intellectual 
frameworks in natural sciences and sociology', The Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 6 (2), 100-110. 
204 
Smolicz J. and Nunan E., 1975, 'The philosophical and sociological foundations 
of science education: the demythologising of school science', Studies 
in Science Education, 2, 101-143. 
Sutton C.R. and Haysom J., (eds.), 1974, Readings in science education, STEP, 
McGraw Hill, London. 
Tamir P. and Lunetta V., 1978 September, 'An analysis of laboratory inquiries 
in the BSCS Yellow Version', The American Biology Teacher, 353-357. 
Toulmin S., 1960, The philosophy of science, New York. 
Von Glasersfeld E., 1989, 'Cognition, construction of knowledge, and teaching', 
Synthese, 80, 121-140. 
Watson J.D., 1970, The double helix, Penguin, London. 
Weiner J.S., 1955, The Piltdownforge,y, Oxford University Press, London. 
Whitfield R., 1971, Disciplines of the curriculum, McGraw Hill, 13-15. 
Yager R., 1985, 'In defense of defining science education as the science/society 
interface', Science Education, 69 (2), 143-144. 
Ziman J., 1980, Teaching and learning about science and society, Cambridge 
University Press. 













Results of the Levels of Inquiry Tests 
(after Herron) ......................................................................... 1 
Results of the Task Analysis of 
Laboratory Inquiries 
( after Tamir and Lunetta) ................................................... 11 
Results of the Textbook 
Questioning Strategies Assessment Instrument 
(after Lowery and Leonard) ............................................... 50 
Results of the Text Analyses 
(after Romey) ........................................................................ 57 
Results of the Philosophical Checklist .............................. 63 
Copy of the collaborative Paper by 
Professor P.E. Spargo and myself published 
in the Canadian education journal 
Interchange in July 1989 ....................................................... 87 
Halton Arp article from 
Sky and Telescope (January 1988, pp.38-43) 
207 
APPENDIX A 
LEVELS OF INQUIRY TEXTBOOK A: Brink ' Jones 8 
----------------------------- -----------------------------
Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. 
No. lem od er Level No. lem od er Level 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
1.1 y y y 0 15.5 y y y 0 
1. 2 y y y 0 15.6 y y y 0 
2.1 y y y 0 16.1 y y y 0 
2.2 y y y 0 16.2 y y y 0 
2.3 y y y 0 16.3 y y y 0 
2.4 y y y 0 16.4 y y y 0 
2.5 y y y 0 17.1 y y y 0 
3.1 y y y 0 17.2 y y y 0 
3.2 y y y 0 18.1 y y y 0 
3.3 y y y 0 18.2 y y y 0 
4.1 y y y 0 19.1 y y y 0 
4.2 y y y 0 19.2 y y y 0 
4.3 y y y 0 19.3 y y y 0 
4.4 y y y 0 20.1 y y y 0 
4.5 y y N 1 20.2 y y y 0 
5.1 y y y 0 
5.2 y y y 0 
5.3 y y y 0 
5.4 y y y 0 
5.5 y y y 0 
5.6 y y y 0 
5.7 y y y 0 
5.8 y y y 0 
5.9 y y y 0 
6.1 y y y 0 
6.2 y y y 0 
7.1 y y y 0 
7.2 y y y 0 
7.3 y y y 0 
7.4 y y y 0 
7.5 y y y 0 
7.6 y y y 0 
8.1 y y y 0 
8.2 y y y 0 
9.1 y y y 0 
9.2 y y y 0 
9.3 y y N 1 
9.4 y y y 0 (Answers not given in 
9.5 y y y 0 lab inquiry itself, 
9.6 y y y 0 but immediately in 
10.1 y y y 0 following text.) 
10.2 y y y 0 
10.3 y y y 0 
10.4 y y y 0 Level O: 96% 
11.1 y y y 0 II 1: 4 
11. 2 y y y 0 II 2 : 0 
11. 3 y y N 1 II 3: 0 
15.1 y y y 0 
15.2 y y y 0 TOTAL No: 66 
15.3 y y y 0 
15.4 y y y 0 
page 1 
LEVELS OF INQUIRY TEXTBOOK B: Pienaar & Walters 8 
----------------------------- -----------------------------
Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. 
No. lem od er Level No. lem od er Level 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
1.1 y y y 0 16.2 y y y 0 
1. 2 y y y 0 17.1 y y y 0 
1. 3 y y y 0 17.2 y y y 0 
2.1 y y y 0 17.3 y y y 0 
2.2 y y y 0 18.1 y y N 1 
2.3 y y y 0 18.2 y y N 1 
2.4 y y y 0 18.3 y y N 1 
2.5 y y y 0 18.4 y y N 1 
2.6 y y y 0 19.1 y y y 0 
2.7 y y y 0 19.2 y y y 0 
2.8 y y y 0 
3.1 y y y 0 
3.2 y y y 0 
4.1 y y y 0 
4.2 y y N 1 
4.3 y y y 0 
4.4 y y y 0 
4.5 y y y 0 
5.1 y y y 0 
6.1 y y N 1 
6.2 y y y 0 
6.3 y y y 0 
6.4 y y y 0 
6.5 y y y 0 
7.1 y y y 0 
7.2 y y N 1 
7.3 y y y 0 
7.4 y y y 0 
9.1 y y y 0 
9.2 y y y 0 
9.3 y y y 0 
9.4 y y y 0 
9.5 y y y 0 
9.6 y y y 0 
10.1 y y y 0 
10.2 y y y 0 
10.3 y y y 0 
10.4 y y y 0 (Answers not given in 
10.5 y y y 0 lab inquiry itself, 
14.1 y y N 1 but immediately in 
14.2 y y N 1 following text.) 
14.3 y y y 0 
14.4 y y y 0 
14.5 y y y 0 Level O: 84% 
14.6 y y y 0 II 1: 16 
14.7 y y y 0 II 2: 0 
15.1 y y N 1 II 3: 0 
15.2 y y y 0 
15.3 y y y 0 TOTAL No: 61 
15.4 y y y 0 
16.1 y y y 0 
page 2 
LEVELS OF INQUIRY TEXTBOOK C: Broster & James 8 
----------------------------- -----------------------------
Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. 
Page lem od er Level Page lem od er Level 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
6 y y y 0 142 y y y 0 
8 y y y 0 143 y y y 0 
9 y y y 0 146 y y N 1 
11 y y y 0 147 y y N 1 
16 y y y 0 151 y y y 0 
19 y y y 0 154 y y y 0 
20 y y y 0 155 y y y 0 
21 y y y 0 158 y y y 0 
21 y y y 0 165 y y N 1 
22 y y y 0 166 y y y 0 
26 y y y 0 168 y y y 0 
27 y y y 0 172 y y y 0 
30 y y y 0 173 y y y 0 
31 y y y 0 178 y y N 1 
32 y y y 0 179 y y N 1 
38 y y y 0 183 y y y 0 
39 y y y 0 185 y y y 0 
44 y y y 0 186 y y N 1 
46 y y y 0 
46 y y y 0 
47 y y y 0 
48 y y y 0 
50 y y y 0 
51 y y y 0 
53 y y y 0 
53 y y y 0 
57 y y y 0 
59 y y y 0 
61 y y y 0 
63 y y y 0 
67 y y y 0 
69 y y y 0 
70 y y y 0 
71 y y y 0 
74 y y y 0 
80 y y y 0 
85 y y y 0 
93 y y y 0 (Answers not given in 
95 y y y 0 lab inquiry itself, 
96 y y y 0 but immediately in 
99 y y y 0 following text.) 
100 y y y 0 
103 y y y 0 
107 y y y 0 Level O: 91% 
111 y y y 0 II 1: 9 
114 y y y 0 II 2: 0 
115 y y y 0 II 3: 0 
136 y y y 0 
137 y y y 0 TOTAL No: 69 
138 y y y 0 
139 y y y 0 
page 3 
LEVELS OF INQUIRY TEXTBOOK J: SEP 8 
----------------------------- -----------------------------
Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. 
Page lem od er Level Page lem od er Level 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
1 y y N 1 135 y y N 1 
2 y y N 1 137 y y N 1 
5 y y N 1 141 y y N 1 
6 y y N 1 146 y y N 1 
7 y y N 1 150 y y N 1 
8 y y N 1 153 y y N 1 
9 y y N 1 159 y y N 1 
12 y y N 1 161 y y N 1 
13 y y N 1 166 y y N 1 
14 y y N 1 168 y y N 1 
15 y y N 1 170 y y N 1 
17 y y N 1 172 y y N 1 
19 y y N 1 174 y y N 1 
22 y y N 1 179 y y N 1 
25 y y y 0 183 y y N 1 
28 y y N 1 186 y y N 1 
30 y y y 0 191 y y N 1 
32 y y N 1 
35 y y N 1 
37 y y N 1 
39 y y N 1 
41 y y N 1 
43 y y N 1 
46 y y N 1 
48 y y N 1 
51 y y N 1 
54 y y N 1 
58 y y N 1 
63 y y N 1 
66 y y N 1 
69 y y N 1 
72 y y N 1 
76 y y N 1 
78 y y N 1 
81 y y N 1 
88 y y N 1 
93 y y N 1 
96 y y N 1 
100 y y N 1 
105 y y N 1 
109 y y N 1 
111 y y N 1 
112 y y N 1 
115 y y y 0 Level o: 4% 
119 y y N 1 II 1: 96 
120 y y N 1 II 2 : 0 
124 y y N 1 II 3 : 0 
126 y y N 1 
128 y y N 1 TOTAL No: 68 
131 y y N 1 
132 y y N 1 
page 4 
LEVELS OF INQUIRY TEXTBOOK K: Duncan GCSE Physics 
-----------------------------
Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. 
Page lem od er Level 
----- ----- -----
10 y y N 1 
12 y y y 0 * 
14 y y y 0 * 
17 y y y 0 * 
18 y y N 1 
20 y y N 1 
23 y y N 1 
24 y y y 0 
26 y y y 0 * Answers not given in 
30 y y y 0 prac, but given immedi-
37 y y y 0 ately after in Text. 
41 y y N 1 
57 y y N 1 
60 y y y 0 * 
62 y y y 0 
63 y y N 1 
68 y y y 0 
71 y y y 0 
74 y y y 0 
78 y y N 1 
80 y y N 1 
88 y y y 0 
100 y y N 1 
104 y y y 0 
108 y y y 0 
112 y y y 0 
113 y y N 1 
116 y y N 1 
128 y y y 0 
128 y y y 0 Most of the Level l's were 
131 y y N 1 calculations. 
134 y y N 1 Highly computative type 
134 y y N 1 of practical work (eg work 
158 y y y 0 out your own power) 
160 y y y 0 
167 y y y 0 
170 y y y 0 Many "see-for-yourself" 
173 y y y 0 type; confirmations. 
181 y y N 1 
185 y y y 0 Very instrumentalist. 
189 y y y 0 
193 y y y 0 
199 y y y 0 
215 y y y 0 Level O: 67% 
226 y y y 0 II 1: 33 
238 y y y 0 II 2 : 0 
243 y y y 0 II 3 : 0 
243 y y y 0 
TOTAL No: 48 
page 5 
LEVELS OF INQUIRY TEXTBOOK R: Harvard: Concepts in Motion 
-----------------------------
Prob- Meth- Answ Inqu. 
Page lem od er Level 
----- ----- -----
134 y y N 1 
142 y y N 1 
144 y y N 1 
145 y y y 0 
153 y y y 0 
157 y y N 1 
158 y y N 1 
166 y y N 1 
169 y y N 1 
176 y y y 0 
179 y N N 2 
181 y y N 1 
182 y y N 1 
Level O: 23% 
II 1: 69 
II 2: 8 
II 3 : 0 
TOTAL No: 13 
page 6 
LEVELS OF INQUIRY 
RANDOM SAMPLING: (Ten pages randomly selected from each 
Textbook.) (X = no practical inquiry on that page) 
A. Brink ' Jones 8 B. Pienaar & Walters 8 Page Level Page Level 
9 X 188 X 
218 X 315 X 
16 0 40 0 
189 0 319 X 
87 X 285 X 
100 X 92 X 
15 X 147 X 
202 0 234 X 
244 0 203 X 
240 X 326 X 
c. Broster & James 8 D. Brink & Jones 9 
Page Level Page Level 
16 0 204 X 
189 X 188 0 
87 X 312 X 
100 1 40 0 
15 X 285 X 
55 X 92 0 
40 X 146 X 
79 X 234 X 
80 0 109 X 
188 X 85 X 
E. Pienaar & Walters 9 F. Broster & James 9 
Page Level Page Level 
316 X 100 X 
100 0 15 X 
210 X 202 0 
19 0 55 X 
344 0 40 0 
96 X 79 0 
338 0 80 X 
260 0 77 X 
51 0 207 0 
50 0 188 X 
G. Brink & Jones 10 H. Pienaar & Walters 10 
Page Level Page Level 
204 X 12 X 
188 X 101 X 
31 X 210 X 
40 0 22 X 
82 X 204 X 
92 1 97 X 
146 0 110 X 
234 1 260 0 
109 0 51 X 
89 X 50 X 
page 7 



































































































































































































u. Nigerian Physics 
Page Level 
10 Bk 1 X 
14 II 0 
59 II 1 
82 Bk 2 X 
47 II 0 
24 II X 
140 II X 
33 Bk 3 0 
42 II X 
52 II X 
w. Jansen & Dekker 
Page Level 
18 Std 6 X 
14 II 0 
51 II 0 
82 II 0 
45 II X 
24 Std 7 0 
7 II X 
75 II X 
114 II 1 
59 II X 
























v. Kenyan Physics 
Page Level 
91 Bk 1 0 
14 II X 
51 II 0 
82 Bk 2 0 
45 II 1 
24 II 0 
7 Bk 3 0 
33 II X 
34 Bk 4 X 
25 II X 
page 9 
SUMMARY OF SAMPLED LABORATORY INQUIRIES 
TEXTBOOK 
Level A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 p Q R s T u V w 
0 4 1 2 3 7 4 3 1 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 6 3 0 0 2 3 5 4 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 8 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 4 3 0 1 1 1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Level Total _L 
Overall 87 
0 56 64 
1 28 32 
2 3 4 
3 0 0 
South African ~ 
0 25 66 
1 12 31 
2 1 3 
3 0 0 
British 24 
0 17 71 
1 6 25 
2 1 4 
3 0 0 
American 10 
0 2 20 
1 7 70 
2 1 10 
3 0 0 
African 15 
0 12 80 
1 3 20 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
page 10 
APPENDIX B 
TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook A 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Brink & Jones a (1) Lvl 1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 
1. Recognise & def. 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn.& 
meas. procedures 
--------------------------------------
5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. Carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
?.Record results 
8. Transform rslts. 




























--- --- --- ---
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
-------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 


































































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( " 

































































































OVERALL LEVEL: I O I 1 I 1 I O I 1 I O I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook A 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Brink & Jones 8 (2) Lvl 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 
1. Recognise & def. 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas. procedures 
--------------------------------------
5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. Carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
?.Record results 
a. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations or models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 



























































































































































































O (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 

































































































OVERALL LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I 1 I O I O I 1 I O I 1 I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook A 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Brink & Jones 8 (3) Lvl 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 8.1 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 












5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations or models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
-------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 






































































--- --- --- --- --- --- ---







































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 

































































































LEVEL: I 1 I 1 I 1 I O I 1 I 1 I 1 I O j O j O I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook A 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Brink & Jones a (4) Lvl 8.2 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.610.110.210.310.4 
1. Recognise & def. 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas. procedures 
------------------- ---
5. Design expts 
-------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
?.Record results 
a. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations or models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 



























































































































































































o (Max s) 
X 1 ( " 4) 
2 ( " 

































































































LEVEL: I 1 I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I 1 I O I 1 I 
page 14 
TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook A 
--------------------------------------------------------------------I Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Brink & Jones 8 (5) Lvlll.lll.211.315.115.215.315.415.515.616.116.2 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 










































------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. Carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
a. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations or models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 


















































































































































O (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 































































































LEVEL: I O I O I O I 1 I O I O I O I O I O I 1 I 1 I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook A 
--------------------------------------------------------------------I Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Brink & Jones 8 (6) Lvl16.316.417.117.218.118.219.119.219.320.120.2 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 



















































































0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 































































































Result A: LEVEL: I 1 I O I O I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I O I 1 I O I 
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RESULTS: TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook A 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Brink & Jones 8 
--------------------------
1. Recognise and define 
2. Formulate hypothesis 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observation and 
measurement procedures 
----------------------------------------------------
5. Design experiments 
----------------------------------------------------6. carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
3 
7.Record results, describe o 
8. Transform results into 
standard forms 
----------------------------------------------------9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 
12. Define limitations or 
assumptions 
----------------------------------------------------
13. Learn techniques 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 
----------------------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" lab 
inquiries 



















































RESULT A: (Columns) RESULT B: (Rows) 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------
Number Total l Number Total 1 
Level o: 36 66 55 Level o: 165 330 50 
Level 1: 30 66 45 Level 1: 106 264 40 
Level 2: 0 66 0 Level 2: 1 264 0 
Level 3: 0 66 0 Level 3: 0 198 0 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------
page 17 
TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook B 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Pienaar & w. 8 (1) Lvl 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
-------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 




























































































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( " 4) 
































































































OVERALL LEVEL: I O I O I 1 j O I O I 1 I O I 1 I O I O I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook B 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Pienaar & w. 8 (2) Lvl 3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------
5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
a. Transform rslts 




























--- --- --- ---
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
inquiries 
------------------- 3 


































































































































































O (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 































































































LEVEL: I O I O I 1 I 1 I O I 1 j 1 j O j O I 1 j 1 I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook B 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Pienaar & w. 8 (3) Lvl 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 






































------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
5. Design expts 
-------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
e. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 


































































































































































































X 1 ( " 4) 
2 ( " 4) 



















































LEVEL: I 1 I O I 1 I 1 I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook B 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Pienaar & w. 8 (4) Lvl 9.610.110.210.310.410.514.114.214.314.414.5 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------
5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. Carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
?.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 






































































































































































































































X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 



















































LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook B 
--------------------------------------------------------------------I Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Pienaar & w. 8 (5) Lvl14.614.715.115.215.315.416.116.217.117.217.3 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------
5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
a. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
-------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 
















































































--- --- --- --- ---
0 0 0 0 0 






































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 
































































































LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I O I O I 1 I O I O I O I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook B 
-------------------------------------------------------I Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Pienaar & Walters 8 (6) LvllB.118.218.318.419.119.2 
1. Recognise and define 
problem 
2. Formulate hypothesis 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 





















0 0 0 0 0 0 
s. Design experiments 3 o o o o o O 
-------------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
6. carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
?.Record results, describe o 





















--- --- --- --- --- --- ---
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 
12. Define limitations or 
assumptions 
----------------------------------------------------
13. Learn techniques 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 
----------------------------------------------------































































{ O (Max S) 
X { 1 ( 11 4) 
{ 2 ( " 4) 























































Results A: LEVEL: I 1 I 1 I O I O I 1 I O I 
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RESULTS: TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook B 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pienaar & Walters 8 
--------------------------
1. Recognise and define 
--------------------------
2. Formulate hypothesis 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 

























------------------------------------------------ ------- ---------- ------- -------s. Design experiments 3 o o 0 
----------------------------------------------------
6. carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
7.Record results, describe o 




10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 
12. Define limitations or 
assumptions 
----------------------------------------------------
13. Learn techniques 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 
--------------------------




------- -------------- ------- ----------------------
59 97 
58 95 126 
9 15 










------- ------- ------------------ ------- -----------
0 0 
-------------------------- 3 ------- ------- 0 
16. Work according to own 
design 0 0 
----------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------- ------------
RESULT A: (Columns) RESULT B: (Rows) 
------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------
Number Total 1 Number Total ! 
Level o: 45 61 74 Level o: 155 305 51 
Level 1: 16 61 26 Level 1: 66 244 27 
Level 2: 0 61 0 Level 2: 0 244 0 
Level 3: 0 61 0 Level 3: 0 183 0 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------
page 24 
TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook c 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Broster & J. a (1) Lvl 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------
5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
?.Record results 
a. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 






Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 


























































































0 0 0 0 0 0 






















































































O (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 
































































































OVERALL LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I 1 I 1 I O I O I O I 1 I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook c 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. I 
Broster & J. 8 (2) Lvl 27 30 31 32 38 39 44 46 46 47 48 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------
5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
?.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
-------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
tions, models 
12. Define limit or 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 








































































































































































































































X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( " 4) 



















































LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook c 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry No. 
Broster & J. 8 (3) Lvl so 51 53 53 57 59 61 63 67 69 70 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 















































s. Design expts 3 o o o o o o o o O O o 
------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
6. Carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 



































































































































o (Max s) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 































































































LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook C 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
Broster & J. 8 (4) Lvl 71 74 80 85 93 95 96 99 100 103 107 
-------------------
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------









6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
?.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
lab std forms 
-------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
-------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 






















































































--- --- --- --- ---
0 0 0 0 0 







































































































































X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 



















































LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I O I O I 1 I O I O I O I 1 I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook c 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
Broster & J. a (5) Lvl 111 114 115 136 137 138 139 142 143 146 147 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 






































------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---






------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
a. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 








































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 































































































LEVEL: I 1 I O I 1 I 1 I 1 I O I O I 1 I 1 I 1 I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook c 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
Broster & J. 8 (6) Lvl 151 154 155 158 165 166 168 172 173 178 179 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 










































------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
5. Design expts 3 0 
------------------- ---------------------- ---
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- O 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 

















































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 
































































































OVERALL LEVEL: I O I O I 1 I O I O I O I O I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook c 
----------------------------------------------------
Broster & James 8 (7) 
Lab Ing Pg No. I 
Lvl 183 185 186 
--------------------------
1. Recognise and define 
problem 
--------------------------
2. Formulate hypothesis 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observation and 
measurement procedures 
----------------------------------------------------s. Design experiments 
----------------------------------------------------
6. carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
3 
7.Record results, describe o 




10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 
12. Define limitations or 
assumptions 
----------------------------------------------------
13. Learn techniques 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 
----------------------------------------------------































































{ o (Max 5) 
X { 1 ( 11 4) 
{ 2 ( II 4) 































OVERALL LEVEL: I 1 I O I 1 j 
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RESULTS: TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook C 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Broster & James 8 
1. Recognise and define 
2. Formulate hypothesis 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 






















-------------------------- ------- -~------- ------- - ----
5. Design experiments 3 o o 
-------------------------- ------- --------------------------------- --- ------- -------
6. Carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
7.Record results, describe o 




10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 
12. Define limitations or 
assumptions 
----------------------------------------------------
13. Learn techniques 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 
--------------------------

















-------------------------- 3 ------- -------
16. Work according to own 















RESULT A: (Columns) RESULT B: (Rows) 
------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------
Number Total ~ Number Total 1 
Level o: 50 69 73 Level O: 189 345 55 
Level 1: 19 69 27 Level 1: 81 276 29 
Level 2: 0 69 0 Level 2: 0 276 0 
Level 3: 0 69 0 Level 3: 0 138 0 
------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook J 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
SEP 8 (1) 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 











Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 





































------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
5. Design expts 3 o o o o o o o o o o o 
------------------- --- ---
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
a. Transform rslts 

































--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 

































































































O (Max 5) 
X l ( 11 4) 
2 ( " 




































































































OVERALL LEVEL: I 1 I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I 2 I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook J 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
SEP 8 (2) Lvl 17 19 22 25 28 30 32 35 37 39 41 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 








5. Design expts 3 0 
-------------------------------------- --- ---
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 


















































































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 




































































































LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I O I 1 I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook J 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
SEP 8 (3) Lvl 43 46 48 51 54 58 63 66 69 72 76 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 








5. Design expts 
--------------------------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 










10. Make inferences 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 















































































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( " 4) 
2 ( " 




































































































LEVEL : I 2 I 1 I 2 I O I O I O I 2 I O I O I 2 I O I 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook J 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
SEP 8 (4) Lvl 78 81 88 93 96 100 105 109 111 112 115 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------




































0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
6. Carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 


















--- --- --- --- --- ---
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 
















































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook J 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
SEP 8 (5) Lvl 119 120 124 126 128 131 132 135 137 141 146 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------














6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
tative work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 












































































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook J 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
SEP 8 (6) Lvl 150 153 159 161 166 168 170 172 174 179 183 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 
4. Design observn & 
meas procedures 
--------------------------------------
5. Design expts 
-------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 























































































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook J 
---------------------------------------------------
SEP 8 (7) 
Lab Ing Page Nol 
Level 186 191 
-------------------------- -------
1. Recognise & define 
problem 
--------------------------
2. Formulate hypothesis 
3. Predict 
--------------------------












-------------------------- ------- --- ---
5. Design experiments 3 o o 
-------------------------- --------------------------------- ------- --- ---
6. carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
7.Record results, describe 










-------------------------- ------- --- ---
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 












-------------------------- ------- --- ---
13. Learn techniques 







15. Perform "dry" lab 
inquiries 

















{ 0 (Max 5) 5 5 
X { 1 ( " 4) 3 0 
{ 2 ( " 4) l l 
{ 3 ( " 3) 0 0 ------------------------------------------------------
{ 0 












OVERALL LEVEL: I l I O I 
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RESULTS: TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook J 
-------------------------------------------------------------
SEP 8 
1. Recognise and define 
2. Formulate hypothesis 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 


















4 -------------------------- ------- --------------------------------- --- ------- -------
5. Design experiments 3 3 4 
-------------------------- ------- --------------------------------- --- ------- -------
6. carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
7.Record results, describe O 




10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 














0 0 -------------------------- ------- --------------------------------- --- ------- -------
13. Learn techniques 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 
----------------------------------------------------







-------------------------- 3 ------- -------
16. Work according to own 















RESULT A: (Columns) RESULT B: (Rows) 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------
Number Total ~ Number Total 1 
Level O: 42 68 62 Level o: 243 340 71 
Level 1: 15 68 22 Level 1: 83 272 31 
Level 2: 11 68 16 Level 2: 68 272 25 
Level 3: 0 68 0 Level 3: 7 204 3 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook K 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
Duncan: Physics (1) Lvl 10 12 14 17 18 20 23 24 26 30 37 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 







--- ---s. Design expts 
--------------------------------------6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
inquiries 
------------------- 3 



















































































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook K 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
Duncan: Physics (2) Lvl 41 57 60 62 63 68 71 74 78 80 88 
1. Recognise, def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 


































meas procedures o o o o o o 1 o o o O 
------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
5. Design expts 
-------------------
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
3 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 










































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook K 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
Duncan: Physics (3) Lvl 100 104 108 112 113 116 128 128 131 134 134 
-------------------
1. Recognise, def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 














































------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
5. Design expts 3 o o o o o o o o o o o 
------------------- --- ---
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
inquiries 
------------------- 3 































































































































O (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( " 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook K 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
Duncan: Physics (4) Lvl 158 160 167 170 173 181 185 189 193 199 215 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 























--- --- --- --- --- ---
5. Design expts 3 0 
------------------- --- ---
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 
to std forms 
--------------------------------------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
0 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits 
assumptions 
--------------------------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
lab inquiries 
------------------- 3 

































































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 




































































































LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I O j O I O I O I O I O I O I 
page 44 
TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook K 
----------------------------------------------------
Duncan: GCSE Physics (5) 
Lab Ing Page No.I 
Level 226 238 243 243 
-------------------------- -------
1. Recognise & define 
problem 
--------------------------
2. Formulate hypothesis 
3. Predict 




















------- --- --- --- ---
5. Design experiments 3 o o o O 
-------------------------- --------------------------------- ------- ---
6. Carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
7.Record results, describe 





10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 




13. Learn techniques 




15. Perform "dry" lab 
inquiries 























































{ o (Max 5) 
X { 1 ( 11 4) 
{ 2 (" 4) 







































OVERALL LEVEL: I O I O I O I O I 
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RESULTS: TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES 
Duncan: GCSE Physics 
1. Recognise and define 
2. Formulate hypothesis 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 




















2 -------------------------- ------- --------------------------------- --- ------- -------
5. Design experiments 3 o o 
-------------------------- ------- --------------------------------- --- ------- -------
6. Carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
7.Record results, describe o 




10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 
12. Define limitations or 
assumptions 
----------------------------------------------------
13. Learn techniques 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 
----------------------------------------------------





















-------------------------- 3 ------- -------
16. Work according to own 
















RESULT A: (Columns) RESULT B: (Rows) 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------
Number Total 1 Number Total 1 
Level o: 40 48 83 Level o: 180 240 75 
Level 1: 8 48 17 Level 1: 28 192 15 
Level 2: 0 48 0 Level 2: 1 192 1 
Level 3: 0 48 0 Level 3: 0 144 0 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook R 
Laboratory Inquiry Page No. 
Harvard Physics (1) Lvl 134 142 144 145 153 157 158 166 169 176 179 
1. Recognise & def 
problem 
2. Form hypothesis 
------------------- 2 
3. Predict 







































--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
5. Design expts 3 0 0 0 
------------------- --- --- --- ---
6. carry out obsvns 
measurements, expts 
7.Record results 
8. Transform rslts 








10. Make inferences 
11. Form generalis- 1 
ations, models 
12. Define limits, 
assumptions 
-------------------
13. Learn technique 
14. Perform quanti- o 
work 
--------------------------------------
15. Perform "dry" 
inquiries 
------------------- 3 












































































































































o (Max 5) 
X 1 ( 11 4) 
2 ( II 4) 
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TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook R 
Lab Ing Page 
Harvard Project Physics(2) Level 181 182 
-------------------------- -------
1. Recognise ' define problem 1 0 
--------------------------
2. Formulate hypothesis 0 0 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 0 0 
--------------------------
4. Design observation and 
measurement procedures 0 0 
-------------------------- --------------------------------- ------- ---
5. Design experiments 3 0 0 
-------------------------- --------------------------------- ------- ---
6. carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 1 1 
--------------------------
7.Record results, describe 0 1 1 
--------------------------
8. Transform results into 
standard forms 0 0 
-------------------------- --------------------------------- ------- --- ---
9. Explain 0 0 
--------------------------
10. Make inferences 1 0 
--------------------------
11. Formulate generalisa- 1 
tions or models 1 1 
--------------------------
12. Define limitations or 
assumptions 0 0 
-------------------------- --------------------------------- -------
13. Learn techniques 1 1 
--------------------------
14. Perform quantitative 0 
work 1 0 
-------------------------- --------------------------------- -------
15. Perform "dry" lab 
inquiries 0 0 
-------------------------- 3 
16. Work according to own 









{ 0 (Max 5) 4 3 
X { 1 ( II 4) 2 1 
{ 2 ( II 4) 1 0 
{ 3 ( II 3) 0 0 
----------------------------------------------------
{ 0 












OVERALL LEVEL: I 1 I O I 
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No. I 
RESULTS: TASK ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY INQUIRIES Textbook R 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Harvard Project Physics 
1. Recognise and define 
2. Formulate hypothesis 
-------------------------- 2 
3. Predict 






















-------------------------- ------- --------------------------------- --- ------- -------
5. Design experiments 3 1 8 
----------------------------------------------------
6. carry out observations, 
measurements, experiments 
?.Record results, describe o 






-------------------------- ------- --------------------------------- --- ------- -------
9. Explain 
10. Make inferences 
11. Formulate generalisa-
tions or models 







-------------------------- ------- ---------- ------- -------
13. Learn techniques 
14. Perform quantitative 
work 
----------------------------------------------------







-------------------------- 3 ------- -------
16. Work according to own 















RESULT A: (Columns) RESULT B: (Rows) 
------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------
Number Total i Number Total 1 
Level o: 6 13 46 Level o: 57 65 88 
Level 1: 6 13 46 Level 1: 23 52 44 
Level 2: 1 13 8 Level 2: 9 52 17 




TEXTBOOK QUESTIONING STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 
Textbook: Brink & Jones 8 
(Random pages:21 115 151 67 
Textbook A 
227 208 190 202 55 20) 
No. of Sentences: 220 No. of Questions: 20 
Ratio S/Q: 11,00 (Q/S: 0,09) 
A. Non-experiential 
1.Rhetor- 2.Direct 3.Focusing 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
ical Information Ended 
---------- ------------- ----------- ---------- -----------





a. Observing 3 (15%) 
-----------
b. Communicating 0 
-----------
c. Comparing 1 (5%) 
-----------
d. Organising 0 
-----------
e. Experimenting 0 
-----------
f. Inferring 0 
-----------
g. Applying 0 
c. Position of Questions 
Initiatory 
8 ( 4 0%) 
Contextual 
0 
*%of Total Questions 
0 0 0 
3.Focus- 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
ing Ended 
--------- --------- ----------
5 (25%) 0 0 
--------- --------- ----------
0 0 0 
--------- --------- ----------
2 (10%) 1 (5%) 0 
--------- --------- ----------
0 0 0 
--------- --------- ----------
0 0 0 
--------- --------- ----------
2 (10%) 3 (15%) 0 
--------- --------- ----------






TEXTBOOK QUESTIONING STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 
Textbook: Pienaar & Walters 
(Random pages:21 115 152 69 
8 Textbook B 
229 208 187 202 55 20) 
No. of Sentences: 160 No. of Questions: 11 
Ratio S/Q: 14,55 (Q/S: 0,09) 
A. Non-experiential 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1.Rhetor- 2.Direct 3.Focusing 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
ical Information Ended 
---------- ------------- ----------- ---------- -----------




3.Focus- 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
ing Ended 
a. Observing 2 (18%) 2 (18%) O O 
b. Communicating O O O O 
c. Comparing O 2 (18%) O O 
d. Organising O O O O 
e. Experimenting O o O O 
f. Inferring 0 1 ( 9%) 2 (19%) 0 
g. Applying O O O 0 
c. Position of Questions 
Initiatory 
1 ( 9%) 
Contextual 




TEXTBOOK QUESTIONING STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 
Textbook: Brester & James 8 Textbook C 
(Random pages:21 115 151 67 190 12 55 20 188 140} 
No. of Sentences: 251 No. of Questions: 23 
Ratio S/Q: 10,91 (Q/S: 0,09) 
A. Non-experiential 
1.Rhetor- 2.Direct 3.Focusing 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
ical Information Ended 
---------- ------------- ----------- ---------- -----------




3.Focus- 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
ing Ended 
a. Observing 5 (22%) o o O 
b. Communicating O O O O 
c. Comparing 3 ( 13%) 2 (9%) 0 0 
d. Organising O o o O 
e. Experimenting O O O O 
f. Inferring 3 (13%) 3 (13%) 1 ( 4%) 0 
g. Applying O O O 0 









TEXTBOOK QUESTIONING STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 
Textbook: SEP 8 Textbook J 
(Random pages:21 115 151 67 190 12 55 20 140 18) 
No. of Sentences: 74 No. of Questions: 15 
Ratio S/Q: 4,93 (Q/S: 0,20) 
A. Non-experiential 
1.Rhetor- 2.Direct 3.Focusing 4.0pen-
ical Information Ended 













a. Observing 4 (25%) 2 (13%) 1 (7%) O 





e. Experimenting O 
f. Inferring 1 (7%) 
g. Applying 
c. Position of Questions 
Initiatory 
3 ( 2 0%) 
Contextual 
3 (20%) 




















TEXTBOOK QUESTIONING STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 
Textbook: Duncan GCSE Physics Textbook K 
(Random pages:21 119 149 66 227 208 191 202 12 221) 
No. of Sentences: 217 No. of Questions: 27 
Ratio S/Q: 8,04 (Q/S: 0,12) 
A. Non-experiential 
-------------------------------------------------------------
1.Rhetor- 2.Direct 3.Focusing 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
ical Information Ended 
---------- ------------- ----------- ---------- -----------









---------------- ----------- --------- --------- ----------
a. Observing O O o O 
b. Communicating O O O O 
c. Comparing O o o O 
d. Organising O o O O 
e. Experimenting O O o O 
f. Inferring 2 (15%) o o o 
g. Applying 2 (15%) 2 (15%) 0 0 









TEXTBOOK QUESTIONING STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 
Textbook: Harvard Project Physics Textbook R 
(Random pages:21 115 151 67 190 12 54 20 138 18) 
No. of Sentences: 225 No. of Questions: 27 
Ratio S/Q: 8,33 (Q/S: 0,12) 
A. Non-experiential 
1.Rhetor- 2.Direct 3.Focusing 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
ical Information Ended 
---------- ------------- ----------- ---------- -----------
1 (4%) 1 (4%) 5 (19%) 3 (11%) 0 
B. Experiential 
2.Direct 3.Focus- 4.0pen- 5.Valuing 
Information ing Ended 
----------- --------- --------- ----------
a. Observing 1 ( 4%) 2 (7%) 2 (7%) 0 
----------- --------- --------- ----------
b. Communicating 0 0 0 0 
----------- --------- --------- ----------
c. Comparing 1 (4%) 2 (7%) 1 (4%) 0 
----------- --------- --------- ----------
d. Organising 0 0 0 0 
----------- --------- --------- ----------
e. Experimenting 0 0 2 (7%) 0 
----------- --------- --------- ----------
f. Inferring 2 ( 7%) 1 (4%) 2 (7%) 0 
----------- --------- --------- ----------
g. Applying 0 0 1 (4%) 0 




8 ( 3 0%) 
Terminal Captional 
12 (44%) 
*%of Total Questions 
page 55 
D. ComRarison of Questioning Style in Reading Content 
----------------------------------------------------------------
TEXTBOOK: Brink Pien. Brost. SEP Duncan Harv. 
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
No. of Questions 20 11 23 15 27 27 
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
No. of Sentences 220 160 251 74 217 225 
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
% of Ques. per Sent. 9% 7% 9% 20% 12% 12% 
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
% of Experientl. Qu. 85% 82% 74% 93% 45% 66% 
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
9--
0 of Non-Expertl.Qu. 15% 18% 26% 7% 55% 34 
-------------------- ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== 
% of Initiatory Qu. 40% 9% 17% 20% 0% 26% 
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
% of Contextual Qu. 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 30% 
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
% of Terminal Ques. 60% 91% 83% 60% 100% 44% 
-------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
% of Captional Ques. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
page 56 
APPENDIXD 
TEXT ANALYSIS Take 25 sentences, assigning each to category below. 
Textbook A: Brink & Jones 8 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Tot 
Random Page Number: 20 193 140 18 204 128 38 237 142 56 250 ~ 0 
--------------------- -- --- --- -- --- --- -- --- --- -- --- ---
a. Facts 9 13 7 13 13 13 3 7 24 21 123 49 
b. Conclusions 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 2 
c. Definitions 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 3 
d. Ques. asked but 
answd immediatelv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Questions requrng 
stud. to analvse data 2 2 7 2 1 3 6 3 0 0 26 10 
f. Statements requrng 
ouoil to form concln 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Dir. to pupil to 
oerform& analvse act. 7 6 10 5 8 5 15 12 1 0 69 28 
h.Ques to arouse intr 
-not answered immdtlv 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 4 2 
i. Sentence directing 
student to fioure 1 3 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 3 12 5 
i . Rhetorical auestns 0 0 1 0 0 1 ol 0 0 1 3 1 
overall Involvement 
Index for Text 
(e + f + g + h) 
(a+ b + C + d) 
26 + 1 + 69 + 4 = 0,74 
123 + 5 + 7 + 0 
ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS AT CHAPTER ENDS 
Textbook: Brink & Jones 8 
Chagter 
-----------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
a. ( *) 5 8 3 5 2 4 2 2 1 4 1 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 7 1 
b. 2 2 2 3 0 1 2 0 0 2 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
c. 2 2 4 0 5 3 0 4 1 0 2 1 4 4 4 7 4 4 1 5 
d. 5 0 0 4 2 4 2 2 2 0 3 4 0 4 1 0 0 0 7 1 
e. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(*) a. Answer in text 
b. Definition 
c. Requires pupil to apply learning to new situation 
d. Requires pupil to solve a problem 
e. None of the above 




overall Index for Questions (C + d) : 56 + 41 : 1,33 
(a+ b) 52 + 21 
page 57 
TEXT ANALYSIS Take 25 sentences, assigning each to category below. 
Textbook B: Pienaar & Walters 8 
Random Page Number: 208 38 268 106 212 283 155 317 303 203 250 % 
--------------------- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --
a. Facts 22 14 10 18 13 15 20 7 21 24 164 66 
b. Conclusions 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 1 7 3 
c. Definitions 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 
d. Ques asked but 
answd immedtlv 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 6 2 
e. Questions requrng 
stud. to analvse data 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 2 
f. Statements requrng 
nunil to form concl. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Dir. to pupil to 
nerform & analvse act 0 5 6 1 4 0 3 16 1 0 36 14 
h. Ques to arouse int 
-not answered immdtlv 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
i. Sentence directing 
student to fiaure 3 1 5 1 5 7 2 0 0 0 24 10 
; . Rhetorical auestns 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 
Overall Involvement 
Index for Text 
= (e + f + g + h) 
(a + b + C + d) 
= 5 + 0 + 36 + 3 
164 + 7 + 3 + 6 
0,24 
ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS AT CHAPTER ENDS 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
----- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
a. < *) 12 7 10 6 5 6 5 - 5 3 2 3 2 10 3 2 5 
b. 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 - 1 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 
c. 0 6 4 7 0 0 1 - 4 3 2 4 3 7 3 3 2 
d. 4 6 7 9 5 1 2 - 2 3 2 5 1 10 3 1 3 
e. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(*) a. Answer in text. 
b. Definition. 
c. Requires pupil to apply learning to new situation. 
d. Requires pupil to solve a problem. 
e. None of the above. 
overall Index for Questions (C + d) 
(a + b) 
page 58 
57 + 68 
94 + 16 
18 19 T 
-- -- --
3 5 94 
3 3 16 
4 4 57 
3 1 68 
0 0 0 
1,14 
TEXT ANALYSIS Take 25 sentences, assigning each to category below. 
Textbook c: Broster & James 8 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tot 
Random Page Number: 38 104 155 21 115 151 67 12 52 20 250 ~ 0 
--------------------- -- --- --- -- --- --- -- -- -- -- --- ---
a. Facts 19 13 4 2 15 18 21 9 3 11 115 46 
b. Conclusions 0 0 9 0 3 0 2 0 3 2 19 8 
c. Definitions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Quest asked but 
answd immediatelv 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 8 3 
e. Questions requrng 
stud. to analvse data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 2 
f. Statements requrng 
nunil to form concl 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 10 4 
g. Dir. to pupil to 
nerform & analvse act 6 8 12 12 6 7 2 9 10 11 83 33 
h. Ques to arouse int 
-not answered immdtlv 0 2 0 5 1 0 0 1 0 1 10 4 
i. Sentence directing 
student to fiaure 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
i . Rhetorical auestns 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
overall Involvement 
Index for Text 
(e + f + g + h) = 4 + 10 + 83 + 10 = 0,75 
(a+ b + C + d) 115 + 19 + 0 + 8 
ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS AT CHAPTER ENDS 
Textbook: Brester & James 8 
Cha12ter 
-----------------------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
----- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -----------
a. r *) 4 7 7 3 1 2 2 4 0 4 34 
b. 2 2 0 5 2 3 2 2 2 2 22 
c. 1 3 2 0 4 2 0 2 0 2 18 
d. 5 0 3 4 5 5 4 4 10 2 42 
e. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(*) a. Answer in text 
b. Definition 
c. Requires pupil to apply learning to new situation 
d. Requires pupil to solve a problem 
e. None of the above 
Overall Index for Questions= (c + d) = 18 + 42 1,07 
(a + b) 34 + 22 
page 59 
TEXT ANALYSIS Take 25 sentences, assigning each to category below. 
Textbook J: SEP 8 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Tot 
Random Page Number: 190 48 17 174 179 102 20 96 54 50 250 ~ 0 
--------------------- --- -- -- --- --- --- -- -- -- -- --- ---
a. Facts 2 4 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 12 5 
b. Conclusions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Definitions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Ques asked but 
answd immediately 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Questions requrng 
stud. to analvse data 2 3 8 5 1 6 5 6 8 1 45 18 
f. Statements requrng 
nunil to form concl 3 5 7 3 5 5 2 2 2 4 38 15 
g. Dir. to pupil to 
nerform & analvse act 12 12 7 13 16 14 13 13 13 15 128 51 
h. Ques to arouse int 
-not answered immdtlv 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 4 2 2 20 8 
i. Sentence directing 
student to fiaure 5 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 8 3 
; . Rhetorical auestns 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Overall Involvement 
Index for Text 
(e + f + g + h) 
(a+ b + C + d) 
45 + 38 + 128 + 20 = 19,3 
12 + 0 + 0 + 0 
ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS AT CHAPTER ENDS 
Textbook: SEP 8 
Chapter I 
---------------------------------
a. Answer in text 
b. Definition Not applicable to SEP 8. 
c. Requires pupil 
to apply learn- (No Question at ends of Chapters.) 
ing to new 
situation 
d. Requires pupil 
to solve a 
nroblem 
e. None of the 
above 
Overall Index for Questions (c + d) = 
(a + b) 
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TEXT ANALYSIS Take 25 sentences, assigning each to category below. 
Textbook K: Duncan: GCSE Physics 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tot 
Random Page Number: 175 41 149 81 203 134 71 99 138 51 256 ~ 0 
--------------------- --- -- --- -- --- --- -- -- --- -- --- ---
a. Facts 2 11 0 16 24 14 12 13 25 17 134 54 
b. Conclusions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Definitions 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 2 
d. Ques asked but 
answd immediatelv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Questions requrng 
stud. to analvse data 9 0 9 5 0 0 1 4 0 5 33 13 
f. Statements requrng 
pupil to form concl. 9 3 13 3 0 0 4 2 0 2 36 14 
g. Dir. to pupil to 
perform & analvse act 5 10 3 0 0 10 7 5 0 1 41 16 
h. Ques to arouse int 
-not answered immdtlv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Sentence directing 
student to fiaure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Rhetorical auestns 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
overall Involvement= 
Index for Text 
Ce+ f + g + h) = 33 + 36 + 41 + o = 0,79 
(a+ b + C + d) 134 + 0 + 6 + 0 
ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS AT CHAPTER ENDS 
Textbook: Duncan: GCSE Physics 
Cha2ter 
-----------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Total 
----- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --------
a. ( *) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 5 
b. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. 2 0 1 1 3 0 1 2 2 2 2 12 3 3 0 1 1 36 
d. 2 3 2 0 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 5 0 30 
e. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(*) a. Answer in text 
b. Definition 
c. Requires pupil to apply learning to new situation 
d. Requires pupil to solve problem 
e. None of the above 
Overall Index for Questions (C + d) : 36 + 30 : 13,2 
(a+ b) s + o 
page 61 
TEXT ANALYSIS Take 25 sentences, assigning each to category below. 
Textbook R: Harvard Project Physics 
---------------------------------------------------------------





d. Ques asked but 
answd immediatelv 
e. Questions requrng 
stud. to analvse data 
f. Statements requrng 
nunil to form concl 
g. Dir. to pupil to 
nerform & analvse act 
h. Ques to arouse int 
-not answered immdtlv 
i. Sentence directing 
student to fiaure 
i . Rhetorical auestns 
Overall Involvement 
Index for Text 
139 1 160 64 99 
--- -- --- -- --
1 0 10 0 12 
0 0 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 16 0 
9 0 1 8 0 
12 0 11 0 0 
0 25 0 0 13 
3 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Ce+ f + g + h) 
(a+ b + C + d) 
ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONS AT CHAPTER ENDS 
Textbook: Harvard Project Physics 
Cha:Qter 
--------------------
1 2 3 4 Total 
------------------ -- -- -- -- --------
a. Answer in text 1 0 0 0 1 
b. Definition 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Requires pupil 
to apply learn-
ing to new 
situation 5 5 5 2 17 
d. Requires pupil 
to solve a 
oroblem 6 7 7 10 30 
e. None of the 
above 0 0 0 0 0 
Tot 
67 81 87 38 106 250 
-- -- -- -- --- ---
22 24 15 25 19 128 
0 0 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 18 
0 0 4 0 4 26 
0 0 1 0 0 24 
3 1 4 0 2 48 
0 0 0 0 0 4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 + 26 + 24 + 48 
128 + 2 + 0 + 0 
Overall Index for Questions = (C + d) 
(a + b) 
17 + 30 = 47 
















PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT A 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Brink & Jones 8 Instance 
----------------------------- ------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 9 218 16 189 87 100 15 202 244 240 T 
----------------------------- - --- -- --- -- --- -- --- --- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 
c. Observation objective - 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 5 
2 . Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
c. Verification 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 5 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 
d. Questions answd immedly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
59 I 190 = 31 % 
--------------------------=== = --- -- --- -- --- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2 . Com:gutative :gredictions 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 
Predictions "expected" 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 
Recipe-like procedures 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Only terms in an equatn 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
3 • Definition: Nominalistic 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Operational 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 
4 . Theories: Fictions 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 
Rules of thumb 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 
Convenient, prag 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 5 
41 I 110 = 37 % 
page 63 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT B 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Pienaar & Walt. 8 Instance 
--------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 188 315 40 319 285 92 147 234 203 326 T 
--------------------------- --- --- -- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science bgns with obs 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 
b. "Observation" mentnd 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 
c. Observation objective 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 
2. Inductive generalisation 
a. Inductive gnrlstns 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
c. Verification 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law" , "theory" mntnd 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
b. Obs leads rig to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
d. Data yield unique con 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
4 • Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 6 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 6 
d. Question answd immdly 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
e. Science is reliable 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
h. Science always logicl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
i. Sci leads to abs tru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
52 I 190 = 27 % 
--------------------------- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2. Com2utative 2redictions 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Predictions "expected" 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Recipe-like procedurs 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Only terms in an equn 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 
Operational 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 
4 . Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Rules of thumb 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Convent, pragm 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 
41 I 110 = 37 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT C 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Brester & James 8 Instances 
----------------------------- ----------------------------------
Random Page Number: 16 189 87 100 15 55 40 79 80 188 T 
----------------------------- -- --- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
b. "Observation" mentioned 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
c. Observation objective - 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
b. No. of instances few 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
c. Verification 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
3 • Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
b. Obs. leads rig to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
d. Questions answd immedly 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
43 I 190 = 23 % 
----------------------------- --- -- -- -- -- -- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Phenomenal 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2 • Com2utative 2redictions 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 
Predictions "expected" 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
Recipe-like procedures 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Only terms in an equatn 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
4. Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Rules of thumb 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Convenient, prag 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 
40 I 110 = 36 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT D 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Brink & Jones 9 Instance 
---------------------------- --------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 204 188 312 40 285 92 146 234 109 85 T 
---------------------------- --- --- --- -- --- -- --- --- --- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with ob 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 
b. "Observation" mentiond 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
c. Observation objective 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstn made 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
b. No. of instances few 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
c. Verification 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3 • Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
b. Obs. leads rig to laws 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique cone 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
c. Tone is "factual" 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 6 
d. Questions answd immdly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs t 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
40 I 190 = 21 % 
---------------------------- -- --- -- --- --- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 • Comgutative gredictions 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 
Predictions "expected" 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 7 
Recipe-like procedures 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 
Only terms in an equatn 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Operational 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4 . Theories: Fictions 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 
Rules of thumb 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Convenient, prg 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 
43 I 110 = 39 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT E 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Pienaar & Walters 9 Instance 
----------------------------- -------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 316 100 210 19 344 96 338 260 51 50 T 
----------------------------- --- --- --- -- --- -- --- --- -- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 6 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 6 
c. Observation objective 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 7 
2 • Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
b. No. of instances few 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 
c. Verification 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
3 • Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 
d. Questions answd immedly 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
f. Technological fix 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
g. Linear accretion 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
h. Science always logical 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
63 I 190 = 33 % 
----------------------------- --- --- -- --- -- --- --- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 
Phenomenal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2 • Com12utative 12redictions 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 
Predictions "expected" 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Recipe-like procedures 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 
Only terms in an equatn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
4 • Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Rules of thumb 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Convenient, prag 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 
41 I 110 = 37 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT F 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Brester & James 9 Instance 
----------------------------- -----------------------------------
Random Page Number: 100 15 202 55 40 79 80 77 207 188 T 
----------------------------- --- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- --- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 -
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 5 
c. Observation objective 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 5 -
2 . Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
c. Verification 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 5 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
d. Questions answd immedly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
f. Technological fix 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
55 I 190 = 29 % 
----------------------------- --- --- -- -- -- -- -- --- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 5 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 . Com12utative 12redictions 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Predictions "expected" 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 6 
Recipe-like procedures 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 6 
Only terms in an equatn 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 6 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Operational 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
4 . Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Rules of thumb 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 5 
Convenient, prag 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
42 I 110 = 38 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT G 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Brink & Jones 10 Instance 
----------------------------- ------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 204 188 31 40 82 92 146 234 109 84 T 
----------------------------- --- --- -- -- -- -- --- --- --- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 7 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
c. Observation objective 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 7 -
2 . Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 
b. No. of instances few 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
c. Verification 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 5 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 7 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 7 
d. Questions answd immedly 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
g. Linear accretion 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 
h. Science always logical 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
i. Science leads to abs tr 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
68 I 190 = 36 % 
=---------------------------- --- --- -- -- -- -- --- --- --- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 7 
Phenomenal 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 
2. Com2utative 2redictions 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Predictions "expected" 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 5 
Recipe-like procedures 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Only terms in an equatn 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 4 
3 . Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Operational 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 6 
4 • Theories: Fictions 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Rules of thumb 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Convenient, prag 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 
46 I 110 = 42 % 
page 69 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT H 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Pienaar & Walt. 10 Instance 
----------------------------- ------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 12 101 210 22 204 97 110 260 51 50 T 
----------------------------- -- --- --- -- --- -- --- --- -- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
c. Observation objective - 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
2 • Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
c. Verification 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
3 • Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
c. Laws mature theories 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
d. Data yield unique concl 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 8 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
d. Questions answd immedly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
g. Linear accretion 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
h. Science always logical 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 7 
i. Science leads to abs tr 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
64 I 190 = 34 % 
---------------------------== -- --- --- -- --- -- --- --- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Phenomenal 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 4 
2 . Com2utative 2redictions 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 
Predictions "expected" 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 5 
Recipe-like procedures 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 
Only terms in an equatn 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 
3 . Definition: Nominalistic 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Operational 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
4. Theories: Fictions 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 5 -
Rules of thumb 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 5 
Convenient, prag 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 
47 I 110 = 43 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT I 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Brester & James 10 Instance 
----------------------------- -----------------------------------
Random Page Number: 100 14 202 55 42 79 82 64 208 188 T 
----------------------------- --- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- --- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
c. Observation objective 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 4 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
c. Verification 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 
4 • Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 7 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 6 
c. Tone is "factual" 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 7 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
f. Technological fix 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 5 
h. Science always logical 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 4 
i. Science leads to abs tr 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
74 I 190 = 39 % 
----------------------------- --- -- -- -- -- -- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Phenomenal 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
2 • Com:gutative :gredictions 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 5 
Predictions "expected" 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 5 
Recipe-like procedures 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
Only terms in an equatn 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Operational 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4 . Theories: Fictions 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Rules of thumb 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Convenient, prag 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 5 
44 I 110 = 40 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT J 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: SEP 8 Instance 
----------------------------- ---------------------------------
Random Page Number: 26 11 163 94 8 102 49 17 189 87 '.I'. 
----------------------------- -- -- --- -- - --- -- -- --- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 7 
b. "Observation" mentioned 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
c. Observation objective - 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 6 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Verification 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 . Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 7 
c. Tone is "factual" 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 0 _ .... ,_ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 I 190 = 13 % 
----------------------------- -- -- = --- -- -- --- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 7 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 5 
2 . Com:gutative :gredictions 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 
Predictions "expected" 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Recipe-like procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Only terms in an equatn 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 -Rules of thumb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Convenient, prag 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 
24 I 110 = 22 % 
page 72 
APPENDIX E 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT K 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Duncan: Physics Instance 
----------------------------- ------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 50 51 260 101 19 210 99 252 179 80 T 
----------------------------- -- -- --- --- -- --- -- --- --- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
b. "Observation" mentioned 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
c. Observation objective 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
2 • Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
c. Verification 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 • Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
c. Tone is "factual" 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
d. Questions answd immedly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
27 I 190 = 14 % 
--------------------------=== -- --- -- --- -- --- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
Phenomenal 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
2 . Com:gutative 12redictions 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Predictions "expected" 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Recipe-like procedures 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 
Only terms in an equatn 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Operational 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4 • Theories: Fictions 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 -Rules of thumb 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 
Convenient, prag 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 7 
57 I 110 = 52 % 
page 73 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT L 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Fogle: Sci to 16 Instance 
----------------------------- ------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 82 107 45 116 22 218 92 40 204 187 T 
----------------------------- -- --- -- --- -- --- -- -- --- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Observation objective 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 -
2 • Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 1 0 ·o 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
b. No. of instances few 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 
c. Verification 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 . Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
f. Technological fix 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs tr 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
54 I 190 = 28 % 
----------------------------- --- -- -- -- --- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2 . Comgutative gredictions 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Predictions "expected" 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Recipe-like procedures 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Only terms in an equatn 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Operational 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
4 . Theories: Fictions 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 -
Rules of thumb 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
Convenient, prag 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
so I 110 = 45 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT M 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Atherton, et al.: Instance 
--------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 379 242 204 151 182 240 35 342 252 55 T 
--------------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science bgns with obs 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
b. "Observation" mentned 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 5 
c. Observation objective 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
2. Inductive generalisation 
a. Inductive gnrlstns 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 
c. Verification 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 
3 . Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mntnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. Obs leads rig to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique con 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 
d. Question answ immdtly 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
h. Science always logicl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Sci leads to abs tru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
65 I 190 = 34 % 
--------------------------- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
Phenomenal 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 
2. Com12utative 12redictions 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
Predictions "expected" 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
Recipe-like procedures 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 4 
Only terms in an equtn 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 4 
3 . Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Operational 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
4. Theories: Fictions 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Rules of thumb 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
Convennt, prag 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 7 
50 I 110 = 45 % 
page 75 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT N 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Text: Lewis & Waller: Instance 
----------------------------- -------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 340 203 326 47 277 140 374 31 42 37 '.I'. 
----------------------------- --- --- --- -- --- --- --- -- -- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
c. Observation objective 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
2 . Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
c. Verification 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 
4 . Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 9 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 8 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
f. Technological fix 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
g. Linear accretion 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 6 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
i. Science leads to abs tr 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
77 I 190 = 41 % 
-----------------=--===--==== --- -- --- --- --- -- -- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: '.I'. 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
Phenomenal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 8 
2 . Com2utative 2redictions 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -Predictions "expected" 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -
Recipe-like procedures 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 
Only terms in an equatn 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Operational 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4 . Theories: Fictions 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Rules of thumb- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 7 
Convenient, prag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 7 
46 I 110 = 42 % 
page 76 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT 0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: PoQle: ExQlg Phys Instance 
---------------------------- --------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 77 207 240 188 109 114 151 182 51 32 T 
---------------------------- -- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with ob 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
b. "Observation" mentiond 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Observation objective 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 8 
2 • Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstn made 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Verification 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. Obs. leads rig to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique cone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
d. Question answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs t 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
62 I 190 = 33 % 
---------------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 8 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2 . Com12utative 12redictions 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 7 
Predictions "expected" 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 7 
Recipe-like procedures 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 7 
Only terms in an equatn 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operational 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
4 • Theories: Fictions 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Rules of thumb 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 6 
Convenient, prg 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
50 I 110 = 45 % 
page 77 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT p 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Warren: Phys Alive Instance 
----------------------------- -------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 21 42 37 189 14 168 137 169 190 221 T 
----------------------------- -- -- -- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 
c. Observation objective - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 9 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
c. Verification 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 7 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
c. Tone is "factual" 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 
77 I 190 = 41 % 
----------------------------- -- -- -- --- -- --- --- --- --- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Phenomenal 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
2 . Com:gutative :gredictions 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 5 
Predictions "expected" 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 5 
Recipe-like procedures 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
Only terms in an equatn 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 
3 . Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
4. Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Rules of thumb 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 7 
Convenient, prag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 8 
48 I 110 = 44 % 
page 78 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT Q 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Lambert: Physics Instance 
----------------------------- -----------------------------------
Random Page Number: 94 249 26 8 228 218 102 90 49 243 T 
----------------------------- -- --- -- - --- --- --- -- -- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9 
b. "Observation" mentioned 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 
c. Observation objective - 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 7 
2 • Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 7 
b. No. of instances few 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
c. Verification 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
3 . Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 . Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 8 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 
d. Questions answd immdtly 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 7 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
i. Science leads to abs tr 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 7 
73 I 190 = 38 % 
-----------------=--------=== --- -- = --- --- --- -- -- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTAL ISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 
Phenomenal 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
2 . Com2utative 2redictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Predictions "expected" 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 -
Recipe-like procedures 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Only terms in an equatn 0 0 0 .0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
4 • Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 -
Rules of thumb 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Convenient, prag 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 7 
46 I 110 = 42 % 
page 79 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT R 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Harvard Physics Instance 
----------------------------- -----------------------------------
Random Page Number: 21 43 37 179 14 153 137 177 85 48 '.!'. 
----------------------------- -- -- -- --- -- --- --- --- -- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
c. Observation objective - 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
c. Verification 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 3 
3 . Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
c. Tone is "factual" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 I 190 = 10 % 
----------------------------- --- -- --- --- --- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: '.!'. 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 . Com2utative 2redictions 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 
Predictions "expected" 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Recipe-like procedures 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Only terms in an equatn 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
4 . Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 -
Rules of thumb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Convenient, prag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 I 110 = 17 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT s 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: CHEM Study Instance 
----------------------------- -----------------------------------
Random Page Number: 448 91 342 9 62 283 218 16 51 150 T 
----------------------------- --- -- --- - -- --- --- -- -- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. science begins with obs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
b. "Observation" mentioned 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
c. Observation objective 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 
b. No. of instances few 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 
c. Verification 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 5 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 7 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
62 I 190 = 33 % 
----------------------------= = -- --- --- -- -- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2 • Com12utative 12redictions 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Predictions "expected" 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 
Recipe-like procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Only terms in an equatn 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 • Theories: Fictions 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 -Rules of thumb 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Convenient, prag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
26 I 110 = 24 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT T 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Physics: PSSC Instance 
-------------------------- ----------------------------------------
Random Page Number: 109 114 151 182 450 240 487 33 342 252 T 
-------------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science bgn with obs 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 
b. "Observation" mentnd 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 
c. Observation objectiv 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 8 
2. Inductive generalistns 
a. Inductive gnrlstns 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 5 
b. No. of instances few 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
c. Verification 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mntd 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
b. Obs lead rig to laws 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
d. Data yield unique en 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 • Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
b. Sci "discovers" fact 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 7 
c. Tone is "factual" 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
d. Questions answd immd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
h. Science always logcl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Sci leads to abs tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
51 I 190 = 27 % 
-------------------------- --- --- --- --- -- --- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumd obj 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 
Phenomenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 • Corn2utative :gredictions 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 
Prediction "expected" 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Recipe-like procedure 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
Only terms in an equn 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
3. Definition: Nominalistc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
4 • Theories: Fictions 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
Rule of thumb 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
Convnnt, prag 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
27 I 110 = 25 % 
page 82 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT u 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Physics: Nigerian Instance 
----------------------------- Book 1 Book 2 Book 3 
Random Page Number: 10 14 59 82 47 24 140 33 42 52 T 
----------------------------- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 6 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Observation objective_ 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 6 
2 . Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
b. No. of instances few 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c. Verification 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 
3. Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
d. Data yield unique concl 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 5 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 8 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 
h. Science always logical 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 5 
i. Science leads to abs tr 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 7 
72 I 190 = 38 % 
----------------------------- -- --- -- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 5 
Phenomenal 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
2 . Com2utative 2redictions 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
Predictions "expected" 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 
Recipe-like procedures 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 
Only terms in an equatn 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 6 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Operational 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 
4 • Theories: Fictions 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Rules of thumb 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 
Convenient, prag 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
52 I 110 = 47 % 
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PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT V 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Physics: Kenyan Instance 
----------------------------- Book 1 Book 2 Bk 3 Bk 4 -
Random Page Number: 91 14 51 82 45 24 7 33 34 25 T 
----------------------------- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation 
a. Science begins with obs 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 
b. "Observation" mentioned 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
c. Observation objective - 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 8 
2. Inductive generalisations 
a. Inductive gnrlstns made 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 5 
b. No. of instances few 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
c. Verification 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3 . Laws and theories 
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
c. Laws mature theories 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
d. Data yield unique concl 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 6 
4. Proven knowledge 
a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 8 
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 
c. Tone is "factual" 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
d. Questions answd immdtly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
e. Science is reliable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
f. Technological fix 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
g. Linear accretion 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 
h. Science always logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i. Science leads to abs tr 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 
68 I 190 = 36 % 
----------------------------- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8 
Phenomenal 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 
2 . Com12utative 12redictions 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 5 
Predictions "expected" 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 
Recipe-like procedures 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 
Only terms in an equatn 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 
3. Definition: Nominalistic 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
Operational 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
4 . Theories: Fictions 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
Rules of thumb 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
Convenient, prag 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
43 I 110 = 39 % 
page 84 
PHILOSOPHY CHECKLIST TEXT W 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Textbook: Jansen & Dekker Instance 
----------------------------- Standard 6 Standard 7 
Random Page Number: 18 45 24 7 75 114 59 T 14 51 82 
-- -- --
A. INDUCTIVIST-EMPIRICISM: 
1. Observation - - -
a. Science begins with obs 1 1 1 1 - - - 1 1 0 0 1 1 8 b. "Observation" mentioned O 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 - - -c. Observation objective 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 8 - - -2. Inductive generalisations - - -a. Inductive gnrlstns made 1 1 0 0 - - - 1 1 0 0 1 0 5 b. No. of instances few o 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 - - -c. Verification 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 5 - - -3. Laws and theories - - -
a. "Law", "theory" mentnd O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - -
b. Obs. leads rig. to laws o 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - -
c. Laws mature theories o 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - -d. Data yield unique concl 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 - - -4. Proven knowledge 
- - -a. Proven knowledge 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 - - -
b. Sci "discovers" facts 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 - - -c. Tone is "factual" 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 8 - - -
d. Questions answd immdtly o 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 - - -e. Science is reliable 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 - - -
f. Technological fix 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 - - -g. Linear accretion O 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 - - -h. Science always logical o 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 - - -i. Science leads to abs tr 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 5 - - -
83 I 190 = 44 % 
----------------------------- -- -- -- -- --- = 
B. INSTRUMENTALISM: T 
1. Observation: Assumed obj 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 8 
Phenomenal 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 5 
2 . Com12utative 12redictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Predictions "expected" 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Recipe-like procedures 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Only terms in an equatn 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 
3 • Definition: Nominalistic 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 5 
Operational 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 
4. Theories: Fictions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 
Rules of thumb 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 4 
Convenient, prag 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 
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Ptolemy Revived? -
The Existence of a Mild Instrumentalism 
in Some Selected British, American, and South 
African High School Physical Science Textbooks 
B. A. Jacoby and P. E. Spargo 
University of Cape Town 
Scientific theories are our intellectual constructions about the nature of the physical world. 
There are at least two ways of relating scientific theories and the world: the first is called 
realism, and the second instrumentalism. 
A realist believes that theories actually describe what the world is really like. For the 
realist, the kinetic theory of gases claims that "gases really are made up of molecules in 
random motion" (Chalmers. 1986, p. 146). On the other hand. an instrumentalist holds 
that scientific theories do not actually describe the world, but simply relate sets of observa-
tions. For the instrumentalist, the kinetic theory of gases is merely a convenient fiction 
enabling scientists to relate and make predictions about the observable properties of gases. 
in order to make use of them in a variety of ways. Theories are only useful devices for 
prediction. 
lnstrumentalism. then, is an approach to scientific inquiry which shelves questions about 
the real nature of the universe. and is solely interested in whether its practical purpose 
of computative predictions work or not. Instrumentalist science stems from tough-minded, 
common-sense empiricism. which regards all knowledge as coming from sensory experience. 
The inductivist-empiricist assumes that such sensory observation is objective and theory-
free. So too does the instrumentalist. 
According to Popper. "the instrumentalist view ... has become an accepted dogma" 
in contemporary physical science. and in fact "has become part of the current teaching 
of physics" (1956, p. 360). Since physics teaching begins in schools. it is important to see 
if instrumentalism is present in school science, and if so, its pros and cons. 
Instrumentalism from Ptolemy to Dewey 
Sa1·i11g the App('(/ra/lC<'S 
lnstrumL·ntali'm ha, its origins in the compartmcntal1zcd thinking. the "controlled 
schizophrenia." as Koestler puts it. which began to emerge with the Greek astronomers 
around the 2nd century A.D. In order to account for the retrograde looping., of planetary 
paths. Ptolemy devi.sed a complex system of 40 whecb within wheeb or epicycles. He never 
hdieved that there really were wheeb out there. hut they did "save the appearances" and 
provided a mechanism for accurately predicting the position of the planets. The astronomer 
"saved the phenomena" hy inventing a suitahle hypothesis; it w;is immaterial whether the 
hypothesis was true or not. that is. whether it w;is physically pn,sihle or not. As Koestler 
poinh out. 
/11ra, 111111,i.:1· 20/2 " The Ontario Institute for Stud ic, in Educ at ,on 1989 :n 
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;1,1ro11<1111y. ;tflt:r ,\ri,lolk. ht:c<1111c:, .111 ~h,ILtcl ,l..y·gc:0111c1ry. Jl\t>rcc:J from physiL·:il rc'.d1· 
I\ . II ,c·rvc, a pracltL·;tl purp,"c: .i, .i rnc·th,.J ti,r L·11111pu1ing lahlt:, of lhc 111111111n, <1! 1hc: 
,un. 111< K >n aml planc:h. hu1 a, tt> thc: real n~lu re: 11! the: uni,c:r,c:. 11 ha, 11< ,1h111g to ,a:, ( l'l'it/. I' 7.. 1 
Cnpernicus. huwe\cr. put tiirnarJ a the:, ir1 v. h1d1 11ot u11ly preJicteJ but abo npl:t111L·J 
Thc Cupcrn1can thenry provided a morc c·,irnprehcnsive urnccptual ,tructurc with a much 
greater power for promotmg under,tanJ1ng. It revc:akd a phy,ical link bctwc:cn planc:ury 
111ot1on anJ theory. Copcrn1L·u, hcilcvc:J rtut hi, theor:,. was a true dc:sn1ptiu11 of ,:,tLTnal 
rL·ality. not a rnerc: t1,:ti,1nal h:,. pothc:,h. It J1J not rnatter whether you bel1c:vcJ 111 then 
1,te11ce of Ptokrn1 \ c:picyck, ,ir not. all th.1t 111;.ittcred v.a, that hh theory \\llrked. H\l\\L'\er. 
(\1pern1ca11 thcllry h:1d to he t.1!..cn ,c:n"u,l\ tPr 1t attempkd IP de,c:rihe \\hat 1, ph\,1L·all, 
really Put there. Copenm.:u,· ,un-L·c:ntrcJ ,htcm wa, more than a L·o111put;1t1onal de\lL·e 
Realism Versus Phe11omt·nali.1m 
Instrumental 1st science is interested onl:,. in ,c:nsory phenomena. and avoid, any rcfcrencc: 
to a reality behind appearance. William uf Occam was againsl !he Aris1otelian tendcnc: 
to create unnecessary enlilies. ,uch as a reality behind the phenomena. Reality. said Occam. 
is pn:cisely whal appears lo the sen,es. All our knowledge about !he world comes through 
nur senses. All being is thus reduced to v. hat is perceived. Theologians were quick tu 
realize that Occam's radical empiricism (<Jr nominalism) meant !hat spiritual being-;, and 
in parlicular God. were threatened. 
Galileo accepted Copernican heliocentric theory as a !rue description of reali1y Cardinal 
Bellarmino objecled to this realist in1erpre1a1ion. but informed Galileo that ii \\as per-
missable. from the Church's standpoin1. to hold the Copernican system as a mathematical 
device for saving !he appearances. In other words. the Church was willing, temporarily. 
to accept Galileo ·s theory in a phenomenalist. instrumentalist sense. 
Berkeley's /nstrumentalism 
Similarly. Bishop George Berkeley saw Newton's theory as a serious competitor to religion. 
What distressed Berkeley was that Newton talked about "forces" as if they were real. 
For Newton, forces were more than mere terms in an equation. Berkeley regarded forces 
in mechanics as analogous to Ptolemaic epicycles in astronomy, useful in calculating !he 
motions of bodies, but without real existence. Berkeley's instrumentalism stemmed from 
his bold empiricism: all our knowledge comes through our senses. Since force is unobser-
vable, we cannot have any knowledge of it. All we can observe is the motion of bodies. 
Indeed. the notion of force as a causal agent derives from the fact that it is a concept in 
the mind. Thus Berkeley's instrumenlalism derives from his idealistic philosophy. 
Mi/1 's lnductivism as a Form of lnstrwnentalism 
The aim of 19th-century positivists like John Stuart Mill was to eliminate metaphysics 
from science as far as possible. A tough-minded empiricist approach was adopted. \Vhalever 
was beyond the reach of experience should be rejected. 
Mill was a thorough-going inductivist. He held that scientific inquiry is a process of 
inductive generalization from the results of observations and experiments. Mill suggested 
that the world of appearances should be accepted as it is. If the external world is defined 
as a set of phenomenal objects, the existence of an underlying sub-stratum becomes a 
pseudo-problem. As Gardner notes ( 1983. p. 20). Mill saw nothing wrong with belief 
in a reality behind the phenomenon; he simply found it superfluous. adding nothing to 
what we already know. Hence. in his \ iew. the object of scientific inquiry should begin 
and end with the phenomenal world. 
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In the 1920s, the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle reinforced the inductivist view. 
It is meaningless to talk about what lies "behind" or "beyond" experience. For positivists, 
phenomenalism is an adequate approach to science, just as realism is. Both yield successful 
results. However, the language of phenomenal ism is more convenient. 
Dewey's /nstrumentalism and Pragmatism 
An instrumentalist approach to scientific inquiry tends to be pragmatic and utilitarian. Like 
Mill, John Dewey assumed a phenomenalist standpoint. For a realist, truth is the cor-
respondence between an assertion and reality. For Dewey, truth is that which is confirmed 
by testing; it is that which works. Truth is created when an assertion is confirmed. 
Suppose there is a penny in a box. The realist says, "There is a penny in the box," 
whether or not the assertion is verified. The pragmatist says, "There is a penny in the 
box,'' only when, on opening the box, he sees the penny. Truth is instrumental and expe-
dient. Theories are not "judged in terms of truth or falsity but rather in terms of their 
usefulness as instruments" (Chalmers, 1986, p. 147). Popper rejects this notion of truth 
because it is relativistic. 
Instrumentalism distinguishes clearly between observation and theory. For the instrumen-
talist, observation is objective and theory-independent. Scientific theories are mere fic-
tions, nothing but convenient instruments. Theories may, or may not, describe the real 
world; it does not matter whether they do or not. What matters is the relationships bet-
ween observations. Thus instrumentalism is a shallow form of realism dealing with ap-
pearances only. 
Instrumentalism in School Science Textbooks 
Cawthron and Rowell (1978, p. 31) suggest that one way of investigating whether in-
strumentalism is present in school science is to analyze the contents of the most widely 
used textbooks in school science courses. No matter how objective a science textbook 
purports to be, it contains explicit or tacit assertions which reflect a particular philosophy 
of science. Although it is recognized that the contents of textbooks represent the beliefs 
of their authors, nevertheless they must also reflect the views of the practising school science 
community who give the texts their popularity in the first place, and who presumably then 
become influenced by them. 
The literature on the subject suggests that "a scrutiny of school science texts almo~t 
invariably reveals an implicit epistemological preoccupation with the existence of 'objec-
tive· reality .. (Cawthron & Rowell. 1978. p. 32). Such textbooks "project an image of 
science which can be called empiricist-induct1vist" · (p. 33 ). Rowell and Cawthron state 
that "our texts portray science as some inexorable linear pursuit of truth" (1982, p. 93). 
In a careful reading of nearly all the introductory first-year, non-major chemistry and 
physics textbooks in use in the United States during the 1979-1980 academic year, Factor 
and Kooser point out that 
a~ with the science and society texts. the narrow inductivism and empiricism of the 19th cen-
tury. particularly that of John Stuart Mill. plays a formative role in the image of science in 
skills and drills texts. (1981, p. 28) 
The empiricist view is strongly present in textbooks advocating the heuristic method of 
science education. Discovery by activity, as proposed generally by Dewey, and more 
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specifically in science education by Armstrong. and more recently ir. Science - A Pro-
cess Approach, emphasizes the role of observation and indudion. Driver criticizes induc-
tionism in that it "suggests that there is one unique interpretation of the data" ( 1983. p. 48). 
In fact, observation is theory-laden. and children can and do form multiple explanations 
for events, each of which accounts for the data in a particular way. 
Kuhn observed that textbooks ''address themselves to an already articulated body of 
problems. data, and theory" (1970. p. 136). The increasing reliance on textbooks, says 
Kuhn, accompanies the emergence of a first paradigm in any field of science. Further-
more, reliam:e on textbooks is becoming increasingly evident. especially in Third World 
countries, where the teacher often has little. if any. training in scienc1.:. Thus the textbook 
is fast becoming the only vehicle for transmitting a correct image of ~cience. As Kuhn says. 
More than any other single aspect of science, that pedagogic form (namely. the textbook) 
has determined our image of the nature of science. (1970, p. 143) 
The aim of this study is to detennine the image of science portrayed in a number of selected 
British. American, and South African high school physical science textbooks in widespread 
current use in schools. On the basis of the above literature, as well as our acquaintance 
with school texts, we made the hypothesis that high school physical science textbooks in 
current use portray an empiricist-inductivist and, by implication, an instrumentalist im-
age of science. 
Method 
We began by listing the essential features of inductivism. empiricism. and instrumental ism 
and then drawing up a systematic check-list or questionnaire for the different philosophies. 
The check-list was used to try to ensure a unifonn approach to our reading of selected 
textbooks. By careful reading, a reasonably consistent quantitative and comparative assess-
ment emerged. 
The following characteristics were chosen as being characteristic of the inductivist-
empiricist view: 
l. Science begins with observation. 
2. Observation is objective. 
3. Inductive generalizations arise from several instances. 
4. Experimental data yield a unique conclusion. 
5. Observation leads rigorously to laws and theories. 
6. Laws are mature theories. 
7. Science produces proven knowledge. 
The following characteristics were chosen as being characteristic of the instrumentalist 
view: 
l. Observation is objective. 
2. Computative predictions relate observations. 
3. Predictions are "expected." 
4. Calculations are recipe-like. 
5. Definitions are nominalistic. 
6. Definitions are operational. 
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7. Theories are mere fictions. 
8. Theories are not informative about the physical world. 
9. Theories are only convenient instruments. 
On the basis of these critiera, the text analysis (see Table 2) was drawn up. 
Sixteen high school physical science textbooks were chosen for the study. Seven of these 
are texts widely used in British schools, as well as in English-speaking schools in Third 
World countries, such as Lesotho and Swaziland. Six are texts widely used in South African 
high schools, and are designed to cover the "New" 1985 Standard 8 and 9 Syllabus. 
(Average pupil age in Standards 8 and 9 is 15 and 16 years old respectively.) The reason 
for choosing these Standards was to align the textbooks with the corresponding British 
0-level and GCSE, and the American Project Physics, CHEM Study, and PSSC Physics. 
Eight of the books were read from cover to cover in order to obtain an overall assess-
ment of their philosophy. These were A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and Nin the list below. 
Textbooks Examined 
South African 
A. Brink and Jones. (1985). Physical Science Standard 8, Juta. 
B. Pienaar, Walters, de Jager, Schreuder. (1985). Senior Physical Science 8, Maskew 
Miller Longman. 
C. Broster and James. (1987). Successful Science (Physical Science) 8, Oxford Universi-
ty Press. 
D. Brink and Jones. (1986). Physical Science Standard 9, Juta. 
E. Pienaar, Walters, Schreuder, de Jager. (1986). Senior Physical Science 9, Maskew 
Miller Longman. 
F. Broster and James. (1987). Successful Science (Physical Science) 9, Oxford Universi-
ty Press. 
British 
G. Duncan Tom. (1987). GCSE Physics, 2nd Edition, John Murray. 
H. Pople and Williams. (1980). Science to Sixteen, Oxford University Press. 
I. Atherton, Duncan, Mackean. (1983). Science for Today and Tomorrow, John Murray. 
J. Lewis and Waller. (1986). Thinking Chemistry (GCSE Version), Oxford University Press. 
K. Pople. (1986). Explaining Physics (GCSE Version), Oxford University Press. 
L. Warren P. (1985). Physics Alive, John Murray. 
M. Lambert. (1985). Physics for First Examinations, Blackie. 
American 
N. The Project Physics Course (Harvard). (1970). Concepts of Morion, Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. 
0. CHEM Study. (1968). Chemistry an Expen·mental Science, Freeman. 
P. PSSC. (1960). Physics, Heath. 
Using random number tables, 10 pages were selected from each of the 16 textbooks. Thus, 
over the 16 selected textbooks, 160 pages were examined for their image of science. 
Three distinct features were sought on each page: (a) level ofpupil involvement, both 
in the text as well as in any practical laboratory work; (b) signs of inductivist-empiricism; 
and (c) signs of instrumentalism. 
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(a) Level of /nvoh·ement 
It is suggested here that level of involvement, as discussed by Herron ( 1971) amd Tamir 
and Lunetta ( 1978), provides a way of determining the image of science portrayed in the 
textbook. 
Herron determined the pupil's level of involvement in scientific inquiry by examining 
whether, in a laboratory inquiry, the problem, the method, and the solution, or any com-
bination of these, were given to the pupil. Table I summarizes Herron's levels of 
involvement: 
Table 1/Herron 's Levels of Involvement 
Problem Method Solution 
Level 0 Given Given Given 
Level I Given Given Not given 
Level 2 Given Not given Not given 
Level 3 Not given Not given Not given 
In this study, we interpret Levels O and I as giving to the pupil an image of science 
that is cumulative, factual, and proven knowledge. Because Levels 2 and 3, being more 
open-endec!, give the pupil more opportunity for imaginative hypothesis-making, a more 
correct and up-to-date view of science would be conveyed, namely, that scientific inquiry 
begins with theory, and not with observation. 
Tamir and Lunetta ( 1978) devised a more refined scheme for analyzing level of involve-
ment. However, whereas they apply their procedure to practical laboratory inquiry text-
books, this has been extended here to include both ordinary expository text as well as 
any laboratory experiments present in the text. The reason for this is that some of the 
textbooks examined contain both text and inquiries, and others text only, with separate 
laboratory manuals. Ideas from Romey (1968) and Lowery and Leonard (1978) were also 
used, especially as far as the role of questions was concerned. 
On a given page. the total number of sentences (excluding captions and headings) was 
counted, as well as the number of facts, questions, definitions, calculations, and instruc-
tions to the pupil-reader. These counts were then totalled for all ten pages of a given text-
book, and converted into percentages of the total number of sentences on the ten pages 
sampled. Data for all ten pages of a given textbook were recorded on a text analysis check-
list sheet (Section Con Table 2). At the end of the study, 16 text analysis check .. list sheets, 
one for each textbook, had been completed. 
These percentages were then transferred, for comparison purposes, to a summary of 
the text analysis (Section Con Table 3). Averages of these data were then calculated over 
the 16 texts in order to obtain a general idea of the overall level of involvement. This 
is reflected in the bar chart (Figure l). Also included in this section (C) is a count of the 
number of practical laboratory inquiries found in each textbook, as well as the level of 
involvement, following Herron (1971). 
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(b) Jnductivist-Empiricism 
On a given page, all sentences in which the words "observe" or "observation" occurred 
were counted, and recorded under C8 of Table 2. These were totalled for a given text-
book, and convened into a percentage of the total number of sentences in the ten pages 
examined in that text. These percentages were then summarized in C8 in Table 3 and the 
bar chan (Figure 1). 
As far as the categories l to 9 in section A of Table 2 are concerned, if any of these 
features was encountered at least once, it was awarded a value of l. If not encountered, 
a value of O was awarded. Totals for the ten selected pages of a given textbook thus have 
a maximum of ten points. These totals were then transferred to Table 3 for the sake of 
comparison. In order to obtain an average over all the textbooks for each category Al 
to A9, say Al on Table 3, all five rows of values in Al were added. These totals were 
then added and divided by 16, then by 5, to get (for Al on Table 3) the average 4.4. 
Because this is 4.4 out of 10, its percentage was chaned as 44 percent on Figure I. 
(c) /nstrumentalism 
Similarly, the categories 1 to 8 under Section B of Table 2 were awarded a value of l 
if such features were encountered at least once. If not encountered, a value ofO was award-
ed. Totals for each textbook had a maximum score of ~O. These totals were transferred 
to Table 3, and averaged over the 16 textbooks. Again, because these were out of a maxi-
mum of ten, they were recorded as percentages on Figure 1. 
Classification of statements according to the criteria in the text analysis often called for 
perceptive judgments. Therefore, in addition to these results, a detailed set of written notes 
was kept, justifying these judgments, especially where observation, computative predic-
tions, definitions, induction, and theories and laws were concerned. 
Also, the index at the back of the books was examined for any reference to keywords 
such as "theory," "mode," "law," or "observation." In the absence of an index, the 
book was skimmed from cover to cover for such references, especially in topics like Atomic 
Theory, Models of the Atom, and so on. 
If any statement could be interpreted in either a realist or an instrumentalist sense, the 
latter was assumed. This was deemed to be a legitimate procedure because (a) positivism 
accepts both realist theory and instrumentalist theory as successful scientific views and 
(b) the aim of the study was to read the textbook from an instrumentalist perspective. For 
example, if the word "observe" was used in the text, it was assumed to refer to objective 
observation. In the same way, any calculation of the rote, plug-in type was interpreted 
as being a convenient computational device with no necessary connection with the real 
world, and hence not necessarily informative ahout the world. 
Any references to words like "observe," "look, .. or "mea~ure" were carefully noted 
and counted. Similarly, any historical assertion ahcmt a scientist "discovering" something 
was recorded. Any conclusions, or rules, or laws were regarded as inductive 
generalizations. 
The lack of any discussion of the meaning or role of theory, or law, as well as of the 
theory-ladenness of observation, was also taken to be a sign of instrumentalism. 
Preface Analysis 
Finally, following Lynch and Strube (1985), the prefaces of all the texthooks were read 
to see if the author(s) claimed to be presenting a particular view of science, or of theory. 
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Table 2/Examples of Text Analysis: Textbook B (Pienaar and Walters 8) 
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Table 3/Summary of Text Analysis: Totals of each book: 
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Results of the Textbook Study 
With the exception of one textbook, namely, The Project Physics Course, all the texts 
examined reveal a predominance of an inductivist-empiricist approach. This is clearly 
illustrated in the bar chart (Figure I). Forty-four percent of the pages sampled reflect a 
repeated assumption on the part of the author(s) that observation is impersonal and objec-
tive, and that it precedes any generalizations. Inductive generalizations, either as laws, 
but more often as the conclusions of practical experiments in the laboratory, occupy 32 
pecent of the sentences sampled. Thirty-four percent of the statements sampled suggest 
that science is a body of proven facts, that is, achieved knowledge. In our opinion, a serious 
omission in most of the texts is any discussion of the limitations of scientific method. Very 
few texts actually make any mention of "observation," "laws," or "theories." 
The bar chart also reveals an emphasis on computative predictions (37 percent) and on 
both nominalistic and operational definitions (22 percent). A mild instrumentalism is im-
plied by this emphasis together with the assumption, noted above, that observation is theory-
free. Also implying a mild instrumentalism is the belief, reflected in 28 percent of the 
pages sampled, that physical science makes great use of mathematical relationships as con-
venient devices for prediction. 
About 45 percent of the sample contained laboratory inquiries. Virtually all of these 
were at Level O (Herron, 1971). 
About 63 percent of the sentences sampled were factual. Questions formed large pro-
portions of some texts (e.g., Duncan, GCSE Physics), but on average. only 9 percent 
of the total comprised questions. 
Examples from the Textbooks 
Some examples and quotations from the various textbooks are now presented, illustrating 
their view of (a) observation, (b) computative prediction, (c) definitions, (d) induction, 
and (e) theories. 
(a) Observation 
Most of the texts assume that observation is objective and completely unaffected by previous 
theoretical presuppositions. Statements suggesting this are: "Because the scientist cannot 
directly observe the atoms ... an atomic model has been devised which explains the dif-
ferent observations" (Book B. p. 229); "You have observed evidence of this" (Book E, 
p. 96); "Human beings find out things by using their senses" (Book J, p. 3). 
The three exceptions, which briefly but clearly discuss the limitations and subjectiveness 
of observation. are the American textbooks (N. 0, and P). The Project Physics Course 
(N) stands out from all the others in that it shows the theory-ladenness of observation by 
a detailed historical treatment of the Aristotelian versus the Galilean view (e.g., p. 43). 
(b) Computati,•e Prediction 
There are naturally many examples of the use of mathematical equations in most of the 
texts. These may (or may not) be used by the pupil in a rote, "plug-in," instrumental 
way, merely "to get the right answer," with little thought of relating it to real life. If 
this is done, the computations are "expected" predictions (that is, not really informative 
about the world). There are many worked examples in the texts (for example, on Ohm's 
Law, Boyle's Law, heat calculations, chemical calculations), as well as large numbers 
of questions at the end of chapters. 
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Calculations using e4uations, like v = f A. R = V /I, may be interpreted as non-causal. 
That is, there is no indication that V ca1ues I. but only that I always accompanies V. 
The focus of interest implied here is the relationship between the variables. This techni-
4ue side-steps problems of reality. 
Inductive prediction is found in several of the texts. This is the notion that on the basis 
of observing regularities of some past events. we can predict the occurrence of a future 
one: "We can therefore predict that fluorine will be even more reactive" (Book B, p. 188). 
( c) Definitiom 
Among the many types of definition, only two wen: systematically sought for in the text-
books: nominalist definitions, in which a name is given to a phenomenon or relationship; 
and operational definitions, which define a concept in terms of the actual operations carried 
out to obtain it. These are sometimes closely connected. For example, "density" is the 
name given to ··mass per unit volume,'' and also the operation of dividing mass by volume. 
Operational definitions are also related to mathematical equations, such as resistance using 
Ohms' Law. 
Here are some nominalist definitions from the textbooks: "Upthrust is the name we 
give ... " (Book M, p. 94); " ... called the critical angle" (Book I, p. 204); and " ... 
are called allotropes" (Book E, p. 316). 
Examples of operational definitions are as follows: " ... Resistance R is defined by 
R = V /I" (Book G, p. 172); "(Refractive Index) ... is defined by the equation ... " 
(Book G, p. 18); and " ... covalent radius, where this radius (r) is half the distance (d) 
between two nuclei ... " (Book D, p. 285). 
Operational definitions define concepts in terms of the procedures required to measure 
them. Operational definitions have the instrumentalist property of avoiding difficult ques-
tions of a metaphysical nature. But operational definitions have a severe weakness: not 
all the conditions can be specified. 
Usually, a definition should be informative about the real world. It asks the question 
"What is it?" of the term on the left side of the definition, and answers it by the defining 
formula on the right. However, according to Popper ( 1983, p. 92), this is not the way 
modern science works. Modem science asks: "What shall we call mass per unit volume?" 
and answers with the name: "Density." It starts with the defining formula, and calls for 
a name for it. Hence in modem science, definitions are merely shorthand symbols, or 
succinct phrases, to make language less cumbersome, rather than ways of providing in-
formation. Now there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this approach. Indeed, elimina-
tion of excess baggage is one of the reasons for the enormous success of science. 
However, the cost of using nominalistic definitions is great, because the tendency to 
give names to complex relationships and phenomena can lead to discussions about the 
meaning of words, rather than the physical phenomena to which the words refer. Also, 
the danger of any definition is that it gives the impression that knowledge is a closed book. 
no longer open to revision. Definitions that seek the essence of things, ultimate truth, are 
wrong. For, of its very nature, truth is always provisional and tentative. 
(d) Induction 
Induction is the process of generalizing from a relatively few instances. It includes draw-
ing conclusions, formulating laws and rules. verification, and the idea that scientific 
knowledge is established by many confirmations. Popper endorsed Hume's criticism of 
induction; namely that by its very nature it goes beyond the facts. It is invalid to assert 
a universal property on the basis of a comparatively few observations. 
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An example of an inductive generalization in the text is: "The wave phenomena we 
observed ... are characteristic of all types" (Book B. p. 19). 
With respect to examples of verification, many of the practical experiments were pro-
vided merely so that the pupil could verify a law or principle. That is, they were of the 
"see-for-yourself' type. for example, Verification of Faraday's Law (Book C, p. 80). 
Various references to scientific laws are mentioned (e.g .. Ohm's Law, Faraday's Law, 
Boyle's Law, Snell's Law. Lenz's Law), but none of the texts discussed the notion that 
lav. ~ are inductive generalizations. 
Examples of the proven knowledge idea are mainly of the name and date type. Science 
is seen as leading cumulatively and linearly to our contemporary store of established 
"unrevisable" knowledge: " ... experimentation established finally that ... " (Book 
A. p. 15); "Soon afterwards Madame Curie discovered radium" (Book I, p. 379). 
The only explicit reference to the term "induction" that could be found in any of the 
texts was in CHEM Study. On page 3, induction is described as an elementary logical 
thought process, and the bounds within which inductive generalizations are valid are given. 
(e) Theories 
Discussion about the role of theory, or the interaction with and priority of theory. in all 
stages of the scientific inquiry process, is most conspicuous by its absence in most of the 
textbooks examined. There is also a lack of any explanation about models and their im-
portance. The exc.eptions are The Project Physics Course and, to a lesser degree, CHEM 
Study and PSSC Physics. 
In reality, scientific theories are arrived at, not by generalizing the sensory data, but 
by modifying already existing theories. Science begins with theories, not observation. 
Popper defends this priority of theory. All we know are our theories. The mind is not 
a tabula rasa, as the empiricists maintain: 
All observation involves interpretation in the light of our theoretical knowledge ... (Popper. 
1983, p. 48) 
Yet, in spite of this, we read statements like these in our textbooks: 
Initially the existence of electrons was determined by experiment ... (Book B, p. 219) 
Explicit mention of theory is made only in the following texts: Book J, p. 3; PSSC Physics; 
CHEM Study; and Harvard Project Physics. 
The relationship portrayed in the texts between theory and the real world is an ambiguous 
one. Most people, as Gardner (1983) states, are naive realists. When we talk about an 
electron. we believe that there is something out there, existing independently of our think-
ing. called an electron. And certainly, school pupils, particularly younger ones, are naive 
realists. No doubt, the authors of these textbooks believe in the independent reality of 
electrons and photons and other observables. In this sense, they too are realists. So when 
they talk about • 'kinetic theory,·· they surely hold that matter really consists of particles 
in constant, random motion. Yet it is possible to read their words in a purely instrumental 
way. Their kinetic theory could refer to reality, but equally it might not. It could be regarded 
as a convenient fiction only. with no sense of commitment to a common-sense reality. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are many references in most of the texts to 
industrial applications of science. For example, on the pages sampled, the uses of 
transformers and electric motors. as well as the industrial preparation of ammonia and 
sulphuric acid, are described. 
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Results of the Preface Analysis 
A reading of the prefaces reveals a general unawareness on the part of the authors of the 
philosophical implications and weaknesses of the instrumentalism present in their texts. 
Those few who do refer to scientific method have a notion of method which is strongly 
criticized by contemporary philosophers of science. 
Book A. Brink and Jones 8: The separation of observation and theory is clearly stated, 
"It is important in the study of Physical Science that concepts and theories be developed 
from actual experimental observation and discovery.'' The authors emphasize understan-
ding phenomena, rather than learning facts. 
Book B. Pienaar, Walters 8: There is no explicit reference to the nature or method of 
science, only that the presentation is pupil-oriented, both as regards text and experiments. 
Book C. Broster and James 8: The authors are convinced that science must be experienced 
to be understood, and the emphasis is therefore on the experiments. Pupils are also en-
couraged to keep a list of definitions. 
Book D. Brink and Jones 9: This preface expresses the same sentiments as in A above. 
Book E. Pienaar, Walters 9: The authors have made this text pupil-oriented. New con-
cepts appearing for the first time are fully explained. Summaries and questions assist pupils. 
Practical experiments are integrated into the text. 
Book F. Broster and James 9: No preface. 
Book G. Duncan: Hints for pupil revision are given. There is no mention of scientific 
method or the philosophical aims of the author. However, immediately following the preface 
is a two-page (mainly photographs) discussion of Physics and Technology. Here we read 
that physicists "find the facts by observation and experiment," and "try to discover the 
laws that summarise (often as mathematical equations) these facts. Sense has then to be 
made of the laws by thinking up and testing theories (thought-models) to explain these 
law<;." 
Book H. Pople and Williams: The authors state that "science is about asking questions." 
Answers are found using experiments or looking up a reference book such as this one. 
"The information that scientists have gained is important." 
Book I. Athenon, Duncan, Mackean: Each chapter contains essential facts, ideas, details 
of experiments, everyday applications, and questions for revision. The authors' primary 
concern has been to provide access to information. 
Book J. Lewis and Waller: The aim of this book is understanding rather than memoriza-
tion of facts. The main concepts are developed through analysis of experimental facts. 
Facts and theory are kept carefully distinct. and presented in a way that reflects the scien-
tific approach, where observation comes first, then inference. This preface clearly reflects 
the philosophical standpoint of the authors, which is inductivist-empiricist. 
Book K. Pople: This book deals with physics and its applications. However, the author 
does not mention his philosophical standpoint. The preface merely discusses the structure 
of the book. 
Book L. Warren: Each new idea is investigated by simple experiments. The emphasis 
is on active involvement and learning from first-hand experience. Summaries identify a 
"body of knowledge" to be learned. 
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Book M. Lamben: The author states that this book is full of questions, which encourage 
hard thought. Summaries are given at the end of chapters. No reference at all is made 
to philosophical standpoint. 
Book N. Harvard Project Physics: The declared three main aims of this course were: to 
design a humanistically oriented physics course; to attract more pupils to physics; and 
to find out more about the factors affecting the learning of science. The focus is on ideas 
that characterize science as a human activity. Hence it is presented in a historical and cultural 
way. 
Book 0. CHEM Study: The emphasis is on experimentation. Principles grow out of obser-
vations. By understanding principle, memorization of facts falls away. Active engage-
ment permits the student to some extent to become a scientist at school. 
Book P. PSSC Physics: This text does not present physics as a body of facts but as a continu-
ing process by which we seek to understand the nature of the physical world. Concepts 
grow through exploration in the laboratory, and analysis in the text. It is humanistically 
oriented. How we grasp and measure physical quantities, and how instruments are exten-
sions of our senses, is explained. Direct experience is provided, and imagination en-
couraged. The role and development of theory and models are explored. In kinematics, 
pupils learn to predict. 
Apart from the last three texts listed above, all the others reflect a strong separation be-
tween observation and theory. Their implicit approach is empiricist-inductivist. Even PSSC 
Physics, while acknowledging the limitations of scientific procedures and the importance 
of creativity, follows an inductivist line. It does not mention that observation is theory-laden. 
The prefaces generally reveal a strong commitment to traditional Baconian scientific 
method. Since this inductivist-empiricist approach has serious inherent philosophical 
weaknesses, we feel strongly that a brief discussion of its educational implications should 
be included in every preface. 
General Discussion and Conclusion 
The dominant image of science portrayed in all the British and South African textbooks 
examined is strongly inductivist-empiricist. 
First, in these books, there is a sharp distinction between observation and theory. This 
is the chief characteristic of a positivistic approach. and the main attribute of inductivism, 
empiricism. and instrurnentalism. 
Second. our te~ts to detect instrumentalism in these texthoob reveal a mild instrumen-
talism. There is ample evidence that calculations are of the plug-in. recipe-like type, leading 
deductively to a solution that is isolated from the real world. These are mere computative 
devices for prediction and control, nothing but "puzzle-solving," in a way. only games. 
Third. analysis of definitions in these textbooks reveals the existence of a number of 
operational and nominalistic definitions, which indicate an instrumental approach. 
Our conclusion is that there are clear signs of a mild but widespread instrumentalism 
in the selected British and South African high school physical science textbooks. The British 
textbooks contain a stronger emphasis on an instrumentalist anitude than the South African 
texts. The three American textbooks examined, while not nearly as instrumentalist as the 
British and South African text hooks, nevertheless do show signs of it. 
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From the kind of textbook presentation revealed in this study, the pupil could perhaps 
perceive science as a method for verifying facts already known. He might obtain a view 
of observation as being completely objective. And he could possibly regard science as 
a convenient tool for predicting and calculating, in a rote fashion, with little relevance 
to real life. It is difficult to see how any textbook can be written in any but an inductivist-
empiricist way. The very aim of a textbook is to be a condensation of the current state 
of science. It is a reference book, and so must contain a large proportion of facts. Kuhn 
(l 970, p. 188) believes that one of the primary tasks of textbooks is to introduce the future 
scientist into the scientific community by means of exemplars (typical problems and solu-
tions of the scientific community). The student needs to act on such problems in order 
to get a feel for science. 
Similarly, Ravetz acknowledges that, while a textbook is a caricature of real science, 
it is necessary for standardization to occur. Ravetz says that 
it is quite necessary, if the fact is to be useful to those who lack the time, skill or inclination 
to master the elaborate theoretical context. ... (1971, p. 200) 
Something is lost in this process. School science textbooks, in particular, are "standardiza-
tions of standardizations,'· according to Ravetz. Vulgarization of science can easily occur 
in schools, where many teachers are not science specialists and lack sufficient training 
in physics and chemistry. 
These inherent limitations of the schoolteaching situation, along with its function of imparting 
basic craft skills rather than "understanding" must be recognised if there is to be any funda-
mental improvement in its quality. (Ravetz, 1971, p. 207) 
To write a good textbook requires a special skill. Ravetz makes a plea for the inclusion 
of historical case studies in textbooks. However, cost factors unfortunately impose a severe 
limitation on this. 
In the end it seems that textbooks cannot be otherwise than largely inductivist, empiricist, 
and instrumentalist. So the responsibility rests squarely on the teacher to counter-act the 
philosophical disadvantages of these approaches. Hence the teacher must be aware of the 
dangers involved. For this reason, we believe that all authors should, at the very least, 
provide some guidance in their preface. This is often especially desirable in Third World 
countries where teachers lack the required training in science. We recommend that all 
physical science textbooks should include in their preface a short summary of the follow-
ing discussion. 
The Unsoundness of /nstrumentalism 
Popper opposes instrumental ism on the grounds that observation is theory-laden. Modern 
science tends to be phenomenalist, but Popper ( I 956, p. 383) maintains that it is silly to 
~ay that my direct perception of. say, a piano. is valid, whereas my knowledge of its under-
lying molecular structure is a mere fiction. For surely even my direct observation is steeped 
in theory. as are my mental constructs of the structure. Both appearance and underlying 
form are theoretical interpretations. They differ only in the degree of conjecture. 
We should consider three reasons why instrumentalism should be avoided in science 
education. First. it leads to idealism. It makes a clear distinction between appearances 
and reality, and maintains that we can never have knowledge of things-in-themselves. Such 
an attitude leads to scepticism. If reality is reduced to action, and action is reduced to 
what takes place in us, our experience is closed to the transcendental. Berkeley objected 
to this viewpoint. In order to undercut scepticism, Berkeley rejected one of the most funda-
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mental tenets of the common-sense view of the world, namely. that an external reality 
exists apart from any consciousness of it. Objects are nothing more than ideas in our minds. 
All we ever perceive are our ideas. Thus Berkeley adopts idealism in order to escape from 
scepticism. 
Second, positivism is instrumentalist. Logical positivists hold that unless a statement 
can be verified, it is meaningless. This view, of course, means that any statement made 
in morality. religion. philosophy, politics, or art is meaningless. The whole notion of God 
is seriously undermined. Popper regarded this view as nonsense. for truth is much wider 
than science. 
Third, the phenomenalism of instrumentalism commits us to nominalism. For if we do 
not know things-in-themselves, our concepts of things are only names. Knowledge becomes 
instrumental instead of physically real. Further, because names are arbitrary, instrumen-
talism tends to become relativist and subjective. 
Thus instrumentalism, in its pure form, tends to lead to idealism, agnosticism, and 
relativism. Our high school physical science textbooks contain a mild form of instrumen-
tal ism. We, as science educators, should be aware of its philosophical implications. 
But instrumentalism rears its head in other books as well, namely, popular science paper-
backs (Capra, 1975; Zukav, 1979) about contemporary particle physics, enjoyed by many 
pupils. These books portray an idealist-instrumentalist approach. They relate many of the 
paradoxes of particle physics to Eastern thinking. They make statements, such as "nothing 
is real unless it is observed" (Gribbin, 1984), and that the Aspect experiments done in 
Paris in 1982 prove that there is no underlying reality to the world. 
The /nstrumenralism of Computer Games 
Pirsig (1974, p. 24) divides people into two classes: those who are against science and 
technology; and those who enjoy it. Yet, he says, there is a large third group consisting 
of technologists, who use science but are not committed to it. They are uninvolved. They 
behave like spectators. 
A similar phenomenon perhaps occurs in the field of computers and particularly com-
puter games. How easily youngsters become addicted to computer games! They seem to 
be thoroughly involved. But are they really? Surely those asteroids tumbling across their 
monitor screens. and laser beams flashing their destructive paths, are mere simulations, 
flickering images obediently following the programmed co-ordinates? The eye predicts, 
the hand presses a button, a high-speed digital calculation occurs, and the asteroid is 
destroyed in a gigantic explosion. But the pieces of shrapnel whizzing past are not real. 
It is only a game. And it is passive, and the player essentially uninvolved. 
We contend that computer games are prime examples of the instrumentalist attitude. 
This struck us one evening in 1987 when we were using a BASIC program we had written 
to predict the position of Halley's Comet on any given night. It was only a calculus, like 
Ptolemy's, for prediction. Data and images could be manipulated in a purely geometric 
way. with little or no reference to physical reality. The computer was isolated in time 
and space from everything else in the universe. It had no relationship with the user, or 
the Cosmos. except in a superficial. instrumental way. It was not interested in the real 
physical gravitational forces pulling on real masses. It merely computed the mathematical 
models of Newton's Laws, and came up with the right answer. It was a spectator, and 
it made the user a passive spectator as well. And therein lay its dar,ger. 
Powers (I 982) encourages us to take a realist stand in science. for we can easily be 
deceived hy the escapism and superficiality of the instrumentalist approach. Realism 
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requires us to take very seriously the question of the consistency of the assumptions our theories 
make. A recipe-book instrumentalism carries with it no such injunction. Phenomenalism (or 
submicroscopic phenomenalism) provides a way of brushing problems of intelligibility aside, 
but if the implication is that we are simply investigating experimental effects W!! produce in 
our apparatus and that these can tell us nothing about "what is there," then the whole enter-
prise may seem like a costly hoax we have played on ourselves; and it will be hard to believe 
a positivist who claims that this makes no difference. When experimentalists "bombard" 
protons with electrons they have to "believe" in both their missiles and their targets; though 
it seems "hard-headed," phenomenalism is a theory for spectators rather than actors. (Powers, 
1982. p. 164) 
The deliberate lack of commitment to a serious realism suggests that instrumentalists are 
playing games. For Berne, 
a game is an ongoing series of complementary ulterior transactions progressing to a well-
defined, predictable outcome. (1964, p. 44) 
Games are substitutes for real living. They are governed by rules, and involve activity 
anci fantasy. Games are directed toward the manipulation of reality, and are evaluated 
by their effectiveness or pay-off. Games may not be intended to convey information, but 
merely to follow a predetennined course to an expected conclusion. Games are basically 
dishonest, for they tend to be cosmetic and superficial, shelving the important issues of 
life. They can be manoevres to attain pragmatic, utilitarian goals. 
The parallel of games with instrumentalism is more than mere coincidence. For, like 
games, instrumentalism is also basically dishonest, as Koestler (1959, p. 65) says, for 
this reason: it deliberately ignores whole areas of non-empirical reality. It is a pretence. 
/nstrumentalism and Pragmatism 
Commenting on the recent cut-backs in the American space-research program, Lago (1983) 
observes that contemporary Western society's emphasis on practicality and financial suc-
cess has led to utilitarian values. Nothing is worth doing unless it is useful. Since a space-
probe to Neptune has no obvious usefulness, the American exploratory space program 
will probably languish. 
Practicality has created America's greatness, but we have paid a dear price for it - and in 
the space age, that price is paralysis. (Lago, 1983, p. 28) 
There are unquestionably certain human enterprises which are justifiable in themselves, 
without having to be obviously useful. But the instrumentalist attitude tends to blind us 
to this, and encourages the passivity syndrome which permeates so much of modem society. 
Commenting on Dewey's instrumentalism, Bertrand Russell says, "In all this I feel a 
grave danger, the danger of what might be called cosmic impiety" (1979, p. 782). For 
Russell, the instrumentalist view of truth about the world lacks the necessary element of 
humility. It is a step 
on the road towards a certain kind of madness .... I am persuaded that this intoxication 
is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy which, however unintentionally, 
contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster. (Russell, 1979, p. 782) 
lnstrumentalism and Science Education 
As science educators, we should not allow our pupils to leave school as passive spec-
tators, able only to turn switches, adjust voltage levels, check instruments. Rather, they 
must learn to become involved and care about what they do. They should be full-blooded 
realists, joining in the fruitful, productive quest for knowledge. They must reject sterile. 
PTOLEMY REVIVED'' 53 
pa~sive, instrumentalist spectatorship and gamesmanship. We believe, with Pirsig, that 
it is somewhere in this strange separation of realist from instrumentalist, of what man 
is from what man does. that we may have a clue as to what has gone wrong in this 20th 
century. 
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THIS IS a very unusual book. Halton C. Arp, known worldwide as Chip, is 
a distinguished observational astronomer. 
In the first part of his career he worked 
on various aspects of stellar evolution -
his Ph.D. thesis at Mount Wilson on the 
frequency of novae in the Andromeda 
galaxy was a fundamental contribution. In 
his early years at Mount Wilson and 
Palomar he was considered one of the 
leading young observers. If we use an 
equivalent to the ladder system of the 
Association of Tennis Professionals, Arp 
would have ranked among the first 20 
The Discovery of Quasars 
Around 1950 the first accurate posi-
tions of radio sources were measured, 
and identifications with optical objects 
became possible. The optical counter-
parts turned out to be supernova 
remnants in our galaxy, or distant galax-
ies. However, in 1960 Allan Sandage 
(Mount Wilson and Palomar Observato-
ries) and Tom Matthews (Caltech) an-
nounced the discovery of a faint, starlike 
object associated with the radio source 
3C 48. Sandage described the first opti-
cal observations at the December, 1960, 
meeting of the American Astronomical 
Society (S& T: March, 1961, page 148). 
The spectrum could not be understood. 
Further radio identifications of star-
like objects were made by Sandage and 
others. In 1962 in Australia, Cyril Haz-
ard and colleagues M. B. Mackey and A. 
J. Shimmins, using the method of lunar 
occultations, identified the radio source 
3C 273 with a much brighter starlike 
object. 
It was early in 1963 - 25 years ago -
when Caltech's Maarten Schmidt real-
ized that the emission lines in his optical 
spectrum of 3C 273 coincided with the 
Balmer lines of hydrogen shifted toward 
the red by an astonishing 16 percent of 
their laboratory wavelengths. Interpret-
ing this unprecedentedly large redshift as 
due to the Doppler effect, Schmidt de-
duced that the "radio star" was no star 
at all, but an extragalactic object per-
haps one billion light-years away. For 
3C 273 to shine with its observed bright-
ness, it must be 100 times more lumi-
nous than any nearby spiral galaxy, 
making it by far the intrinsically bright-
est object known at that time. 
Thus, it is to Hazard, Matthews, and 
other radio astronomers who determined 
positions, and to Sandage and Schmidt, 
that we owe the discovery of quasars. 
Following these first discoveries, other 
quasars were identified, and a new sub-
specialty arose within astrophysics as 
astronomers scrambled to explain the 
objects' unusual characteristics. Today, 
most researchers think of quasars as the 
extremely luminous nuclei of distant gal-
axies, systems in many ways like other 
"active" galaxies but far more extreme 
in intensity, perhaps due to the action of 
a supermassive black hole voraciously 
feeding on stars. 
Yet some astronomers have steadfastly 
refused to accept the fantastic claims 
being made for quasars. They have pre-
sented evidence showing, among other 
things, that some quasars are physically 
associated with galaxies having vastly 
different redshifts, implying that redshift 
does not correlate with distance for all 
types of extragalactic objects. Because it 
would require the abandonment of many 
cherished notions at the heart of modern 
cosmology, this suggestion has sparked 
one of the most acrimonious debates in 
the history of science. 
The central figure in this controversy 
is Halton C. Arp, who has made the 
largest contribution to the evidence for 
galaxy-quasar associations. Arp has just 
published his retrospective account, so 
we devote this month's Books and the 
Sky to the ongoing battle between those 
defending orthodoxy and those favoring 
the unconventional approach. Geoffrey 
Burbidge, a principal in the debate, 
reviews Arp's book and offers some 
personal reflections on the evidence for 
noncosmological redshifts. And, on page 
42, Arp himself presents the case that 
high redshifts do not necessarily mean 
large distances. 
THE EDITORS 
A diffuse, faintly luminous connection ex-
tends from the galaxy NGC 5296 to the 
large spiral NGC 5297, as well as in the 
opposite direction to a high-redshift quasar 
(arrowed). A compact galaxy just below, 
and silhouetted against, NGC 5296 must be 
spatially in front of it. Yet this tiny object's 
redshift is 23,000 kilometers per second 
higher than the larger galaxy's. That was 
·the first extended object (a galaxy rather 
than a point-source quasar) Halton Arp 
and Jack Sulentic found having an excess, 
or nonvelocity, redshift. Palomar 200-inch 
telescope photograph. 
observational optical astronomers in the 
world. 
In professional tennis your ranking de-
pends on wins and losses, on whom you 
beat, and on how much money you win. 
Older players invariably end up losers! In 
professional astronomy it's very different. 
There is no unambiguous way to win or 
Jose. Most people are very bright. But 
advancement depends on judgment by 
your peers. Thus the important factors for 
a successful career are your sponsors 
(where and with whom did you get your 
Ph.D.); field of research (popular or un-
popular); and diplomatic skills (always 
speak quietly with great conviction, and, 
when in doubt, agree with the wisest 
person present, who by definition must 
come from one of very few institutions). 
Look upon new ideas with great disap-
proval and never discover a phenomenon 
for which no explanation exists, and cer-
tainly not one for which an explanation 
within the framework of known physics 
does not appear to be possible. 
As you get older your ranking will 
improve. It helps, of course, if you per-
form creative work, but regular use of a 
large telescope may suffice instead. All of 
this to investigate the universe, which is so 
beautiful and so unimaginable that in 
10,000 years we will only have scratched 
the surface of understanding! 
Chip Arp started with impeccable cre-
dentials. Educated at Harvard and Cal-
tech, after a short spell at Indiana he was 
appointed to a staff position at the Mount 
Wilson and Palomar Observatories, where 
he remained for 29 years. A little more 
than 20 years ago Arp began to devote all 
his time to extragalactic astronomy. At 
first he compiled the marvelous Atlas of 
Peculiar Galaxies. Then he started to find 
what he believed were physical associa-
tions between some of these galaxies and 
previously identified powerful radio 
sources. Soon he found many cases of 
apparent associations between galaxies 
and quasi-stellar objects, or quasars. 
All of this would have been completely 
acceptable if the associated objects had 
the same redshifts, but they did not. Yet 
Arp believed in the reality of the associa-
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In the last few years there has been a 
plethora of meetings on cosmology. 
Throughout all of them the same themes 
are reiterated again and again. It is taken 
for granted that we live in an expanding 
universe that started with a hot Big 
Bang; that in its first moments the 
universe swelled enormously in a so-
called inflationary phase; that the forma-
tion of large-scale structure resulted 
from "quantum fluctuations"; that gal-
axies formed from regions of higher-
than-average matter density as late as 
redshifts of 3 to 10; and that most of the 
mass of the universe is in the form of 
(currently popular) cold dark matter. In 
addition, cosmologists argue that counts 
of quasars and radio sources tell us that 
there has been complicated evolution in 
luminosity, number density, or both as a 
function of redshift - that is, of time. 
Is any of this true? Obviously, most 
astronomers and physicists believe that it 
is. The hard observational evidence for 
this scenario rests principally on two 
measurements: the spectrum of the cos-
mic microwave background radiation, 
predicted by George Gamow and his 
colleagues to have a blackbody form, 
and the redshift-distance, or Hubble, 
relation for galaxies. The match between 
the observed amounts of deuterium, he-
lium, and one of the isotopes of lithium 
and the amounts predicted by theories of 
Big-Bang nucleosynthesis often is cited 
as a third powerful observational argu-
ment for this cosmological model. 
This evidence taken as a whole is 
fairly convincing, but it is not as "hard" 
as is sometimes claimed. The microwave 
background shows significant departures 
from the blackbody form, and the under-
lying assumption of the Hubble relation 
- that the redshifts are Doppler shifts 
and therefore indicative of high reces-
sion velocities - remains to be proved. 
The remainder of this scenario is even 
more dubious, particularly the belief in 
inflation and the existence of cold dark 
matter. There can never be an observa-
tional test of inflation, and there is at 
present no direct evidence for cold dark 
matter. And, of course, the need for a 
complex evolutionary history for quasars 
and radio sources depends completely on 
the belief that the observed redshifts 
measure distance (see the discussion by 
Arp on page 42). 
While so much attention is now being 
paid by observers and theoreticians alike 
to this current view of cosmology, one 
of the most fundamental issues - the 
nature of the redshifts of extragalactic 
objects - is almost ignored. 
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Anatomy of a Controversy 
If a large part of the redshifts of 
galaxies and quasars is not due to the 
expansion of the universe, this will have 
major repercussions on the popular cos-
mology just outlined. Moreover, it raises 
another issue. If some part of the 
redshifts is not due to expansion, what is 
it due to? 
Both the book by Arp and his article 
here are concerned with this problem. 
Evidence for noncosmological redshifts 
comes from three directions: 
• Patterns in the values of the ob-
served redshifts that cannot be under-
stood in terms of the standard cosmolo-
gies. 
• Physical associations between pairs 
or small groups of objects with very 
different redshifts. 
• Statistical evidence suggesting that 
some classes of objects are physically 
associated with other classes generally 
having very different redshifts. 
What follows is a brief elaboration. In 
the early 1970's William Tifft found that 
the differences between the redshifts of 
pairs of galaxies in clusters were distrib-
uted not randomly, but periodically, 
with a period near 72 kilometers per 
second. This phenomenon, known as 
redshift quantization, has now been ex-
tended to double galaxies and compact 
groups (see last January's issue, page 
19). Also, since 1967 some astronomers 
have concluded that there are regularities 
in the emission-line spectra of quasars. 
By the late 1970's K. G. Karlsson and 
others demonstrated that quasar red-
shifts show periodic peaks on a loga-
rithmic scale, clustering around values of 
0.30, 0.60, 0.96, 1.41, and 1.96. 
Modern data on physical associations 
- luminous bridges - between objects 
with different redshifts comes almost 
completely from Chip Arp. His pictures 
of the galaxy NGC 7603 and its compan-
ion, and NGC 4319 and the low-redshift 
quasar Markarian 205 (pictured on the 
front cover), are well known. While such 
cases are rare, it has always seemed to 
me that they are overwhelming. 
Statistical evidence for the association 
of bright galaxies and quasars has also 
been growing for many years. Again, in 
my view, it is very strong and shows that 
there are many quasars and at least some 
peculiar galaxies with noncosmological 
redshifts. 
The community of astronomers is to-
tally polarized by this argument. Most 
do not want to hear about it. The strong 
disbelievers hold that those who propose 
or believe in this hypothesis are variously 
naive, mistaken, ignorant of how to do 
statistics, overly zealous, or worse. They 
claim that Tifft's results are not repro-
ducible, that we have no theory to 
explain these phenomena, that we should 
recant, and that in fact the redshift 
controversy is over; that is, the status 
quo has been maintained. This last state-
ment is often made in meetings to which 
the proponents of unorthodoxy are 
either not invited, or not allowed to 
speak. 
What does one make of this impasse 
20 years after the proposal was first put 
forward? 
_ ,Those in the mainstream do have 
some good scientific arguments. For ex-
ample, the well-behaved Hubble relation 
for galaxies in clusters is by itself evi-
dence that for most galaxies the bulk of 
the redshift is indeed cosmological in 
origin. But then we have Tifft's data on 
galaxies, which appears correct, baffles 
us all, and continues to grow stronger 
(see the November issue, page 454). 
Again, for the orthodox, it appears 
that many low-redshift quasars are sur-
rounded by "fuzz," perhaps the outer 
parts of quasi-normal galaxies. This evi-
dence, which is still weak, together with 
the statistical evidence that in some 
samples low-redshift quasars have com-
panion galaxies with similar redshifts, 
also favors the cosmological-redshift hy-
pothesis. 
At the same time, these observations 
do not negate the strong evidence for the 
existence of noncosmological redshifts. 
To do so we would have to conclude 
that all of the configurations involving 
objects with very different redshifts are 
accidental, and this is too much to 
expect. In my view both effects must 
coexist, but how? 
Are there theories that can begin to 
explain what we see? Yes. William C. 
Saslaw has described a slingshot mecha-
nism that might enable us to understand 
how discrete objects like quasars can be 
ejected from the nuclei of galaxies at 
high speed. Fred Hoyle and Jayant Nar-
likar have proposed unorthodox cos-
mologies that might, with some further 
work, explain noncosmological redshifts. 
But these theories are still in very rudi-
mentary states. 
For some, astronomy faces new and 
unusual phenomena that call for new 
ideas. For others, these phenomena are 
best swept under the rug. I, for one, feel 
obliged to leave open the possibility that 
radical revisions in our current views 
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Three quasars (arrowed) apparently sit in the outer arms of the barred spiral galaxy 
NGC 1073. The chance of finding three high-redshift objects so close to a low-redshift 
galaxy are about 1 in 50,000, suggesting that the quasars and galaxy are physically 
associated. Quasars 2 and 3 are separated by about 1.5 arc minutes. Allan Sandage's 
photograph was taken with the Palomar 200-inch telescope. 
his papers were published. Others were 
finding similar results, and soon the terms 
"nonvelocity redshifts" (those not associ-
ated with the expansion of the universe) 
and "local" (as distinct from distant, or 
"cosmological") quasars entered the litera-
ture. Arp's ranking in the "Association of 
Astronomy Professionals" plunged from 
within the first 20 to below 200. As he 
continued to claim that not all galaxy 
redshifts were due to the expansion of the 
universe, his ranking dropped further. 
About four years ago came the final 
blow: his whole field of research was 
deemed unacceptable by the telescope-
allocation committee in Pasadena. Both 
directors (of Mount Wilson and Las Cam-
panas, and Palomar, observatories)· en-
dorsed the censure. Since Arp refused to 
work in a more conventional field, he was 
given no more telescope time. After abor-
tive appeals all the way up to the trustees 
of the Carnegie Institution, he took early 
retirement and moved to West Germany. 
Earlier, Fritz Zwicky had also been fre-
quently criticized by his colleagues in 
Pasadena (by coincidence?). Zwicky re-
mained a staff member at Mount Wilson 
and Palomar until he retired, but much of 
his work continued to be ignored or 
derided until some years after his death. 
Quasars, Redshifts, and Controversies 
contains Arp's account of his own work 
and that of others leading, in his mind, to 
the conclusion that redshifts are not al-
ways correlated with distances. It also 
contains his personal view of the way he 
has been treated. When he is critical of 
others, he omits their names. Zwicky was 
more blunt in his Morphological Astron-
omy. Anyway, for those who have lived 
through this episode there are no secrets. 
Before going on to discuss the subject 
matter, let me explain my own position. 
After all, the community sees me as a 
friend and strong supporter of Arp, and it 
will be argued that this colors my attitude. 
In 1966, at about the time that Arp began 
his fateful observational program, Fred 
Hoyle and I were trying to make models 
of quasars that would preserve the general 
belief that they lay at cosmological dis-
tances yet allow us to understand the 
rapid brightness variability. In the course 
of this work we considered the possi-
bility that quasars are local, and in our 
paper we examined the pros and cons 
of both hypotheses but tried to sit on the 
fence. 
For the next decade I still remained 
open-minded despite the fact that in the 
early 1970's a group at the University of 
California, San Diego, had produced 
some very strong statistical evidence for 
local quasars. In addition to this I had 
concluded that there were peaks and perio-
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dicities in the redshift distribution that are 
very hard to explain in a conventional 
picture. Moreover, by the end of the 
decade, despite all of the difficulties, I 
was convinced that the evidence for local 
quasars was too great for it all to be 
wrong. (You can tolerate only so many 
accidents, and if the noncosmological hy-
pothesis is wrong, every juxtaposition of 
objects with different redshifts must be 
accidental.) At the same time, evidence 
that some quasars have cosmological 
redshifts is compelling. So I am left 
believing in the radical hypothesis while 
trying to accommodate some part of the 
conventional view. 
The other part of this learning process 
has been unpleasant, probably because I 
have a strong instinct for fair play. It may 
be argued that this is no substitute for 
good judgment. But neither are the tactics 
that have been used by those who want to 
maintain the status quo. These include 
interminable refereeing, blackballing of 
speakers at meetings, distortion and mis-
quotation of the written word, rewriting 
of history, and, worst of all, the denial of 
telescope time to those who are investigat-
ing what some believe are the wrong 
things. Thus, for both scientific and socio-
logical reasons, I am sympathetic to Arp. 
The book is well worth reading, though 
I believe that a much stronger case could 
have been made for the major scientific 
thesis. But this volume is pure Chip Arp, 
warts and all. He gives a blow-by-blow 
description of discovery, data and statisti-
cal analysis, refereeing, publication, edito-
rial interference, and more. 
In my view the best evidence for the 
existence of noncosmological redshifts is 
the following: the three quasars within 2 
arc minutes of the center of NGC 1073, 
each having a redshift at a peak in the 
distribution found earlier; the low-redshift 
quasar Markarian 205 joined to NGC 
4319; the pair of galaxies NGC 7603 and 
its companion, which are connected by a 
The Crucial Assumption about Redshifts 
Almost all of extragalactic astronomy 
rests on the assumption that large 
redshifts always measure large distances. 
Most astronomers believe that the only 
possible cause of large redshift is the 
expansion of a universe in which velocity 
increases with distance. 
What is the evidence to support this 
assumption? Does the apparent bright-
ness decrease with higher redshift in the 
way one would expect if the distance is 
increasing? Only for certain extragalactic 
objects. Many others violate such a 
Hubble relation. And it is just these 
latter kinds of objects for which all 
possible tests yield distances that are 
much smaller than those derived from 
their redshifts. 
The starlike objects called quasars 
have the highest redshifts, the most 
extreme implying recession velocities of 
90 percent the speed of light. Strangely, 
the latter tend to have brighter apparent 
magnitudes - to exhibit a "backward-
running Hubble relation." Truthfully, 
we must admit there is no actual evi-
dence for these objects having distances 
that are measured by their redshifts. 
For more than 20 years a number of 
us have been advancing evidence that 
quasars fall more closely around bright 
(low-redshift) galaxies than expected by 
chance. Opponents of this conclusion 
have tested the association of quasars 
with fainter, more distant galaxies, and 
reported lesser degrees of correlation, 
which they maintain disproves the asso-
ciation. But all the serious tests with 
bright quasars and bright, nearby galax-
ies have given proofs of association. 
Recently, for example, bright quasars 
were shown to be IO times more abun-
dant than normal around the Sculptor 
group galaxies, our Local Group's near-
est neighbors. Even more recently, ser-
endipitously discovered X-ray quasars 
were tested. It turned out that the 
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redshifts of those around galaxies were 
significantly different than those in the 
general field. This last result will lead 
astronomers to accept higher densities of 
quasars around low-redshift galaxies, in 
my opinion not because the evidence is 
any more overwhelming than it has been 
for decades, but because theorists can 
now interpret the excess as due to gravita-
tionally lensed background quasars. (I 
am willing to argue later whether hypo-
thetical lensing bodies exist out at 2 to 3 
diameters from galaxies.) 
There have always been examples of 
high-redshift quasars actually connected 
to or interacting with low-redshift galax-
ies. Consider the best-known case. After 
a decade of resistance, many astrono-
mers now admit that there is a luminous 
filament, or bridge, extending from the 
quasar Markarian 205 back toward the 
nucleus of the galaxy NGC 4319 (front 
cover of this magazine). 
Is Markarian 205 a background ob-
ject? If so, then why do filaments extend 
in opposite directions from the nucleus 
of the galaxy toward it and toward an 
ultraviolet-bright knot about the same 
distance on the other side? Why are 
there radio lobes ejected from the gal-
axy, an absence of hydrogen gas, ostensi-
bly shock-excited nitrogen emission, and 
expansion velocities around the ultravio-
let knot up to 1,000 kilometers per 
second? And why are the spiral arms 
breaking off at the roots in this galaxy? 
But the redshift crisis is more serious 
than just the situation with quasars. 
There are now many dozens of galaxies 
with widely different redshifts observed 
to be physically interacting. Therefore 
the conventional theory that objects with 
different redshifts must be at different 
distances is contradicted not in just one 
case (which, of course, is all it takes) but 
in many mutually supporting cases rang-
ing from quasars to galaxies. 
If galaxies can have nonvelocity 
redshifts, extragalactic astronomy is in 
deep trouble. They do. In the Local 
Group and MS I group together, 21 out 
of 21 major companions have higher 
redshifts than the dominant Sb spiral 
galaxy. Group after group of galaxies 
shows the more open-armed Sc spirals to 
have systematically higher redshifts than 
the Sb's. 
The Sc l's, supposedly the most lumi-
nous spirals, show the most shocking 
redshift excesses. In the Virgo cluster the 
four Sc l's have 900 kilometers per 
second greater redshift than the average 
material in the cluster. At their supposed 
redshift distances some Sc l's have 
diameters enormously larger than the 
largest galaxies of which we have any 
reliable knowledge. They could, for ex-
ample, swallow the whole Andromeda 
galaxy, M3 I, out to M33 in Triangulum. 
Supernovae would be popping off in 
such systems about once a month! 
Another astonishing result of placing 
quasars and active galaxies at the dis-
tances implied by their redshifts is that 
some then have internal expansion veloci-
ties of up to 30 times the speed of light, 
making them "superluminal." Accepting 
the evidence that they are closer makes it 
unnecessary to hypothesize complicated 
and implausible mass ejections at 99 
percent the speed of light aimed almost 
exactly at the observer. 
Most of the absurd consequences that 
result from the conventional tenet about 
redshifts and distances are violently con-
tradicted by observations. When will 
astronomers reexamine the single, frail 
assumption on which so much of mod-
ern astronomy and cosmology depends? 
HALTON ARP 
Max Planck Institute 
for Physics and Astrophysics 
Garching, West Germany 
luminous bridge but have very different 
redshifts; and the statistical evidence relat-
ing many quasars to bright - not faint -
galaxies. Each of these results is fully 
described, as are the phenomenon of 
quantized galaxy redshifts found by Wil-
liam G. Tifft and the periodicities of 
quasar redshifts (see the box on page 40). 
What is, in my view, some of the weakest 
evidence - showing that some compara-
tively nearby galaxies have noncosmologi-
cal redshifts - is also documented. 
One of the most fascinating chapters 
describes the idea that the alignments of 
objects with different redshifts are not 
accidental, but real, implying that galaxies 
can eject objects, up to and including 
other galaxies. This is Viktor A. Am-
bartsumian's old idea, and it might just be 
correct. 
In his next-to-last chapter Arp gives a 
painfully honest account of the way he 
was barred from the telescopes. He writes, 
"The six-person telescope allocation com-
mittee . . . sent me an unsigned Jetter 
stating that my research was judged to be 
without value and that they intended to 
refuse allocation of further observing 
time." 
I remember very well when Arp called 
and told me this. At the time I was 
director of Kitt Peak National Observa-
tory. I told him that in my experience 
telescope-allocation committees were only 
advisory to directors, and I could not 
imagine the directors in Pasadena accept-
ing such biased advice. But, as I noted 
earlier, they did, and Arp's research ca-
reer in the United States abruptly ended. 
No responsible scientist I know, including 
many astronomers who are strongly op-
posed to Arp's thesis and many scientists 
outside the field, believes that justice was 
served. 
How will this episode be seen 50 years 
from now? Everything depends, of 
course, on how far astronomy has ad-
vanced. If, as I suspect, the "Arp effect" 
is only the tip of the iceberg, then it will 
look very similar to the case of Alfred 
Wegener and the theory of continental 
drift. If not, then all that will be remem-
bered and still used will be the atlases Arp 
has provided to the community. Those 
alone an: no small legacy. 
Quasars, Redshifts, and Controversies 
recounts a great deal of interesting sci-
ence. It also gives one side of a very 
important argument. It is not a textbook 
and unfortunately contains quite a num-
ber of typographical errors. But some of 
its material could be used for lectures to 
graduate students. 
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